sidered as a substitution for those interests, but his Honour was not aware of any determination to that ef feet (r). But where a lease had been held of a college, and, the corporation having disposed of the reversion to a stranger, the trustee purchased of the alienee, his Honour expressly decided that the parties interested in the original lease had no equity against the trustee, for the tenant-right of renewal with a public body was gone, and a lease at a rack-rent was all that could be expected from a private proprietor (s). III. The last kind of trust we have to consider is, where a trust already in existence and annexed to the present subject matter is created de novo by operation of law as against this particular person. A trust attaches in this manner wherever the property passes from the trustee into the hands of a person who takes by a title derivative from the trustee; as, if the trustee die, the heir, executor, or administrator, becomes the legal owner of the property, but, as he merely represents the ancestor, testator, or intestate, he takes it in the same character, and is therefore bound by the same equity. So, if a trustee devise the estate, the devisee, as an assign, will be invested with the character of a trustee (t). If the estate be passed to a stranger by conveyance, then the grantee, if he be a volunteer, will be bound by (r) Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 197; and see Hardman v. Johnson, Ib. 347; Norris v. Neve, 3 Atk. 37 & 38; Lesley's case, 2 Freem. 52; Fosbrooke v. Balguy, 1 M. & K. 226. (s) Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190. (t) Marlow v. Smith, 2 P. W. 201, per Sir J. Jekyll; Lord Grenville v. Blyth, 16 Ves. 231, per Sir W. Grant. the trust, whether he had notice of it (u) or not (x), for, though he had no actual notice of the equity, yet the Court will presume it against him, where he paid no consideration. But, if the grantee be a purchaser of the estate at its full value, then, if he take with notice of the trust, he is bound to the same extent and in the same manner as the person of whom he purchased (y), even though the conveyance was made to him by fine with non-claim (≈), for, knowing another's right to the property, he throws away his money voluntarily, and of his own free will (a); and the rule applies not only to the case of a trust, properly so called, but to purchasers with notice of any equitable incumbrance, as of a covenant or agreement affecting the estate (b), or a lien for purchase (u) Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. W. 678; Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271; S. C. 2 Freem. 123; Langton v. Astrey, 2 Ch. Re. 30; S. C. Nels. 126. (x) Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. W. 681, per cur.; Pye v. George, 2 Salk. 680, per Lord Harcourt; and see 1 Re. 122. b.; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Ed. 219; Spurgeon y. Collier, 1 Ed. 55; Cole v. Moore, Mo. 806. (y) Dunbar v. Tredennick, 2 B. & B. 319, per Lord Manners; Pawlett v. Attorney-General, Hard. 469, per Lord Hale; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Ed. 195, per Sir T. Clarke; Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 149; Phayre v. Peree, 3 Dow, 129; Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef. 262, per Lord Redesdale; Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 382; Mead v. Lord Orrery, 3 Atk. 238, per Lord Hardwicke; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 350, per Lord Eldon; Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. W. 681, per cur.; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1 T. R. 771, per Lord Hardwicke; Verney v. Carding, cited Joy v. Campbell, 1 Sch. & Lef. 345; Flemming v. Page, Rep. t. Finch, 320; Powell v. Price, 2 P. W. 539, admitted; Backhouse v. Middleton, 1 Ch. Ca. 173; S. C. Id. 208. (z) Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Sch. & Lef. 355. (a) Mead v. Lord Orrery, 3 Atk. 238, per Lord Hardwicke. (b) Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249; Earl Brook v. Bulkeley, 2 Ves. 498; Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. jun. 437; Winged v. Lefebury, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 32; Ferrars money (c). But, if a bona fide purchaser have not notice, he then merits the full protection of the Court, and his title, even in equity, cannot be impeached (d). If a purchaser had no notice of a trust at the time of the purchase, but afterwards discovers a trust, and obtains a conveyance from the trustee, it seems he cannot protect himself by taking shelter under the legal estate; for notice of the trust converts him into a trustee, and he must not, to get a plank to save himself, be guilty of a breach of trust (e). A purchaser without notice from a purchaser with notice is not liable, for his own bona fides is a good defence in itself, and the mala fides of the vendor ought not to invalidate it (ƒ). But an exception must be made in the case of a charitable use, for it has been ruled that a purchaser without notice from a purchaser with notice shall be bound by the claim of the charity (g). v. Cherry, 2 Vern. 384; Jackson's case, Lane, 60; Crofton v. Ormsby, 2 Sch. & Lef. 583; Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Sch. & Lef. 355. (c) Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; Walker v. Preswick, 2 Ves. 622, per Lord Hardwicke; Kator v. Pembroke, 1 B. C. C. 302, per Lord Loughborough ; Gibbons v. Baddall, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 682, note (b); Elliot v. Edwards, 3 B. & P. 181; and see Grant v. Mills, 2 V. & B. 306; Dunbar v. Tredennick, 2 B. & B. 320. (d) Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Ed. 195, per Sir T. Clarke; Id. 246, per Lord Henley; Millard's case, 2 Freem. 43; Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. W. 681, per cur.; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1 T. R. 771, per Lord Hardwicke; Dunbar v. Tre- (e) Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271; S. C. 2 Freem. 123; Langton v. Astrey, 2 Ch. Re. 30; S. C. Nels. 126. (f) Mertins v. Jolliffe, Amb. 313, per Lord Hardwicke; Ferv. Cherry, 2 Vern. 384; see Pitts v. Edelph, Tothill, 164; Salsbury v. Bagott, 2 Sw. 608, per rars cur. (g) East Greensted's case, Duke, 65; Sutton Colefield case, Id. 68; and see Id. 94, 173. A purchaser with notice from a purchaser without notice is exempt from the trust, not from the merits of the second purchaser, but of the first; and also on the ground that, if an innocent purchaser were prevented from disposing of the beneficial interest, the necessary result would be a stagnation of property (h). But, if the trustee sell the lands to a bona fide purchaser without notice, and afterwards himself become the owner of the lands, though for a good and valuable consideration, the trust as to him revives again, and he shall restore the land to the trust (i); and in this respect equity follows the law, for, if a trespasser of goods sell them in market overt the owner's title is barred, but, if they come to the trespasser again, the owner may seize them (k). 66 Upon the question, how far a purchaser will be bound by notice of a doubtful equity, Lord Camden said, “ A man must take notice of a deed on which an equity, supported by precedents the justice of which every one acknowledges, arises, but not the mere construction of words, which are uncertain in themselves, and the meaning of which often depends on their locality" (1). And Sir W. Grant observed, "There may be such a doubtful equity that a purchaser is not to be taken to know what will be the decision, and that (h) Harrison v. Forth, Pr. Ch. 51; Bradwell v. Catchpole, stated Walker v. Symonds, 3 Sw. 78, note (a); Mertins v. Jolliffe, Amb. 313, per Lord Hardwicke; Brandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571, per eundem; Sweet v. Southcote, 2 B. C.C. 66; M'Queen v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 478, per Lord Eldon; Lowther v. Carlton, 2 Atk. 242; S. C. 3 Barn. 358; S. C. For. 187; Andrew v. Wrigley, 4 B. C. C. 136, per M. R.; Salsbury v. Bagott, 2 Sw. 608, per cur. (i) Bovy v. Smith, 2 Ch. Ca. 124; S. C. 1 Vern. 60, 84, 144; Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Sch. & Lef. 379, per Lord Redesdale. (k) See Bovy v. Smith, 2 Ch. Ca. 126. (1) Cordwell v. Mackrill, 2 Ed. 347; S. C. Amb. 517. is all Lord Camden means; but in this case the equity is clear (m)." The rule, that " heirs of the body" in articles shall be construed" first and other sons," does not appear to have been fully established till about the year 1720 (n): Lord Hardwicke therefore said, that notice of ancient articles, that is, of articles before the doctrine was well settled, should not bind a bona fide purchaser (o). And afterwards, in a case of both articles and settlement before marriage, the settlement reciting the articles, Lord Hardwicke thought that, as the equity in this instance rested upon a single authority (p), and that as between the parties and their representatives and mere volunteers, the purchaser ought not to be bound by the claim of the issue (q). But notice of modern articles, that is, of articles entered into since the clear establishment of the rule, will affect a purchaser (r); but, even then, the articles themselves must be produced, that the Court may judge from the whole instrument; for the true construction depends upon the words, and other parts of the deed may be material to find out their meaning (s). In a case where a residuary legatee had enjoyed for nineteen years a copyhold estate, which had been mortgaged to the testator in fee, and then the heir of the tes |