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inquirers may conveniently consult it there rather than at offices of the municipalities. That unquestionably being its purpose the provision is directory.

Indeed, my own thought is splendidly expressed by the able judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County who, in a well considered opinion (Ehler v. Lower Paxton School District, 1 D. & C. Reports 7), says:

"We cannot agree that the return of this election, being a special election held on a special date, not the date for holding the general municipal elections of the county, should have been returned to the prothonotary's office; nor can we agree that the failure of the election officers to include with their return a copy of the resolution authorizing the indebtedness and a copy of the notice invalidated the election, in view of the fact that this part of the law was complied with later on. The practice in such a case was carefully prescribed by act of assembly in order that the will of the majority of electors of the election district might be ascertain and a public record thereof made. This has been done, for it appears that a substantial majority of the electors of this school district desire that the bonded indebtedness thereof be increased for the purposes mentioned in the resolution and duly expressed their desire, and for the court to grant this injunction would result in defeating the will of the majority of the electors in that school district. We are not inclined to take any action in this case which would have the effect of defeating the will of such a substantial majority of the electors for what we regard as a mere and nonessential technicality."

Along the same line of thought is the excerpt from Black on Interpretation of Laws, quoted with approval in Knight v. Coudersport, 246 Pa. 289:

"If the law declares a specified irregularity to be fatal, the court will follow that command, irrespective of their view of the importance of the requirement. In the absence of such declaration the judiciary endeavor, as best they may, to discern whether the deviation from the prescribed forms of law had or had not so vital an influence on the proceedings as probably prevented a full and free expression of the popular will. If it had, the irregularity is held to vitiate the entire return: otherwise, it is considered immaterial. It has been sometimes said,

in this connection, that certain provisions of the election laws are mandatory and others directory. These terms may perhaps be convenient to distinguish one class of irregularities from the other; but strictly speaking all provisions of such laws are mandatory, in the sense that they impose the duty of obedience on those who come within their purview. But it does not therefore follow that every slight departure therefrom should taint the whole proceedings with a fatal blemish. Courts justly consider the chief purpose of such laws, namely, the obtaining of a fair election and an honest return.

and in order not to defeat the main design, are frequently led to ignore such innocent irregularities of election officers as are free of fraud and have not interfered with a full and fair expression of the voter's choice."

Of course, this conclusion is only warranted by the fact that there is clear proof that an ordinance was actually passed and that the notice required by law was actually given. That is, I think the provision is mandatory to this extent; that until such evidence is filed bonds or obligations issued in pursuance of the election are not valid, but the filing of the ordinance and advertisement "together with" the return is directory.

5. Certificate of Clerk.

The same section of the Act also provides that "the said clerk (of the court of quarter sessions) shall make a record of the same, (that is, of the return) and furnish a certified copy thereof, under seal, showing the result, to the corporate authorities of such municipality and the same shall be placed of record upon the minutes thereof."

This has not been done and the omission to do this, it is alleged, invalidates the election. We do not so construe the provision The transmission by the clerk to the municipality of a certified copy of the return is essential but it need not be done immediately after the election. It is sufficient if done before the obligations are actually issued. Until it is done the borough authorities have no official information of the electoral assent. That being the only purpose of the certificate, and there being no time fixed within which it is to be given, the failure to

furnish it immediately after the election manifestly has no effect whatever upon the election.

6. Certificates of Indebtedness.

In response to the plaintiffs' requests for findings of facts I have found the facts concerning the issuing of the so-called temporary certificates of indebtedness. But having found the fact I am at a loss to know what signifi cance to ascribe to them. For, if it be contended that the issuance of the certificates was an exercise of the authority granted by the electors, plaintiffs would argue themselves out of court. It is obvious that equity will not attempt to restrain that which has already been done. It is also clear that courts will not pass upon the validity of municipal obligations unless the holders (in this case, a bank) are parties thereto. The bill contains no prayer with respect to the certificates and, at the argument, counsel for plaintiffs frankly stated that there was no disposition to question their validity. It is suggested, however, that since the certificates evidence an intent to use the authority granted by the election, the resolution or ordinance whereby the certificates were authorized should have contained a provision for the assessment and levy of a tax sufficient to pay the interest and principal thereof at maturity or that the ordinance of September 1, 1919, should have so provided. It would be a complete answer to this contention to point out again that the bill does not draw their validity into question and that for want of proper parties their validity cannot be determined in the litigation. But, as a matter of fact, while the certificates refer to the authority granted by the election they are manifestly not issued in pursuance of it. They are payable on demand; the bonds contemplated by the ordinance were payable only after the expiration of five years. The rate of interest of the bonds was fixed at four and one-fourth (44) per cent.; that of the certificates is six per cent. The certificate upon its face purports to be a temporary loan. Temporary loans are not favored; nevertheless, it is conceded that municipalities may, without complying with the usual formalities incident to a permanent loan, borrow such amounts as can be repaid out of the revenue available within the year of the borrowing: Schuylkill County v Snyder, 20 Pa. C. C. R. 649; Brown v. Corry, 4 D. R., 645. These certificates plainly

evidence a purpose to incur temporary loans and there being no evidence in the case concerning the inability of the borough to repay them within the fiscal year of their issuance it is unnecessary to pursue the inquiry further. 7. Counting the Vote.

At plaintiffs' request I have found, as a fact, that the record of the Court of Quarter Sessions does not show that "the vote as returned had been counted by the court." The finding is correct; for, the evidence adduced at the trial does not affirmatively show the counting of the vote by the court. But in view of the presumption of regularity attaching to the actions of courts and public officials is it sufficient, for any purpose, for plaintiffs to show merely lack of a record? If they contend that the law requires the court to count the vote, they should show affirmatively that the vote was not counted. The presumption of regularity requires them to show something more than the mere lack of a record: Springbrook Road, 27 Pa. 451. I have no knowledge of what was done in this case but I do know that is is the invariable custom to take the return of elections for the increase of indebtedness into court and there, in the presence of a judge or judges, canvass and compute them. I have always assumed that this was necessary, but after a thorough exmination of the statutes and decisions I am not certain that it is required. Knight v. Coudersport, 246 Pa. 284; Steelton Borough Election, 22 Pa. C. C. R., 593; Clough v. Shreve, 10 Pa. C. C. R., 398; Fowler v. Gable, 3 District Reports, 23. But since there is no evidence that the vote was not counted, I do not feel called upon to decide this point, even if I were entirely satisfied that equity has jurisdiction to examine the proceedings in the Court of Quarter Sessions: Wilson v. Blaine, 262 Pa. 367.

8. Laches.

While I have discussed and decided each one of the several questions raised by paintiff, I think that the whole case might well have been decided upon the equitable ground of laches. Equity aids the diligent, not the slothful, and even a slight delay in invoking equitable relief against a municipality will stay the hand of the chancellor: Keeling v. Pittsburg, Virginia and Charleston Railroad, 205 Pa. 31; Chew v. Philadelphia, 257 Pa. 589; Fluck V Philadelphia, 26 District Reports, 587; Holtzman v.

Braddock, 14 Id., 547. Applying the doctrine of these cases to the case at bar it is altogether clear that plaintiffs have too long slept upon their rights, if any they had. The election was held November 14, 1919; the bill was filed January 28, 1921. One year and three months intervened. During the interval the borough purchased fire apparatus, purchased the Shenk property, issued temporary certificates, secured subscriptions to assist in purchasing the Barron House, and took an option upon the latter property. While none of these acts involved the issuing of the bonds yet all of them were unquestionably made in reliance upon the power of the borough to issue the bonds when the proper time arrived. Meanwhile plaintiffs stood by and did nothing. They come into court only after the borough evinced an intention to purchasing the Barron property. Can it be that they were moved to exertion only when the borough purchased a property which they deemed unsuitable? It must not be forgotten that the burden of their complaint, as evidenced by the bill, was the unsuitableness and inadaptability of the Barron House, concerning which Judge Henninger refused to receive evidence. May it not be assumed that as long as the borough restricted its efforts to the acquirement of the Shenk property, plaintiffs were satisfied and that when the borough changed its plans and undertook to acquire the Barron House plaintiffs used the alleged defects of the election as a means of preventing a purchase which they did not approve? Whatever the motive it is clearly my duty as chancellor, under the decisions, to refuse relief.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

1. That the ordinance of September 1, 1919, is valid. 2. That the return of the election as completed by subsequent proceedings, is a sufficient compliance with the Act of 1909.

3. That the Borough of Coopersburg may issue bonds or obligations in pursuance of the ordinance and the election when but only when (a) the Clerk of Court of Quarter Sessions shall furnish a certified copy of the return, under seal, showing the result, to the corporate authorities and the same shall have been placed of record upon the minutes thereof; and (b) the said Borough shall

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