troops requested by Clinton, and accordingly, leaving Lafayette to his own designs, he hastened toward Portsmouth. Upon a careful examination of the place, he became convinced that the position was unsuitable to furthering the ulterior designs of Clinton; nevertheless, he pro *See Gordon, American Revolution, vol. iv., pp. 107, 118, 185 (ed. 1788); Tower, LaFayette, vol. ii., chap. xxvi.; Lee's Memoirs, vol. ii., pp. 222-230, 234; Tarleton, Campaigns, pp. 353-356, 400-403. Germans from Europe, and would not require any portion of Cornwallis' army. He also desired to open a passage by way of Hampton and the James River toward that fertile region of Virginia lying between the James and York rivers. After examination, Point Comfort was found to be unsuitable for an entrenched camp, and the British abandoned Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., PP. 407-408. 1 FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE. their plans of fortifying it.* Nevertheless, as it was considered advisable to have some fixed basis of operations, Lord Cornwallis on August 1 resolved to repass the James River and to establish headquarters at Yorktown.† This village was situated on the right bank of the York River, and opposite lay a small town called Gloucester, built upon a point of land projecting into the river from the left side. At this point the river was very deep and capable of receiving and harboring the largest vessels of war. For a mile in front of Yorktown lay a strip of open level ground, in advance of which was a wood, its left extending to the river and its right being bordered by a creek. On the right of Yorktown flowed a marshy By August 22 Cornwallis had established himself in entrenchments at this place, while Lafayette occupied a position from which he could watch the British movements and prevent foraging in the country. ‡ Meanwhile the French court had closely watched the turn of affairs in America, and believing that the time had now come for decisive action, sent a naval force to American waters sufficient to render the French stream. 267 fleet there vastly superior to the British. They also sent sufficient troops to enable Washington to completely overwhelm the British army. In March, 1781, therefore, François Jean Paul, Count de Grasse, set sail from Brest with 25 ships of the line, several thousand land troops, and a large convoy, the whole fleet numbering about 200 vessels.* A small portion of this force was destined for the East Indies, but de Grasse with the greater part of it sailed for Martinique. The British fleet then in the West Indies, though weakened by the departure of a squadron to protect the ships carrying to England the booty captured at St. Eustatius, attempted to intercept the French fleet under De Grasse; but before the two fleets met, the French had been reinforced by eight ships of the line and one of 50 guns, which had previously been at Martinique and San Domingo. Thus the French had a decided superiority, and the English deemed it unwise to attack. After completing his mission in the Indies, De Grasse set sail for America early in August. Meanwhile, on August 22, Washington and Knox had gone to Weathersfield, Conn., for the purpose of consulting with Rochambeau re *Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, garding plans for besieging New vol. ii., p. 469. Ibid, p. 470. See also Lafayette's letter in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 366-368. See his letter of August 21 to Washington in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 389-392. York. Relying upon the arrival of For details concerning the efforts to secure this aid, see Tower, Marquis de Lafayette, vol. ii., chap. xxiv. Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, 268 WASHINGTON PLANS TO CAPTURE CORNWALLIS. De Grasse, Washington earnestly called for troops from the New England States, hoping that the combined forces would have no difficulty in capturing that city. In June the French troops began to march from Rhode Island, and early in the following month effected a junction with the American army. At the same time, Washington moved his army from their winter quarters at Peekskill to the vicinity of Kingsbridge.* Lincoln fell down the Hudson with a detachment of boats and occupied the position where Fort Independence formerly stood. All the British outposts were now called in to the main encampment at New York. Washington hoped to begin operations against New York at the latest toward the end of July. He ordered the construction of enough flat-bottom boats to transport 5,000 troops down the Hudson, and had caused ovens to be erected opposite Staten Island for the use of the French troops. He was disappointed, however, in the number of troops received from the New England States; whereas he had expected 12,000, he could hardly muster more than 5,000, a number by no means adequate to carry out the projected siege. He vol. ii., pp. 476-477; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., p. 381 et seq.; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. iv., p. 318 et seq.; Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 332 et seq. *Heath's Memoirs, p. 269 et seq. (Abbatt's ed.). Thacher, Military Journal, p. 257; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. iv., pp. 322-323; Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., pp. 393-394. also learned that De Grasse could not remain on the American coast longer than October 15,* and that instead of coming to the north, his destination was the Chesapeake. Washington therefore suddenly changed his plans, and instead of attacking Clinton at New York, determined to completely surround and capture Cornwallis in Virginia.† While the plans for the attack on New York were being perfected, the British had somehow captured a letter from Washington giving all the details and particulars concerning the intended operations against the city. But even after Washington's plans were changed, Clinton could not be persuaded that Washington really had designs on Cornwallis, thinking that any movement toward the South was merely a subterfuge to make him unwary in his defence of New York. Therefore, instead of attempting to prevent the passage of the French and American troops to the South, Clinton contented himself with strengthening the defences of New York against the expected attack. Not until the opportunity of striking at the allied armies had passed, did Clinton become convinced that the capture of Cornwallis was the object of the combined forces. Then it was too late for him to make MOVEMENT TOWARD SOUTH BEGUN. a movement by land, for General Heath had been left in the vicinity to watch Clinton, and if possible to prevent his following the allied forces, or at least to delay him until they had had time to reach Virginia.* Some years later, Washington replied as follows to inquiries regarding his movement: "A combined operation of the land and naval forces of France in America, for the year 1781, was preconcerted the year before; that the point of attack was not absolutely agreed upon; because it could not be foreknown where the enemy would be most susceptible of impression; and, because we (having the command of the water, with sufficient means of conveyance) could transport ourselves to any spot, with the greatest celerity; that it was determined by me, nearly twelve months beforehand, at all hazards, to give out, and cause it to be believed by the highest military, as well as civil officers, that New York was the destined place of attack, for the important purpose of inducing the eastern and middle states, to make greater exertions in furnishing specific supplies, than they otherwise would have done, as well as for the interesting purpose of rendering the enemy less prepared elsewhere; that, by these means, and these alone, artillery, boats, stores, and provisions, were in seasonable 269 became the definitive and certain object of the campaign. "I only add, that it never was in contemplation to attack New York, unless the garrison should first have been so far degarnished, to carry on the southern operations, as to render our success in the siege of that place as infallible as any future military event can ever be made. For I repeat it, and dwell upon it again, some splendid advantage, whether upon a larger or smaller scale was almost immaterial, was so essentially necessary, to revive the expiring hopes and languid exertions of the country, at the crisis in question, that I never would have consented to embark in any enterprise, wherein, from the most rational plan and accurate calculations, the favorable issue should not have appeared to my view as a ray of light. The failure of an attempt against the posts of the enemy, could, in no other possible situation during the war, have been so fatal to our cause. "That much trouble was taken, and finesse used, to misguide and bewilder Sir Henry Clinton, in regard to the real object, by fictitious communications, as well as by making a deceptive provision of ovens, forage, and boats in his neighborhood, is certain; nor were less pains taken to deceive our own army; for I had always conceived, where the imposition does not completely take place at home, it would never sufficiently succeed abroad." Following this plan, therefore, preparation, to move with the utmost rapidity, Washington broke up the camp at to any part of the continent; for the difficulty consisted more in providing, than knowing how to apply the military apparatus; that, before the arrival of the Count de Grasse, it was the fixed determination, to strike the enemy in the most vulnerable quarter, so as to insure success with moral certainty, as our affairs were then in the most ruinous train imaginable; that New York was thought to be beyond our effort, and consequently, that the only hesitation that remained was between an attack upon the British army in Virginia, and that in Charleston; and finally, that, by the intervention of several communications, and some incidents, which cannot be detailed in a letter, the hostile post in Virginia, from being a provisional and strongly expected, 'Heath's Memoirs, pp. 175–179 (Abbatt's ed.); Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. viii., p. 139. VOL. III-18 * New Windsor and on July 21 reached Kingsbridge. Here he was joined by the French troops to the number of 5,000 under Rochambeau. The combined forces then made several movements calculated to deceive the British into believing that the object of the movement was to capture New York. On August 19 a body of troops was sent across the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry, ostensibly to establish a permanent post in that vicinity. On the next two days the main body of the 270 WASHINGTON ARRIVES IN VIRGINIA. American army passed the river at After Cornwallis reached Yorktown, he proceeded to erect strong fortifications. Lafayette, being encamped on the James River, was in a position to prevent his passage into North Carolina, while the allied *Bancroft, vol. v., p. 516; Thacher, Military Journal, p. 260 et seq.; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 617 et seq.; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. iv., pp. 325-329; 354 et seq.; Gordon, American Revolution, vol. iv., pp. 119127; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. ix., pp. 343-347; Tarleton, Campaigns, pp. 416418. Fiske, American Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 277278; Oberholtzer, Life of Morris, p. 82. Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., p. 420. forces on their way south could prevent his escape to the northward. De Grasse then sent four ships of the line and some frigates to block the entrance of the York River, so that Cornwallis could not escape in that direction, and the French troops brought by De Grasse under the Marquis de St. Simon were sent to Lafayette's camp. The rest of the fleet remained at the entrance of the bay on the lookout for the British squadron.* Having made all the necessary arrangements for transporting the northern army to Yorktown, Washington, accompanied by Rochambeau, proceeded ahead of the troops, and on September 14 joined Lafayette at Williamsburg. As Cornwallis was now lying behind very strong works, it was seen that without artillery he could not be captured save by a regu lar siege. It was expected that a French squadron under command of Count de Barras, which had sailed from Rhode Island, would bring the needed artillery; but this did not arrive for some time, as De Barras had gone far out to sea in order to avoid the British fleet which was known to be in that vicinity. On September 5, while awaiting the arrival of De Barras, De Grasse spied off the coast a British fleet of 19 vessels under Admiral Graves. He there *Tower, Marquis de LaFayette, vol. ii., P. 428 et seq.; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 305. Tower, p. 444. |