it is settled that, if they do proceed further in the cause, for any purpose, no matter what, it is erroneous, and the judgment will be reversed. This was decided in the case of Kanouse v. Martin, 15 Howard, 198. In that case, the declaration claimed one thousand dollars, more than five hundred dollars. The defendant appeared and offered a bond, and after he had appeared and offered a bond, and filed his petition for the removal of the cause, the State court allowed the ad damnum to be amended and reduced to a sum less than five hundred dollars, and you perceive this section applies only to cases where the amount demanded exceeds five hundred dollars, the State court, I say, allowed that amendment to be made, and then, the demand having been reduced below five hundred dollars, they refused to allow the case to be removed. The Supreme Court decided that this was erroneous; that they had no right to take another step; "that they should have proceeded no further"; that when the petition had been filed and the bond offered, their jurisdiction terminated, and they had no more right to allow an amendment to the declaration which reduced the ad damnum than they had to take any other step in the case, and therefore the judgment was reversed.

I have called your attention to that clause in the eleventh section which contains the restriction that assignees cannot sue in certain cases unless their

assignors could sue; but it has been decided that this restriction does not apply to the twelfth section; that this restriction in the eleventh section does not apply to a person sued in a State court if he be an assignee merely. This was decided in 9 Wallace, 387. Nor is it any objection to this power of removal, that the proceeding commenced against a citizen of the other State is a statute proceeding of a peculiar character. You know that all the States have statute proceedings, not according to the course of the common law, but varying greatly therefrom; sometimes by way of petition, sometimes in one way, and sometimes in another. Well, it is no objection that the remedy is a mere statute remedy given by the State. It is a case for removal, if it is any remedy at all under the State law; and when the case has been removed into the Circuit Court, and entered there, they will proceed according to such forms as they find adapted to their practice, and required by the necessities of the particular case. Until very recently, when a suit at common law, for instance, was removed from a State court in the State of New York into the Circuit Court, inasmuch as suits were commenced in New York simply by a summons and petition, that petition was entered in the Circuit Court; and then, under a rule of the court, the plaintiff was required to declare according to the forms of the common law. And so it was in this State. Although we have

1 Bushnell v. Kennedy.

not departed by any means so far from the modes of proceeding at common law as they have in many other States, still, our forms of declaration are not the same as the forms of declaration used in the Circuit Courts, which are the common-law forms of pleading; and accordingly, whenever a suit was entered there the plaintiff was put to declare anew, as if he had not filed any declaration in the State court. How far this is altered by a very recent statute, I shall have occasion to state in another connection.

When the State court has made an order for the removal of a case, and it has been entered in the Circuit Court, it does not follow that that court will entertain it. If that court, on looking into the proceedings, thinks it has not jurisdiction, they will remand the case to the State court. An order of the State court cannot give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court. That must depend on the Constitution and the acts of Congress; and if, on applying these to the particular case, the Circuit Court thinks it has not jurisdiction, and the case ought not to have been removed, it remands the case to the State court. You will find that laid down in the case of Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 9 Peters, 692. And so, on the contrary, if the State court denies the petition, the petitioner has only to take a copy of the proceedings, including his petition and the bond which he has offered, and present them to the Circuit Court,

with a petition praying for leave to allow him to enter it, and the denial by the State court does not prevent the entry of the suit. In that case, the Circuit Court judges of its own jurisdiction, just as it did in the other case, where the State court allowed it. The fact that the State court has allowed or disallowed the petition does not settle the question; that question is settled by the Circuit Court itself. And perhaps it may be worth while to mention, in this connection, although you would naturally infer it,—that corporations may remove suits as well as individuals, just as they may bring suits. If, however, a corporation which is sued as a defendant removes a suit into the Circuit Court of the United States, that removal is a waiver of any objection to the service of process on the corporation under the laws of the State. That you will find laid down in the case of Sayles v. Northwestern Insurance Company, 2 Curtis's C. C. R. 212.1

1 [Judge Curtis in this Lecture did not touch upon the cases where a foreign corporation is sued in the Federal court within a State in which it is permitted by a State statute to do business, and the question arises whether it was "formed" in that Federal District. Prior to the year 1877, there was some conflict in the authorities on this subject. But it has since been settled that, where process is served, in accordance with the State law, upon the agent of the corporation, who resides within the District where the suit is brought, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction, the plaintiff being a citizen of another State than that which created the corporation. Ex parte Schollenberger, 6 Otto, 369.]

I think, gentlemen, I have now gone through this part of the subject. There are one or two other particulars in regard to the removal of suits, but they are quite distinct from those of which I have now spoken, and perhaps they had better be reserved for another Lecture.1

1 [See Lecture VI., infra, and the notes on the subject of removal of suits from the State courts to the Circuit Courts.]