CRS-8 18/ In Nippert v. Richmond, the Court noted that even the traffic in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-First Amendment gives the states the highest degree of control, is not absolutely beyond the reach of federal commerce power. In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor 19/ Corp., the Court examined a situation where there was the intersection of the commerce power and the Twenty-First Amendment. The Idlewild company sold liquor at an airport under the administration of the Federal Bureau of Customs. The state argued that since the business was not licensed by the state it could not operate and that the Twenty-First Amendment barred federal action to the contrary, The Court ruled against the state: [that]...the Twenty-First Amendment has somehow operated to repeal" The Court concluded that the Twenty-First Amendment and the commerce clause must be considered in light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. 21/ 18/ 327 U.S. 416, 425, n. 15 (1946). 19/ 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 20/ Ibid., at 331-332. 21/ Ibid., at 332. CRS-9 The Supreme Court has most recently evaluated the Twenty-First Amendment and the commerce clause in the context of federal antitrust law. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Al22/ uminum, Inc., the Court struck down a state-operated resale price maintenance scheme for wine despite state invocation of the Twenty First Amendment. The Court held that in cases of this sort, the compet ing state and federal interest in the antitrust laws outweighed any interest 23/ the state was able to show. In applying the Midcal balancing test, and evaluating competing interests, a strong argument can be made in favor of the constitutionality of the bill. For it is at least arguable that whatever state interest is advanced by being able to provide alcohol to persons under the age of twenty-one, it may not rise to the level of the federal interest in elim inating drunken drivers from the nation's highways. 22/ 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 23/ Ibid., at 113-114. CRS-10 Power to Regulate Commerce--The Commerce Clause The Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to regulate com- Berce. The commerce power has been held a source of plenary power for Congress to legislate in a broad sphere. Congress thus has authority to legislate with respect to any activity that "affects commerce," such as regulation of the movement or transit of goods, and is further empowered to determine in the first instance what legislation is reason25/ In the keystone ably necessary to achieve its regulatory objectives. 26/ case of Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court stated that the Commerce power is 27/ in itself complete and can be exercised to the utmost. Later cases determined that Congress can reach even a local activity that is purely intrastate in character "where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the states or with foreign nations." Through its implied power to enact legislation that is necessary and proper to the regulation of interstate commerce, Congress can regulate even wholly local activity as long as Congress could rationally conclude that such legilation affects commerce. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 28/ Association provided certain standards. "The judicial test is at an end 24/ U.S. Const. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3, known as the "Commerce Clause." 25/ United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 26/9 Wheat. 1 (1824). 27/ See, Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-128 (1942). 28/ 452 U.S. 264 (1981). CRS-11 29/ once the Court determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a parThus, the rational basis" test has develop ticular regulatory scheme." ed as the constitutional measure of commerce based legislation. The bill specifically includes as proposed findings of fact that the consumption of alcoholic beverages is a major cause of vehicle accidents, that a large number of these accidents are caused by drivers under the age of 21 and that the proposed legislation is necessary for the public safety and welfare. Assuming that the legislative record adequately supports these statutory and related legislative findings, Congress may well have the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the proposed legislation. As the Court has stated: "The Court must defer to a congressional finding that regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there 30/ is any rational basis for such a finding." Congress has legislated in a variety of areas for the protection of the public. The Court has upheld federal legislation forbidding the sale of misbranded drugs that have moved in interstate commerce, even when the drugs are ultimately sold by a retailer who received them from an in31/ state wholesaler. The Court has also upheld federal legislation forbidding discrimination against Blacks by a small restaurant where the restaurant purchased 46 percent of its food from a local supplier who had procured it 32/ from outside the state. Under the circumstances of the bill, the 29/ Ibid., at 276. 30/ Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276. See also, Heart of Atlanta Model Inc., 379 U.S. at 258; and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-304. 31/ United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948). 32/ Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). CRS-12 national traffic in alcoholic beverages and the substantial impact on interstate commerce caused by those who drink and drive appear to be within the purview of the commerce power. Thus it appears that a compelling argument can be made for the bill's constitutionality under the commerce clause since there appears to be a rational basis for the proposed legislative ban. |