subject which still interested him in his high position was the security of our North-West frontier, having regard to the near approach of Russia, and our consequent promise to the Ameer to preserve the integrity of his kingdom, a promise which rendered us responsible for the northern as well as the southern

boundary of Afghanistan. Lord Roberts, contrary to the opinions of the majority of the Defence Committee, laid greater stress on the maintenance of lines of communication than on the construction of numerous fortifications. His aim was to have the means of bringing all the strategical points on the frontier into direct communication with the Indian railways, so as to be able to mass our troops rapidly. The offensive and defensive requirements of Quetta and the Bolan Pass were to be provided for, and a spot was selected on the right bank of the Kabul river between Khairabad and the Indus, and commanding the latter river, on which the garrisons of Peshawur and Noushera could fall back if necessary and await reinforcements. This is with a view to the probable hos tility of the warlike tribes, who in case of invasion would, so long as they remain hostile, combine against us from Chitral to Baluchistan, and pour into India. The Khyber Pass was the chief pass to be defended, for it alone debouched directly on cultivated country and on roads leading to the chief Punjab cities. Too many forts had to be avoided, on grounds both of finance and of the difficulty of garrisoning them. Lord Roberts also prescribed the defensive works which should be taken in hand without delay, and the roads and railways which should be constructed. And it is worth noting that he was

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"Seven years later, when I gave up my command of the army in India, I had the supreme satisfaction of knowing that I left our North-West frontier secure so far as it was possible to make it so, hampered as we were by want of money. The necessary fortifications had been completed, schemes for the defence of the various less important positions had been prepared, and the roads and railways, in my estimation of such vast importance, had either been finished or were well advanced."

Thus Lord Beaconsfield's wellknown policy for the construction of a scientific frontier to the northwest of our Indian empire has been carried out. The declaration of that policy was at the time derided by the party hacks and political nincompoops of the time; but successive Viceroys have given thought and attention to it, realising that so long as invasion remains a remote risk we could not look unconcernedly on, while Russia crept step by step closer to our dominions. Lord Lytton's forward movement was the first step in carrying out this policy, and from first to last Lord Roberts has been a main instrument in its execution.

It must not be supposed that all occasion for anxiety has been removed, but at least the plans have been adopted and executed to an extent which was satisfactory. Rawul Pindi on the right and Quetta on the left marked the boundaries of the frontier line, Multan having been rejected. There was also a scheme for utilising the armies of native States as an auxiliary force for the service of the empire. Lord Roberts was at first doubtful of the wisdom of encouraging a high state of efficiency amongst the troops of

Y

independent States. But having fought side by side with natives, he had gained confidence in their desire to co-operate with us and in their unmistakable loyalty. But for the saving clause, "so long as our Government continues just and sympathetic," we should infer that he had at the close of his career fallen a victim to that excessive trust in the natives which he found so rife when he first landed, and which was the prime cause of the Mutiny. The chiefs of course cordially responded to proposals of this kind, and steadily improved their armies under the guidance of carefully selected British officers. It is a policy which we must take on trust, confiding in our experts. Sub. stantial results are said to have been already obtained, the Chitral expedition having had valuable help from the transport trains organised by the rulers of Gwalior and Jeypoor, and by the troops of the Maharajah of Kashmir. Still for our part we rely with greater confidence in regard to the future on this circumstance, that instead of British troops being in the proportion of less than 1 to 6, as they were in the days before the Mutiny, we have now, or had in 1885 (vol. ii. p. 390), 70,000 British with 414 guns, and 128,636 natives, a proportion of more than 1 to 2. So long as our trust in native loyalty and professions does not lead us to tamper with this proportion, and to take all the securities which a position, pre carious in spite of all our efforts, requires, there can be no political unwisdom in cultivating friendship and inspiring confidence in

native States, a policy which we hope will, before many generations have passed away, lead to the introduction of friendly sentiments and civilising agencies even amongst the hostile tribes who hang like a dark cloud over our North-Western frontier.

We lay down these volumes with the feeling that they are the record of the life not only of a brave and capable soldier, but of a loyal friend and of a very kindly and modest-hearted gentleman. When he succeeds, it is his "luck," when others fail, it is their "misfortune." There is not an unkind word from beginning to end, and when an adverse criticism is inevitable, it is free from bitterness, and names are withheld as far as possible. Those who served under him in later life were made to feel that his eye was on them, and that their actions would be appraised in an ungrudging and appreciative spirit. The record of his young days is fresh and full of charm, recalling the bright young officer whose

"Bobs sobriquet of throughout the service was the Indian unerring sign of genial manners and personal popularity. And throughout the book, from the day when he "found his fate" to the hour when he penned its dedication, we have occasional glimpses of the domestic sentiment which Englishmen recognise as the basis of national greatness, and without whose gilding this life of strenuous activity of 'Fortyone Years in India' could not be the happy retrospect it is. such men our Indian empire was won, and by such men it must be held.

By

VOL. CLXI.

GENERAL GORDON'S remarkable career and tragic end at Khartúm have frequently been described; but the public know little of the man who, at a few hours' notice, was ordered to accompany Gordon to the Súdán, and acted as his staff officer. It is evident, to any one who studies the history of Gordon's mission, that Colonel Stewart's appreciation of the position created in the Súdán by the successes of the Mahdi was juster than that of his chief. And a notice of his brief career and services may not be without interest at the present moment when the reoccupation of Dongola, and the declared intention of Government to continue the advance southward this year, have reawakened interest in the Súdán, and in the events connected with General Gordon's mission in 1884.

John Donald Hamill Stewart was born on the 15th October

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1845, and was not quite thirtynine when he was treacherously murdered in the house of Fakri Wad Etman at Hebba. He was an Ulsterman; and one of the most distinguished of living Ulstermen thus wrote of him :

"Amongst the many noble and fine soldiers I have known, I have met scarcely any one for whom I conceived a greater respect and admiration. His charming manners, his high sense of duty, his unselfishness, and his great ability, impressed every one who came into contact with him."

Stewart passed first out of Sandhurst in June 1865, and was gazetted ensign in the 12th Regiment. In the following month he was transferred to the 11th Hussars, in which regiment he obtained his lieutenant-colonelcy on the 1st July 1881. The earlier years of his service were passed in India, and here he de

Ꮓ

The other ceremonial was at Delhi, when Lord Lytton received in durbar 63 ruling chiefs and nearly 300 titular chiefs and persons of distinction, the assemblage being intended to emphasise and repeat the proclamation of the Queen in 1858 in her public assumption of the title of "Empress of India." Lord Roberts played a leading part in its arrangement and conduct. He conversed, he says, with every one of the princes and nobles, and each in turn repeated the same sentiments of loyalty as had been publicly expressed by the leading Maharajahs. The political object, which must have been to some extent furthered by this tremendous ceremonial, was to assure each potentate and prince, "not only of the close union between the throne of England and your loyal and princely house, but also of the earnest desire of the paramount Power to see your dynasty strong, prosperous, and permanent." In other words, they were no longer to fear annexation by what they regarded as the rapacity of a Company, but were to consider themselves as part and parcel of the British empire, enrolled amongst its feudatories, secure in their possessions whilst they continued in their loyalty.

The same year, 1877, which witnessed this final consummation of empire after more than a century of heroic achievement, also witnessed the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, and the consequent unrest on the frontiers which looked in the direction of Russian power. The TransIndus tract of country was now removed from the Punjab Government, formed into a separate district, under the control of a Chief Commissioner who would be responsible direct to the Government of India for frontier

administration and trans-frontier relations. This post, with the command of the Punjab Frontier Force, was conferred on Roberts, who now had our relations with Afghanistan and Russia primarily in his hands.

Lord Roberts' account of the great historical occurrences which date from 1877 is as valuable as that of the still more stirring events of twenty years earlier. Of both series of events he is entitled to say, "Quorum pars magna fui." In the latter his responsibility was of course far the greater.

the

The dominant feature of the situation which now engrossed his attention was that both England and Russia were solicitous for the friendship of the Ameer of Afghanistan. His territories were conterminous with ours, while Russia in two centuries had expanded along nearly 4000 miles of territory which lay between her boundary of that date and present border-line of our Indian Empire. Both Afghan wars have. been brought about by the presence of Russian officers in Kabul, In 1877 Russia's southern boundary was almost conterminous with the northern boundary of Afghanistan. The Ameer felt that Russia was in a position to crush him, while he was doubtful if we would protect him. In 1878 there was considerable risk of England having to go to war with Russia, and Indian troops had been brought to Malta with that view. At that moment the Ameer, at a council of his leading chiefs, decided to throw in his lot with Russia, and to receive at Kabul a Russian mission, headed by General Stolietoff. An offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and the Ameer was contemplated (Lord Roberts gives the proofs), had the Berlin Congress of that year failed