Opinion of the Court. court. The appeal was disposed of in March, 1880, and a transcript of the order reversing and remanding the cause was filed in the circuit court of Cook county, December 8, 1880, but no formal order reinstating the case upon the docket was entered by the court upon the filing of such transcript, as is evidently contemplated by the 84th section of the Practice act. It appears, however, after the filing of the transcript,to-wit, on the 22d of December, 1880,-appellees served the appellant with notice of an application for leave to amend the intervening petition; that the same was subsequently amended, and after such amendment appellant appeared and pleaded to the same, and upon the issues being made up, there was a rehearing of the cause upon the pleadings and proofs, and a decree rendered therein upon the merits, which has been affirmed by the Appellate Court, and the appellant now makes the point he was not personally notified of the filing of the transcript of the remanding order, as provided by the section of the Practice act above cited; and this is the only question presented by the record which we deem of sufficient importance to notice, and even as to this there can be little, if any, room to doubt. It is very clear that by the 84th section of the Practice act, if either party desires to prosecute a case further, where there has been a reversal and remanding order by an appellate tribunal, he must file a transcript of the reversal and remanding order in the trial court within two years from the date of such remanding order, and if this is not done, the cause will be deemed abandoned. By the filing of the transcript in the trial court that court again obtains jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. But this is not sufficient, of itself, to authorize the court to proceed. Before any steps can be taken in the cause, the court must also obtain jurisdiction over the person of the adverse party, and this, in the absence of a voluntary appearance, can only be done by giving the notice required by the section of the statute above mentioned. Opinion of the Court. It is hardly necessary to add, unless the court has jurisdiction both of the person and subject matter of the suit, its proceedings will be coram non judice,-or, in other words, void. So it would have been in this case if appellant had paid no attention to the proceedings in the circuit court after the filing of the remanding order. In that event such proceedings, assuming no notice was given, would have been wholly inoperative and void as to him. But he did not see proper to adopt this course. On the contrary, he appeared and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, which subserved every purpose of notice, and it is now, as in any other case where a party voluntarily appears, too late to object to the want of service. Nor can the appellant be heard to say, as he does, that in appearing in the case after it was remanded, in the manner we have seen, he supposed he was appearing to a new suit. One who, in the absence of fraud or imposition, by a voluntary appearance makes himself a party to a cause, is conclusively presumed to have notice of everything that appears of record in such suit, and it is clear a mere inspection of the record in this case would have fully apprised appellant of the fact that the proceedings, after the filing of the remanding order, were but a continuation of the original suit. There is nothing in Haywood v. Collins, 60 Ill. 340, that conflicts with the views here presented. No reason is perceived why the decree in the case should be disturbed, and we are of opinion the Appellate Court properly affirmed it. Judgment affirmed. Syllabus. Briefs of Counsel. THE CHICAGO AND EVANSTON RAILROAD COMPANY v. AUGUST DRESEL. Filed at Ottawa May 19, 1884. 1. EMINENT DOMAIN-loss of profits in business on the premises—as an element of damages. On an application to condemn for a right of way for a railroad, a part of four lots, held by the defendant under a lease, which leasehold lots were occupied by the defendant in connection with adjacent lots, of which he was the absolute owner, and which were used in carrying on an extensive hot-bed system of flower-gardening, the court instructed the jury that there could be no recovery for loss of business or loss of profits: Held, that the instruction was correct. 2. SAME of the proper basis for damages, where a part of the premises are held under lease, and the residue in fee. A person occupied fourteen lots in a certain block in carrying on the business of flower-gardening, as one tract, or as an entirety, holding four of them under a lease for two years, and owning the other ten, and a railway company sought to take a portion of the leasehold property for a right of way. It was held, if by so doing the market value of the whole tract was lessened during the two years the lease had to run, the owner and occupant ought to be allowed damages to the extent that the market value of the entire property was thereby depreciated. APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. RICHARD PRENDERGAST, Judge, presiding. Mr. E. WALKER, and Mr. F. J. LOESCH, for the appellant: The loss of business and of profits derived from the use of the land is not a proper element of damages. Booker v. Venice and Carondelet Ry. Co. 101 Ill. 333; Jerseyville and Southeastern Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 106 id. 253. Messrs. BEAM & Cook, for the appellee: Evidence as to the amount of traffic is legitimate to show the extent of the use the lots would be subjected in the operation of the road, as affecting the question of depreciation of 110 89 161 644 Opinion of the Court. value. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Chicago and Western Indiana R. R. Co. 100 Ill. 21. As to the proper measure of damages, and the evidence proper to show the same, see Keithsburg and Eastern R. R. Co. v. Henry, 79 Ill. 292; Chicago and Iowa R. R. Co. v. Hopkins et al. 90 id. 322; St. Louis, Jerseyville and Springfield R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 104 id. 345. The personal examination of the premises by the jury is in the nature of evidence, and the facts thus learned may have fully justified the verdict. Chicago and Iowa R. R. Co. v. Hopkins et al. 90 Ill. 322; Peoria and Farmington Ry. Co. v. Barnum, 107 id. 160. Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court: Appellee, Dresel was in the possession of lots 2 to 15, inclusive, in sub-block 10, subdivision of block 13, in Sheffield's addition to Chicago. Lots 2 to 9 were held under a lease which expires July 1, 1885. Lots 10 to 15 were owned in fee by appellee. The lots 2 to 15, inclusive, have been occupied and cultivated by appellee as an entirety, within one inclosure, since 1870. The fee to lots 2 to 5, inclusive, was in appellant, having been purchased of appellee's landlord, Lewis, pending the proceedings. The appellant, by its amended petition, undertook to condemn only so much of Dresel's leasehold interest in lots 2 to 5 as is contained in a triangular piece shown on the map, and being about one-fifth of the area of the four lots. Appellee, upon the lots 2 to 15, was carrying on an extensive hot-bed system of flowergardening. His residence, barns, sheds, etc., are upon lots 14 and 15. The jury, on the evidence introduced, and upon a personal examination of the premises, awarded appellee $1500 as compensation for all damages resulting by reason. of the taking of that part of the leasehold heretofore mentioned. Opinion of the Court. It is claimed that the court erred in permitting evidence to go to the jury in regard to the profits to be derived from the land in question. We do not understand that evidence of this character was admitted by the court. When appellee was on the stand as a witness, the court, at the request of counsel for appellant, ruled that "all evidence as to the amount of work that could be done on the property, and all evidence of the probable profits from the business, is excluded from the consideration of the jury." There may be some answers to questions propounded to the witnesses Harding and Donovan which might, without close examination of the entire evidence of the two witnesses, indicate that the court had not adhered strictly to the rule announced; but after a careful examination of the evidence we think the rule was substantially observed, and no testimony was admitted by the court on this branch of the case which conflicted with the rule, or which could prejudice appellant. But it is said the court erred in refusing the first and fourth instructions asked by appellant. The first was modified by striking out the latter portion, which related to the amount of business which could be done on the premises, etc., and given as modified. The fourth, which was refused, related to the same subject. The court, however, gave instruction No. 5, which covered the whole subject in fewer words, and in a more concise form, as follows: "The jury are instructed. that there can be no recovery for loss of business or loss of profits." This instruction obviated the objection made to the decision of the court on the two instructions mentioned. It is also claimed by appellant that the court erred in giving instructions one and two, on behalf of appellee. The complaint is, that the jury were, in substance, directed, that if by virtue of the lease of certain lots, and Dresel's ownership of certain other lots in block 10, he is entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment of these lots and improvements thereon, as one entire tract or parcel, until the expiration of |