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duty. At the argument we suggested to counsel for appellee that a man might leave his wife, be absent a month or even a shorter period, during which she endeavored to learn of his whereabouts so that a warrant could be served upon him, and having no other means of support, performed small services for her neighbors, and that, if appellee's contention prevailed, she could not be awarded compensation; and counsel with characteristic frankness conceded that that was precisely the logical but regrettable conclusion following the application of the principle of law for which he contends. From such a conclusion one instinctively recoils, especially when it results from the interpretation of a statute into which has been supposedly written the most modern and enlightened thought for the alleviation of the industrial evils of the day. In a statute designed for that purpose only an exceptionally clear expression of the legislative intent should move the courts to adopt such rule. For ourselves, we cannot adopt the rule and we prefer to believe that a widow should be denied compensation only when she has made no effort to compel the decedent to perform his legal obligation or has otherwise acquiesced in his refusal to maintain her: Cf. Karpati v. Cambria Steel Co., 70 Pa. Super. Ct. R., 202; Corcoran v. Penna. Coal Co., 76 Pa. Super. Ct. R., 325.

Now, May 17, 1922, the appeal of the claimant is sustained, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board is reversed; the award of the referee is reinstated and judgment is entered for the claimant and against the defendant in the sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) together with interest at the rate of six (6) per cent. per annum from December 6, 1920 to May 17, 1922, or $260.50, a total of $3,260.50 to be paid in the manner provided for by law.

BRUCH v. BRUCH.

Divorce Adultery-Bill of Particular-Sufficiency.

Where libellant, in a bill of particulars in divorce, made two specific allegations of adultery by respondent, and in the third allegation averred "that at other times and places between said dates of September 23, 1921, and January, 1921, the respondent committed adultery" with the same person, but averring inability to supply more exact information, it was held that the third allegation was as specific as the nature of the case would allow and fairly apprised respondent and the court of the nature of the charge and evidence.

Doubted, whether respondent was entitled to a bill of particulars before filing an answer.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 3 January Term, 1922. Earl E. Bruch v. Bessie C. Bruch. Divorce Bill of particulars. Rule for more specific bill. Rule discharged.

Dewalt & Heydt, for Libellant.
John D. Hoffman, for Respondent.

Reno, J., May 17, 1922. In response to a rule, procured by respondent, after the return day but before filing an answer, libellant filed a bill of particulars in the first two paragraphs of which he specified two distinct acts of adultery by mentioning precisely date, place and particeps criminis. In the third paragraph he alleged "that at other times and places between said dates of September 23, 1921, and January, 1921, the respondent committed adultery" with a person named and avers that he cannot now state the exact time and places with greater particularity. Respondent demands a more specific bill, alleging that the last mentioned specification is too vague and indefinite. With this we cannot agree. The first and second paragraphs are admittedly beyond criticism. They fix certainly, definitely and positively the first and last acts of adultery. The third paragraph definitely, certainly and positively fixed a period, coincident with the period comprehended by the first two paragraphs, during which other acis of adultery are alleged to have been committed with the same person mentioned in the first two paragraphs. This paragraph, taken and read in connection with the first two paragraphs and keeping in mind libellant's averment of inability to supply more exact information, is as specific as the nature of the case

will allow and fairly apprises respondent and the court of the nature of the charge and the nature of the evidence: Weedon v. Weedon, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. R., 358. When libellant cannot specify dates it is proper for him to state between what dates the acts are alleged to have been committed: Ehrhart v. Ehrhart, 18 District Reports, 925. If libellant should before trial or hearing secure more definite information he will undoubtedly notify libellant in advance of trial: Garratt v. Garratt, 4 Yeates, 244.

We doubt whether respondent was entitled to a bill of particulars before filing an answer. However, this question not having been raised requires no decision.

Now, May 17, 1922, rule for a more specific bill of particulars is discharged.

WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP ROAD.

Roads-Vacating - Petition-Report - Termini-Improvements-Notice-Act of April 21' 1846, P. L. 416,Sec. 1; June 13, 1836, P. L. 551; April 23, 1909, P. L. 142; May 28, 1913. P. L. 368, and April 3, 1899, P. L. 26, Sec. 1.

1. It seems that the court has the same power, under the Act of April 21, 1846, P. L. 416, Sec. 1, to vacate roads "existing by prescription or lapse of time," as it possessed under the Act of June 13, 1836, P. L. 551.

2-While petitions for laying out or vacating roads, under Act of April 23, 1909, P. L. 142, shall defiinitely fix points of beginning and ending, by giving exact distances from an intersecting public road, street or railroad already opened, a defect therein is cured by a report of viewers fixing with mathematical precision said termini.

3. Under the Act of June 13, 1836, P. L. 551, Sec. 3, where it ap pears that there may be improvements through which the road passes, which are not shown on the plot or draft annexed to the viewers' report, the court will allow the exceptant to move for a reference back for amendment by noting improvements.

4. Where, under rule of court, it is required that notice be given "to the owners or occupants of the land along the route of the proposed road," the court would hesitate to confirm a report vacating a road, of which an abutting owner had no notice, even though said rule refers only to the opening of a new road, especially since the Act of May 28, 1913, P. L. 368, which permits the recovery of damages for vacation of township roads; but, where an abutting owner is a petitioner for vacation, no notice is required.

5. In Lehigh County, the opening of roads is governed by local acts, and the damages are payable by the township, and, therefore, no notice to the county commissioners is required.

In the Court of Quarter Sessions of Lehigh County. In re Proposed Road in the Township of Washington. Exceptions to Report of Viewers. Leave granted for motion for reference back; otherwise exceptions dismissed.

Thomas F. Diefenderfer and Oliver W. Frey, for Petitioners.

Charles D. Thomas, for Exceptants.

May 15, 1922, Reno, J. The petitioners prayed for the opening of a road in Washington Township "to lead from a point in a public road leading from Slatington to the Heidelberg Church and Saegersville, and beginning at a point about sixteen and one-half (162) feet South of a hickory nut tree; thence on the North side of said public road leading from Oswalds Mill to Emerald, a distance of about twelve hundred (1200) feet, and extending thence to a point in the same mentioned public road to a point about sixteen and one-half (162) feet South of a walnut stump in the said public road, being the ending of the proposed public road." They also prayed for the vacation "of that part of the public road now opened and used from the point of beginning and point of ending of the proposed new road which last mentioned portion of the public road will be reason of the laying out of the proposed new road become useless."

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The viewers have returned a report and have laid out a new road, describing it as follows:

"Beginning at an iron pin in the middle of the public road leading from Best's Station to Slatington, said point being 16.5 feet south of a hickory tree located along the north side of said road, and 392 feet eastward from the intersection of said public road with a public road leading from Oswald's Mill to Slatedale, thence through lands of Sarah Rauch and Benjamin and Edgar P. Miller N. 67 degrees, 15 minutes East 1297.8 feet to an iron pin in the middle of first mentioned public road the place of ending, said iron pin being 16.5 feet south of a walnut stump located along the north side of said public road and 1717.3 feet eastward from the intersection of the public roads above mentioned." And have vacated a portion of the old road, describing the vacated part as follows:

"Beginning at an iron pin in the middle of the public road leading from Best's Station to Slatington, said point being 392 feet eastward from the intersection of said public road with a public road leading from Oswald's Mill to Slatedale, thence along the middle of first mentioned public road N. 72 degrees, 20 minutes, East 625.3 feet to a point, thence North 82 degrees, 30 minutes, East 200 feet to a point, thence North 63 degrees, 30 minutes, East 150 feet to a point, thence North 50 degrees, 30 minutes, East 350 feet to the place of ending, the same being 1717.3 feet east of the intersection hereinbefore mentioned."

To their report exceptions have been filed which, with the depositions taken on behalf of the petitioners, are before us for disposition.

The first exception is: "The petition does not state the kind of road to be vacated" The contention is, that although the court is invested with power to vacate parts C he whole of public roads, (that is, roads opened by authority of law), its power to vacate roads existing by prescription is limited in that only the whole of a socalled prescriptive road may be vacated, and that, therefore, the petition to vacate part of a road must state whether it is a public or a prescriptive road which is to be vacated. But it will be observed that the petition states that the road to be vacated is a public road and the exception is therefore without merit. Moreover, we think that the Act of April 21, 1846 (Section 1; P. L. 416) confers upon the court precisely the same power to vacate roads "existing by prescription or lapse of time" as it possesses under the Act of June 13, 1836 (P. L. 551.)

The second exception is that the petition does not conform to the Act of April 23, 1909 (P. L. 142). That Act requires that petitions for laying out or vacating roads shall definitely fix points of beginning and ending by giving exact distance from an intersecting public road, street or railroad already opened. The purpose of the Act is to give the State Highway Department information in order that it may have a complete record of the system of roads of the Commonwealth: Roaring Brook Township Road: 72 Pa. Superior Ct. R., 447. The intersecting road referred to in the Act means that road which intersects the public road upon which the terminal point

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