or a certified copy thereof, signed by the clerk of the court, for the purpose of being filed in the land records of the town in which the mortgaged real estate or personal property is situated?

(2) If such stamps are required, when and by whom should they be affixed? (Meaning whether they should be placed upon the instrument before it goes upon the public record or the certified copy thereof.)

For the purpose of informing me specifically in regard to the questions, you state that under the law as it exists in Vermont you have what is known as a "strict foreclosure." In other words, the mortgagee, upon expiration of the time of redemption, takes the land itself, this being different from a number of other jurisdictions, in which the land would be exposed to public sale.

Under a mortgage in the State of Vermont, the mortgagee conveys his title to the real estate subject to a conditional right of redemption upon payment of the sum stipulated in the mortgage deed itself. If he fail to pay the specified sum so stated, the mortgagee's right at law at once becomes absolute, and he has the right to take immediate possession of the land. He may, under the Vermont law, as stated by you, maintain an ejectment against the mortgagor for nonpayment of the mortgage debt in accordance with its terms, or he may proceed by way of a foreclosure, which is a suit in equity, and in which, if the mortgagee obtains a decree in his favor, a time is fixed within which the mortgagor may redeem by paying the amount found due by the chancellor. This decree is nothing more nor less than a judgment of the court that there is due to the mortgagee a certain sum of money which has not been paid according to the conditions of the mortgage deed. This decree signed by the chancellor attests the fact that the mortgagee has obtained his judgment. The mortgagee holds this as his voucher, which he receives in lieu of his mortgage notes and deed, which are filed with the clerk of the court. This decree expresses the mortgagee's rights under the judgment of the court.

At the expiration of the period fixed for redemption, the mortgagee, in order to perfect his title, is required to file with the town clerk of the town in which the land lies a certified copy of this decree for the purpose of recordation in the land record; and you ask what is the taxation accruing upon this decree, if any.

In reply, you are advised that I am of the opinion, and so hold, that no taxation accrues upon this decree as a conveyance. Without having the instruments before me, and relying solely upon the facts and the law as stated in your letter, I am of the opinion that the title to the real estate mentioned in the document fully vested in the mortgagee, subject only to the conditional right of redemption. The decree of the court is simply the evidence of the judicial determination of a fact-i. e., that the mortgagor has failed to comply with the requirements of payment, etc.

If the chancellor, by his decree, had directed either the sheriff or any other person to execute a deed of conveyance, conveying title to

the mortgagee, this conveyance would be taxable under the act; but no such transaction occurred.

Upon proof offered, the chancellor finds the fact which he states in his decree, and by the operation of this decree title is found to have been vested in the mortgagee by the former executed document or mortgage deed.

Upon the expiration of the period of redemption, the statute requires that a certified copy of this decree be recorded in the land record, and I hold that neither the decree nor the certified copy is subject to taxation. The decree, for the reasons above stated, is not taxable, and my reason for holding that the certified copy is not subject to taxation is that it is an instrument required to complete a legal proceeding. G. W. WILSON, Commissioner.

Respectfully, yours,

Hon. H. H. POWERS,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

CUSTOM-HOUSE BROKERS.

(20595.)

Special tax-Custom-house brokers.

Payment of special tax as commercial brokers does not relieve persons who act as the agents of others to arrange entries and other custom-house papers from special tax as custom-house brokers.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Washington, D. C., January 19, 1899.

SIR: Referring to the letter of Miller & Houghton, of 16 Beaver street, New York, under date of December 3, relative to their liability to pay special tax as custom-house brokers, you will please inform them of the ruling of this office on September 13.

"Persons should pay special tax as commercial brokers, if they act as the agents of others to arrange entries and other custom-house papers," etc., and must in addition pay the special tax as customhouse brokers. (See Treasury decision 20033,1 September 15, 1898.) Respectfully, yours, G. W. WILSON, Acting Commissioner. Mr. CHARLES H. TREAT,

1

Collector Internal Revenue, New York, N. Y.

Compilation of Decisions Rendered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under the War-Revenue Act of June 13, 1898 (January, 1899), page 141.

(20725.)

Special tax-Custom-house brokers.

Persons whose occupation it is, as agents for others, to enter and clear vessels at the custom-house, can not be relieved from payment of special tax as custom-house brokers on the ground that they have paid special tax as commercial brokers, which entitles them “to negotiate freights or other business for the owners of vessels."

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Washington, D. C., February 20, 1899. SIR: Your letter of the 27th ultimo has been received, inclosing a letter from Richard P. Buck & Co., who have been called upon to pay special tax as custom-house brokers for entering and clearing vessels, and who contend that they are not liable for this special tax, having paid special tax as commercial brokers.

You say that "they feel, under section 4 defining commercial brokers, that the clause, or to negotiate freights or other business for the owners of vessels,' that they are justified in entering and clearing vessels at the custom-house without special tax, as they are the owners of the vessels."

If they can show that, in every instance of entering and clearing vessels at the custom-house, these vessels belong to them, they are not required to pay special tax as custom-house brokers on this account.

But if it be shown that it is the occupation of this firm, "as the agent of others, to arrange entries and other custom-house papers, or transact business at any port of entry relating to the importation or exportation of goods, wares, or merchandise," they must, by the express terms of paragraph 5 of section 2 of the act of June 13, 1898, be regarded as custom-house brokers; and they must pay special tax accordingly in addition to the special tax which they have paid as commercial brokers, under paragraph 4 of that section.

Respectfully, yours,

N. B. SCOTT, Commissioner.

Mr. CHAS. H. TREAT, Collector Second District, New York, N. Y.

DEEDS.

(See CONVEYANCES; MORTGAGES.)

DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES AND LEGACIES.

(See LEGACIES AND DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES.)

DRUGS AND MEDICINES.

(See MEDICINAL PREPARATIONS; PROPRIETARY ARTICLES.)

EXCHANGES, BOARDS OF TRADE, ETC., SALES AT.

(See also DECISIONS 21279, p. 61; 21315, p. 239.)

(20984.)

Stamp tax-Schedule A, act June 18, 1898.

Decisions of United States Supreme Court.-The provision relating to sales or agreements to sell products or merchandise at any exchange or board of trade, or other similar place, and requiring the seller to give a bill or memorandum which shall be stamped, declared constitutional.-Sales of live stock at stock yards come within the law, the same being a similar place to an exchange or board of trade.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Washington, D. C., April 7, 1899. Attention is called to the appended decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of James Nicol, appellant, v. James Ames, United States marshal, etc., decided April 3, 1899.

G. W. WILSON, Commissioner.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

435. James Nicol, Appellant, v. James Ames, United States Marshal, etc. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. 4. Original. Ex parte: In the matter of George R. Nichols, Petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.

625. Edwin S. Skillen, Appellant, v. John C. Ames, United States Marshal, etc. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois.

636. Charles H. Ingwersen, Plaintiff in Error, v. The United States. In error to the district court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. These cases involve the validity and construction of some of the provisions of section 6, and a portion of Schedule A, therein referred to, of the act of Congress approved June 13, 1898 (30 Stat., 448), entitled "An Act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes," commonly spoken of as the war-revenue act. The cases come before the court in this way:

No. 435 is an appeal to this court from an order made by the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioner to the custody of the marshal. The petition to the circuit court for the writ alleged that the petitioner Nicol had been convicted in the Unit d States court for the northern district of Illinois, upon au

information duly filed charging him with selling, at the Chicago Board of Trade and at its rooms, two carloads of oats, "without then and there making and delivering to the buyer any bill, memorandum, agreement, or other evidence of said sale, showing the date thereof, the name of the seller, the amount of the same, and the matter or thing to which it referred, as required by the act of Congress," above mentioned. He was sentenced to pay a fine and to be imprisoned until paid. He refused to pay, and was taken into custody by the marshal. That part of the act referring to the making and delivering of a bill or memorandum, etc., the petitioner claimed was unconstitutional. The circuit court, after argument, held the law valid and the conviction legal.

No. 4 Original is an application to this court for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to bring before the court the petitioner, George R. Nichols, and for a rule requiring the marshal for the northern district of Illinois, in whose custody the petitioner is, to show cause why the writ should not issue. The petition states that Nichols was convicted and sentenced, under the act of Congress above mentioned, upon an information filed in the district court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, for selling at the Chicago Board of Trade, of which he was then a member, for immediate delivery, to one Roloson, also a member of such board, ten tierces, or three thousand pounds, of hams, then in Chicago, at a price named, amounting to $195, and on the sale unlawfully making and delivering to Roloson a bill and memorandum of the sale showing the date thereof, the name of the seller, the amount of the same, and the matters and things to which it referred, without having the proper stamps affixed to said bill or memorandum denoting the internal revenue accruing upon said sale, bill, or memorandum, as required by law, but, on the contrary, unlawfully refusing and neglecting to affix any such stamps to said bill or memorandum. Upon the trial the jury rendered a verdict finding the petitioner guilty as charged in the information, and the court sentenced him to pay a fine of $500 and to be committed to the county jail until such fine and costs should be paid. The petitioner refused to pay the fine, and an order of commitment was made out and placed in the hands of the marshal, who arrested the petitioner, and he is now in the custody of the marshal. The petitioner upon the trial claimed that the act in regard to the matters named in the information was unconstitutional, and therefore no offense was charged in the information; that the court had no jurisdiction to try him, and that his conviction and subsequent arrest and detention were wholly without jurisdiction. The petitioner gives as a reason for his application to this court for the writ of habeas corpus that one James Nicol (the appellant in No. 435) had been convicted of substantially the same offense in the district court for the northern district of Illinois, and that he had made application for a writ of habeas corpus to the circuit court held in that district, which court, after a hearing upon the writ, decided against Nicol and in favor of the constitutionality of the act of Congress herein questioned, and the petitioner herein alleges that it would be a vain act to apply for a writ of habeas corpus to the same circuit court which had already, after a hearing, decided the question in a way unfavorable to the claims of the petitioner herein.

No. 625 is also an appeal to this court from an order of the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioner Skillen