and a "pine apple face" and lot more that I can't remember (Page 17.) Q. Did she give him any reason whatever for acting in this way? A. No. (Page 17.) Mrs. Nelson Evans, libellant's daughter, testifies as follows: Q. How old about were you then? A. Eight or nine years old. He had a wild piece of land full of weeds and she helped him plow it around and held the lines of the horses and then got caught in the tree and he cursed her one time after another, and he said he wished a "gewitter would hit her" (Page 25.) A. Called her a "older dunnervetter" and words like that, and he was real mad about it too. A. Often times he would go towards her and try to strike her A. Raised his fist and his hands and said if it would not have been for the law he would have hit her. (Page 26.) A. Yes, often times when he thought everything would be all right with him he would look at her and say "she looked like the devil" and things like that. (Page 26.) Q. How did he strike her? A. So that she fell topsy turvey. Q. That she fell down? A. Yes. (Page 28.) Q. Did she fall down more than once? A. Yes. (Page 28.) Q When he took the lines out of her hands and hit her could you see whether it was her fault or the fault of the horses? A. Why she could not hold the horses. Q. When he struck her, did he swear at her? A. Yes. A. Dunnervetter and geh in die hell when he hit her. He said that often. Q. Do you know whether your father took your mother to church? A. No, not even when I was confirmed. Q. Did he take her anywhere? A. No, not that I can remember during the time that I was home. (Page 28.) Now July 1, 1922, exceptions to the decree in divorce recommended by the Master and Examiner are hereby dismissed, and decree in divorce granted. IN RE MARY GALLAGHER. Orphans' Court-Decedent's Estate-Auditor's Report-Findings of Facts. Findings of fact by an auditor are equivalent to a verdict of a jury; the same tests are to be applied in disposing of exceptions to an auditor's findings; and the tests are similar to those made on a motion for a new trial. In this case the court itself restated the account and made distribution. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 50 April term, 1919. In Re Estate of Mary Gallagher, a weak-minded person. Exceptions to auditor's report. John L. Cutshall, for Accountant. Horace W. Schantz, for Exceptant. Groman, P. J., July 1, 1922. A careful examination of the testimony submitted in this matter convinces us that the findings of fact by the auditor are warranted by the testimony, and the exceptions thereto will have to be dismissed. Findings of fact by an auditor are equivalent to the verdict of a jury, the same tests to be applied in disposing of exceptions to an auditor's findings and are similar to those made on a motion for a new trial. The exceptions urged fall far short of such requirements. As to the conclusions of law and the distribution made, some of the exceptions to the distribution made would have to be sustained, and the matter referred back to the auditor to make distribution in accordance with the opinion of the court As the balance for distribution is very small, the court will re-state the account, and make distribution. The debtor side of the re-stated account being $431.66, is correct, the United States Liberty Bond being treated as cash. On the credit side of the account, the expenses of audit amounting to $167.75, publication and service of writ by Sheriff Clauss amounting to $12.19, and counsel fees for accountant, which attorney for accountant has requested the court to reduce to $50.00 for appearing before the auditor at five meetings, and such other services as counsel for an accountant usually renders, is very reasonable, with the credits allowed by the auditor, amounting to $102.89, would bring the total credits to $332.83, which amount deducted from the debtor side of the account, leaves a balance for distribu tion amounting to $98.83. The auditor recognized the claims of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and of the County of Lehigh, each claim amounting to $127.00, as the claims pro rata, and distribution is made as follows: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for maintenance, $49.41; County of Lehigh, for maintenance, $49.41. As to the personal money not converted into money by the accountant, the actual value is so small, as disclosed by the testimony, that it would hardly warrant the expense of advertising and holding a public sale, such personal property may be turned over to the owner thereof, so as to relieve the accountant from further liability, whether the owner accepts the personal property or not. It seems estates involving thousands and thousands of dollars have been settled in this county with less litigation and expense than this matter involving a few hundred dollars. Now July 1, 1922, the court directs distribution to be made by the accountant as set forth in the above opinion. IN RE A. NORMAN ROTH. Infants-Habeas Corpus-Custody. Where acts of wrong-doing by respondent, entering into the question of the custody of a child, were condoned by relator, the court will, nevertheless, in a habeas corpus proceeding, consider the question of the moral welfare of the child and its proper environment. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 96 April Term, 1922. In re petition of A. Norman Roth, father, for the custody of his three minor children. Habeas Corpus. Re-hearing ordered. Dallas S. Gangewere, for Relator. Groman, P. J. July 1, 1922. The testimony submitted discloses the fact that the acts of wrong-doing complained of, and relied upon by relator to move the court to award the custody of the children to the relator, were condoned by the relator, the parties having lived together for some time, in fact, for several years after the commission of the offenses. Such being the case, in proceedings in divorce between the parties, the offenses would have been condoned, but we have a different situation confronting us, the moral welfare of the children is at stake, and as to them and their proper moral environment, the court has a duty to perform in spite of condonation of wrong-doing by the husband. That no injustice be done to the parties and the children affected by this proceeding, the court re-opens the matter for rehearing and the submission of such testimony as the parties may see fit and proper under the circumstances. Now July 1, 1922, this matter ordered for re-hearing on the third Monday of September, next, when parties in interest may offer such testimony as to them may seem fit and proper. BRIGHTMAN MFG. CO. v TAYLOR & CO. Practice, C. P.-Partnership-Suit Against-Failure to Set Forth Names of Partners-Amendments. It is a fatal mistake in a suit against a partnership to omit the names of the individual partners. Such a suit cannot be amended. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 75 October term, 1921. The Brightman Manufacturing Company v. William H. Taylor and Company. Assumpsit. Affidavit of defense raising questions of law. Rule to amend. Rule discharged. Judgment for defendant. Fred G. W. Runk, for Plaintiff and Rule. * Reno, J., July 18, 1922. Plaintiff sues defendant in assumpsit. The writ was served "upon Wm. H. Taylor & Co., by handing a true and attested copy thereof at its place of business to Charles S. Beckwith, manager for the time being in charge thereof and upon inquiry the defendant's residence in the county is not ascertained." Chas. S. Beckwith, on behalf of Wm. H. Taylor & Co., files an affidavit of defense raising questions for the decision of the court averring that Wm. H. Taylor & Co., is a partnership consisting of William H. Taylor and Charles S. Beckwith; that the partnership is not suable eo nomine but that the suit must be instituted against the partners as individuals trading under a firm name. Plaintiff thereupon moved to amend so that the name of defendants shall read "William H. Taylor and Charles S. Beckwith, partners trading as Wm. H. Taylor & Co." It is obvious that the suit as it now stands is a nullity for want of a defendant which the law recognizes as a suable entity. If Wm. H. Taylor & Co., were a corporation it would be suable as such, but Wm. H. Taylor & Co., a partnership, is suable only in the names of the partners: McConnell v. Opollo Savings Bank, 146 Pa. 79; Hoffman v. Faulk, 5 District Reports, 774; Wharton v. Rosengarten, 3 Weekly Notes of Cases, 258. Can plaintiff cure his defective suit by an amendment? Amendments are allowed when the effect is to correct the name under which the right party was sued but not when its effect is to bring a new party on the record: White v. Fayette Automobile Co., 43 Pa. Superior Court, 532, approved in McGinnis v. Valvoline Oil Works, 251 Pa. 407. The distinction is between those cases where the right defendant, is mistakenly sued under a wrong name and those where the purpose of the amendment is to substitute entirely new parties not theretofore appearing in the record: Markowitz v. Arrarat Dye Works, 73 Pa. Superior Court, 119. The right parties to be sued are William H. Taylor and Charles S. Beckwith. The party sued is Wm. H. Taylor & Co. They are not the same parties; for, although the latter is the name of an association composed of the former, the latter is not a party at all. Hence, the effect of the proposed amendment is not to place upon the record the right defendant who has been mistakenly sued under a wrong name but to bring entirely new parties upon the record. No party whatever was sued and if the amendment were allowed the effect would be to supply defendants to a suit where none existed before. Or to state it in the language of the learned counsel for defendant "while the court may aid the |