-3 Nebraska reports thet during the first 12 months of its program, the State experienced 26 percent fewer fatalities than the previous year. Also, from June 1980 to May 1981, 41 percent of the fatal accidents were listed as involving alcohol yet from. June 1981 to May 1982, the alcohol involvement was reported at 37 percent, constituting e 10-percent reduction in fatal accidents involving alcohol. While the Safety Board cannot specifically correlate these results to the Nebraska REDDI Program, and undoubtedly other factors contributed to some degree, it is not aware of any other significant changes in State enforcement policy or procedures which would have brought about these reductions. The five programs discussed above have been implemented by either the States' highway safety or highway law enforcement agencies, or both. The individuals involved in the programs reviewed by the Safety Board were enthusiastic about their respective State programs, and indicated thet media support and local enforcement agency involvement were key elements in the success of the programs. Most programs were "kicked off" by Large press conferences hosted by the Governors of the respective States. The programs typically make use of posters depicting real-life surviving victims of drunk drivers, and telephone numbers where citizens can call to report drunk drivers. Utah utilizes billboards and bumper stickers with the message "Drunk Drivers Hurt People Be REDDI". Brochures are used to give citizens information on how to spot drunk drivers, how to report drunk drivers to the police by citizens band (CB) radio and by telephone, what information should be given to the police when reporting drunk drivers, and what no: to do when a drunk driver is encountered. Publicizing reports from the enforcement agency on a weekly or monthly basis is necessary to inform citizens of the effectiveness of their reporting efforts and to encourage them to continue reporting. Based on the positive results of State programs to encourage citizens to report drunk drivers, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Mayor of the District of Columbia and the Governors of the States listed: Implement a citizen awareness and citizen drunk driver reporting The Safety Board is concurrently recommending to the International Association of Chiefs of Police and The National Safety Council that they collaborate and act as focal points for gathering and disseminating information on REDDI-type programs, and provide pertinent information and assistance to interested States and local communities. BURNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and MCADAMS, BURSLEY, and ENGEN, Members, concurred in this recommendation. Jim Burnett By: Jim Burnett Chairman STATEMENT OF C. THOMAS DIENES Congressman James J. Florio House Office Bldg. Annex No. 2 November 2, 1983 Dear Congressman Florio: The I am writing concerning the constitutionality of H.R. 3870 which prohibits the sale or offer for sale of any alcoholic beverage to persons under the age of 21 if the beverage has traveled in interstate commerce or if the sale is made in an establishment which is in or affects interstate commerce. constitutionality of the proposed enactment is necessarily speculative since the Supreme Court has never addressed itself to the constitutionality under the Twenty First Amendment of Federal legislation which displaces state laws regulating the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. Nevertheless, as my remarks below will indicate, I believe that the proposed law - 2 would be held constitutional. In spite of the testimony and legal memoranda submitted to the Committee, which question Congress' constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to enact H.R. 3870, there is very little question that Congress has the constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to enact H.R. 3870. Indeed, since the time of the New Deal, no federal law based on the commerce power has been held unconstitutional for want of a constitutional source of power. While federal legislation has been invalidated on the basis of various limitations contained in the Constitution, the commerce power has provided a plenary source of power for Congress to legislate. First, Congress can legislate regarding any activity actually in interstate commerce (e.g., regulation of the shipping or transit of goods) since it has plenary authority under the Commerce Clause to determine what legislation is required. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). As early as Gibbons v. Odgen, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), the Court stated that the Commerce power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Further, Congress can reach even a local activity that is purely intrastate in character "where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the states or with foreign nations." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. - 3 · 241, 255 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128 (1942). Pursuant to its implied power to enact legislation necessary and proper to the regulation of interstate commerce, Congress can regulate even wholly local activity so long as Congress could rationally conclude that such legislation affects interstate commerce. "The judicial task is at an end once the Court determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 262; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). H.R. 3870 specifically includes as proposed findings of fact that consumption of alcoholic beverages is a major cause of vehicular accidents, that a disproportionate number of accidents are caused by drivers under the age of 21 and that the proposed legislation is "necessary for the public safety and welfare." Assuming that the legislative record contains support for these statutory findings, Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to enact the proposed legislation. The Supreme Court has noted: "The Court must defer to a congressional finding that regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276; Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc., 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-304. 4 Nor does the fact that the proposed legislation is enacted for a public welfare objective in any way limit the federal prerogative under the Commerce Clause. The Court has established that it is not the judicial function to second-guess the wisdom of a challenged law nor to probe the congressional motivation in enacting it. "The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937). Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. In upholding the constitutionality of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), the Court noted: "That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs... rendered its enactments no less valid....It was [the] burden [on interstate commerce] which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong." Assuming that Congress in enacting H.R. 3870 determined that the law was a reasonable means of promoting highway safety |