ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE-4.

1. Courts have latterly leaned very much against
extending the doctrine of implied acceptances, so
as to sustain an action upon a bill. For all practi-
cal purposes in commercial transactions in bills of
exchange, such collateral acceptances are extreme-
ly inconvenient, and injurious to the credit of bills;
and this has led judges frequently to express their
dissatisfaction that the rule has beeen carried so far
as it has; and their regret that any other act, than
a written acceptance on the bill, had ever been
deemed an acceptance.

Boyce and Henry v. Edwards, (122) 803
2. As it respects the rights and the remedy of the
immediate parties to the promise to accept, and all
others who may take bills upon the credit of such
promise, they are equally secure and equally at-
tainable, by an action for the breach of the promise
to accept, as they would be by an action on the bill
itself.
(123) 803
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS-1.

In England any instrument or claim, though not
negotiable, may be assigned to the king, who can
sue upon it in his own name. No valid objection
is perceived against giving the same effect to an
assignment to the government of this country.

The United States v. Buford, (30) 591

1. Where administrators, acting under the pro-
visions of an Act of Assembly of the State of Ohio,
were ordered by the court, vested by the law with
the power to grant such order, to sell real estate,
and before the sale was made the law was repealed,
the powers of the administrators to sell terminated
with the repeal of the law.

The Bank of Hamilton v. Dud-
ley's Heirs,
(523) 507
2. The lands of an intestate descend not to the
administrator, but to the heir; they vest in him,
liable to the debts of his ancestor, and subject to be
sold for those debts. The administrator has no es-
tate in the land, but a power to sell under the au-
thority of the Court of Common Pleas. This is not
an independent power, to be exercised at discretion,
when the exigency in his opinion may require it;
but it is conferred by the court, in a state of
things prescribed by the law. The order of the
court is a prerequisite, indispensable to the very
existence of the power; and if the law which au-
thorizes the court to make the order, be repealed,
the power to sell can never come into existence.
The repeal of such a law devests no vested estate,
but it is the exercise of a legislative power, which
every Legislature possesses. The mode of subject-
ing the property of a debtor to the demands of a
creditor, must always depend on the wisdom of the
Legislature.
(Ib.) 507

Id.

ADMIRALTY-3.

In admiralty cases a decree is not final while an
appeal from the same is depending in this court,
and any statute which governs the case must be an
existing valid statute at the time of affirming of the
The United States v. Preston, (65) 604
AFFIDAVIT—1.

decree below.

See Evidence, 20, 21.

AGENT-1.

It is believed to be a general rule, that an agent,
with limited powers, cannot find his principal
when he transcends his power. It would seem to
follow, that a person transacting business with
him, on the credit of his principal, is bound to
know the extent of his authority; yet, if the princi-
pal has, by his declarations or conduct, authorized

the opinion that he had given more extensive |
powers to his agent than were in fact given, he
would not be permitted to avail himself of the im-
position, and to protest bills, the drawing of which
his conduct had sanctioned.

Schimmelpennich et al. v. Bayard
et al.

AGENT AND PRINCIPAL 4.

1. No principle is better settled than that the
powers of an agent cease on the death of his princi-
pal.
Galt et al. v. Galloway et al. (344) 880

AGENT AND PRINCIPAL-3.

1. C. & Co., merchants of Boston, owners of
ship proceeeding on freight from Havana to the con-
signment of B. & Co. at Leghorn, and to return to
Havana, instructed B. & Co. to invest the freight,
estimated at four thousand six hundred petsos;
two thousand two hundred in marble tiles, and the
residue, after paying disbursements, in wrapping
paper. B. & Co. undertook to execute these orders.
Instead, however, of investing two thousand two
hundred petsos in marble, they invested all the
funds which came into their hands in wrapping pa-
per, which was received by the captain of the ship
and was carried to Havana and there sold on ac-
count of C. & Co. and produced a loss, instead of
the profit which would have resulted had the in-
vestment been made in marble tiles. As soon as in-
formation of the breach of orders was received C.
& Co. addressed a letter to B. & Co., expressing in
strong terms their disapprobation of the departure
from their orders, but did not signify their de-
termination to disavow the transaction entirely,
and consider the paper as sold on account of B. &
Held that C. & Co. were entitled to recover
damages for the breach of their orders; that their
not having given notice to B. & Co. that the
paper would be considered as sold on their account
did not injure their claim, and that the amount of
the damages may be determined by the positive and
direct loss arising plainly and immediately from
the breach of the orders.

Bell et al. v. Cunningham,

(69) 606

2. If the principal, after a knowledge that his
orders have been violated by his agent, receives
merchandize purchased for him contrary to or-
ders, and sells the same without signifying any
intention of disavowing the acts of the agent, an
inference in favor of the ratification of the acts of
the agent may fairly be drawn by the jury. But
if the merchandise was received by the principal,
under a just confidence that his orders to his agent
had been faithfully executed, such an inference
would be in a high degree unreasonable.
Id.
(81) 611
3. The faithful execution of orders which an
agent or correspondent has contracted to execute,
is of vital importance in commercial transactions,
and may often affect the injured party far beyond
the actual sum misapplied. A failure in this respect
may entirely break up a voyage and defeat the
whole enterprise. Speculative damages dependent
on possible, successive schemes, ought not to be
given in such cases; but positive and direct loss,
resulting plainly and immediately from the breach
of orders, may be taken into the estimate.
Id.
612 |
4. The jury, in an action for damages for breach
of orders, may compensate the plaintiff for actual
loss, and not give vindictive damages. The profits
which would have been obtained on the sale of the
article directed to be purchased, may be properly
allowed as damages.

Id.

(85)

(86) 612

5. The general rule is, that the principal is bound
by the act of his agent no further than he author-
izes that agent to bind him; but the extent of the
power given to an agent is decided as well from
facts from express delegation. In the estimate
or application of such facts, the law has regard to
public security, and often applies the rule "that he
who trusts must pay." So, also, collusion with an
agent to get a debt paid through the intervention
of one in failing circumstances, has been held to
make the principal liable on the ground of immoral
dealing.
(428) 730

Parsons v. Armor and Oakley,

AGREEMENT—1.

1. Equity, 3, 4, 5.

2. When property conveyed in trust to be sold at

3. Equity, 10.

ALEXANDRIA, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-3.
See the case of Fowle v. The Common Council of
Alexandria, 398 as to the powers of the corporation
of Alexandria.

ALIEN, AND ALIENAGE-3.

See the cases of Inglis v. The Trustees of the
Sailor's Snug Harbor, 99, and Shanks et al. v. Du-
pont et al., 242.

ALLEGIANCE-3.

1. What are the rights of the individuals compos-
ing a society, and living under the protection of
the government when a revolution occurs, a dis-
memberment takes place, and when new govern-
ments are formed, and new relations between the
government and the people are established. A
person born in New York before the 4th of July,
1776, and who remained an infant with his father
in the city of New York during the period it was oc-
cupied by the British troops; his father, being a
royalist and having adhered to the British govern-
ment, and left New York with the British troops,
taking his son with him, who never returned to the
United States, but afterwards became a bishop of
the Episcopal Church in Nova Scotia; such a per-
son was born a British subject, and continued an
alien, and is disabled from taking land by inherit-
ance in the State of New York.

Inglis v. The Trustees of the Sail-
or's Snug Harbor,

(126) 627

2. If such a person had been born after the 4th
of July, 1776, and before the 15th of September,
1776, when the British troops took possession of the
city of New York and the adjacent places, his in-
fancy incapaciated him from making an election
for himself, and his election and character followed
that of his father, subject to the right of disaffirm-
ance in a reasonable time after the termination of
his minority: which never having been done, he
remained a British subject, and disabled from in-
heriting land in the State of New York.
Id.

(Ib.) 627

3. The rule as to the point of time at which the
American antenati ceased to be British subjects
differs in this country and in England, as estab-
lished by the courts of justice in the respective
countries. The English rule is to take the date of
the Treaty of Peace in 1783. Our rule is to take the
date of the Declaration of Independence.
Id.
(121) 625

4. The settled doctrine in this country is, that a
person born here, but who left the country before
the Declaration of Independence and never re-
turned here, became an alien and incapable of tak-
ing lands subsequently by descent. The right to
inherit depends upon the existing state of allegiance
at the time of the descent cast.

Id.

(Ib.) 625

5. The doctrine of perpetual allegiance is not ap-
plied by the British courts to the American ante-
nati; and this court, in the case of Blight's Lessee
v. Rochester (7 Wheat. 544), adopted the same rule
with respect to the rights of British subjects here.
That, although born before the Revolution, they
are equally incapable with those born subsequent
to that event of inheriting or transmitting the in-
heritance of lands in this country.

Id.

(lb.) 625

6. The British doctrine, therefore, is that the
American antenati, by remaining in America after
the peace, lost their character of British subjects;
and our doctrine is, that by withdrawing from this
country and adhering to the British government
they lost, or perhaps, more properly speaking,
never acquired, the character of American citi-

zens.

7. The right of election must necessarily exist in
all revolutions like ours, and is well established by
adjudged cases.

Inglis v. The Trustees of the
Sailor's Snug Harbor,

(Ib.) 625
8. This court in the case of M'Ilvaine's Lessee v.
Coxe, 4 Cranch, 211, fully recognized the right of
election but they considered that Mr. Coxe had lost
that right by remaining in the State of New Jersey,
not only after she had declared herself a sovereign
State, but after she had passed laws by which she
declared him to be a member of, and in allegiance
to, the new government.

Id.

(124) 626
9. Allegiance may be dissolved by the mutual
consent of the government and its citizens or sub-
jects. The government may release the governed
from their allegiance. This is even the British
doctrine.

Id.

(125) 626

10. Thomas Scott, a native of South Carolina,
died in 1782, intestate, seized of land on James Is-
land, having two daughters, Ann and Sarah, both
born in South Carolina before the Declaration of
Independence. Sarah married D. P., a citizen of
South Carolina, and died in 1802, entitled to one-
half of the estate. The British took possession of
James Island and Charleston in February and May,
1780; and in 1781 Ann Scott married Joseph
Shanks, a British officer, and at the evacuation of
Charleston in 1782, she went to England with her
husband, where she remained until her death in
1801. She left five children born in England. They
claimed the other moiety of the real estate of Thom-
as Scott, in right of their mother, under the ninth
article of the Treaty of Peace between this country
and Great Britain of the 19th of November, 1794.
Held, that they were entitled to recover and hold

the same.

Shanks et al. v. Dupont et al. (242) 666
11. If Ann Scott was of age before December,
1782, she remained in South Carolina until that
time, her birth and residence must be deemed to
constitute her by election a citizen of South Caro-
lina while she remained in that State. If she was
not of age, then, under the circumstances of this
case, she might well be deemed to hold the citizen-
ship of her father; for children born in a country,
continuing while under age in the family of the
father, partake of his natural character as a citizen
of that country.

Id.

(245) 667

12. All British-born subjects whose allegiance
Great Britain has never renounced, ought, upon
general principles of interpretation, to be held
within the intent, as they certainly are within the
words of the Treaty of 1794.
Id.

(250) 669
13. The capture and possession of James Island
in February, 1780 and of Charleston on the 11th
of May in the same year, by the British troops.
was not an absolute change of the allegiance of
the captured inhabitants They owed allegiance to
the conquerors during their occupation; but it
was a temporary allegiance, which did not destroy,
but only suspended their former allegiance.
İd.

(246) 668
14. The marriage of Ann Scott with Shanks, a
British officer, did not change or destroy her al-
legiance to the State of South Carolina, because
marriage with an alien, whether friend or enemy,
produces no dissolution of the native allegiance of

the wife.

AMENDMENT-2.

1. The declaration purported to count upon six-
ty-eight bills of the Bank of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, and it appeared that one of the bills had
been omitted to be described, so that the declara-
tion made out a less sum than the writ claimed or
the judgment gave. The defendants in error,
plaintiffs below, moved for leave to cure the defect
by entering a remittitur of the amount of the bill so
omitted and damages pro tanto.

This court thinks itself authorized to make a
precedent in furtherance of justice, whereby a
more convenient practice may be introduced, and
to allow the party to enter his remittitur; but on
payment of the costs of the writ, if error is prose-
cuted no further after such amendment made.
Bank of Kentucky v. Ashley et

(329) 441

This court has repeatedly decided that the exer-
cise of the discretion of the court below, in refus-
ing or granting amendments of pleadings or motions
for new trials, affords no grounds for a writ of
In overruling a motion for leave to with-
exercised its discretion; and the reason assigned,
draw a replication and file a new one, the court
as influencing that discretion, cannot affect the de-
cision.
United States v. Buford,

AMERICAN REVOLUTION—3.

(31) 591

For the effect of the American Revolution on the
rights of persons born in the British colonies in
American before the Revolution, and born in the
United States during the Revolution and before
the Treaty of Peace, see the cases of Inglis v. The
Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 99, and
Shanks v. Dupont, 242.

APPEAL-3.

1. In admiralty cases a decree is not final while
an appeal from the same is depending in this court,
and any statute which governs the case must be an
existing valid statute at the time of affirming the
decree below.

The United States v. Preston, (65) 604

2. The Josefa Segunda, having persons of color
on board of her, was, on the 11th of February,
1818, found hovering on the coast of the United
States, and was seized and brought into New
Orleans, and the vessel and the persons on board
were libeled in the District Court of the United
States of Louisiana, under the Act of Congress of
the 2d of March, 1807. After the decree of condem-
nation below, but pending the appeal to this court,
the sheriff of New Orleans went on, with the con-
sent of all the parties to the proceedings, to sell the
persons of color as slaves, and sixty-five thousand
dollars, the proceeds, were deposited in the registry
of the court to await the final disposal of the
law. By the tenth section of the Act of the 30th of
April, 1818, the six first sections of the act are re-
pealed, and no provision is made by which the con-
dition of the persons of color found on board a
vessel hovering on the coast of the United States is
altered from that in which they were placed under
the Act of 1807, no power having been given to dis-
pose of them otherwise than to appoint some one to
receive them. The seventh section of the Act of
1818 confirms no other sales previously or subse-
quently made under the State laws, but those for
illegal importation, and does not comprise the case
of a condemnation under the seventh section. The
final condemnation of the persons on board the
Josefa Segunda took place in this court on the 13th
of March, 1820, after Congress had passed the Act
of the 3d of March, 1819, entitled, "An Act in addi-
tion to an act prohibiting the slave trade," by the
provisions of which persons of color brought in
under any of the acts prohibiting traffic in slaves,
were to be delivered to the President of the United
States to be sent to Africa. The condemnation
could not affect them.
Id.

(Ib.) 604

3. Where an appeal has been dismissed, the ap-
pellant having omitted to file a transcript of the
record within the time required by the rule of court,
an official certificate of the dismissal of the appeal
may not be given by the clerk during the term.
The appellant may file the transcript with the clerk
during the term, and move to have the appeal re-
61
961