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Table 3 compares changes in underage drivers crash stats.cs observed alter raising the legal drinking age in Michigan by Wagenaar and in Illinois by Maxwell", with those involving drivers of the same age in Wisconsin in 1996 81 The values shown in Table 3 are the difference in actual versus predicted crash levels in significant change years Figures for Michigan and Illinois reflect changes in three factor surrogate crashes (night-time, single vehicle crashes involving male drivers) resulting from Box.Jenkins Time Series analyses. (See Wagenaari for detailed discussion of data and methodology) Wisconsin figures are for changes in fatal crashes and driver deaths. The data selected for comparison in Table 3 are those least likely to be distorted by influence other than changes in real occurances Each item bears a direct relationship to alcohol involvement and reflects the degree of change in alcohol. related crashes among the populations studied.

previous trends for 18-20 year-olds in each of the states studied. Reductions among younger drivers in Michigan (17.7%) and Wisconsin (20.5% -28.6%) were substantially greater than the 8.8% decrease observed among young it linois drivers subsequent to raising the legal drinking age. Reductions among 18-20 year-old drivers attributed to intervention of the drinking age change in Michigan in 1978-79 are well within the range of decreases in alcoholrelated highway crashes involving drivers of the same age in Wisconsin in 1980-81, where there was no evident intervening legal variable.

Chances for changes of these magnitudes occuring without intervention range from .05 (5 in 100) to less than .001 (1 in 1,000), supporting the conclusion that the change in Wisconsin, and the changes in Michigan and Illinois are not due to chance fluctuation, or the changing legal drink ing age, but to changes in other influences on younger drivers' drinking and driving behaviors.

As shown in Table 3. alcohol-related crash involvement decreased relative to the level predicted on the basis of

drivers' fatal crash involvement attributable to difterences in the states' legal drinking ages.

CONCLUSIONS The study results show that raising the legal drinking age had no greater impact on 18-20 year-old drivers' highway crash involvement in Michigan and illinois than not changing the legal drinking age had on Crashes involving 18-20 year-old drivers in Wiscon. sin. These results are entirely consistent with those of earlier research conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and more re. cent analysis of data for twenty-two states which retained different drinking ages over time', which found no significant difference in 18-20 year-old

Although there clearly is a compelling public safety interest to be served in reducing the incidence of alcohol-related highway crashes and other negative consequences of alcohol abuse among young people, the results of this study do not support the proposition that rescinding or restricting the legal drink. ing priveleges of 18, 19, or 20 year-old adults is an appropriate or effective mechanism for accomplishing that public purpose.

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Mr. FLORIO. Mr. Micek.

STATEMENT OF TERRANCE D. MICEK Mr. MICEK. Thank you, Chairman Florio.

I am testifying on behalf of the National Conference of State Liquor Administrators.

I come from the State of Nebraska. I am employed by the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission. I have heard officers of various States, representatives of various States talk about their situation.

Just a personal comment, and that is in Nebraska during the year 1982 we reduced our highway fatalities more than any State in the Union, over 40 percent. We have not increased our drinking age. We reduced it in all categories. We reduced it through public education. I think that is a little bit of what my conclusion will be on behalf of our National Conference as well.

I wish to talk about—we call them legislative bills back homebut House bill 3870. I wish to speak in four areas because our concern is with the proposed bill as opposed to some philosophies regarding proper treatment. I wish to speak to a constitutional question, the effectiveness of the legislation, the workability of the legislation, and perhaps some alcohol attitude.

The constitutional review I think is a very pertinent question, not necessarily avoided, but certainly it is one that this committee will have to research. Without the 21st amendment we had the 18th. The 18th amendment established concurrent powers in Congress and the States. The 10th amendment identifies the States rights issue. But the 21st amendment repealed the 18th amendment and certainly concurrent powers. It identified powers reserved to the States under arguments and applications of the 10th amendment.

The interstate commerce clause I believe is a very valid concern. I think it has definite application in the alcoholic beverage industry as it relates to the commercial flow of alcoholic beverages. I question, not to suggest that it may not relate constitutionally, with all due respect, to user attitudes, user statutes, which I believe H.R. 3870 is; it is a user statute.

The effectiveness of H.R. 3870, I think that based upon the findings in section 1, we are definitely concerned with highway safety, and I respect your concerns there. I do not know if they are appropriately put, though, through the auspices of this bill.

But more specifically, H.R. 3870 in its content, in its writings avoids highway safety as it creates a deterrent to a seller, a person who sells or offers to sell. It avoids any deterrent effect, if that is the philosophy of the bill, to the parents, whether they are paid or friends, and to the minors themselves when they are—the persons-actually making the purchase.

There is not a State in our organization that does not have statutes that relate to all four of those categories as it tries to control and tries to use its abilities in the processing of sales to minors and questions regarding the same.

Because you control the seller and not the licensee-and, Chairman Florio, I regard your opening statement as having insinuated, or I think you made the statement that your bill would accomplish a restriction on establishments, and I think “establishments” and “restrictions” were the two words you used.

Your bill does not identify establishments. It is identifying persons. Take, for example, my experience for 842 years. When we go into a bar, if they have been improperly and illegally selling to a minor, the person making the sale is generally not the licensee. It is the mother of the children at home or the father of the children at home, or independent, individual employees, that is my point, it is not the licensee.

So here your bill does not work on establishments.

Mr. FLORIO. Are you espousing the theory that somehow the employee of the establishment is not an agency relationship and therefore is separate and apart? And I hope you do not administer your State laws that way.

Mr. MICEK. Let me identify the workability of it, because, yes, in our State we have to take-taking the average sale to a minor in a licensed premise, we have three charges and perhaps even more that can result from that transaction.

The first one, mandatorily under the policy of our Liquor Control Commission we do have our own enforcement and arrest powers. The first one is against the minor, and we require that the minor be charged.

The second one-and that goes for local courts, which is very important, as we review the workability of your bill—the second one would be against the person making the sale individually liable. Here again, the local courts.

The third area, review, and this is the jurisdiction of your liquor control authority, is against the license-the jurisdiction which we hold over the license to do business at that location.

Mr. FLORIO. And, of course, none of that is impacted by this legislation because it specifically states that the State is not preempted from asserting its authority.

Mr. MicEK. The review of the license perhaps is impacted. Let us talk about the workability, if I can continue, and perhaps it will clarify the general sense of your inquiry.

First off, the Federal Government in this regard through H.R. 3870 is getting into the sales to minor question. Are you prepared, are you knowledgeable with the door that you open? If you are going to promote the legislation, be prepared to administer it. For example, the bill calls for the Secretary of Commerce through administration to take anyone who sells or offers to sell to someone less than 21 years of age and put forth up to a $5,000 penalty.

It speaks not against the purchaser, it speaks not against a licensee under the definition. It asks then that we go to the Federal courthouse through the Federal system as opposed to the traditional concepts of working through our local judicial system. It asks that you join us. Perhaps, or maybe in the area of review of cutting State budgets, if you have entered the field of regulating minors, that the State can now respectfully get out of that posture, get out of that responsibility and let you take care of it with your Department of Commerce.

I will not comment on the penalties. A $5,000 penalty would certainly be much greater than anything I have seen in the State of Nebraska relative to someone selling alcoholic beverages to a minor.

I wish to stress the procurement problem. I have already identified what I think is a problem by not also going after the purchaser minor, but avoiding the minor purchaser, the licensee sales situation, or the person sales situation.

I did take the liberty to attach just a small project review we did in the State of Nebraska. It is called attachment A, and it is with my written testimony on procurements. And I think that that hints to an area that needs to be responded to equally sufficient-equally sufficient response by Congress if they are going to get into this field of regulation.

The last area of comment that I wish to identify is that of a stance on alcohol abuse in interpretation of my testimony. I have not commented as to what would be a proper age. I think that should be resolved respectively by each State under the 21st amendment. I believe that its chief virtue was to have each State allow for some consumption of beverage with temperance, but in accordance to the customs and traditions of that locale.

I think that alcohol use, regardless of age, will never be cured. You will never heal the wounds of those injured from its abuse unless you look at the person and assist them in knowing their respect for themselves and their responsibility toward others, and give some assurances that their rights are protected.

That concludes my testimony.
[Testimony resumes on p. 197.)
[The prepared statement of Terrance Micek follows:)

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tative of the National Conference of State Liquor Administrators and I serve that association as the Executive Secretary/Treasurer.

I am gainfully employed by the State of Nebraska, Liquor Control

Commission which is a member state of the NCSLA. I serve the

Nebraska Liquor Control Commission as its Executive Director, and
prior to my employment with the State of Nebraska, I practiced
law in Grant, Nebraska, and was engaged in a general practice
with responsibilities including appointment as the City Attorney
for the City of Grant, Nebraska. I was also certified by the
State of Nebraska Department of Education for teaching grades

seven through twelve.

The National Conference of State Liquor Administrators is an association which represents thirty-one states, the City of Baltimore, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and the Common

Included within the purposes of our

wealth of Puerto Rico.

association is the need to devise and promote the enactment of the most effective and equitable types of state liquor laws and

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