fer, the latter is the adopted limitation of the general principles. 10 An ordinance appended to a constitution is a part of the fundamental law. The fundamental conditions attached to the act of admission of a State form a part of the organic law. 12

1 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Ex parte Dorsey, 7 Port. 293; Ex parte Pickett, 24 Ala. 91; Stein v. Mayor, Ibid. 591; Alabama & Fla. R. R. Co. v. Burkett, 42 Ala. 83; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 547; Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 125; Opin. of Judges, 30 Ibid. 596; State v. Lancaster Co. 4 Neb. 540; Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 394; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 549; People v. Flagg, 46 Ibid. 401; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & S. 117.

2 Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 183; Smith v. Judge Twelfth District Court, 17 Cal. 547; People v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 159; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; Hobart v. Supervisors of Butte, 17 Cal. 30; People v. Bigler, 5 Cal. 23; People v. Seymour, 16 Cal. 332; Hagar v. Yolo Co. 47 Cal. 223; Comm. v. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 119; Sharpless v. Mayor &c. 21 Ibid. 160; Weister v. Hade, 52 Ibid. 474.

3 Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Ex parte Pickett, 24 Ala. 91; Stein v. Mayor &c. Ibid. 591; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 394; Comm. v. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 119; Sharpless v. Mayor &c. 21 Ibid. 160; Weister v. Hade, 52 Ibid. 474.

4 Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Ex parte Dorsey, 7 Port. 293; Beals v. Amador Co. 35 Cal. 630.

5 Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338.

6 Moore v. Sinaw and Fremont v. Flower, 17 Cal. 199.

7 Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 396.

8 District T. Co. v. Dubuque, 7 Clarke, (Iowa) 262.

9 District T. Co. v. Dubuque, 7 Clarke, (Iowa) 262. 10 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376.

11 Stewart v. Crosby, 15 Tex. 546. 12 Buttle v. People, 2 Neb. 225.

Interpretation and construction. State constitutions are to be interpreted with reference to previous State legislation,1 and when provisions are borrowed from constitutions of other States, which provisions had already received judicial interpretation, it is presumed they were adopted in view of such interpretation.2 Judicial interpretations made near the time of their adoption is strong evidence that the people understood and intended them to be as interpreted. The solemn, deliberate, and longsettled precedents of courts and the practice and acquiescence of governments and people should possess controlling weight.4 So, every reason is in favor of a steady adherence to judicial decisions on doubtful questions.5 Constitutional provisions are to have a reasonable con

struction. The object of all rules of construction is to discover the true intent of the instrument, to be derived from the subject-matter and language in common with known political truths, the real intent to prevail over the literal sense of the terms, which are not to be taken in a technical sense, 10 and the whole to be taken together,11 and considered in ascertaining construction of terms in particular clauses. 12 Constitutions, like statutes, must be construed, if possible, to give some force and effect to each of their provisions, 13 and not one portion in antagonism with another,14 but such a construction as will leave all the provisions unimpaired. 15 And when compelled to declare that full and detailed effect cannot be given to a certain part, courts will not declare that no effect can be given to any part, but will give the provision all the effect they can.16 They are to be liberally construed, while the Federal Constitution is to be strictly construed. 17 They are to be liberally construed in favor of citizens as to life, liberty, and property.18 They are to be studied in the light of ordinary language, the circumstances attending their foundation, and the constructions placed on them by the people whose bond they are. 19 The debates in convention cannot properly be referred to in expounding the constitution.20 If a provision differs from the declaration of rights, the former is to be taken in construing the intent.21 A constitution, unless otherwise clearly expressed, can operate only prospectively.22 Negative and prohibitory provisions are self-executing,28 and restrictions not merely prospective operate in presenti without legislative action.24 A provision designed to remove an existing mischief should never be construed as dependent upon legislative will for its efficacy or operation.25

1 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376.

2 People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; Attorney-General v. Brunst, 3 Wis. 787.

3 Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82.

4 Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 178; State v. Sorrells, 15 Ark. 664.

5 Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56.

6 People v. Mahoney, 13 Mich. 481.

7 District T. &c. Co. v. Dubuque, 7 Clarke, 262.

8 Ex parte Allis, 12 Ark. 101.

9 District T. &c. Co. v. Dubuque, 7 Clarke, 262.

10 Page v. State, 58 Pa. St. 338; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 661.

11 District T. &c. Co. v. Dubuque, 7 Clarke, 262.

12 Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135.

13 French v. Teschemacher, 24 Cal. 539; Hagenbuck v. Reed, 3 Neb. 24; People v. Gosper, 3 Neb. 310; Helmer v. McCounel, 8 Neb. 28; Decklar v. Frankenberger, 30 La. An. 410.

14 Brooks v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 227; McCann v. McLennan, 2 Neb. 288. 15 State v. Scott, 9 Ark. 270.

16 Cummings v. Spaunhorst, 5 Mo. Ct. App. 21.

17 Walcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44.

18 Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; State v. Scott, 9 Ark. 270.

19 Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255; Padelford v. Mayor &c. 14 Ga. 438. 20 Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107.

21 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376.

22 Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 Ill. 349; State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258; Orr v. Rhine, 45 Tex. 345.

23 Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385.

24 People v. McRoberts, 62 Ill. 38.

25 People v. Rumsey, 64 Ill. 44; Chance v. Marion Co. 64 Ill. 66; O'Connor v. Leddy, 64 Ill. 299.

Construction of terms.-Words are to be taken in their common acceptance where not used in a technical sense. The plain meaning of words employed cannot be changed because the literal interpretation may be inconsistent with other parts of the instrument in relation to other subjects.2 Resort must be had to the natural signification of the words. If a literal interpretation involves any absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or extreme hardship, courts may deviate from the received sense and literal meaning of the words, but this must be done with great caution, and a strained construction or astute interpretation is not to be given to relieve against local or individual hardships.5 In case of uncertainty of language, broad considerations of expediency are not to be overlooked.6 "Necessary" does not always mean "indispensable," but may be construed to signify a grant of discretion.7

1 State v. Scott, 9 Ark. 270; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135.

2 Cautwell v. Owens, 14 Md. 215; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385.

3 Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626.

4 Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107. 5 Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385.

6 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376. 7 Cotton v. Leon Co. 6 Fla. 610.

PREAMBLE AND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

PREAMBLE.

We, the people of the State of California, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure and perpetuate its blessings, do establish this Constitution.

7. Trial by jury.

8. Offenses, how prosecuted.

9. Liberty of speech and freedom of the press-trials for libel. 10. Popular assemblies.

11. Uniformity of laws.

12. Military power.

13. Personal and property rights.

14. Eminent domain.

15. Imprisonment in civil cases.

16. Laws prohibited. Bills of attainder, ex post facto, etc.
17. Rights of foreign residents.

18. Slavery prohibited.

19. Searches and seizures, restriction on.

20. Treason defined.

21. Privileges and immunities of citizens.
22. Provisions of Constitution construed.
23. Rights retained by the people.
24. Property qualification not required.

§ 1. All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

See Ala. I, 1; Ark. II, 2; Colo. II, 3; Conn. I, 1; Fla. I, 1; Ill. II, 1; Ind. I, 1; Iowa, I, 1; Kans. Bill Rts. 1; Ky. Bill Rts. 1: La. I, 1; Me. I, 1; Mass. Pt. I, st. 1; Mo. II, 4; Neb. I, 1,2; Nev. I, 1; N. H. I, 1,2; N. J. I, 1; N. C. I, 1; Ohio, I, 1; Or. I,1; Pa. I, 1; S. C. I, 1; Vt. 1,1; Va. I, 1; Wis. I, 1; W. Va. III, 1.

Construction.-The term "all men are by nature free and independent" did not abolish slavery in New Jersey, or affect the laws existing on that subject.1 No person can be deprived of the right to manage his own affairs or his personal liberty without the intervention of a jury;2 and any grant to another to manage and improve one's property is an infringement of the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property;' " but destruction of property in abating a public nuisance is justifiable; 4 so, the legislature may compel local improvements, and impose local assessments to pay for the same.5 Choses in action, State bonds, and bills of exchange are property.6 While every one is to be secure in the exercise and enjoyment of all these rights, he may be restrained or prohibited from exercising them in any manner which will interfere with a reasonable exercise of the same rights by other persons.7 An act creating a lien on lumber, etc., is no abridgment of the right. The legislative power cannot reach the life, liberty, or property of an individual, except when convicted of crime, or when the sacrifice of his property is demanded by a just regard for public welfare.9

1 State v. Post, Spenc. 368; 1 Zab. 699.

2 In re Dey, 1 Stockt. 181.

8 Coster v. Tide Water Co. 3 C. E. Green, 54, 518.

4 Dunbar v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. 355; Correas v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. 452; Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69; Manhattan Co. v. Van Kenren, 8 C. E. Green, 251.

5 Hagar v. Yolo Co. 47 Cal. 223.

6 People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 338.

7 Ex parte Smith & Keating, 38 Cal. 704.

8 Spofford v. True, 33 Me. 283.

9 A. & N. R. R. Co. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37.

§ 2. All political power is inherent in the people.1 Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it.2

1 Ala. I, 3; Ark. II, 1; Conn. I, 2; Fla. I, 2; Ind. I, 1; Iowa, 1,2; Kans. Bill Rts. 2; Ky. XIII, 4; Me. I, 2; Nev. I, 2; N. J. I, 2; Ohio, I, 2; Or. I, 1; Pa. I, 2; Tenn. I, 1; Tex. 1, 2.

2 Ark. II, 1; Fla. I, 2; Ind. I, 1; Ky. XIII, 4; Iowa, I, 2; Me. I, 2; Nev. I, 2; N. J. I, 2; Ohio, I, 2; Pa. I, 2; Tenn. I,'1.

And see Md. Dec. Rts. 4; Mo. II, 1, 2; N. C. I, 2; Or. I, 1; S. C. I, 3; Va. I, 2, 3; W. Va. III, 2, 3.