and official returns of lockouts and strikes, whether involving infringements of the laws or not are not systematically made. As regards the responsibility for the enforcement of the laws restricting the right to strike, there is also some obscurity and there are few data indicating clearly where that responsibility lies; as to how it is interpreted; and as to the policy or practice adopted. The information which is available, however, makes possible some satisfactory conclusions as to the most effective means of preventing strikes and preserving industrial peace.

EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPULSORY MEASURES.

Absolute prohibition of strikes has only been practically successful where it has been backed by actual or threatened coercion through armed forces or military law. This is typified by the legislation or measures adopted in Austria, Italy, France, and Roumania, and in a modified way in Belgium and Holland. The Italian law provides for loss of employment and fine or imprisonment of railway employees who strike, but the authorities frankly state that these penalties would be ineffective were it not for the power of the Government to call the strikers to the colors and operate the railways under military law. The great railway strike in France in 1910 was stopped by these same drastic measures. Under Russian law the strikers on a public service corporation may be arrested or imprisoned without court proceedings. In Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Holland the railway employee practically gives up his freedom of action so far as the right to strike is concerned before he enters the railway service, and any possibility of the development of a strike among railway employees is prevented by the detailed supervision and surveillance which the Government authorities exercise over individuals and organizations of the working forces. Added to this is the danger to the employee of losing his opportunity for advancement to an official status, and his pension and retirement privileges in the event that he should incur the displeasure of the railway management through some concerted action.

THE OPERATION OF AUSTRALASIAN LAWS.

In Australasia the adoption of compulsory legal measures for the prevention of strikes has not been effective in preventing strikes.

The Commonwealth of Australia, the several constituent States, and the Commonwealth of New Zealand, have during the past 25 years developed elaborate governmental machinery for the determination of wages and working conditions, the prevention of strikes, and the promotion of industrial peace. The primary object of these laws has been to protect the working classes against rates of pay and working conditions which are alleged to be unsatisfactory and to protect employers, industrial workers, and general public against the inconvenience and losses arising from industrial warfare. Under these conditions special attention has been not directed toward the transportation industry and pubiic-utility service. The regulation of wage disputes between public-service corporations and their employees has been subordinate to the broader objects of the industrial program.

The industrial conciliation and arbitration act of New Zealand is perhaps known of the whole body of the Australian labor legislation, largely because it has been in active operation since a year or two after its adoption in 1894. The act has been amended on several occasions.

The great change introduced in the New Zealand Act of 1908 is one by which failing voluntary and informal settlements, the reference of disputes" in the first instance to special councils of conciliation is made, save with regard to Government railway workers, obligatory. The court remains as an integral part of the structure of the act, but it can be appealed to only if the councils of conciliation fail in the task of adjustment. These councils, although appointed ad hoc to deal with "disputes" and not for a period of years to fix certain specified conditions in a trade, are, alike in their position and as regards their more important duties, of the nature of wages and special boards. The investigative powers of the councils of conciliation are limited to the extent that the trade secrets and business profits and losses are not subject to disclosure.

Authority was granted to the Federal Parliament of Australia to legislate disputes extending beyond the boundaries of any one State by the Constitution of 1900, the law thus authorized being enacted in 1904. The law is of the most inclusive scope as far as employments or occupations are concerned; the court established by it has cognizance of all disputes, actual, pending, or threatened, which are of a geographic extent to bring them within federal purview.

Jurisdiction is obtained by certification by the proper industrial or political authority, by the request of the parties in interest, or by the voluntary action of the presi

dent of the court. Conciliation is of course the first attempt, which failing, awards of a binding nature may be made.

The system is based on unionism, registers of organizations of employers and employees being kept by an official registrar, whose certifications and records are an essential part of the procedure established by the act. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden under penalties of such severity as to make their occurrence extremely unlikely, while the enforcement of awards is likewise undertaken by levying fines on the offending persons or organizations, members of unions being personally responsible where the union assets are insufficient to meet the fine. Agreements by way of conciliation, when properly authenticated are binding in the same way as awards. The court has the authority to make use of subsidiary bodies and agencies for the securing of data or the decision of technical matters. Amendments extending the authority of the court and strengthening the provisions of the act are evidence that the method is generally approved, though there are of course some unwilling submissions. There has not been since the enactment of the law any strike extending beyond the boundaries of a single State.

The laws of the State of Victoria, although comprising a long series of acts dealing, among other things, with the system of wage regulation through the "special" or wages boards first adopted in 1896, deal only indirectly with the question of strikes or lockouts. The primary object of these acts in so far as they refer to the wages boards is not to prevent active dispute but to insure for the various trades concerned the observance of such conditions as regards wages, hours, and other related matters as may be laid down. In the case of any organized trade for which a wages board has been established, the task of the board, especially when determinations—as in some cases frequently happens-are revised, may correspond closely to that of "compulsory conciliation," but even in trades subject to this form of regulation strikes and lockouts are not illegal under the act.

Like South Australia and Tasmania, Queensland has recently adopted through the wages board act of 1908 the Victorian system of wages boards. As in South Australia, industrial agreements may be ratified in trades or businesses where no boards exist, and when thus ratified have the same force as wages board determinations. The law of Queensland is administered by an industrial court, consisting of a judge appointed by the governor in council. Local industrial boards are created on the application of prescribed numbers of employers or employees, but only on the recommendation of the court. The court has jurisdiction over certain classes of disputes directly, and over others by way of appeal from the awards of the industrial boards. It may also take over any case where it appears that a board is causing unnecessary or willful delay.

These brief analyses furnish a clear insight into Australasian legislation. The facts available as to the operation of the various laws show that (1) a compulsory arbitration has not brought about industrial peace, and (2) that the existence of legal prohibitions and penalties against strikes have not brought about a cessation of industrial conflict. It is impossible, obviously, to measure arbitrarily the effect of such legislation. Even the records which are available do not tell of the strikes which might have occurred without legal penalties and restrictions, but which did not happen. At the same time, the data which are at hand plainly indicate a tendency toward the extension of industrial conflict in Australian countries. In 1914, as compared with 1913, the number of industrial disputes in Australia increased from 208 to 337. This tendency was apparent in all of the constituent States of the Commonwealth. The number of working people involved was also considerably larger in 1915, as compared with 1914 as well as the aggregate working days and wages lost. The Official Yearbook of Australia for 1914, has the following significant comment relative to the settlement of disputes during that year:

"Of 337 disputes in 1914 only 29 were settled by the machinery of State and Federal industrial acts. A majority were by private negotiation. Wage earners lost $850,000 through strikes during 1914 and 1915, according to the commonwealth statistician. In 1915, according to the report of the secretary of labor, New Zealand had one woolen mill strike, involving 233 operatives, and six strikes of steamship and wharf labor."

In New Zealand during the fiscal year 1915 a total of 34 industrial agreements were formally arranged, recommendations were secured in 93 cases from conciliation councils, and 71 cases were settled by awards of arbitration boards. In four instances cases for the enforcement of awards were conducted by the labor department, and a total of 330 cases for the enforcement of awards were also brought before magistrates during the same fiscal year. On the other hand, in 1915, the number of disputes brought to the attention of the conciliation commissioners was 101. Of this number 61 were settled by mutual agreement, 23 were partially adjusted, and 17 were referred wholly to the court of arbitration.

So far as the maintenance of industrial peace is concerned, the conciliation factor has, it would seem, been most effective, and has come to be more and more relied upon by the Australasian countries. This is evidenced by the records as to the adjustment of industrial disputes, the tendency in legislation to provide machinery for the settlement of disputes which consists of a combination of wages or conciliation boards and industrial courts, and by the procedure in the arbitration courts themselves, where, either in accordance with legal requirements or from the wisdom of experience, the possibilities of mediating a controversy are exhausted before recourse is had to formal judicial proceedings and awards. The penalties attaching to strikes and lockouts have also evidently been ineffective in preventing industrial conflict or in enforcing awards.

THE CANADIAN LAW.

Statistics as to the operation of the Canadian industrial disputes investigation act of 1907, as well as the opinion of reliable and well-informed persons, indicate that "it is a fair conclusion that the act has prevented strikes. No official statement is made as to whether or not this has been due to the compulsory or penal features. All students and investigators of the operation of the law practically agree that its chief merit lies in its conciliatory possibilities. The principal service which the boards have been able to accomplish has been to bring the parties to a controversy together for an amicable settlement. If this is not done the investigating boards seldom make a unanimous report, and two or three divergent reports on one point have little effect on public opinion. From the time of its passage up to the close of the fiscal year 1915 applications had been made for investigating boards in 59 disputes between railroads and their employees. Six of these controversies were settled by direct negotiations between the parties after an application for a board had been made but before the board had been constituted by the Government authorities. In 13 cases the boards by conciliatory measures adjusted the matters in dispute and arranged agreements between the employees and the railroad officials. In cases where a unanimous report was made by the boards-16 in all-an amicable settlement between the parties was reached. Of the remaining 24 cases where the boards made divided reports, 19 were settled either by direct negotiations or through the intervention of the department of labor, 4 were followed by strikes, and 1 by a lockout. These results of the operation of the law are succinctly set forth in the following

The total number of railway disputes dealt with under the act from its passage on March 22, 1907, to October 18, 1916, the latest date for which statistics have been obtained, was 85. The total number of strikes not averted or ended was 7, or, in other words, the act was successfully applied in 91 per cent of cases in which its provisions were invoked. A total of 27 street railway disputes also came under the act during the same period and in all but two cases strikes were averted. In shipping, telephones, and commercial telegraph, 16 cases were covered, in all of which strikes were averted. In all branches of transportation and communication, a total of 128 disputes occurred in which the provisions of the act were invoked, and in all but 9 cases, or in 93 per cent of the total, strikes were averted.

During the year 1912, Sir George Askwith, representing the Board of Trade of Great Britain, made a careful study and analysis of the effects of the Canadian law. His report is undoubtedly the best that has been made as to the operation of the law and contains a critical estimate as to its effectiveness and real strength.

The report was prepared by him for the British Board of Trade in 1912 relative to the operations of the Canadian industrial disputes investigation act of 1997. He spent two months in Canada in making a personal investigation in all parts of the country among all classes of persons. He personally interviewed several hundred employers, workmen, trade-union officials, public men, and Government officials at most of the principal industrial centers. Because of his long experience and prac

tical knowledge of trades disputes in England, Mr. Askwith was selected to consider how far any developments upon the lines of the Canadian act could be of service to Great Britain in its adjustments of labor difficulties. For these reasons a digest of his report and recommendations is submitted, as follows:

I. ATTITUDE OF LABOR.

a. Originally, labor was hostile, Mr. Askwith found, not because of any demerits of the act, but because it was thought the object of the passage of the act was to deprive them of the right to strike.

It was passed in the face of the strongest labor opposition-Western Miners and railway employees who considered the railway conciliation act of 1903 sufficient.

b. Western Miners and many leading trade-unionists have maintained their attitude of hostility. Leaders of railway unions have reversed their former attitude and "no more warmer supporters of the act are to be found in the Dominion than leaders of railway unions."

c. The Canadian Trades Union Congress in 1911 adopted, and in 1912 reiterated its adherence to, the following resolution:

"While this congress still believes in the principle of investigation and conciliation, and while recognizing that benefits have accrued at times to various bodies of workmen under the operation of the Lemieux Act, yet, in view of decisions and rulings and delays of the Department of Labor in connection with the administration of the act, and in consequence of judicial decisions like that of Judge Townsend in the Province of Nova Scotia, determining feeding a starving man, on strike, contrary to the act, is an offense under the act: Be it

"Resolved, That this congress ask for the repeal of the act."

d. Mr. Askwith discussed the labor opposition to the Canadian act, as follows (stated in a very succinct form):

1. It is claimed that the act hinders the workers from taking advantage of the best moment for securing better conditions. In this connection it is asserted that the owners of all other commodities "can sell or withhold them without any restrictions whatsoever, and, it is asked, why should workmen, who have only their labor to sell, be prevented from disposing of it or withholding it at the moment most favorable to them?" Labor, it is contended, should not be required, any more than the owner of wheat or iron and steel is required, to give 30 days' notice before withdrawing their services from the market.

Mr. Askwith's answer to this criticism is that if wheat, coal, iron, or any other commodity should be so held up as to endanger the interest of society, the public would take action to protect themselves, and it was because of the recognition of these same considerations that society had to take measures to protect itself in the Canadian industrial disputes act of 1907.

Mr. Askwith also asserts that this criticism is also at variance with the well-established methods of procedure of every trade union in Canada and the United States, for the reason that the policy of the unions is not to obtain immediate action, but to bring about discussion and through conferences and discussion to secure a settlement. The Canadian act, he claims, makes possible exhaustive discussion and investigation, and hence encourages a settlement without conflict.

2. Labor leaders, in the second place, according to Mr. Askwith's analysis, say in criticism of the act that employees refuse to accept the recommendations of the boards of investigation appointed under the provisions of the law.

Mr. Askwith's answer to this criticism is that this is expressly permitted by the act, and likewise that employees have a right to strike after the recommendations of the boards have been made public.

3. In the third place, labor contends, Mr. Askwith states, that unnecessary delays by the boards are made in reaching a decision.

Mr. Askwith believes that this is a real difficulty, as unnecessary delay may cause irritation and misunderstanding. At the same time, because of the unusual distances in Canada, the consequent difficulty in selecting and assembling boards, he does not see how more speedy action may be obtained. Furthermore, he is not at all sure that delays are such a disadvantage to the workers who come under the act. He says,

At the same time, I am not sure that any very great actual loss is sustained by either the one side or the other; the recommendations can be made to date back to the time when the application for the board was first made, and frequently, judging from my own experience in this country, as well as what I learned in Canada, time proves a great healer. In any case, this objection is capable of remedy and, although often irritating enough, is not vital."

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4. Labor claims further, according to Mr. Askwith, that employers are guilty of exploitation during the period in which strikes are not legally permitted.

Mr. Askwith's conclusion in this connection was that exploitation of this kind had been anticipated before the passage of the act and had undoubtedly occurred, but with the growing acceptance of the spirit of the act, it would probably gradually disappear. Employers, he states, make the same contention against labor, and it was his observation that it was a matter that cut both ways.

5. The contention is further made by labor, Mr. Askwith states, that the parties themselves have a right to settle their own disputes.

Mr. Askwith's conclusion in this respect was (1) that every opportunity has been given to the disputants to settle their own differences for the reason that the board is not requested until an affidavit is made that a strike is imminent, and (2) that this contention neglects the fact that the public have a very vital interest in preventing a striketheir very own subsistence, welfare, or safety may be involved; (3) that there is nothing to gain by permitting parties to settle a dispute by conflict and exhaustion, as the result of which the wrong may be triumphant; and (4) parties to an impending industrial conflict usually need the intervention of a third party as their own attitudes have usually reached an extreme and intemporate stage.

6. As to the additional claim of labor that those in authority had frequently refused to grant boards when requested, Mr. Askwith's observation led him to the opposite conclusion that the tendency had been to grant boards too freely.

7. The claim that some of the boards were partisan in character, Mr. Askwith found, was urged by both employers and employees. The best answer he was able to make to this was that a large number of the findings of boards was unanimous, being indorsed by the chairman, and representatives of both sides.

The fact that both sides complained of partisanship of boards was also evidence of Mr. Askwith's mind that the boards had pursued an independent course.

NOTE. Some boards might possibly have some partisan one way, and others another. This would explain the double criticism.

8. The most serious objection which Mr. Askwith found among employees relative to the act arose from certain court decisions which made it illegal to assist any employee engaged in an illegal strike. These decisions, if applied strictly, would lead to very heavy penalties for minor offenses. Mr. Askwith believed that trade-union benefits should be eliminated from the category of such offenses.

9. The claim that there were no methods for interpretation of decisions of boards Mr. Askwith evidently considered invalid for the reason that the act itself contemplated no such methods-publicity being relied upon as the remedy-and under the act boards ceased to exist as soon as reports were made.

NOTE. Mr. Askwith's answer would not hold good where both parties had agreed to give the findings of the board the force of an arbitration award.

The general conclusion of Mr. Askwith relative to the objections of labor to the act were as follows:

"Generally the objections to the act appeared to me to be either such as would disappear as the act became better understood, or could be remedied by some amendment of the act without altering its main principles.'

II. ATTITUDE OF EMPLOYERS AND THE PUBLIC.

a. Summary statement.

1. Originally employers, Mr. Askwith found, objected because of their general opposition to State interference, but this objection has largely disappeared.

2. Railway employers, at the time of his inquiry, were especially strong in their support of the act.

3. Public officials almost without exception supported the act; the chief value they saw in it was the conciliatory feature.

4. While employers were generally favorable, they formulated some criticisms to the following effect:

(a) That recommendations of the boards should be fully brought before individual employees for their consideration.

The contention was made that men who had not heard the arguments or who had not received a copy of the report, had an opportunity to secure an account of the boards' recommendations from partisans only. The Government, it was suggested, should so publish and distribute the facts and findings as to ascertain the true feeling of the men based on the facts.

(b) Employers asserted that partisans should not be appointed on the boards. (1) Advantage of partisans, Mr. Ask with points out, is that they have technical knowledge, but on the other hand, they tend to be advocates.

(2) Impartial men with a general knowledge tend to act as arbitrators.