Now, September 18, 1922, motion to strike off mechanics' lien is dismissed; petition for leave to amend is granted and claimants will, within fifteen days after service of a copy of this order upon them, submit the specifications of their amendment or amendments for allowance, of which submission the owners and contractors and all other parties, if any, shall have due notice. This order shall in no wise operate to prejudice intervening rights, if any there be. Costs to abide the outcome of the litigation.

YOUNG v. WOODRING (No. 2.)

Practice, C. P.-Statement of Claim-Affidavit of DefenseSufficiency-Assumpsit-Mechanics' Lien.

A disavowal of knowledge and a formal call for proof, in an affidavit of defense, do not constitute a specific denial.

An allegation that defendants cannot determine whether an exhibit to plaintiffs' statement is a copy of the books of original entries; that defendants did order certain goods at prices agreed upon; but that they are unable to state that the prices alleged in the statement are the prices agreed upon at the time of sale, and calling on plaintiffs to produce said books at the trial, is not a specific denial.

A denial that the total sum claimed is the amount due, or that it became due as alleged, is an ineffective denial.

Where plaintiffs have admitted certain credits, the defence is evasive and insufficient, when it admits one credit but claims more credit as to another item without stating the amount, etc.

A suit in assumpsit is not barred by the pendency of a mechanics' lien.

An allegation by defendants of the record of a mechanics' lien and a petition to amend the same, from which they deduce the conclusion that the defendant firm was the agent of one of its members in purchasing goods from plaintiffs, and that, therefore, the debt is not theirs but that of the purchasing member, is insufficient.

Defendants, after having admitted the sale and delivery to them, cannot defend on the ground that the purchase by the defendant firm was for an undisclosed principal, a member of the firm and one of the defendants, without averring anything as to whether the principalship was disclosed or undisclosed.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 157 June term, 1922. Edward M. Young, Wilson P. Ludwig and Robert A. Young, co-partners trading as M. S. Young and Company, v. William H. Woodring and George B. Woodring, copartners trading as W. H. Woodring and Son. Assumpsit. Rule for Judgment for Want of Sufficient Affidavit of Defense. Rule Absolute.

Butz & Rupp, for Plaintiffs.
Dallas Dillinger and Dewalt & Heydt, for Defendants.

Reno, J., September 18, 1922. Plaintiffs allege that they sold and delivered goods at the prices and in the amounts itemized in their exhibit "A" which is a copy of their boods of original entry. Defendant aver, "that they have no knowledge and upon investigation cannot determine as to whether the exhibit referred to as exhibit 'A' is a copy of the plaintiff's original account taken from the plaintiffs' book of original entries and in further answer thereto say that the defendants did order from plaintiffs' representatives certain goods and materials at prices and amounts agreed upon but the defendants are not able to say that the prices as stated in exhibit 'A' are the prices agreed upon at the time of the sale and as matter of defense call upon plaintiffs to produce their original books at the trial of the case." This denial is not specific within the meaning of the Practice Act (Section 6 and 8) and is equivalent to an admission of plaintiffs' allegations. A disavowal of knowledge and a formal call for proof do not constitute a specific denial: Buchler v. Fashion Plate Company, 269 Pa. 428; Mellon Bank v. People's Bank, 226 Pa. 261.

Plaintiffs allege that thereby there became due to them the sum of two thousand eight hundred thirty-eight dollars and ninety-four cents and that the same became due thirty days after the delivery of each article. Defendants deny that the total sum of two thousand eight hundred thirty-eight dollars and ninety-four cents is the amount due from defendants to plaintiffs and they fur ther deny that the same became due thirty days after the date of delivery of each article." The denial is bad: First, because it does not deny that which is alleged namely, that a certain amount became due; second, because a bald denial is never sufficient. To make his denial effective, a defendant must deny that he collected anything from the party named in the statement or aver how much he did collect from that party and he must make that denial so clear and specific that plaintiff may forthwith obtain judgment for the amount as to which there is no real defense:" Fulton Farmers Association v. Bomberger, 262 Pa. 43.

Plaintiffs admit a credit for sixty-six cents for goods returned on October 10, 1921 and two credits of three hundred dollars each for cash payments made on February 12, 1921 and February 7, 1922, leaving a balance of two thousand two hundred thirty-eight dollars and ninetyfour cents due for which suit is instituted. Defendants admit that the payment of three hundred dollars is correct but they claim they are entitled to more credit than the sixty cents mentioned of October 10, 1921, and they deny that the full sum of two thousand eight hundred thirty-eight dollars and ninety-four cents is still due and owing from defendants to plaintiffs." We do not understand this answer. Plaintiffs admit credits by cash payments aggregating six hundred dollars; defendants admit the correctness of only one of these payments in the sum of three hundred dollars. Plaintiffs admit a credit. of sixty-six cents for goods returned; defendants aver that they are entitled to more credit than sixty cents without stating whether it is sixty-six cents or more or how such larger credit became available to them. Plaintiffs aver that two thousand two hundred thirty-eight dollars and ninety-four cents is the balance due; defendants deny that the sum of two thousand eight hundred thirty-eight dollars and ninety-four cents is due. Of course, the answer is insufficient because it is evasive.

As a further defense defendants set out the record of mechanics' liens filed in this court by these plaintiff's against these defendants and also the petitions to amend the same from which, by a comparison of the averments of the liens and the petitions, they deduce the conclusion that the defendant firm was the agent of one of its members, namely, George B. Woodring, in purchasing goods from plaintiffs and that the debt is, therefore, not theirs but George B. Woodring's. That is, to say nothing of the error of pleading a conclusion, and after having admitted the sale and delivery to them, they propose to defend upon the ground that the purchase by the defendant firm was for an undisclosed principal, a member of the firm and one of the defendants, without averring anything as to whether the principalship was disclosed or undisclosed. The mere statement of their position is the best exposition of its unsoundness. Nor is the suit in assumpsit barred by the pendency of the mechanics' liens: Act

of June 4, 1901 (P. L. 455; section 58); Artman v. Truby, 130 Pa. 619.

Now, September 18, 1922, rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense absolute and the Prothonotary will enter judgment for plaintiffs and against defendants for principal and interest upon praecipe of plaintiffs' attorneys.

THORNTON v. THORNTON.

Divorce-Master's Report-Finding of Facts-Recommitting Report-Act of March 10, 1899, P. L. 8.

The Act of March 10, 1899, P. L. 8, requires the report of the Master in divorce to be framed in the manner of reports of Masters in chancery. It should contain specific findings of fact.

When the proper practice has not been followed, the report will be recommitted.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 152 January term, 1922. Marguerite E. Thornton v. James S. Thornton. Divorce. Master's Report. Report recommitted.

Oliver W. Frey, for Libellant.

John D. Hoffman, for Respondent.

Reno, J., September 18, 1922. We regret that we are obliged to recommit this report to the Master. Except for the defect which we shall point out it is an able and exhaustive report and evinces the learned Master's conscientious effort to solve properly and justly a case bristling with difficulties in respect to the facts. But these very difficulties require us to return the report. There are no findings of those facts concerning which controversy exists. The fifth paragraph of the findings of facts, viz., "that because of indignities to the person of the libellant, the libellant was compelled to withdraw from the respondent's home and family and that the respondent has been guilty of cruel and barbarous treatment, endangering the libellant's life" is a conclusion of law, or at most a conclusion compounded of law and facts. Beyond that there are no findings of the disputed and con

troverted facts, unless certain references to the testimony made by the learned Master in that part of his report called the "Discussion" might be taken as findings. In a pinch we might so regard them if they were there stated as findings, but even in the "Discussion" the learned Master does not so treat them. To illustrate: the learned Master says, "the libellant asserts that she was seventeen years of age at the time of her marriage and that the respondent was ten years her senior." It is obvious that if this is intended as the finding of a fact it lacks that positive, distinct and specific statement of the existence of a fact which is essential to a finding. At most, it is a finding of what libellant asserted or averred and not a finding that that which she asserted was the fact. If, therefore, that fact is to be considered as material upon which a conclusion of law is to be founded, the Master should find as a fact, not what libellant asserted, but that, "libellant was seventeen years old and respondent twenty-seven years old at the time of the marriage." A more glaring instance is provided by the statement in the "Discussion" as follows: "The testimony shows that the respondent admitted his wrongdoing." It is exceedingly important to know whether or not the respondent confessed to his wrongful acts. It is, perhaps, the pivotal point of the case. The libellant asserts it; the respondent denies it. What is the fact? Did respondent admit the wrongdoing? A finding that "the testimony shows" is a finding of what some of the testimony discloses, but is not a finding, except possibly by inference, upon the weight of all the testimony, of the fact whether or not he admitted the wrong-doing. We may note also, in passing, that there is no finding, even by reference in the "Discussion", of respondent's contention that for a long period of time after the alleged happening of certain acts of indignities respondent remained in the same house with libellant. To the respondent this may possibly be an important factor in the decision of the case, and if the learned Master, after considering the weight of the testimony with respect o that contention, is convinced that such was the fact he should give respondent the benefit of such finding. It is needless to say that respondent is entitled to a finding of all facts which he has proved by the weight of the testimony to the sat