basis, and has systematized the methods of observation and deduction, for all the subjects of scientific research.

Upon the field of logical science, as defined by the writers whom I have referred to, I do not propose to encroach. The object of the following pages will be of a subordinate and more limited kind. Without entering into any inquiry into the process of reasoning, or attempting to throw any light upon scientific method, it will concern a portion of the application of logical science, which has often been discussed in a detached or fragmentary manner, but which seems of sufficient importance to deserve a connected consideration.

It is familiarly known, that, in our progress from childhood to manhood, during the course of our education, and afterwards in the business of life, our belief, both speculative and practical, is, owing to our inability or unwillingness to investigate the subject for ourselves, often determined by the opinions of others. That the opinions of mankind should so often be formed in this manner, has been a matter of regret to many writers: others again have enforced the duty of submitting our convictions, in certain cases, to the guidance of fit judges; but all have admitted the wide extent to which the derivation of opinions upon trust prevails, and the desirableness that the choice of guides in these matters should be regulated by a sound discretion. It is, therefore, proposed to inquire how far our opinions may be properly influenced by the mere authority of others,

* This use of the word authority is in accordance with its sense in classical writers. One of the meanings of auctoritas is explained by Facciolati, as follows: "Item pro pondere ac momento quod habent res legitime, sapienter, ac prudenter constitutæ, ut

independently of our own conviction founded upon appropriate reasoning.

When any one forms an opinion on a question either of speculation or practice, without any appropriate process of reasoning, really or apparently leading to that conclusion, and without compulsion or inducement of interest, but simply because some other persons, whom he believes to be competent judges on the matter, entertain that opinion, he is said to have formed his opinion upon authority.

If he is convinced by a legitimate process of reasoning -as by studying a scientific treatise on the subjecthis opinion does not rest upon authority. Or if he adopts any opinion, either sincerely or professedly, from motives of interest, or from fear of persecution, he does not found his opinion upon authority. He who believes upon authority, entertains the opinion simply because it is entertained by a person who appears to him likely to think correctly on the subject.

Whenever, in the course of this Essay, I speak of the

sunt leges, decreta senatus, responsa prudentum, res præclare gestæ, sententiæ clarorum virorum."-See Cic. Top. c. xix.

An auctor meant the originator or creator of anything. Hence Virgil speaks of the deified Augustus as "Auctorem frugum tempestatumque potentem," (Georg. i. 27;) and Sallust says that unequal glory attends "Scriptorem et auctorem rerum,” (Cat. c. ii.) Hence any person who determines our belief, even as a witness, is called an auctor. Thus Tacitus, in quoting Julius Cæsar as a witness with respect to the former state of the Gauls, calls him "Summus auctorum," (Germ. c. 28,)—i. e., the highest of authorities. As writers, particularly of history, were the authorities for facts, "auctor" came to mean a writer. Hence Juvenal speaks of a preceptor of the Roman youth being required, "Ut legat historias, auctores noverit omnes, Tamquam ungues digitosque suos."-VII. 231. Compare Quintilian, Inst. Orat. I. 8, §. 18–21.

Principle of Authority, I shall understand the principle of adopting the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without reference to the particular grounds on which that belief may rest.

In pursuing the inquiry, thus indicated in general terms, I shall attempt, first, to describe the circumstances under which opinions are usually derived from authority, and next, to ascertain the marks of sound or trustworthy authority in matters of opinion. Having shown what are the best indications of the competent judges in each subject, I shall inquire as to their numerical ratio to the rest of the community, and shall afterwards offer some remarks upon the application of the principle of authority to questions of civil government. Lastly, I shall make some suggestions upon the best means of creating a trustworthy authority in matters of opinion, and of guarding against the abuses to which the principle of authority is liable.

§ 3. It will be shown presently that a large proportion of the general opinions of mankind are derived merely from authority, and are entertained without any distinct understanding of the evidence on which they rest, or the argumentative grounds by which they are supported. Moreover, the advice of professional persons, or other competent judges in any subject matter, has great influence in questions of practice, both in public and private life. An inquiry, therefore, into the legitimate use of the principle of authority, and the consequences to which it tends, must be admitted to relate to an important subject. The importance of investigations in the field of logical science is undoubtedly far superior, inasmuch as logic furnishes the ultimate tests for the discovery of truth. The rules of logic, considered as an art, are a guide to the mind in the conduct

of all processes of independent reasoning and intellectual investigation. A complete and philosophical scheme of logic is, therefore, a powerful instrument for facilitating the confutation of existing errors, and the discovery of new truths. It thus opens the way to the progressive advancement of science; all accurate knowledge must ultimately be derived from sound methods of investigation. For all scientific truths we must be indebted to original researches, carried on according to logical rules. But when these truths have been discovered by original inquirers, and received by competent judges, it is chiefly by the influence of authority that they are accredited and diffused. Now, it is true that when a person derives an opinion from authority, the utmost he can hope is to adopt the belief of those who, at the time, are the least likely to be in error. If this opinion happens to be erroneous, the error is necessarily shared by those who receive it upon mere trust, and without any process of verification. For example, before the Copernican system of the world was demonstrated, and accepted by all competent astronomers, persons ignorant of astronomy naturally believed in the truth of the Ptolemaic system, which was received among all astronomers of authority. Until men of science had, by independent observation and reasoning, overthrown this erroneous doctrine, and established the true system of the world, the opinions of all those who relied upon authority were necessarily misled. It must be admitted that the formation of opinions by authority can never (except by indirect means), produce any increase or improvement of knowledge, or bring about the discovery of new truths. Its influence is at best confined to the diffusion and extension of sound opinions, when they are in existence; and the utmost that any rules on the subject can effect is to

enable an uninformed person to discern who are the most competent judges of a question on which he is unable, from any cause, to judge for himself. But it is, nevertheless, of paramount importance that truth, and not error, should be accredited; that men, when they are led, should be led by safe guides; and that they should thus profit by those processes of reasoning and investigation, which have been carried on in accordance with logical rules, but which they are not able to verify for themselves.

With the view of arriving at the best means for the accomplishment of this desirable end, we shall proceed, first, to indicate the extent of the opinions necessarily founded on authority, and shall afterwards endeavour to trace the manner in which the principle of authority can be so applied as to be most conducive to the welfare of human society.