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of the corporate authorities of the Borough of Coopersburg to make an increase of the borough indebtedness in the sum of $19,500 for the purpose of erecting a municipal building for the use of a fire hall, fire apparatus and other borough purposes." We are asked to hold that this title is vague, indefinite and misleading. There is little merit in this contention. The Borough Code (Act May 14, 1915, P. L., 312) does not require that ordinances enacted by boroughs shall contain a title. It has been held that an ordinance of a municipality is not a law within the meaning of the constitutional provision requiring that the subject of the enactment be clearly expressed in a title: Corry v. Corry Chair Co., 18 Pa. Super. Ct. R., 261, 279. It is true that in Storch v. Lansdowne, 239 Pa. 306, the Supreme Court considered the alleged defectiveness of a title of a borough ordinance and used expressions which might imply that a title is an essential part of a borough ordinance even in the absence of legislative requirement. But in view of the fact that there is no provision in the organic law regulating boroughs requiring ordinances to have titles we think that, at most, this case is authority only for the rule that if a title is used it may not be unduly misleading. Viewed in that light we cannot say that the title is misleading. The ordinance signifies a desire for the increase of indebtedness, setting out the amount, purpose and character of the indebtedness and providing for the holding of an election to secure the assent of the electors thereto. These provisions are clearly comprehended within the title or, at least, the title gives fair notice of the legislative purpose: Phoenixville Road, 109 Pa. 44, 49; Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. 165; Mt. Joy v. Turnpike Co., 182 Pa. 581. Nor is it defective because the ordinance contemplates the issuance of bonds in the sum of $26,000; for, out of the proceeds of the issue in that amount, a prior indebtedness of $6,500 is to be paid, leaving the net increase $19,500, all of which is to be expended for fire apparatus and a municipal building. It was not misleading to call it an increase of $19,500; for the net increase is precisely in that amount; and the refunding of the $6,500 debt is not the creation of a debt but the continuance of an existing debt; Schuldice v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 28.

2. The Ordinance.

The ordinance is said to be invalid because it contains more than one subject, that is, it evidences the councilmanic desire to increase the indebtedness and also provides for the holding of an election at which the assent of the electors thereto may be secured. This contention has been squarely met and decided adversely to plaintiffs in Storch v. Lansdowne, supra, and further consideration of it is not required.

It is also suggested that the ordinance is invalid because it provides for the payment of outstanding bonds and also for the purchase of fire apparatus and a municipal building. This, it is argued, constitutes two subjects or questions and upon the authority of Bloomsburg Town Election, 18 Pa. C. C., 449; s. c. 4 District Reports, 671, we are asked to declare the ordinance invalid. But that case has been impliedly overruled by Barr v. Philadelphia, 191 Pa. 438, which very clearly holds that at election for the increase of debt the electors are to assent or dissent to or from the increase of the indebtedness and not to or from the purposes to which the proceeds of the debt so created are to be applied. It follows, that the subject of a debt increasing ordinance is the increase of the municipal indebtedness and that the purposes of the increase are not to be regarded as several, separate, distinct subjects of legislation which cannot be joined in one enactment: Major v. Alden Borough, 209 Pa. 247.

3. Annual Tax.

The act of April 20, 1874 (P. L., 65) as amended by the acts of April 18, 1895 (P. L., 36) and May 11, 1897 (P. L., 53) provides:

"And they shall, (that is, the municipal authorities, before issuing any obligations therefor, assess and levy an annual tax, the collection of which shall commence the first year after the said increase, which tax shall be equal to and sufficient for and applied exclusively to the payment of the interest and principal of such debt within a period not exceedingly thirty years from the date of such increase."

It is claimed that because the ordinance does not contain a provision assessing an annual tax it is void. The provision is that the tax shall be levied "before issu

ing any obligations." Hence, if obligations are issued without providing a sufficient tax the obligations are void: Bruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. 152: but until authority is given for their issuance there is no requirement for the assessment and levy of a tax. The ordinance before us merely provides a method for securing the electoral assent to an increase. That assent having been secured further action is necessary in order to authorize the proper borough officials to execute, sell and deliver the obligations and these obligations will be valid if and only if the ordinance authorizing them contains a provision for an annual tax. But certainly, the ordinance signifying a desire to increase need not contain the provision. It would be senseless to require municipalities to levy a tax to pay a debt which, because the electors refused their sanction, might never be incurred and never could be incurred. 4. The Return.

The act of April 20, 1874 (P. L., 65) as amended by the acts of June 9, 1891 (P. L. 252) and May 1, 1909, (P. L., 317) provides:

"Such election (that is an election for securing assent to a proposed increase of debt) shall be held at the place, time and under the same regulations as provided by law for the holding of municipal elections, and it shall be the duty of the inspectors to receive tickets and to deposit said tickets in a box provided for that purpose, as is provided by law in regard to other tickets received at said election; and the tickets so received shall be counted and return thereof made to the clerk of the court of quarter sessions as is required by law, together with a certified copy of the ordinance and advertisement."

Admittedly, the return when produced at the original hearing was not accompanied by certified copies of the ordinance and advertisement. The clerk of the Court of Quarter Sessions testified that a certified copy of the ordinance might have been filed but he could not say "for certain." At least, no certified copies of the ordinance and advertisement were offered in evidence. Later, efforts were made to supply the evidence thus lacking. To these efforts I have already referred and it is not now necessary again to review them. It is sufficient to say that, finally, the borough was permitted to file certified copies in the Court of Quarter Sessions and that the

record of the Court of Quarter Sessions, as it then existed, was offered and received in evidence at a second hearing of this case.

Of course, there is still open for discussion and decision the question raised by plaintiffs with respect to the provision of the act. Plaintiffs contend that the provisions of the act are mandatory and that unless the certified copies are filed "together with" the return and at the same time that the return is filed or, at least, within the time limited by law for the filing of the return, the election is invalid and void. That, after all, being the fundamental question for decision it is unnecessary to determine whether the Court of Quarter Sessions had power to permit defendants to file certified copies nunc pro tunc, even though it is assumed that equity will examine the regularity of proceedings in the Court of Quarter Sessions. Certainly, if plaintiffs' contention that the election has become void for failure to file the certified copies with the return is correct it must inevitably follow that the Court of Quarter Sessions could not validate that which was then void and that the election being void equity possesses Jurisdiction to restrain municipal authorities from proceeding without legal authority. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that we now have evidence proving that the advertisement required by law was duly made we must still decide whether it was essential to the validity of the election that the ordinance and advertisement be filed with the return.

This particular provision of the act has not been construed by the courts, although, as already stated, it has been in the law since 1874. Other provisions of the same act have been interpreted by the Supreme Court: McGuire v. Philadelphia, 245 Pa. 307; Hoffman v. Pittsburg, 229 Pa. 26; Bullitt v. Philadelphia, 230 Pa. 544. Indeed, the provisions of this act and similar acts have been so frequently held to be mandatory that one must hesitate before declaring otherwise. However, merely because some of the provisions of an act are held to be mandatory is not sufficient reason for holding all mandatory. A statute may be compounded of provisions which go to the very heart of the matter and of such as are merely incidental. Thus, there is surely some difference in the degree of importance between the provision requiring

accurate notice of the forthcoming election (vide McGuire v. Philadelphia, supra) and the provision for filing the evidence of that notice. The notice is important because electors are entitled to be informed of elections. It is equally important that such notice accurately state that which it is required to state so that the electors may exercise their right of franchise intelligently. Therefore, it is quite proper that a provision prescribing notice be held mandatory. But it does not seem that it is equally important that the evidence of the publication of the notice be preserved in the precise manner and in the precise time prescribed by law. The same difference may be observed between the provision for the passage of an ordinance signifying the desire of the municipal authorities to increase the debt (Bullitt v. Philadelphia, supra) and the provision requiring a return of a certified copy of the ordinance. The provisions heretofore construed to be mandatory are the initiatory steps in the proceeding. By them the proceeding is instituted and carried forward to the election. When the provision under consideration comes into operation the election is over; the ordinance has been passed; the notice has been given; the election has been held; the vote has been canvassed and the result announced; the electors have given their assent. The situation is complete and has passed beyond the control of the municipal authorities. The thing enjoined is commanded not of the municipal authorities but of the election of officers, that is, of those who are to file the return. It would seem, therefore, that the reason for holding certain provisions mandatory does not longer exist. "Whether a statute is mandatory or not depends on whether the thing directed to be done is the essence of the thing required" is the dictum of Lord Mansfield (vide Lancaster v. Lancaster, 160 Pa. 411, 417), and if the thing to be done may as well be done after as before the time prescribed, especially where the thing to be done is not a matter of substance but where it merely subserves some notion of order or convenience, the courts will assume that the legislative intent was merely directory: Cowan's Estate, 184 Pa. 339. Certainly this provision is not of the essence of the election. Its purpose is merely to record in the Court of Quarter Sessions evidence of the passage of the ordinance and the publication of the notice so that

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