(3) Tendency, Mr. Askwith found, was to follow latter course as in England, i. e., to appoint impartial men more or less acquainted with the views of each side, who might act as arbitrators. Mr. Askwith considered this the best course to follow.

(c) Employers claim that penalties should be enforced by the government. (1) Government holds it can not treat lockouts or strikes as a crime, and infliction of penalties should be left to parties concerned, on ground of trespass.

(2) Tarties can not well enforce penalties. If employers would prosecute men, it would disrupt their labor force; attempt to get money from men asking for higher wages would be silly; to prosecute labor officials would arouse resentment and dissatisfaction. Employees can not afford to prosecute employers because of expense of protracted legal proceedings.

(d) Employers urge that unions should be required to incorporate and become legally responsible for damages.

(e) That there should be a method of interpretation of recommendations and settlements. (Mr. Askwith had already pointed out that the act does not contemplate methods of interpretation.)

III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CANADA AND GREAT BRITAIN,

a. Special factors existed in Canada, Mr. Askwith states, as compared with England. 1. International unions in Canada. Disputes extending over boundary lines. Subject to different laws in United States.

2. oreign-born working population in Canada.

3. Immense distances in Canada.

4. Much larger number of disputes in Canada.

IV. ASKWITH'S ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF ACT.

a. Conciliation feature is its greatest strength. "In my opinion the real value of the act does not lie in either of these propsitions, and certainly not in the second. The pith of the act lies in the permitting the parties and the public to obtain full knowledge of the real cause of the dispute, and in causing suggestions to be made as impartially as possible on the basis of such knowledge for dealing with the existing difficulties, whether a strike or lockout has commenced or not. This action on behalf of the public allows an element of calm judgment to be introduced into the dispute which at the time the parties themselves may be unable to exercise.

“It is claimed, and the claim is backed up by statistics upon a strike or lockout prior to such a judgment have been of great assistance in causing a calm discussion or investigation at an early date. If the power of giving such judgment had existed without the restrictions, and if the various trades affected had been gradually educated to see the advantage of discussion prior to a dispute and had the means by and through which such discussion could take place, it may be that practically similar results would have been obtained, without the difficulty of having a law, the complete enforcement of which is almost impracticable, and which, while it has been accepted in cases where education has existed, has been found very difficult in cases where the law is resented and joint consent has not been in being.

b. Recommends the enactment of a similar law in England.

Since the outbreak of the present European war, the provisions of the Canadian law have been extended to all industries engaged in the production of munitions of war supplies of any description. Prior to the outbreak of the present conflict, the Canadian Department of Labor had prepared a tentative draft of a revision of the original law which embodied all the important amendments and changes which the experience with the operation of the original law had shown to be desirable. To these were also added certain new provisions from the Australiasian experience. This tentative draft of a new bill was to have been submitted to Parliament as a Government measure, but action was deferred until the close of the war because it was considered inexpedient to cause any needless controversy while the war was in progress. A copy of the revised draft, together with the comments of the minister of labor have been included in A Study, etc., recently issued by the United States board, etc. The principal amendments proposed are briefly as follows:

1. When both parties agree, any dispute, whatever its nature, may be submitted to a board of investigation for any branch of industry other than mining and transportation.

2. In long continued or serious disputes where no board is requested, the minister of labor is authorized to establish a board on his own initiative.

3. It is not necessary to take a strike vote or secure authority for a strike-before an application can be made for a board (this would remove one of the principal objections against the act made by the railway labor organizations).

4. Technical defects in an application shall not invalidate a request for a board. 5. The establishment of boards, or their proceedings after establishment, shall not be restrained or prohibited by the courts.

6. Boards may be reconvened to pass upon the application or interpretations of awards and agreements.

7. The onus is put upon the party seeking to make a change in wages or hours of applying for a board where the other party does not consent to the change.

8. After a board has made an investigation and report, a secret vote by ballot is required to be taken before a strike can be legally declared. (This provision is added from the Australasian legislation.)

9. Provision is made for registering collective agreements, and a lockout or strike is forbidden where such agreements are in force. Either party may be relieved from a registered agreement by a report of a board. (This addition is also borrowed from the Australasian legislation.)

The effective feature of the Canadian act has been the conciliatory factor-the opportunity which the boards of investigation have afforded of bringing the parties to a dispute together, and of furnishing the ground for adjusting their differences in the light of the facts and a temperate judgment. So far as this fact has been realized in applying the Canadian act, its provisions have been successful. Even under these conditions, the greatest success has occurred when the proceedings of the boards have been informal, and where the attempt has been made to bring disputants to an agreement. Where the inquiries of the boards have been conducted in a judicial or technical way, the results have in general not been so satisfactory. This has been the testimony of Sir George Askwith and other impartial observers.

Apparently the effectiveness of punitive provisions of the law has been disappointing. Prosecutions must be made by the injured party. Labor claims that it is too expensive to bring and sustain action against employers in the courts. The employer, on the other hand, finds it inexpedient to prosecute labor because it creates additional unrest and dissatisfaction, and in case of imprisonment disrupts his working forces in a country where labor is scarce.

The amendments embodies in the revised tentative draft of the act, which it is proposed by the Government to put through Parliament in the future remedies all the serious defects which have been found in the law's operation. This is especially true of the criticisms of labor organizations. Their main arguments against the law are squarely met in the changes providing for a speedy organization of boards and for the removal of the present provision to the effect that a strike vote must be had before an application may be made for a board. The proposed addition to the effect that after a board of investigation has reported that a secret ballot must be taken before a strike must be declared is designed to force, so far as is possible, a deliberate decision on the rank of file of a reorganization before an industrial conflict is participated in.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

In the United States, the only country except Great Britain which has no law abridging the right to strike, except the recently enacted "Adamson law" the most pronounced success in dealing with disputes between railways and their employees has been attained. This success has been reached through the principle of voluntary mediation.

Legislation in the United States for the adjustment of grievances between the railroads and their employees had its inception in the year 1888. A law in October of that year provided for voluntary arbitration and practically for compulsory inves tigation of railway wage disputes. The provisions of this act. however, were never utilized and it was superseded in June, 1898, by what was known as the Erdman law. This legislation provided machinery for the mediation and arbitration of controversies affecting railroads and their train-service employees, and was the basis of existing legislation. During the eight years following the passage of the law only one attempt was made to take advantage of its provisions and strikes affecting transportation were of common occurrence. During the next five years, however, methods of proceedure under the law were fully developed and its effectiveness established, as many as 61 cases being settled on request of the parties, either by mediation or by arbitration in accordance with provisions of the Erdman law. Seven of these cases were concerted movements, involving in each instance a large number of railroads. in one case as many as 64 roads. Of these 61 cases coming under the Erdman law during the 14 years of its existence, 28 were settled through mediation, 8 were settled by mediation and arbitration, and 4 by arbitration alone. In the remaining 21 case the services of the mediators. requested by one of the parties, were either refused by the other or direct settlements were reached between the parties after the services of the mediators were invoked without employing them or resorting to arbitration.

The next step in legislation relative to mediation and arbitration was the so-called Newlands law, approved July 15, 1913.

The law in general reenacted the provisions of the Erdman law relative to mediation. It also provided for three member boards of arbitration, as authorized by the Erdman act, but in addition, in order to meet the criticism of three member boards placing too much power in the hands of the neutral arbitrator, it provided further for six-member boards of arbitration, composed of two representatives from each side to a controversy and two neutral members representing the public.

The immediate cause for the passage of the present law grew out of the demands of the conductors and trainmen, which had been presented in a concerted movement some month previously to 42 eastern railroads in what is known as eastern associated territory. The direct negotiations between the parties resulted in a refusal by the railroads to grant the demands of the men on the ground that the rates of wages then prevailing were adequate and that the employees were working under favorable conditions. A strike vote had been taken, resulting in some 97 per cent of the employees voting to withdraw from the service of the railroads unless their demands were complied with. The situation was an aggravated one and reached an acute stage early in July, 1913. The public mind was excited, and the bill, which had been pending in Congress for some months, was, upon the advice of the President, promptly enacted into law to meet the emergency.

From the approval of the Newlands law on July 15, 1913, up to January 1, 1917, a total of 65 controversies have been adjusted through the Board of Mediation and Conciliation. Of this number 48 cases were settled by mediation, 7 were adjusted by arbitration, and 5 by mediation and arbitration. În 2 cases arbitration is pending, hearings beginning January 8, 1917. In one case which the board attempted to mediate a strike was arrested by congressional action. In one case settlement was reached between the parties themselves after the board had begun mediation proceedings. In one other case mediation proceedings resulted in an arbitration agreement, but before the arbitration actually began a settlement on basis suggested in mediation was arrived at between the parties.

CONCILIATION IN GREAT BRITAIN.

The experience in Great Britain in dealing with disputes betwee 1 transportation employees and the railroads finally led to the adoption of the principle in 1911 of voluntary conciliation, with the further provision that points which could not be adjusted by the interested parties should be left to the decision of an impartial arbitrator or umpire. This method has met with success, not only in settling railway disputes, but those affecting other public utilities and all branches of mining and manufacturing. In the case of railroads it consists of a voluntary agreement between the companies and their working forces. There is no law specifically relating to the matter. The arrangement was made by the labor department of the board of trade and is conducted under its auspices. Its official sanction, so far as legislation is concerned, arises from the general conciliation act of 1896. In 1907 an agreement between the railroads of Great Britain and their employees was put into effect which provided that grievances should be adjusted by conciliation boards constituted according to occupations of employees and equally representative of both sides of a dispute. In the event of disagreement, unsettled points should be referred to a general board of arbitration. The procedure under this arrangement was found to be subject to vexatious and irritating delays. The precedent was gradually established of not seriously attempting to adjust grievances before the sectional conciliation boards, but to pass them on to the arbitration board. The excessive delays which thus occurred aroused intense dissatisfaction among employees, which finally culminated in the general strike of 1911, the appointment of a royal commission to investigate the situation, and the final acceptance of an agreement under the provisions of which the general arbitration board was abolished and reliance placed for final decision upon conciliation boards. Since the adoption of this principle no strikes of any consequence have been declared on the railways of Great Britain. The principle of voluntary conciliation has been firmly established by five years' experience under this arrangement.

CONSTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS.

From the preceding analysis of legislation and its operation it has been seen that in general, five methods of strike prevention have been followed by the leading countries of the world, which may be taken as a basis for framing legislation for th United States.

1. Absolute coercion by military force. This method of strike prevention is obviously impossible of application under existing American institutions.

2. Legal coercion through compulsory arbitration.-This method would also seem to be impracticable of adoption in the United States. Furthermore, it has not proved effective in preventing strikes in the countries where it has been tested. The suc cessful operation of compulsory arbitration presupposes the existence on the part employers and employees of a degree of adherence to industrial constitutionalism which has not been attained. Compulsory adjustment of industrial disputes could undoubtedly be made effective in this country by legal requirements as to the regis tration or incorporation of the organizations of the railroad employees, and an authorization to levy upon the funds of the unions and to imprison labor officials in the event of an illegal strike. It is clear, however, that compulsory adjustment of controver sies by judicial proceedings should come gradually, as a result of a slow, evolutionary process, when the minds of the employees and employers had been gradually educated to it. Under these conditions and it is undoubtedly the industrial ideal which should be constantly held in mind-compulsory arbitration would be a success. the light of the present attitude of labor and capital toward the adjustment of industrial disputes, it is evident that the present is not the time to attempt to enter into compulsory arbitration. It is a matter for the future; not the present.

In

3. Another idea which has been put forward as a means of settling disputes is based on experience in Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Holland. It is the suggestion that the contractual relation between employers and employees be so modified as to provide that employees would, upon entering the railway service, voluntarily give up the right to strike, or give up the right to concerted action to enforce wage and other demands. This recommendation also carries with it the presumption of adequate machinery for ventilating the grievances of employees in a speedy and fair way.

This idea could be put into operation in the future, or, in other words, such a modification of the contract between the railroads and their employees might be made in the future. It could not practically be put into operation by a legislative enactment at the present time. What is a more fundamental defect in the suggestion, however, is that it neglects the basic fact that industrial peace and ecomomic justice might be finally secured through the education of employers and employees to an attitude of greater confidence in each other's probity, and to the realization that the largest measure of economic fairness in the distribution of the output of industry is to be obtained by submitting controversial matters in orderly adjustment and judicial decision. It would be better to reach this end by having it worked out between employers and employees than by having it imposed by legislative enactment at the present time. 4. Another suggestion which has been put forward by certain statesmen and publicists, prominent railroad officials, and the United States Chamber of Commerce is that rates of pay of railroad employees and a minimum wage be fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This involves the same principle of governmental interference which is embodied in the Australasian legislation. It assumes minute governmental regulation-the establishment of standards as to wages, hours, and living—the administrative fixing of wages and conditions of employment.

One of the main arguments put forth in support of this method of regulation is that, in view of the fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission controls railroad rates, it should also regulate wages, so that rates and wages might be correlated. As a matter of fact, there is no need of any such correlation, and it would be without value. The factor to consider so far as the relation of wages to rates is concerned, is labor costs of operating railroads. This is now being done by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and it has ample data in the form of the sworn reports of the railroads which are annually filed with the commission.

5. The last, and most practical suggestion, is based upon the experience which has already been had in the adjustment of wage and other controversies through voluntary conciliation and arbitration. Conciliation has been found to have been the most important factor in settling controversies. This has been the experience of Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.

The real strength of the Canadian law lies, as has already been pointed out, in the opportunity afforded to the boards of investigation of mediating points in disputes. In the United States mediation has been and still is the principal method of maintaining peaceable working relations between railroad officials and employees. Controversies which arise on one railroad or a small group of railroads are usually successfully mediated or, where mediation fails, they are adjusted by arbitration on the basis of an agreement obtained through mediation. This has also been the experience of past years. No difficulty was experienced in mediating disputes until about six years ago, when what has become known among railroad employees as "concerted movements by geographical areas came into play. These movements started originally in one operating section with one group of employees, then passed into concerted action by larger groups as train and engine crews, and finally developed during the present year

into a Nation-wide movement for an eight-hour day by all classes of transportation employees. By its very nature a concerted movement is almost impossible of mediation.

The variations in wage schedules and the operating conditions of the railroads are too great. The earlier movements were after extended conferences adjusted by arbitration. Along with this means of settlement developed the precedent of finally appealing to the President to settle the question as to whether or not arbitration should be had. This procedure was largely the outcome of dissatisfaction of both parties with the results of arbitration procedure. Neither side claimed to be satisfied. With this tendency also went a growing radicalism among the members of the railway brotherhoods which practically expressed itself in the creation of large committees to take part in the negotations with the officials. The establishment of such clumsy and awkward machinery, usually under radical influence, practically rendered the mediation of concerted movements impossible.

Mr. CHAMBERS. With reference to the report of the board on "Railway Strikes and Lockouts," will you permit me the opportunity of saying, Mr. Chairman, that the board had 500 copies printed and that they can be had by interested parties on application. And will the committee pardon the suggestion that it might be well to have it printed as a public document.

The CHAIRMAN. If no one else desires to be heard at this time, the committee will now adjourn.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m., the committee adjourned to meet on Thursday, January 4, 1917, at 10 o'clock a. m.)