1922 proceed in the manner required by law for securing a determination of the question in controversy.

Now June 19, 1922, rule discharged. Costs of the rule to abide the event of the litigation.

Ordinances

LANDIS v. BOROUGH OF COOPERSBURG. Boroughs Title-Increase of IndebtednessSubmission to Electors-Return-Record-Canvass of Vote-Equity-Laches-Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 312; Act of April 20, 1874, P. L. 65, as Amended by Acts of April 18, 1895, P. L. 36 and of May 11, 1897, P. L. 53; and as Amended by Acts of June 9, 1891, P. L. 252, and of May 1, 1909, P. L. 317.

1.-Under the Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 312, a borough ordinance requires no title; at most, if a title is used, it may not be unduly misleading.

2. An ordinance signifying a desire for the increase of indebtedness, stating the amount, purpose, and character thereof, and providing for the holding of an election to secure the assent of the electors thereto, was clearly comprehended in a title signifying the desire of the corporate authorities to make increase, stating the amount, and that it was "for the purpose of erecting a municipal building for the use of a fire hall, fire apparatus, and other borough purposes," and said title is not misleading.

3. Nor was the ordinance defective because it contemplated the issue of bonds in the sum of $26,000, the title thereto referring to an increase of indebtedness of only $19,500, when $6500 of the former sum was to be used for refunding a debt of like amount, and when the net increase was actually only $19,500.

4. The ordinance was not invalid for containing more than one subject because it evidenced the councilmanic desire to increase the indebtedness and also provided for the holding of an election to secure the assent of the electors.

5. The ordinance was not invalid because it provided for the payment of outstanding bonds and also for the purchase of fire apparatus and a municipal building.

6. An ordinance signifying a desire to increase the indebtedness and the holding of an election in reference thereto, need not contain a provision assessing an annual tax. The legislative provision (Act of April 20, 1874, P. L. 65 as amended by the Acts of April 18, 1895, P. L. 36 and May 11, 1897, P. L. 53) is that the tax shall be levied "before issuing any obligations," and it is sufficient if such tax is levied by the ordinance authorizing the issuing of the bonds.

7. The Act of May 1, 1909, P. L. 317, amending the Acts of April 20, 1874, P. L. 65 and June 9, 1891, P. L. 252, requires that a certified copy of the ordinance and advertisement of holding election shall be returned to the Clerk of the Quarter Sessions, together with the return of the vote. Said copies need not be filed at the same time as was the return of the vote, as the Act, in so far as it relates to said copies, is

merely directory, or so, at least, up to the time the bonds or obligations are issued.

8. The fact that the record does not show that the vote, as returned, had been canvassed and computed by the court, is insufficient to invalidate the election; it must also be shown affirmatively that it was not so canvassed and computed.

9. Doubted, whether the Court of Quarter Sessions is required to canvass and compute the vote of special elections of boroughs to increase the indebtedness thereof.

10. A delay in filing a bill. seeking an injunction restraining the issue of bonds, etc., for more than fourteen months after an election authorizing the same, is fatal and subjects the plaintiffs to laches.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. In Equity No. 1, April Term, 1921, Frank B. Landis, David Link, W. S. Moyer and Aaron M. Landis v. The Borough of Coopersburg; John Young, Chief Burgess, and Burton Shaffer, Harry Young, Peter Cooper, Robert Cressman, James Smith, Edgar Knerr and Allen Scholl, members of Town Council of the Borough of Coopersburg. Bill in Equity. Biss Dismissed.

C. William Freed and Dewalt & Heydt, for Plaintiffs. Thomas F. Diefenderfer and Oliver W. Frey, for Defendants.

Reno, J., May 17, 1922. This suit was instituted by bill filed January 28, 1921, to which defendant filed an answer on March 1, 1921. Testimony was heard by the late Judge Henninger on June 20, 1921 and it was finally argued before him on July 11, 1921. Judge Henninger held the case under advisement and had not announced or formulated a decision at the date of his death on September 25, 1921. Immediately after my appointment, finding the papers of the case in the files of Judge Henninger's chambers, with the concurrence of the President Judge, I ordered and heard re-argument on November 21, 1921. At that time reference was made to a certain petition presented to Judge Henninger after the argument of July 11, 1921, (that is, on September 15, 1921), praying for leave to defendants to file nunc pro tunc copies of ordinance and advertisement but this petition had not been discovered among the papers of the late Judge although the exceptions, or more properly, the protest of the plaintiffs against the filing thereof, were found. I agreed that the parties should have a reasonable opportunity of discovering these papers before I should formulate my decision.

Early in 1922 after I had begun to study the case and was about to write an opinion, I was informed by counsel that a petition would be presented to the Court of Quarter Sessions for leave to complete the record in that court. This petition was presented February 20, 1922, argued by both sides, and leave granted on March 6, 1922. On that date a petition was presented to this court for leave to reopen this case for the purpose of proving the record in the Court of Quarter Sessions and this petition, having been argued, was granted by opinion filed April 10, 1922. (For opinion, vide 9 Leh. Co. Law Journal, 406). The second hearing was held on April 17, 1922. This statement is regarded as an explanation for the seemingly long delay in announcing the decision of the chancellor.

In this connection it might also be stated that after the second hearing there was found among the papers the petition already referred to as having been presented to Judge Henninger. Upon the back of the petition there is endorsed thereon in the hand writing of Judge Henninger the following: "And now September 15, 1921, the within papers are directed to be filed by the Prothonotary nunc pro tunc: By the Court, Milton C. Henninger, Judge (at Chambers)." There is also the following notation endorsed "Lehigh County, Pa., filed September 15, 1921, Prothonotary's Office." Included in the petition is a copy of the advertisement and a certified copy of the ordinance. I do not know whether Judge Henninger regarded the filing of this petition and the accompanying papers as the equivalent of their proof in the trial of the cause, and in view of the fact that the same evidence is now supplied by the completed record in the Court of Quarter Sessions it is unnecessary to determine this question. I am noting this fact here because it supplies evidence that defendants moved promptly and diligently to secure proof of the missing ordinance and advertisement concerning which there is considerable discussion and controversy in this case.

I.

THE PLEADINGS.

The following is a brief summary of the several pleadings filed in this case:

A. Bill of Complaint..

1. That the plaintiffs are residents, electors and tax payers of the Borough of Coopersburg.

2. That the Borough of Coopersburg is located in the County of Lehigh and that the defendants, in addition to the borough, are the Chief Burgess and members of Town Council.

3. That on September 1, 1919, the council enacted an ordinance signifying their desire to increase the corporate indebtedness in the sum of nineteen thousand five hundred dollars ($19,500.00) for the purpose of purchasing fire apparatus and a municipal building.

4. That on November 4, 1919, an election was held upon the proposed increase and that a majority of the electors signified their assent to the increase.

5. That defendants propose to increase the indebtedness in the manner and in the amounts prescribed by the ordinance.

6. That after the election defendants purchased premises in the borough for the purpose of erecting a municipal building. (This being referred to in the evidence as the Shank property.)

7. That defendants are proceeding to purchase another certain tract of real estate known as the "Barron House."

8. That the last assessed valuation of taxable property was $457,448.00 and that the indebtedness at that time was $6,700.00.

9. That the proposed increase of indebtedness in the sum of nineteen thousand five hundred dollars ($19,500.00) is beyond the power of the defendants.

10. That the defendants claim to be duly authorized to make contracts and purchases and to increase the indebtedness and to issue bonds.

11. That the defendants have no such power because the election was not legal in that: (a) the title of the ordinance is vague, indefinite and misleading and gives no proper notice of its contents; (b) the title signifies a desire to increase the indebtedness by nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and the ordinance authorizes bonds in the sum of Twenty-six Thousand Dollars; (c) the ordinance has not been transcribed in the ordinance book; (d) that no proper return of the election

has been made to the Clerk of the Court of Quarter Sessions; (e) that no certified copy of the ordinance or advertisement has been returned and filed with the Clerk of Quarter Sessions; (f) no certified copy of the return under seal of the court has been furnished to the borough and the same has not been placed of record upon the minutes thereof.

12. That the premises known as the Barron House is not suitable whereon to erect a municipal building and that defendants have no legal right to purchase the same because: (a) said premises are not suitably adapted for the purposes; (b) said premises are larger than is necessary; (c) the price proposed to be paid is excessive; (d) that the ordinance does not give defendants authority to purchase the premises; (e) defendants have no authority to purchase the premises.

13. That the proposed action on the part of defendants will subject plaintiffs to an unjust and illegal burden and irreparable injury and damage.

14. That the ordinance is void, that the election was illegal, that the purchase of the premises was illegal and that the bonds, if issued, will be without warrant of law. The prayer is for an injunction restraining issue of bonds and general relief.

B. The Answer.

1. Admits allegations of first paragraph of bill. 2. Admits allegations of second paragraph of bill. 3. Admits that ordinance referred to was enacted. 4. Admits the allegation of fourth paragraph of bill. 5. Admits the allegations of the fifth paragraph of bill.

6. Admits the allegations of the sixth paragraph of bill.

7. Alleges that the property referred to in the sixth paragraph of the bill was found insufficient and inadequate and that therefore the same is to be sold and the "Barron House" property purchased, that the purchase price of the Barron property is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and that citizens of the Borough have agreed to contribute at least three thousand five hundred ($3,500) dollars as a donation to the borough for said purchase.