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AUERSTADT AND JENA.

THE memoirs of Prince Eugene of Würtemberg have already supplied us with two curious chapters connected with the history of Russia and Austria. In our present article we purpose to employ the same authority to show how Napoleon taught Prussia a terrible lesson. In our article on Austerlitz, we found the blue coats laughing because the Austrian white coats had been so terribly thrashed at Ulm and Austerlitz: only a year later and the time came for the laugh to be on the side of the white coats. For Bonaparte was justified in saying, "the Prussians are even more stupid than the Austrians," as he most fully proved at Jena and elsewhere. Still we must do the Austrians the justice of saying that they did not openly display their delight at the result of Jena. Even morehad not the Prussian policy in 1806 been so utterly undeserving of confidence, Prussia would probably have had the aid of Austria in her deci sive contest with Napoleon. For although Austria was still bleeding severely from the wounds of 1805, she was convinced that taking up arms again was a mere question of time. Count von Stadion knew that no permanent peace with France was possible, and hence from the first moment of his administration he strove to place Austria in a position to continue the interrupted contest. He also clearly understood that an offensive and defensive alliance between the two great German powers was an imperious necessity, but also that this was impossible so long as Haugwitz guided the policy of Berlin. In September, 1806, he wrote to Gentz that Austria intended to remain neutral, because Prussia had not seriously requested an alliance, and because there was no trusting to Haugwitz; but he was careful to add, "I believe that the existing crisis affects us as much as Prussia, and however great our present difficulties may be, neither the emperor nor myself will ever think of really separating our cause from the Prussian." Gentz at once hinted as much to the cabinet of Berlin, but Haugwitz was blinded by self-conceit, and made no effort to evade the collecting storm.

Prussia must infallibly fall, because she was the Prussia of 1806. She had erred in leaving her sword in the scabbard in 1805, and committed an equal error by drawing it in 1806. Instead of making every effort to win Austria as an ally, she preferred trusting to the half promises of Russia, whose assistance must arrive too late, owing to the precipitation with which matters were hurrying on. After breaking up the third coali tion, Napoleon was determined to seize the first opportunity for crumpling up Prussia, or even to create the opportunity. In the spring and summer of 1806 he played like a cat with the poor mouse Prussia, that fancied itself a lion. This cat play was at the same time artful and arrogant. While committing acts of insulting violence, he offered perfidious advice, such as that Prussia should form a North German Confederation under his protectorate, while his agents at Cassel actively strove to crush the idea of such a confederation in the bud. In order to complete the isola tion of Prussia the French cabinet coquetted with Russia, and even England, whose Whig ministry was paving the way for a peace. In the interviews which Talleyrand had for this purpose with Lord Yarmouth, it

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was evident that Napoleon regarded Germany as his property. Talleyrand went so far as to offer the Hanse Towns as a compensation for the King of Naples. Of course no consideration was given to Prussia. The alliance between France and Prussia in March had made Hanover a Prussian province: but when Lord Yarmouth declared that the restoration of Hanover to George III. must be the preliminary to any further negotiations, Talleyrand did not hesitate to say, "Hanover should make no difficulty." It is only a pity that an "honest" Frederick William III. behaved as honourably with the alliance as did the "perfidious" Napoleon. The ink with which the King of Prussia had signed the treaty was scarce dry ere he formed a secret agreement with the Emperor of Russia, by which he bound himself to march with Russia against France. The reports which the Prussian envoy Lucchesini sent from Paris as to Napoleon's readiness to give back Hanover to George III., caused tremendous excitement in Berlin. On August 10th, Frederick William ordered the mobilisation of his army. This drawing the sword, while a year too late, was at the same time premature by some months. Prussia was quite unprepared, for she stood alone to withstand the superior forces of Napoleon. The recent breach with England was not sufficiently repaired for any help to be expected from that quarter. The imperial friend in Petersburg, when urgently entreated in September, sent off an auxiliary corps of seventy thousand men, but the affair was ended long ere these columns could reach the scene of action. Saxony was forced to join, for which the elector apologised beforehand at Paris, but this compulsion could not be employed against the more distant Hesse Cassel. While the ministry were swaggering with the sword of Frederick the Great, the defences of the country had been allowed to fall into a shameful state. Even in the matter of food for powder Prussia was far inferior: with the aid of the Saxons she could only bring one hundred and thirty-three thousand men into the field, while the Emperor of the French led one hundred and ninety-eight thousand nine hundred and forty troops against Prussia, exclusive of the contingents of his German satraps. And these were veteran troops, full of national pride, and possessed by the demon of glory, commanded by the first general in the world—a general who handled his strategic machine as a virtuoso does his instrument.

And the Prussian army? It was an old Fritzish caput mortuum, a brilliant specimen of noble arrogance and self-esteem. In spite of a few modest efforts on the part of Frederick William to moderate the brutality of the officers, the private was still treated on the footing of the good old times-that is to say, like a wild beast, who could only acquire the necessary training and discipline by a shower of blows and running the gauntlet. The commissariat and clothing were shameful. The soldier received daily two pounds of badly-baked ammunition bread, and one pound of meat a week. His uniform was made of such coarse and looselywoven cloth, that to use a popular expression of the time-peas could be sown through it. The coats were cut away from the chest, so that the stomach was exposed. In summer they wore canvas trousers, and in these the soldiers, who had neither overalls nor cloaks, were obliged to bivouac in the cold autumn nights of 1806. The white waistcoat was not a real thing, but only a rag sewn on to the coat. The cloth, too, was cut so close that the man who was thrust into this uniform could scarce

move, and stood "like a doll whose arms and legs could only be moved to a certain point." The torment of pigtails and powder was almost incredible. An accurate measurement of the regimental pigtails was a great feature of the Prussian art of war. There were in the army captains whose queues trailed on the ground, and required from seventy to eighty yards of ribbon. It happened, at times, that a Prussian fieldmarshal at a grand parade would draw from his pocket the normal pig. tail, and close his reproof of any officer whose men did not reach the standard, with the magnificent dictum: "Ah, general, it is cruelly difficult to make a good queue." It also happened that at an inspection a beardless lieutenant employed an incorrect standard, and ordered the innocent culprit twenty lashes. Fellow, and clod, were the mildest terms of abuse which officers and sergeants lavished on their subordinates. The parade-grounds echoed with savage curses, and the coarse cruelty of the drill-sergeants rendered them true places of torture for the recruits. It is true that a strong tradition of old Prussian bravery had been kept up in the army, but for all that, leading troops thus fed, clothed, and treated, against Napoleon's army, was about the same as opposing Nüremberg toy soldiers to real troops. The fault lay, to a great extent, in the constitution of the officers' corps. The higher ranks were servile, the lower frightfully ignorant and bombastic. It is true that a new race of officers was growing up, men like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Müffling, and others, who eventually became historic glories of the Prussian army. But at the time of which we are writing the fate of the army was entrusted to two imbeciles, Phull and Massenbach, whom Suabia had lent to Prussia. Such men, puffed up and undecided theorists, without any practical knowledge or courage, were ordered to draw up the plan of the campaign against Napoleon. The Prussian Army List of 1806 is a satire upon common sense. A general under sixty-four years of age was a rarity, for most of them were seventy and upwards, while all the field officers were between fifty and sixty years of age. As a type of the Prussian generals of that day, we will take Von Rüchel, whom Clausewitz described as "a concentrated acid of old Prussianism." This Miles gloriosus, over whom all the experiences of the revolutionary wars had passed without leaving a trace, uttered at a Potsdam parade the following fabulous nonsense: "Gentlemen, his majesty's army can display several generals like this Monsieur de Bonaparte." When a sensible young officer, who had learned to admire the mobility of the French army, hinted at the impropriety of the Prussian subaltern officers being mounted, which produced a train of fifty chargers for each battalion, Von Rüchel growled, "A Prussian gentleman does not walk." It is not wonderful, then, to read that when the news of Jena arrived, citizens and peasants should rub their hands and say: "Well, the Junkers have received a good thrashing at last."

It will furnish a sufficient idea of the Prussian army of 1806 when we state that a lieutenant of Möllendorf's regiment took his pianoforte into the field with him, and the generalissimo his mistress, a French woman who was accused of betraying the secrets of head-quarters to her country. men. The latter charge is not true, however, for there was really nothing to reveal. Napoleon was thoroughly acquainted with all that was going on in Prussia through his organised police, and hence, while the Rüchels

were rattling their sabres in the consciousness of victory, he could write from St. Cloud, on September 12, to his brother Joseph at Naples: "Prussia is arming in a ridiculous manner. She must soon disarm, or else pay a

bitter price. In a few days she will either have disarmed or be annihilated." After the resolution was formed at Berlin not to disarm, orders were given for the Silesian army, under Prince von Hohenlohe, to march on Thuringia, and there join the main army under the Duke of Brunswick. The command of the vanguard was entrusted to Blücher, who felt equally confident about destroying the French. A month later, however, we find the hussar lowering his tone considerably. It is a remarkable fact that the two most warlike men in Prussia, Blücher and Prince Louis Ferdinand, could not get rid of their forebodings of evil. Both felt that Prussia was not the Prussia of Frederick the Great, and that there was not a man alive to take his place. The Junkers, though, had no idea that Frederick's Prussia no longer existed, and their continual boasting resembled idiotcy. Thus a general said, "Bonaparte does not deserve to be even a corporal in the Prussian army." Beardless ensigns and lieutenants, who had never seen an enemy, spoke contemptuously of Napoleon's soldiers: "They have never had Prussians before them. The victory is certain to be ours-an easy victory-perhaps too easy to be honourable." Even on October 13, Prussian officers said at Weimar, "Let them come on, that is all. We will soon settle these sans-culottes." As a delirious intermezzo, we may remark that Goethe, who had come to the Prussian head-quarters as a commissary for Weimar a tall, handsome man, always dressed in a court-suit, powdered with a hair-bag, and dress-sword, who looked like a minister" was only a "fellow" in the sight of the old Prussian Junkers. An old corpulent major, who marched with his battalion into Weimar, joined a party at a wine-house. Α young officer asked him whether he had good quarters. "Well, well, decent. I am with one Gethe or Gothe-deuce take me if I know the fellow's name." "Ah, it must be the celebrated Göthe." "It can be so: yes, it can be. I felt the fellow's teeth, and he seems to me to have flies in his head." The thoughtless crowd allowed themselves to be led away by these boasts about Prussian invincibility. Thinking men-a poorly flourishing species at all timesand especially thinking soldiers, regarded the storm gathering in the West with very different feelings. When, after a brilliant Potsdam parade, a comrade asked the Engineer officer, Reiche, "Do you now doubt whether we shall beat the French ?" he replied, "From what I have seen-to-day, the French will beat us." And when Reiche waited on Colonel von Kleist, the adjutant-general at Magdeburg, after the beginning of the campaign, the latter said to him, "My friend, let me advise you not to drop a hint that we can be defeated. My voice does not penetrate. They believe that we need only show ourselves and the French will fly. Experience has not made us wiser." But the strangest thing of all is that the Prussian generalissimo, the Duke of Brunswick, despaired. He only accepted the command in order to escape a war. At times, when his bile was stirred up by his subordinates doing things behind his back about which he was not consulted, he called "Prince von Hohenlohe a weak, vain man, who let himself be governed by Massenbach; General von Rüchel, a fanfaron; Field-Marshal Möllendorf, a worn-out veteran; General von Kalkreuth, a cunning intriguer; and the generals en second

ordre, boasting routiniers." This catalogue he concluded with the words, "and with such people we are to wage a war-a war against Napoleon." Lucchesini and Haugwitz were the duke's stars of hope, because they made him believe that war could still be avoided. When Lucchesini, on arriving at head-quarters at Naumburg, answered the duke's question as to Napo leon's intentions, with the words, "He will never be the assailant-never, never," Brunswick's face displayed the highest expression of satisfaction. And yet so few days lay between Naumburg and Auerstädt !

With such forebodings the campaign began. Berlin was full of martial excitement; the gendarme lieutenants made the most absurd propositions, such as setting a price of ten thousand dollars on Napoleon's head; ladies even spoke of drinking the blood of the French; and the departing army was greeted by a song, in which the "dispersion of the coming storm by the Prussian cannon" was confidently prophesied. But the leading circles were far from feeling such confidence, and the political and military strategists continually became more stupid, and when they finally came in sight of the foe, resembled the bourgeois gentilhomme, who said to his maid, when she advanced on him with her broom, "You do not attack me according to rule; il faut que tu m'attaques ou de tiers ou de quart." The uninitiated, or those who were not acquainted with the embarrassments at head-quarters, where it was not known till October 9th that Napoleon's intentions were hostile, still revelled in their old Prussian chimeras. A few days before the fearful decision, while the delirium tremens was growing sporadic at head-quarters in Erfurt, a staff officer employed the following language in the quarters of Charles Duke of Weimar: " Up to the present the enemy has not taken a single step which we did not prescribe; our operations are so combined, our corps so stationed, that the enemy is everywhere cut off and driven into the strategic net. Napoleon is as certainly ours as if we had him already in this hat." As he concluded, he pointed into his hat, and many of the credulous listeners rose on tiptoe and looked into the hat, as if Bonaparte were really in it. At this time the Prussian main army, seventy thou sand strong, had taken up a position between Erfurt and Weimar. Rüchel stood between Eisenach and Gotha, Blücher between Eisenach and Kreuzburg: both having orders to advance on Erfurt too. The second army, fifty thousand strong, and commanded by Prince von Hohenlohe, was extended along the Upper Saale as far as Jena. The whole Prussian force was spread over a front of nearly one hundred miles, because the augurs at head-quarters constantly talked about outflanking and surrounding Napoleon, who, after driving in a few thousand men, under Tauenzien, on October 7th, was already preparing to slip through the opening so cleverly left for him between the Saale and the Erzgebirge.

Conscious of his superiority, Napoleon had a prescience of victory, and employed language which, though arrogant, was far more justifiable than the Prussian boasting. On September 18th, he wrote from St. Cloud to his brother Joseph: "It is possible that the quarrel with Prussia may be settled in eight or ten days. If not, I shall so thrash the Prussians in the first action, that all will be over in a few days. You need not feel anxious. You will receive the news of my victory simultaneously with that of my joining the army and the beginning of hostilities." Leaving