For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER wages, and supervised their work, subject only a miner's death, the owner is liable under rule to exigencies of railroad transportation, an em- that those concurring in negligently producing ployé or that corporation was not "employed" an injury are jointly and severally liable.by railroad, within federal Employers' Liability Jaras v. Wright, 106 A. 798. Act of April 22, 1908 (U. S. Comp. St. 88 8657-8665), and was not entitled to its benefits. -Id.

(F) Risks Assumed by Servant.

95 (N.J.) Under Factory Act (P. L. 1904, fell from a ladder used in his own way while 217(16) (Pa.) An experienced helper, who p. 152), an action for injury to a child under delivering ice in an opening in a wall seven 14 employed in violation of statute, based upon employer's common-law liability, may be main-feet above the level, cannot recover for his injuries, where there was no evidence as to what caused his fall, and where the ladder was safe.-Freeland v. Consolidated Ice Co.,

tained where such violation is the efficient cause

of injury, though statute itself gives no civil remedy or private right of action.-Feir v. Weil,

106 A. 402.

The employer's breach of Factory Act (P. L. 1904, p. 152) by employing a child under 14 may be prima facie evidence of negligence in action by that child based on employer's common-law liability.-Id.

One employing a child under 14 in violation of Factory Act (P. L. 1904, p. 152) does so at his peril, unless at time of employment he complies with paragraph 3, making proofs of age required thereunder conclusive evidence of child's age.-Id.

106 A. 197.

full knowledge of result of hot scales flying 220(7) (Pa.) An experienced riveter, with from a rivet, who on complaint to his boss of his place of work was told to go home if he did not do the work, and who continued at work, could not recover damages from employing in his eye.-Miller v. Standard Steel Car er for injury resulting from a hot scale lodgCo., 106 A. 82.

(G) Contributory Negligence of Servant. The doctrine of estoppel in pais as applied 233(5) (Pa.) The test of negligence in to infants is not applicable to employment of a child under 14, in violation of Factory Act (P. L. 1904, p. 152).-Id.

methods, machinery, and appliances is the ordinary usage of the business, and that test is applicable to allegations of contributory negligence.-Ulm v. McKeesport Tin Plate Co., 106 A. 639.

100(1) (N.J.) No evasion of Employers' Liability Act April 22, 1908, § 5 (U. S. Comp. St. 88661), making any contract or device intend-243(5) (N.H.) A notice posted by a master, ed to enable common carrier to exempt itself to the effect that servants should wear goggles from liability thereunder void, results from in- when cutting rivets, would not have the conterstate railroad carrier's contract with in- clusive effect of rendering a servant injured dependent stevedoring corporation to load and while cutting rivets without goggles guilty of unload freight, though that corporation ex- contributory negligence, where it was a dead letpressly assumes all liability for injuries to its ter and was not followed.-King v. Boston & M. employés on railroad premises.-Drago v. Cen- R. R., 106 A. 284. tral R. Co. of New Jersey, 106 A. 803.

(B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and Places for Work.

101, 102(1) (Pa.) Employers are only required to furnish a reasonably safe place in which to work and reasonably safe tools.Miller v. Standard Steel Car Co., 106 A. $2.

246(3) (Pa.) A servant acting in an emergency to save the life of others is not charged with the consequences of errors in judgment resulting from excitement and confusion of the moment.-Smith v. Standard Steel Car Co., 106 A. 102.

(H) Actions.

25034. Owing to the great increase of matter heretofore classified to this section, we have ber sections 346-420, at the end of this topic, made a new subdivision, consisting of numwhere the matter in this and future index digests will be found.

118(2) (Pa.) A mine owner violates Act June 9, 1911 (P. L. 798), and, unless contributory negligence intervenes, is liable for injuries resulting therefrom, where he fails to prevent "electric haulage by locomotives operated from trolley wire in gaseous portions of mines except upon intake air, fresh from the outside."265(5) (Pa.) The mere happening of an ac-Jaras v. Wright, 106 A. 798.

There is no legal excuse for failure to obey the absolute statutory requirement of Act June 9, 1911 (P. L. 798), forbidding electric haulage systems in gaseous parts of mine except upon intake air fresh from the outside.-Id.

125(6) (Pa.) Mine owners held to have constructive notice of the gaseous condition of mine in which an electric trolley haulage system was operated in violation of Act June 9. 1911 (P. L. 798).-Jaras v. Wright, 106 A. 798. 125(9) (Pa.) Actual knowledge by mine owners' superintendent of the gaseous condition of a mine is imputable to the owners, so as to render them liable for injuries resulting from running an electric trolley haulage system therein in violation of Act June 9. 1911 (P. L. 798).-Jaras v. Wright, 106 A. 798.

(E) Fellow Servants.

cident raises no presumption of negligence against the master, but a specific act of negligence must be shown.-Miller v. Standard Steel Car Co., 106 A. 82.

268 (N.H.) Where defendants testified that plaintiff was not employed by them until after the alleged date of the accident, and plaintiff whether plaintiff before hearing defendants' teswas permitted to assign a later date, a question timony had heard suggestions from any source of a different date than alleged, asked for the purpose of showing that his former statement was honestly, though mistakenly, made, was properly excluded as too remote.-Boulanger v. McQuestin & Lewis, 106 A. 492.

270(17) (Pa.) Where servant inexperienced in knowledge of defendant's superintendent was ordered to cut off heads of iron rivets, evidence, as to the correct way of cutting off such heads and the necessity for either knowledge or instructions, held admissible.-Broce v. Seaboard Const. Co., 106 A. 300.

185(12) (N.H.) Where granite quarry employer has assumed duty of ascertaining stabil-277 (Pa.) Where a minor applied to deity of pieces of granite before directing em- fendant for employment and was taken to a ployés to work thereon, it is liable at common piece worker and became his helper and was law for negligent performance thereof by fore-paid by him, as known to defendant's superman to whom duty is intrusted.-Tierney v. intendent, and defendant exercised control over New England Granite Works, 106 A. 481.

201(1) (Pa.) Where negligence of mine foreman and the negligence of owner in failing to obey Act June 9, 1911 (P. L. 798), forbidding electric haulage in gaseous part of mine, etc., concurred in producing explosion causing

minor's work and owned the material and tools, and its superintendent ordered mill carpenter to make certain steps over which minor tripped, causing his injury, the evidence sustained a finding that he was in defendant's employ.-Reda v. Mayer China Co., 106 A. 67.

278 (14) (N.H.) Evidence held to justify the jury-Smith v. Standard Steel Car Co., finding that comber upon which plaintiff was 106 A. 102. working at the time of his injury was defec-288(16) (Pa.) In action for injuries to shifttive, and that defendant employer knew or should have known of its dangerous condition. -Brito v. Newmarket Mfg. Co., 106 A. 224. 278 (20) (Pa.) In action by employé for injuries caused while cutting off heads of rivets by orders of defendant's superintendent, who knew plaintiff was inexperienced and gave him no instructions, because of which plaintiff was injured, evidence held to sustain verdict for plaintiff.-Broce v. Seaboard Const. Co., 106 A. 300.

281(6) (N.H.) Evidence held to show that employé, injured while working on defective comber, was guilty of no fault in not knowing of such defect.-Brito v. Newmarket Mfg. Co., 106 A. 224.

ing machinist, having no knowledge of glass factories, except from his short employment, who was directed by foreman to go into inclosure around blowing machine, and was injured by face of roller of glass, held, on the evidence that whether danger was so imminent that it was plaintiff's duty to refuse to obey orders, or whether he acted in reckless disregard of danger, was for jury.-Mountain v. American Window Glass Co., 106 A. 313.

289(4) (N.H.) In an action for injuries by the tipping of piece of granite when split, whether plaintiff, an experienced worker, was at fault for assuming that foreman, who had duty of ascertaining stability of the stone, would not have directed plaintiff to split it without ascertaining that its position was secure, was a question for the jury.-Tierney v. New England Granite Works, 106 A. 481..

281(9) (N.H.) In an action against a master by a servant struck in the eye by a metal chip while cutting rivets, evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that a notice regard-289(22) (N.H.) Where stone quarry employing the use of goggles was not intended to apply to men engaged in cutting rivets.-King y. Boston & M. R. R., 106 A. 284.

285 (5) (N.H.) In an action against the master by a servant struck in the eye by a metal chip, negligence charged being furnishing of hand hammer and chisel instead of an air hammer, whether chip came from hammer or chisel, or from the rivet which was being cut, held for the jury.-King v. Boston & M. R. R., 106 A. 284.

er has assumed duty of ascertaining stability of granite for the work directed, an experienced employé is not as a matter of law, at fault for failing to ascertain whether the duty has been performed.-Tierney v. New England Granite Works, 106 A. 481.

289(25) (Pa.) In a servant's action for injuries, where the evidence was conflicting as to whether he had observed due care in passing along a passageway where he was injured and in placing steps at a point where he might trip over them, his contributory negligence was for the jury.-Reda v. Mayer China Co., 106 A. 67.

286(3) (N.J.) In an action for injuries to a laborer who fell into an open hatchway in a dark passage on a boat which he was helping to unload, evidence held insufficient to take the 289(27) (Pa.) An employé cannot be held case to the jury on the question of negligence guilty of contributory negligence as matter of in failing to furnish a safe place to work. law, merely because of the existence of danBrowski v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 106 A. ger in his way of doing the work and because 369. he knows there is a safer way of doing it, if he does work as he and other like employés were doing it and had many times done safely, and as the employer knew they were doing it. Ulm v. McKeesport Tin Plate Co.. 106 A. 639.

286(3) (Pa.) In a servant's action for injuries where the evidence was conflicting as to whether the place of work was reasonably safe, the defendant's negligence was for the jury. Reda v. Mayer China Co., 106 A. 67.

286(22) (N.J.) Whether it is practicable to guard or cover machinery, and still operate it, is a jury question, where the facts are in controversy.-Feir v. Weil, 106 A. 402.

286(22) (Pa.) In a servant's action for injury where the evidence was conflicting as to whether or not the machinery was properly guarded, the defendant's negligence was for the jury.-Reda v. Mayer China Co., 106 A. 67.

289(65) (N.H.) In an action against a master by a servant struck in the eye by a metal chip while cutting rivets, whether servant was negligent in not wearing goggles for that particular work, in compliance with notice posted in shop, was one of fact, especially where there is evidence that goggles rather increase than diminish the danger incident to flying chips.-King v. Boston & M. R. R., 106 A. 284.

289(38) (Pa.) In action for death of an em286(22) (Pa.) Whether Act May 2, 1905, § ployé, killed while operating a crane, who in 11, requiring the cogwheels of machinery to be an emergency, and to avoid killing men beproperly guarded, was complied with by plac- neath the load, stopped the load, and at once ing a box over entire machine, and nothing upset the crane, held on the evidence that his further over the cogwheels, in respect to an contributory negligence was for the jury.employé whose duty compelled him to work Smith v. Standard Steel Car Co., 106 A. 102. within the box, held a question for the jury.-297(2) (N.H.) In employé's action for injuUlm v. McKeesport Tin Plate Co., 106 Ă. 639. ries, a special verdict that employer was not at 286(29) (N.H.) In action under federal Em- fault will control general verdict for employé ployers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657- and authorize directed verdict for employer.8665) against railroad for death of employé Tierney v. New England Granite Works, 106 A. killed at a station by an incoming train running 481. at an excessive speed, whether engineer should. have done more than sound the required station IV. LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES TO signal was a question for the jury.-Topore v. THIRD PERSONS. Boston & M. R. R., 106 A. 498.

(A) Aets or Omissions of Servant.

287(4) (N.II.) Whether stone quarry fore- 300 (Conn.) The master's responsibility for man, intrusted with duty of ascertaining stabil- the negligence of his servant rests, not merely ity of pieces of granite before directing work on his actual control over the conduct of the thereon, could have foreseen that a stone would servant, but on his duty to so manage his not remain in position after being split, was a affairs through others that third persons are question for the jury.-Tierney v. New England not injured by any breach of legal duty on the Granite Works, 106 A. 481. part of such others, while they are engaged upon his business and within the scope of their authority.-Wolf v. Sulik, 106 A. 443.

288(13) (Pa.) In action for death of plaintiff's husband, killed while operating a crane, after his complaint of its dangerous condition and assurances that repairs had been made, held, on the evidence, that its dangerous condition on day of accident was not such that no ordinary prudent man would undertake its operations, so that assumption of risk was for

301 (1) (Conn.) Gen. St. 1918, § 1572, making an owner liable for the neglect of his agent, or bailee, driving his vehicle, within the scope of his authority, in failing to comply with sections 1568, 1569, relating to the law of the road, etc., does not apply to special bailments

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER for the sole benefit of the bailee, or to mosting that defendant's employé was acting withspecial bailments for the mutual benefit of in the scope of his employment.-Cumberland bailor and bailee.-Wolf v. Sulik, 106 A. 443. Brewing Co. of Allegany County v. Feldstein, Where the wife, owner of an automobile for 106 A. 161. the use and pleasure of the family, gave her husband authority to use it, such use carried out the purpose for which it was maintained by the owner, and the arrangement created was not a special, but a continuing, bailment, so as to make her liable, under Gen. St. 1918, § 1572, for damages inflicted by such car while operated on a highway by her husband.-Id.

302(6) (N.J.) Where a chauffeur is, for purpose of enabling him to reach his work earlier, permitted to drive the master's automobile to and from his home, the relation of master and servant continues during such trips, so that the master is liable for injuries resulting from negligent driving.-Depue v. George D. Salmon Co., 106 A. 379.

332(4) (Md.) In suit against defendant loan company and its agent instruction that jury must find for defendants, unless agent of loan company entered room of plaintiff's wife without her permission and against her wishes and while there by his action and conduct injured the wife and caused her physical and mental pain and suffering, was not error, for, unless the plaintiff's wife was injured by the acts and conduct alleged in the declaration, plaintiff would have no right of recovery.Patapsco Loan Co. of Baltimore City v. Hobbs, 106 A. 619.

VI. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

ACTS.

-

(A) Nature and Grounds of Master's Liability.

302(6) (N.J.) Where servant driving auto from master's residence to garage was accustomed to stop at his own home for supper, as known to master, and while on way home ran 347 (Me.) The Workmen's Compensation into a child crossing the street, requested in- Act is not violative of the Constitution in restruction that neither permission to servant to spect to the method provided by it for the stop at his own home nor acquiescence in prac- exclusive determination of issues of fact, in tice made him a servant while driving home, the absence of fraud, by the chairman of the was properly denied.-Ferris v. McArdle, 106 A. Industrial Accident Commission.-Mailman v. 460. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 A. 606. The word "authorized," as affecting the liabil-348 (Pa.) The Workmen's Compensation ity of a master who commits the use of his auto- Act is a remedial statute and is to receive a mobile to the discretion of his servant as to the liberal construction.-Pater v. Superior Steel route to be followed in returning to the garage, Co., 106 A. 202. and who stops on the way for a personal reason, which has no influence on a tort that had happened prior thereto while driving over the authorized route, does not mean authority expressly conferred, but whether the act was such as was incident to the performance of the duties intrusted to him by the master.-Id.

302 (6) (Pa.) An automobile owner is not liable for damages caused by a collision due to the negligence of an employé who was using automobile for a purpose of his own, whether the owner knew that it was being so used or not.-Beatty v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 106 A. 303.

That an automobile was dangerous by reason of its defective brakes did not render the owner liable for personal injury caused by collision while the employé was using it for a purpose of his own, as that, and not the condition of the brakes, was the proximate cause of the injury.

-Id.

349 (Pa.) Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736) art. 2, § 204, providing that, contracts to the contrary notwithstanding, receipt of benefits from relief associations shall not bar recovery of damages by action at law, applies only to accidents happening after January 1, 1916, as it materially limits substantive rules of law applicable to personal injury from negligence and announces a new public policy.-Riddell v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 106 A. 80.

362 (Md.) The question whether an employment is "casual," within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, must be determined with principal reference to the scope and purpose of the hiring, rather than with sole regard to the duration and regularity of the service.-State Accident Fund v. Jacobs, 106 A. 255.

factory early in the canning season to do hauling at such times as he might be needed during the season at a certain rate of pay, the hauling being a necessary part of the employer's business, was not a "casual employé," within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation

A farmer and teamster engaged by a canning

Act.-Id.

364 (Pa.) Under Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736) §§ 103, 104, defining "employer" as synonymous with master ployé" as synonymous with servant, and in and to include municipal corporations, and "emview of section 106, a borough policeman is an "employé" of the borough within the act.McCarl v. Borough of Houston, 106 A. 104.

330(1) (R.I.) In action for injuries from 373 (Me.) Where the cook of a tugboat, being struck by automobile, plaintiff made out moored to a wharf, went on shore to purchase a prima facie case by proof indicating that the supplies, part of his duty, and, when returning, registration number of the car that struck fell from the wharf and was drowned, the death him was that of a car of the "R. I. Auto Serv- "arose out of" the employment, within the ice Company," under which name defendant Workmen's Compensation Act, to justify award was doing business; for, if defendant was only to his widow.-Westman's Case, 106 A. 532. an agent, as he claimed, it devolved upon him, 375(1) (Me.) Cook employed on tugboat and in order to avoid personal liability, to disclose his principal.-Berger v. Watjen, 106 A. 740.

330(3) (Md.) Where a ten year old boy, while purchasing ice from defendant, which was conducting an ice business and a brewery, had his eye put out by ice tongs handled by defendant's employé regularly employed in its bottling department, while delivering a piece of ice to plaintiff, evidence held to warrant a find106 A.-61

drowned when he fell overboard from a wharf to which his boat was moored, he having gone on shore to purchase supplies, a part of his duty, and returning with some of them in his possession, held injured "in the course of" his employment, within the Workmen's Compensation Act.-Westman's Case, 106 A. 532.

375(2) (Pa.) Where engineer during his vacation, but while in pay of and subject to em

ployer's call, at request of its superintendent award to a widow ceases before decedent's went to inspect a pumping station, to increase children reach 16 years of age they are enhis efficiency as an employé, and was injured titled to compensation until they reach that in automobile accident on his journey on his age.-McCarl v. Borough of Houston, 106 A. way homeward, his widow was entitled to 104. damages for his death as an "injury by acci-3934 [New, vol. 8A Key-No. Series] dent in the course of his employment" and while "actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer," within Workmen's Compensation Act, art. 3, § 301. -Messer v. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co., 106 A. 85.

(N.J.Ch.) The preference given by Workmen's Compensation Act, § 22, in the case of insolvent corporations is under Corporations Act, § 83, confined to the amount representing the weekly award for the two months preceding the proceedings in insolvency.-Steel & Iron Mongers v. Bonnite Insulator Co., 106 A. 380.

(C) Proceedings.

375(2) (Pa.) A mechanical engineer, employed on a salary with no fixed hours of service, who had been directed to go to another city for information for use in employer's business, and who on his return, after 11:30 p. m. 403 (Me.) The burden rests on claimant to and while going from station to his home, before reporting was killed by an automobile, was injured in the "course of his employment," within Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, art. 3, § 301.-Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co., 106 A. 196.

376(2) (Me.) It is sufficient, to justify an award of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, if by weakening resistance or otherwise an accident so influences the progress of an existing disease as to cause death or disability.-Mailman v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 A. 606.

(B) Compensation.

385(4) (Me.) A painter, who through laceration of left hand, affecting extensor muscles controlling third and fourth fingers, practically lost use of fingers, though his earning capacity was not diminished, did not "lose" the fingers within the Workmen's Compensation Act, § 16, and was entitled to compensation only under section 15, basis being difference in earning capacities before and after accident; "loss" meaning physical loss of a member.-In re Merchant's Case, 106 A. 117.

prove the facts necessary to establish a right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, including the fact that the injury arose out of, and in the course of, employment, and evidence, though slender, that nevertheless will satisfy a reasonable man, is sufficient.Westman's Case, 106 A. 532.

To insure recovery of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by the deceased employé's widow, the burden rests upon her to establish that the employé's death was caused, first, by accident; second, that the accident arose out of the employment; and, third, that it arose in the course of the employment.-Id.

In determining whether a death was suicidal or accidental within the Workmen's Compensation Act, certain legal presumptions may properly be considered, and the amount of evidence, circumstantial as well as direct, with the proper presumptions, are all to be taken into consideration when investigating the question.-Id.

403 (Me.) On hearing before the Industrial Accident Commission, the claimant has the burden of proof.-Mailman v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 A. 606. an 403 (Pa.) When employé's body is 385(12) (Pa.) Where injury necessitated found on employer's premises at or near his amputation of arm below the elbow resulting regular place of work under circumstances in employé's permanent loss of use of his arm, indicating accident during his hours of work, he was entitled to compensation for loss of the it may be fairly inferred that he was injured arm, rather than for loss of hand, under Work-in course of his employment.-Flucker v. Carmen's Compensation Act, § 306, which includes negie Steel Co., 106 A. 192. all cases of permanent loss of members mentioned therein without regard to point of amputation as well as in case of loss from injury not requiring amputation.-Pater v. Superior Steel Co., 106 A. 202.

385(20) (N.J.) That a petitioner for commutation of an award under Workmen's Compensation Act, who had accidentally swallowed pins while trimming a show window, was thereby rendered helpless and bedridden, and that a surgical operation was necessary to save her life because of a pin near the base of the brain, an "unusual circumstance," warranting commutation of future weekly payments into a lump sum, within Act April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 143) § 2, par. 21. as amended by Act April 1, 1913 (P. L. p. 309) § 6.-Jensen v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 106 A. 808.

was

That the concluding provision of Act April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 143) § 2, par. 21, as amended by Act April 1, 1913 (P. L. p. 309) § 6, relating to Workmen's Compensation, provides that commutation of an award shall not be allowed for the purpose of enabling the injured employé to satisfy a debt or to make payment to physicians, lawyers, or any other persons, does not defeat commutation, where unusual circumstances exist, requiring payment to physician to save the employé's life.-Id.

388 (Conn.) Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 43, defining dependents as including members of the employe's "family" or next of kin, wholly or in part dependent, the children of decedent living with him and his unlawful consort were dependents; the word "family" being of elastic meaning.-Piccinim v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 106 A. 330.

393 (Pa.) Under the Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915 (P. L. 736), if an

404 (Me.) In proceedings under the Workthe Industrial Accident Commission, rehearsmen's Compensation Act, testimony heard by ing the story of the accident as told by decedent to witnesses, was inadmissible hearsay.Mailman v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 A. 606.

Testimony was admissible before the Industrial Accident Commission, as part of the res gestæ, that when decedent was discovered he said, "I got hurt," and then or afterwards indicated where he was hurt, but was admissible only as tending to show decedent's physical condition at the time.-Id.

405(1) (Me.) There must be some competent evidence supporting an award of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and, though such evidence may be slender, it must be evidence, and not speculation, surmise, or conjecture.-Mailman v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 A. 606.

405(1) (Pa.) In proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, a referee's conclusion as to the manner of an employé's death may be based on circumstantial evidence.-Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Co., 106 A. 192.

405(4) (Me.) To prove an accidental death within the Workmen's Compensation Act. it is not necessary to negative every other possibility of death except that by accidental means, and the proof need not necessarily be direct and positive, but may be by circumstances.-Westman's Case, 106 A. 532.

In proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act for death of the cook of a tugboat when he fell overboard from a wharf to which his boat was moored, evidence held to sustain the

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am,Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

finding of the Industrial Accident Commissioner | pleas are conclusive, if there be any evidence that the death was accidental.-Id. to support them.-Jensen v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 106 A. 808.

405(4) (Me.) Under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 11, to sustain decree awarding 416 (Pa.) The referee in proceedings under compensation, it must appear that there was Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, produced competent legal evidence that de- should make his findings of fact so comprehencedent died or was disabled as a result of (1) sive and explicit as to disclose the full story an accident arising (2) out of (3) and in the of the accident, but legal precision cannot be course of his employment by defendant.-Mail- insisted upon.-Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Co., man v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 106 A. 192. A. 606.

Finding of the Industrial Accident Commissioner that decedent sustained an injury, rather than died of disease, held supported by evidence.-Id.

Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, contemplates brevity in matters of practice, but if referee fails to pass upon any material matter of fact in evidence which either party considers vital, in event of an appeal to court, those affected should apply to compensation board for assistance on a hearing de novo, in view of article 4, § 421.—Id.

Finding of the Industrial Accident Commissioner that the injury to the deceased employé arose out of and in the course of the employment held sustained by evidence; the employé 416 (Pa.) The mere fact that each finding having been left at work in a mirthful condition, and having been found the next morning injured and stating he was hurt.-Id.

405(4) (N.J.Sup.) Compensation for the death of a servant should not be allowed unless the testimony or circumstances adduced fairly give rise to a reasonable inference that death was attributable to the injuries he received.-Lundy v. George Brown & Co., 106 A.

362.

In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of a servant, it was not essential to the right of recovery that petitioner should establish that the injuries were the proximate cause of death; it being sufficient that they were the producing cause. -Id.

of a referee in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not formally labelled as a finding of fact or conclusion of law in no way changes their actual character.Dainty v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 106 A. 194.

Where a series of facts are found showing, in themselves, that an employé was injured on employer's premises, the lack of a formally stated conclusion that injury so occurred is not fatal to referee's adjudication.-Id.

416 (Pa.) Contention that there was no evidence to sustain referee's conclusion that the deceased employé's death was the result of an accident raised a question of law, which the Workmen's Compensation Board had power to determine under Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, § 420, upon consideration of the legal adequacy of the testimony taken before the referee.-Murdock v. New York News Bureau, 106 A. 788.

In proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act to obtain compensation for death of a servant, evidence held to sustain finding that death on February 21, 1918, was caused by injuries received on December 19, 1916, and that 417(34) (Pa.) The findings of a referee, petitioner was entitled to compensation.-Id. affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation 405 (4) (Pa.) Decision of Workmen's Com- Board, that the condition of claimant's hands pensation Board that woman was entitled to as the result of the accident constituted a percompensation for husband's death as result of manent loss of their use within Workmen's accident or injury in course of his employment Compensation Act, art. 3, § 301, was a fact held sustained by evidence that his bruised found, and not a conclusion of law reviewable body was found between wheels of wagon in a on appeal.-Cartin v. Standard Tin Plate Co., washout, that he was a sober man and in good 106 A. 63. health, and report of coroner's physician stated that death was probably due to injuries.-Leary v. McIlvain, 106 A. 785.

417(6) (Me.) A finding of any essential fact in favor of claimant by the chairman of the Industrial Accident Commission without proper evidence is an error of law reviewable by the Supreme Judicial Court, despite Workmen's Compensation Act, § 34.-Mailman v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 A. 606.

405(4) (Pa.) In widow's proceeding, under Workmen's Compensation Act June 2, 1915, ar award by referee, confirmed by Workmen's Compensation Board and the court below, will be affirmed on appeal, where evidence supports findings that deceased, a lineman, fell from a pole after contact with charged wire, that on striking the ground, his knees doubled up and violently struck his chest, causing pain and indicating fracture of rib, and that a week thereafter lobar pneumonia caused his death.-Mur-417(7) (Me.) To make successful challenge dock v. New York News Bureau, 106 A. 788.

That a physician who examined deceased lineman failed to discover a fractured rib did not detract from weight to be given undisputed fact that he had received a blow on the chest when he fell from a pole, after contact with charged wire, and that blow was followed by continuous pain which a week later resulted in his death from lobar pneumonia.-Id.

4092 [New, vol. 7A Key-No. Series] (Me.) Whether an injury is an accident within Workmen's Compensation Act is a mixed question of law and fact, which becomes a question of law when the facts are ascertained or determined.-Westman's Case, 106 A. 532.

412 (N.J.) Where the judgment of the common pleas court is supported by the evidence, it is, under the statute, conclusive and binding upon questions of fact.-Kroog v. Keystone Dairy Co., 106 A. 28.

412 (N.J.) On appeal in a workmen's compensation case from a judgment of the court of common pleas commuting an award to a lump sum, the findings of fact in the common

417(6) (Pa.) When the referee's adjudication contains underlying findings of fact which either negative or fail to support his ultimate findings, an error of law is presented which may be reviewed on appeal.-Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Co., 106 A. 192.

on appeal of finding of industrial commissioner on question whether injury arose out of, and in course of, employment, there must be a favorable answer to query, as a question of law only, whether there was any evidence before the commissioner on which his decision may stand so firmly as to make it final under Workmen's Compensation Act, § 34.-Westman's Case, 106 A. 532.

417(7) (Me.) By Rev. St. c. 50, § 34, in causes arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the chairman of the Industrial Accident Commission is made the trier of facts, and his decrees, in the absence of fraud, are final.-Mailman v. Record Foundry & Machine Co., 106 A. 606.

The Supreme Judicial Court will review the Industrial Accident Commissioner's reasoning as to the effect of or inferences from evidence, but, in the absence of fraud, will not review his findings as to the credibility and weight of testimony.-Id.

If a state of facts is shown more consistent with the Industrial Accident Commissioner's