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of his car, while the son says he was hit in front of the rear wheel, indicating he was well in the traveled bed of the road. The lane he traversed was sixty-three feet wide; he says he saw the defendant approach thirty-five to forty feet from him and if his car was hit in front of the front wheel, if he had deflected his car either to the right or left as he had time to do, the collision would not have occurred. In this condition of the case it cannot be said he presented a case free of contributory negligence. Lynch v. Erie, 157 Pa. 380, 382.

Lucas v. Morris & Johnson, 79 Pa. Sup. Ct. 524.

DECREE.

Now, November 7, 1923, motion to take off compulsory non-suit is overruled.

COMMONWEALTH, TO USE, v. CLAUSS, ET AL. Execution Wages Claim-Sufficient Notice-Act of April 9, 1872, P. L. 48.

The notice to be given the Sheriff by the claimants under the Wages Act of April 9, 1872, P. L. 48, must set forth the following essentials:

(a) The amount of wages due;

(b) The character of service performed and that the same were performed in a business conducted by defendant and such as is defined by law;

(c)

Its performance within the time limited by law;

(d) The process in the hands of the sheriff so that he can identify the same; and

(e) That the claim is a lien upon the property under levy.

A notice signed by a father on behalf of his minor daughter, for wages as a domestic during a certain period, is sufficient, as "domestic" carries with it a definition of the work and place where it was performed and the business of the employer, Ely v. Stanton, 120 Pa. 532, distinquished.

An averment in the affidavit of defense raising questions of law, alleging that the wage notice was filed after the sale, is a speaking demurrer.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to the use of Merle Schlegel, a minor, by her father and next friend, Charles P. Schlegel, v. William F. Clauss, Sheriff of Lehigh County and Royal Indemnity Company of New York. No. 19 January Term, 1924. Assumpsit. Affidavit of Defense raising Questions of Law. Affidavit Overruled.

James F. Henninger, for Use Plaintiff.
Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for Defendants.

Reno, J., December 3, 1923. Plaintiff, a minor suing by her father as next friend, seeks to recover from the sheriff and his sureties, the sum of $19.00, alleging that the sheriff refused to honor and pay her claim for wages out of the fund realized by the execution against her employer, Irvin B. Spohn. The statutory demurrer raises questions which relate principally to the sufficiency of the notice of her claim filed with the Sheriff and attached to her statement of claim in this court.

It may be affirmed that the notice filed with the sheriff is not drawn with that degree of care which a formal pleading is drawn. But we are not obliged to be astute or hypercritical in passing upon the notice. The Act of April 9, 1872, (P. L. 48) and the several amendments thereof do not prescribe a form of notice, and it has been repeatedly held notices are sufficient, which, with reasonable certainty, inform the sheriff of (a) the amount of wages due, (b) the character of service performed and that the same were performed in a business conducted by defendant and such as is defined by law, (c) its performance within the time limited by law, (d) the process in the hands of the sheriff so that he can identify the same, and (e) that the claim is a lien upon the property under levy: Adamson's Appeal, 110 Pa. 459; Hall's Estate, 148 Pa. 121; Timmes v. Metz, 156 Pa. 384; Hoffa v. Person, 1 Super. Ct. R., 357; Bank v. Chemical Co., 9 Super. Ct. R., 275.

The notice is signed by Chas. P. Schlegel on behalf of his minor daughter, and is for her wages as a domestic during August, September and October, 1922. It is true that the nature of execution defendant's business is not defined in the notice except in so far as the word "domestic" defines it. A "domestic" is a servant girl in a private family and, of itself, carries with it a definition of the work for which she was employed, the place where it was performed and the business of the employer, i. e., a householder. To ask for further definition would be requiring the gilding of fine gold.

At first blush it would seem that the case of Ely v. Stanton, 120 Pa. 532, rules that notice cannot be given by

a father on behalf of his minor children. But careful reading of that case shows that the wage claim therein discussed was found invalid because the record failed to disclose either the kind of labor or the character of the defendant as one of the enumerated classes of employers mentioned in the Act of 1872. That the father sued seems not to be the reason for the case. Apart from this, the suit here is not by the father in his own right but as the next friend of his daughter and the latter is, therefore, the real party plaintiff.

The statement of claim alleges that the notice was filed October 31, 1922, and that the sale was held November 1, 1922. The notice was, therefore, filed on time. But the demurrer alleges that it was filed after the sale. To that extent the demurrer is a speaking demurrer and cannot be considered.

Now, December 3, 1923, the affidavit of defense raising questions of law for the decision of the court is overruled. Defendants will file affidavit of defense within fifteen days after service of this order.

COMMONWEALTH, TO USE, v. CLAUSS, ET AL. (No. 2.)

Execution-Wages Claim-Sufficient Notice-Act of April 9, 1872, P. L. 48.

The notice given the Sheriff by a wage claimant under the Wages Act of April 9, 1872, P. L. 48, in the shape of a bill, itemizing the days upon which claimant performed "hired labor" for defendant and the rate per day, but not setting forth that the property levied upon is subject to claimant's lien and stating no facts which described the process in the hands of the sheriff sufficient to identify it, is defective.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to the use of E. H. Bleiler, v. William F. Clauss, Sheriff of Lehigh County and Royal Indemnity Company of New York. No. 20 January Term, 1924. Assumpsit. Affidavit of Defense raising Questions of Law. Affidavit Sustained.

James F. Henninger, for Use Plaintiff.
Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for Defendants.

Reno, J., December 3, 1923. Most of the questions raised by this record have already been decided in an opinion this day filed in Commonwealth to the use of Merle Schlegel v. Clauss, No. 19 January Term, 1924, a case arising out of the same circumstances. It is necessary here to indicate only briefly the new question raised by this record.

The notice is in the shape of a bill, itemizing the days upon which claimant performed "hired labor" for defendant and the rate per day. But it does not allege that the property levied upon is subject to claimant's lien and states no facts which describe the process in the hands of the sheriff sufficiently to identify it: Hall's Estate, 148 Pa. 121. The notice is defective and, therefore, the action to recover cannot be sustained.

Now, December 3, 1923, the affidavit of defense raising questions of law is sustained.

IN RE ESTATE OF MAX HESS, DECEASED. Transfer Tax-Appralsement-Foreign Real Estate-Appeal from Appraisement.

A Pennsylvania decedent, seized of real estate in another state authorized by will his executors to sell real estate, and pay pecuniary legacies out of the proceeds thereof, if the personal estate proved insufficient for their payment.

On an appeal from the transfer tax appraisement, which included this foreign real estate, Held, that the Court could not, in the state of the record, determine whether a conversion would surely take place, and for that reason dismissed the appeal without prejudice to right to renew the question on the settlement of the estate.

If the foreign real estate would, by the terms of the will, have been converted into personal property by an imperative direction to sell, or by an absolute necessity to sell in order that the terms of the will might be effectuated, or by such blending of real and personal estate as to create a fund out of which beneficiaries were to be paid, such property would be taxable.

able.

Not decided, whether unconverted lands in another state are tax

In re Appeal of Lehigh Valley Trust Company, Trustee of Florence R. Hess, under the will of Max Hess, deceased, and of the Lehigh Valley Trust Company, Trustee of Max Hess, Jr., under the Will of Max Hess, Deceased. In the Orphans' Court of Lehigh County. No.

17,874. Appeal from Transfer Tax Appraisement. Appeal Dismissed Without Prejudice.

Horace W. Schantz, for Commonwealth.

Butz & Rupp, for Appellant.

Reno, J., December 3, 1923. This controversy arises upon appeal of the Lehigh Valley Trust Company, trustee under the will of Max Hess, deceased, from the appraisement filed in the office of the Register of Wills of the taxable value of said estate. Included in the appraisement are certain parcels of real estate situate in New Jersey. Broadly stated, appellant's contention is that such property being beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Pennsylvania is also beyond the limits of its taxing power and that to that extent the tax is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.

The Commonwealth rests its right to the tax upon the Act approved June 20, 1919 (P. L. 521) which provides, inter alia, "that a tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property, real or personal

*** when the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this Commonwealth from any persons dying seized or possessed of the property while a resident of this Commonwealth whether the property be situated within the Commonwealth or elsewhere."

The Commonwealth contends that (a) the imposition of the tax is within its powers and (b) the fact that decedent's real estate is beyond the confines of the Commonwealth is beside the point since a conversion of that property is apparently necessary to carry out the terms of the will.

Concerning the last stated contention, it is conceded, as indeed it must be, that if the New Jersey property is, by the terms of the will, converted into personal property, by an imperative direction to sell, or by an absolute necessity to sell in order that the terms of the will may be effectuated, or by such blending of real and personal estate as to create a fund out of which beneficiaries are to be paid, such property is taxable: Miller v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 321; Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. 508; Vanuxem's Estate, 212 Pa. 315; Chamberlain's Estate, 257 Pa. 113. Further, a mere discretionary power to sell

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