into which is soldered a platinum wire and the other metal structures essential to and as exists in every electric-light bulb. They are electric lights colored as and fruit shaped, complete and ready for use, and as such we think not classifiable as artificial or imitation fruit. To classify them otherwise, at least, must be with many doubtful reservations. This doubt should be resolved in favor of the importer. Goat and Sheepskin Import Co. et al. v. United States (5) Ct. Cust. Appls., 178; T. D. 34254), Woolworth v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 120-122; T. D. 31119), United States v. Hatters' Fur Exchange (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 198–202; T. D. 31237), United States - v. Matagrin (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 309–312; T. D. 31406), United States v. Harper (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 101-105; T. D. 31655), American Express Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 475-479; T. D. 33121), United States v. American Bead Co. (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 509-515; T. D. 33166), Newhall et al. v. United States (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 134; T. D. 33410). * * * The board found metal to be the chief value of the importations and overruled the collector's assessment, as articles in chief value of blown glass are, under paragraph 98 of the tariff act of 1909, directing assessment as "articles or wares * * composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, lead, copper, nickel, pewter, zinc, gold, silver, platinum, aluminum, or other metal, *" under paragraph 199 of said act. The Government contests this finding and contends for the former, upon the theory that while the aggregate metal content of the bulbs constitutes chief value, no single metal therein is such, and that but one of the kinds of component metal materials should be considered in this ascertainment. The record shows the metal content composed of "metal base," "nickel," "copper," "platinum," and "solder," the proportion of each being stated. This so-called "catchall" clause of the metal schedule in tariff legislation first appeared in the tariff act of May 2, 1792. If this theory of the Government be accepted in this case it will overturn the accepted and enforced construction of that paragraph and its successors from that date to the present, a period of over one hundred and twenty-two years. It is true that when there is a competing provision of the law which specifically singles out and mentions manufactures of, or a manufacture of, or eo nomine designates one of these or any specific metal, that quantity of such metal in the manufacture can not be weighed in and included as against the particular competing provision. Such is illustrated in G. A. 4839 (T. D. 22725). The doctrine of that case is aptly stated in the syllabus: In ascertaining the chief component it is improper to group together all the components which are in their character wood when any of them are separately provided for by name. Where, however, there is no such competing provision the uniform rule has been and is as applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Klumpp (169 U. S., 209). The question was whether "worsteds" fell within the term "manufactures of wool." The court said: We think that the words "manufactures of wool," in paragraph 297, had relation to the raw material out of which the articles were made, and that as the material of worsted dress goods was wool, such goods fell within the paragraph and held worsteds such a material within the term "manufactures of wool." So "manufactures of metal" refers to the material and includes all the component classes of such by whatever distinctive name they may be known as distinguishing them from other kinds of metal. They are all metal. The statute, paragraph 481, refers to "each single component material" and not to each single component kind or class of a material. Indeed, did the statute so refer the rule here would be the same, for instead of manufactures of the individual metals composing this article being named in competing paragraphs they are all named specifically in this paragraph so far as their character is by the evidence disclosed, to wit, "nickel," "copper," and "platinum," the residue being provided for as "other metals." It follows that the decision should be, and is, affirmed. UNITED STATES v. SHELDON & Co. (No. 1406).1 CATGUT, WHIP GUT, OR WORM GUT, WHEN MANUFACTUred. This merchandise consists of various strands of gut twisted in the form of a rope or cable and then apparently coated with a light varnish-like material. It clearly falls within the description of a manufacture of catgut.-Fischer v. United States (5 Ct. Cust. Appls., 301; T. D. 34477). United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 18, 1914. APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 35422 (T. D. 34416). [Reversed.] Bert Hanson, Assistant Attorney General (Charles D. Lawrence, special attorney, on the brief), for the United States. Submitted on record by appellees. Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, Barber, De Vries, and MARTIN, Judges. MONTGOMERY, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The merchandise in this case was assessed for duty as a manufacture of catgut or whip gut at 25 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 462 of the act of August 5, 1909, which provides a duty of 25 per cent on "manufactures of catgut or whip gut or * * * Reported in T. D. 34944 (27 Treas. Dec., 540). worm gut." The protestant claimed free entry for the merchandise under paragraph 529 of the act which reads: Catgut, whip gut, or worm gut, unmanufactured. The report of the appraiser, in answer to the protest, states that "the merchandise in question is cable made of gut to be used similarly to belting. These cables come in lengths of approximately 100 feet.” The testimony of the importer's witnesses shows that he produced a sample which in no way tends to show that the merchandise is not correctly described in the report of the appraiser, except that he states the length to be about 50 feet instead of 100 feet. The merchandise is described by him as being about 50 feet long and about seven-sixteenths of an inch in diameter. In answer to the question, "Do you know what has been done to this-it is manufactured as it is-it is not just as it came out of the intestines?" stated, "It is in the crudest form I know of." A further question was put by the general appraiser: "But it is not as it comes out of the animal-you do not claim that?" to which he replied, "No, sir. "Q. Do you know what is done to it? A. No, sir." An inspection of the article, however, discloses that it evidently consists of various strands of gut which are twisted in the form of a rope or cable and then apparently coated with a light application of some material in the nature of a varnish or oil. It is apparently well adapted to use for belting purposes, and requires no further manufacture for that purpose. The testimony of the witness falls far short of showing that the article imported is in its crude form. He does state that it is in the crudest form he knows, but this may be the crudest form of the witness's own importations. That it is the crudest form of catgut is clearly disproved by an inspection of the article itself. We think the article clearly falls within the description of a manufacture of catgut. See Fischer v. United States (5 Ct. Cust. Appls., 301; T. D. 34477). The cases cited by the general appraiser in sustaining the protest do not go to the length of supporting the conclusion which was reached. The case T. D. 23640 describes the character of the merchandise involved in these cases as being gut of the silk worm, dried and cleaned, put up in bundles and intended to be manufactured into "snells" or "leaders" for fishing lines; also catgut strings intended to be made into surgical sutures, ligaments, etc. No article adapted to use had been manufactured of the material in the cases cited. In this case, as before stated, the article is adapted to use as belting without anything further being done to it. It falls well within the definition of a manufactured article. The decision of the board is reversed. NEVIN v. UNITED STATES (No. 1408).1 1. BOTTLE CAPS OF METAL. "Bottle caps of metal" in paragraph 196, tariff act of 1909, is not to be deemed a term of exclusion forbidding classification by similitude thereunder.-Strauss & Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 203; T. D. 31946). 2. BOARD'S FINDING OF FACT ON REVIEW. The board's conclusion here was a finding of fact, and such a finding will not be reviewed here unless the finding is wholly without evidence to support it or is clearly contrary to the weight of evidence. 3. IBID. The uncontradicted testimony shows the especial design and use of the cap of the importation is to form an air-tight and air-sealed cap, whether for bottles or tubes, but metal caps do not adhere and do not effect a like purpose. These caps were not dutiable by similitude as metal caps. United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 18, 1914. APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7554 (T. D. 34375). [Reversed.] Curie, Smith & Maxwell (Thomas M. Lane of counsel) for appellant. Bert Hanson, Assistant Attorney General (Charles E. McNabb, assistant attorney, of counsel), for the United States. Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, Barber, De VrIES, and MARTIN, Judges. DE VRIES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: These importations consist of so-called viscose caps. They were returned by the appraiser at the port of New York as "bottle caps composed of viscose" and assessed for duty by the collector by similitude to "bottle caps of metal" under the provisions of paragraph 196, tariff act of 1909, reading as follows: 196. Bottle caps of metal, if not colored, waxed, lacquered, enameled, lithographed, or embossed in color, one-half of one cent per pound and forty-five per centum ad valorem; if colored, waxed, lacquered, enameled, lithographed, or embossed in color, fifty-five per centum ad valorem. And paragraph 481, as follows: 481. That each and every imported article, not enumerated in this section, which is similar, either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, to any article enumerated in this section as chargeable with duty, shall pay the same rate of duty which is levied on the enumerated article which it most resembles in any of the particulars before mentioned; * They are claimed by appellants to be dutiable as nonenumerated manufactured articles under paragraph 480 of the same act. On appeal counsel for the importer at oral argument urged that the express language of paragraph 196, "bottle caps of metal," was such a term of limitation as ex vi termini excluded classification by simili 1 Reported in T. D. 34945 (27 Treas. Dec., 542). tude thereunder of all articles not within its literal terms. This court, however, in Strauss & Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 203; T. D. 31946), laid down the rule that such exclusion would not be assumed or implied from mere descriptive or eo nomine language of a paragraph, but there must be express language of exclusion or of condition tantamount to the same. See also Fensterer & Ruhe v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 93; T. D. 31110, at page 96 et seq.). These cases rule that issue here. The language of this paragraph is merely eo nomine, followed by expressed alternative conditions with one of which at least these importations are susceptible of compliance. The Board of General Appraisers rested their decision upon similitude of use. They stated: Now, as said paragraph 196 specifically provides for "bottle caps of metal," and as the caps or capsules here in controversy are composed of viscose, it is at once apparent that, at least so far as material, quality, or texture is concerned, there exists no similarity whatever between the two articles. Therefore the collector's classification and assessment of the merchandise in suit must stand or fall on the answer to this question, Are these viscose caps or capsules similar in the use to which they may be applied to the bottle caps of metal covered by said paragraph 196? We think they are; and we believe our conclusion is amply supported by the testimony of the importer's own witness. Asked the question, "Could a metal bottle cap be used on such a tube?" he replied, "It could be used on the tube, yes; it could be-a bottle cap could be sealed on anything in the shape of a round neck, piece of glass, but it is a question of putting a cap on to evolve a purpose." Now, while we do not concede that jars or tubes are by any means bottles, nevertheless is it not a fact that, if metal caps for bottles may serve the same purpose with respect to the tubes in question as do the viscose caps under consideration, the latter, by reason of their structure, form, and pliability, would serve the same function with reference to bottles as is performed by metal caps? Certainly the result sought to be accomplished is precisely similar in each case-that of sealing or covering the mouth or opening of the vessel. Again, it is not essential that the vessel should be a bottle; to merely establish that the use for which the article is designed is similar to that for which bottle caps are employed is sufficient to fix its dutiable classification. The similitude provision in the statute plainly refers to a similarity in the employment of an article or its effect in producing similar results. Murphy v. Arnson (96 U. S., 131). It is likewise unnecessary to establish a similarity in more than one particular. It is enough if there be a substantial similitude in any one of the particulars mentioned-material, quality, texture, or use. Arthur v. Fox (108 U. S., 125); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 389; T. D. 32162). In Abstract 32871 (T. D. 33591) this board, in commencing upon the use to which articles similar to those here in question were employed, said: The article is used in capping dental cement. It is form of a preparation of viscose which, while kept submerged in liquid, remains in a soft, pliable condition, and which, when put over the cork of a bottle and left to dry, shrinks, forming an air-tight and sealed cap for the bottle and its contents. The conclusion of the board that there is no direct provision of the tariff law applicable to the merchandise and that the similitude |