UNITARIAN EXPOSITOR. No. III. "I SUPPOSE," says Wardlaw, "it will readily be admitted, that if there be a plurality of persons at all in the one Godhead, that plurality is a trinity. For although the views of the doctrine of the trinity, held by those who have attempted to explain it, have been various, yet trinity and unity (taking the latter term in the sense affixed to it by antitrinitarians) are properly the only two hypotheses on the subject. All who believe the doctrine of a plurality to be taught in the scriptures, believe that plurality to consist of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. None have believed in more, none in fewer. Plurality and trinity may, therefore, on this question be considered as convertible terms; and consequently every proof of a plurality as proof of a trinity. On this principle, as the whole of the evidence of the divinity of Christ, is evidence of a plurality, it might all be considered as bearing on the point, which it is now my object to establish-the personality and deity of the Holy Spirit." According to this writer, then, whoever becomes convinced by any means of the existence of two beings, agents, or persons, (however denominated) in the Godhead, is bound to admit without further proof, the existence of a third. That is, he is to acknowledge an object of worship without any particular proof of his existence. How conclusive such reasoning is, appears from this, that it will prove to equal satisfaction the affirmative or the negative of the same proposition. In the arguments quoted above it is implied, that in order to the reception of the doctrine of the personality and deity of the spirit, no particular proof direct to that point is needed. Suppose, then, that in examining the evidence of the trinitarian doctrine, one attends to the proof of the deity of the spirit before that of the son. If he finds that no sufficient evidence is given for the former, why may he not reason thus :—There are only two opinions on the subject of the Godhead; that there are three persons in it, and that there is but one. The deity of the Holy Spirit (one of the three alleged persons) is not proved. There is therefore but one person, and the evidence of the deity * And according to Professor Stuart, “All difficulties, in respect to the doctrine of the trinity, are essentially connected with proving or disproving the divinity of Christ." (p. 45. 3d ed.) "When this (the divine nature of Christ) is admitted or rejected, no possible objection can be felt to admiting or rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity." p. 59. of the son needs not to be examined.-The argument is equally good on either side of the question. A notable one then doubtless it must be. We are not so much surprised that according to the false modes of interpreting scripture which prevail, some persons should believe themselves convinced that Christ is the supreme God; but we are surprised that the opinion should be professed, with scarcely a shadow of evidence in its support, that there is a third person equally supreme God with the Father and Son,--the Holy Ghost. It would seem that the existence of a Being for whom divine honours are claimed, was a subject of primary consideration. Yet the proof of the personality of the Spirit is scarcely touched on by orthodox writers. In that budget of blunders, Jones on the Trinity, not the slightest reference is made to it. The author actually proceeds as if the existence of a living Being, distinct from the Father, called the Holy Spirit, was not called in question, and as if the only dispute was whether this person were divine. Nay, what is very remarkable, the identical texts which prove that the words Holy Ghost, when spoken of a person, are used, not of a distinct person, but of God the Father himself, this writer assuming that they are separate persons, employs to prove that both are equally God. We do not say that the phrase Spirit of God, and others similar, never stand for a divine person. We think it certain that they do;-for God THE FATHER. (1 Cor. ii. 11. Ps. cxxxix. 7. Comp. Is. Ixiii. 10. with Num. xiv. 11. and Ps. lxxviii. 56.) We are not now to point out the various meanings of the phrase, but refer for them to an essay on the subject in the fourth number of this work. The ground we maintain is, that whenever it means a living Being, it means God the Father, and herein we dissent from the orthodox. It is indispensable to the defence of their belief, that they should prove that the phrase is used in scripture to denote a person in places where it is not applied to God the Father. To the support of this proposition, though of vital importance to the doctrine of the trinity, they have not always given any attention. When they have, it has been principally by the use of texts, in which the figure of personification, so common among the sacred writers, is applied to divine influences on the soul. For the explanation of these texts, as we should not be able to give it in a shorter compass, nor with equal force and clearness, we refer to the essay just named. (Disciple, New Series, Vol. I. p. 260.) * He not only implies but affirms this, discovering a disgraceful ignorance, or a singular effrontery. "The church affirms the Spirit to be in God, as a person of the same divine nature; the Arians deny it, and will understand him to be out of God, not a person of the divine nature, but one inferior to, and distinct from it." "The Holy Ghost," it is said by trinitarians, "is distinctly spoken of as coming, testifying, receiving, showing, teaching, hearing, speaking, &c. all of which evidently imply personal agency." Time, we reply, is distinctly spoken of as coming (Luke ix. 51) and prayers and alms (Acts x. 4.) A song is distinctly spoken of as testifying (Deut. xxxi. 21.) and the pride of Israel (Hos. v. 5.) The heavens are distinctly spoken of as receiving (Acts iii. 21.) and the earth (Gen. iv. 11.) Hf these words "imply personal agency," then are time, prayers, alms, &c. persons. One, who does not understand that according to the common use of language such offices are predicable of things inanimate, may, by turning to a concordance, find applied to things never suspected to possess a personal existence, the same words, on which, when applied to the Holy Spirit, the proof of its personality is founded. This is not trifling, but a sober unexceptionable answer to an argument seriously urged. By such reasoning as this is a doctrine of such moment (if it were true) as that of the trinity, defended. There are three texts of principal note, in which divine attributes are thought to be ascribed to the Spirit in such manner as to lead to the belief of its having a distinct personal existence, viz. Psalm cxxxix. 7. 1 Cor. xii. 11. Heb. ix. 14. I. Omnipresence is thought to be ascribed to a person called the Spirit in Ps. cxxxix. 7. Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" Who is so blind with system as not to see that by the spirit of God, is meant here the mind of God, or God himself, according to the same use of the word spirit as in 1 Cor. xvi. 18. "They have refreshed my spirit and yours," i. e. they have refreshed me and you. Gal. vi. 18. "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit," i. e. be with you. 1 Cor. ii. 11. "What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man that is in him," i. e. the MAN HIMSELF. * 1 Sam. xx. 4. "Whatever thy soul desireth, I will even do it for thee." Jer. xiv. 19. "Hath thy soul loathed Zion;" evidently the same as, hast thou loathed Zion. And the holy psalmist himself explains in the following verse, that this is the sense in which he uses the phrase, for he goes on to say, "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there." The same thing is affirmed in verse 7th, of God's presence, and in verse 10th of his hand, and his right hand, which is declared *The apostle goes on: "Even so the things of God knoweth no one but the spirit of God." Unless we will maintain that the spirit of a man is a different person from that man, we must (if we allow any propriety in the analogy pointed out by the apostle,) grant that the Spirit of God is not a different person from God. in verse 7th of his spirit, viz. that they reach throughout the universe. If then his spirit is proved by this passage to be a distinct divine person, his presence, &c. are equally proved to be so. The argument favours the existence of three other divine persons, in the same degree as it teaches the personality of the Spirit. II. The power of willing is understood to be ascribed to the Spirit, 1 Cor. xii. 11. "All these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will;" and thence it is argued that the Spirit is a person. The reader of the New Testament in the original, need not be informed that the proper rendering of the last clause in this passage is by the neuter pronoun; "dividing to every man severally as it will." It is thus rendered by Wakefield. The context shows, that spiritual gifts are the subject of the apostle's discourse. There is nothing to lead one to the idea, that a person is spoken of, except the supposed ascribing of the faculty of volition to the Spirit. The argument then is this: Only a person can be said to will. Therefore the Spirit is a person. The major proposition, that only a person can be said to will, is indefensible. By a figurative, but common and intelligible use of language, the will, in strictness of speech exerted by the agent, is predicated of the instrument. We should not think the phraseology peculiar, if it were said that the sword of the Lord slays whom it will, his eyes look where they will, his feet go where they will, his hand does what it will, &c.; nor should we conclude thence, that his sword, his eyes, his feet, and hand were persons. When his Spirit is said then to distribute as it will, why, for the sake of explaining a form of language so familiar, should we resort to the bold hypothesis of introducing a new person into the Godhead? The flesh is said to have a will, (John i. 13.) In John iii. 8., the wind is said to blow where it listeth." Is the wind a thinking agent? The last clause of James iii. 4. literally translated, is, "Whither soever the impulse or the will of the governor listeth." Is the impulse or will of the governor therefore a person? 1 Pet. iii. 17., literally rendered, reads thus: "It is better if the will of God will." Is the will of God a separate person? No more then can this be affirmed of the Spirit of God. III. Eternal existence is understood to be ascribed to the Spirit in Heb. ix. 14. "The blood of Christ who, through the eternal Spirit, offered himself without spot unto God," &c. It is hence inferred, that the Spirit is a divine person. Wakefield, we cannot find on what authority, reads auwuov (spotless) for aiwviov (eternal.) There is considerable weight of evidence to show that you (holy) and not alwvíov, was the original word used by the apostle. But granting, as on the whole seems probable, that the text ought to stand as in the common version, we do not find much speciousness in the argument by which the personality of the Spirit is inferred from it. The reasoning is merely this; that to nothing but a person, is eternity ascribed in scripture. The Spirit therefore, having eternity ascribed to it, must be a person. Now the fact is manifestly otherwise. Nothing is more common in scripture than to predicate eternal existence of the attributes of God, and of inanimate things. The divine power and purpose are said to be eternal, (Rom. i. 20. Eph. iii. 11.) Eternal redemption, (Heb. ix. 12.) The hills and mountains are called everlasting; (Gen. xlix. 26. Hab. iii. 6.) and the gospel (Rev. xiv. 6.) God's righteousness is called everlasting, (Ps. cxix. 142.) his kindness, (Isai. liv. 8.) his love. (Jer. xxxi. 3.) His salvation, (Is. li. 8.) his throne, (Lam. v. 19.) his dominion, (Dan. iv. 3.) and his mercy, (Luke i. 50.) are from generation to generation. His faithfulness, (Ps. lxxxix. 1.) his truth, (Ps. c. 5.) his remembrance, (Ps. cii. 12.) and his years (Ps. eii. 24.) are to all generations. If then God's power, purpose, &c. are not proved, by being called eternal, to be separate persons, neither is his Spirit. Our Lord is said to have offered himself through or by the eternal Spirit. By this should we not understand by the eternal mind, the eternal will, counsel, purpose, i. e. of God;-a sense in which the expression would be equivalent with that in Acts ii. 23. iii. 18. and iv. 28. This explanation is fortified by the consideration that the apostle, in this passage, is comparing the priestly office of Christ with that of the priests of the temple, who presented their offerings according to the temporary appointment of God, "for the time then present," "until the time of reformation.” (vv. 9, 10.) We conclude by submitting two questions to the consideration of our readers. The Holy Spirit, in the passage where it is most strikingly personified, (John xvi. 13.) is said not to speak of himself, but to speak whatsoever he shall hear. It is said to make intercession, (Rom. viii. 26.) It is represented (Gal. iv. 6.) as paying reverence to the Father. These representations are inconsistent with the orthodox doctrine of its personality and equality with the Father. When we refer to texts, which show the inferiority of the Son, we are answered, that they allude to the Son when clothed in human nature. Now it is not pretended, that the third person in the Deity ever took on him human nature. By |