CHAPTER XVI.

HE two most wonderful persons of the last age-two of the most wonderful men who have lived in the world

were WASHINGTON and NAPOLEON.

Our young readers may be presumed to be familiar with the histories of both, and it will not be unprofitable to impress upon their minds their characteristics, separately and in contrast. We shall therefore feel no hesitation in laying before them the fine comparison which follows, by the Hon. James K. Paulding, deeming it the best and simplest that has ever been written.

"The superiority of virtue over mere genius," remarks this author, "was probably never exemplified on a scale of greater magnificence, or more completely demonstrated, than in the lives and fortunes of these two illustrious persons. As a man of genius Napoleon was without doubt superior to Washington, but his virtues bore no comparison to

those of the other. In the activity and comprehensiveness of his mind; in that clearness of perception which enabled him to foresee and overcome the obstacles which impeded his course, and achieve an unparalleled succession of triumphs, few men, either of ancient or modern times, equalled him. In these respects, Washington was not his peer perhaps; and yet, when we consider the relative positions of the two, I am inclined to believe he was not much his inferior. He certainly excelled him in wisdom, though he may have been his inferior in genius.

"The mind of Washington was equal to the full and entire comprehension of the sphere in which he acted; and his sagacity in pointing out the probable events of the future, as well as guarding against either present or remote contingencies, is everywhere strikingly displayed, not only in his acts but opinions. His letters to Congress, during the progress of the Revolution, are principally occupied with pointing out approaching danger, or recommending the best means of avoiding it; and it cannot be doubted, that had his advice and exhortations been properly attended to, the struggle for liberty would have been far less protracted and sanguinary. But he was not. like Napoleon, an absolute monarch or leader, the master of his people. He was the servant of his

countrymen, and could advise, but not direct nor control their actions or opinions, except by the force of his reasoning and the weight of his character. These constituted almost the only authority he exercised, except in his military capacity; and thus situated, his means were never in any degree correspondent with the greatness of his designs, or the difficulties which beset him at every moment of his military career. We are not, therefore, to judge of his talents by the victories he gained, but by the defeats which he avoided; and his crowning merit as a warrior is, that of having performed great things with weak instruments and comparatively insignificant means.

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Napoleon, on the contrary, in the more early stages of his career, was the absolute leader of an infuriated multitude; a nation of thirty millions of people, acting under the influence of an enthusiasm of which the world furnishes few examples, as to its extent or its consequences. This alone had previously, under leaders of far inferior capacity, achieved a succession of victories over the veteran troops of Europe. Napoleon placed himself at the head of an irresistible impulse, which was sufficient in itself to carry him to the summit of glory. As emperor, he reaped the benefits of this national en

husiasm, which had resulted in the formation of a warlike nation and armies inured to victory, as well as rendered all but invincible by an ardour almost equal to enthusiasm, a confidence the result of a long series of successes amounting to prodigies. With such instruments, aided by the possession of absolute power over a rich and mighty people, it was comparatively easy to conquer nations, governed by enfeebled monarchs reigning over subjects rendered unwarlike by having for centuries relied on standing armies for protection, and disaffected or indifferent toward a government of which they experienced little but the oppressions. But had he been placed in the situation of Washington, equally circumscribed in his means and his authority, there is every reason to believe that for want of the virtues of that pure and illustrious man, rather than from any inferiority of genius, he would have failed in accomplishing the great object of freeing his own country, or subjecting others.

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Napoleon was inferior to Washington in patriotism. He was not born in France; it was not his native land, endeared to him by the ties and associations of childhood. He loved glory better than France, and sacrificed his adopted country on the altar of insatiable ambition. Without doubt, the

position he occupied often entailed on him the necessity of warring in self-defence, even when he seemed the aggressor. It was indispensable that he should be Cæsar or nothing; to overturn the thrones of others, or cease to reign himself. In this point of view, they may be called defensive wars, partaking in the sentiment of patriotism, because the glory and safety of France were identified with his own. But these motives, however they might have mingled incidentally with other more powerful incitements, cannot justify his conduct toward Spain, or his invasion of Russia. His throne was too well established at these times to fear either one or the other; and an impartial posterity, while it pardons many of his apparent aggressions, will, in all probability, denounce these as the offspring not of patriotism but of a boundless ambition, incapable of being satiated by the acquisition of glory or power.

"If we turn toward Washington, we shall see at a glance that ambition, if it at all influenced his acceptance of the command of armies which scarcely had an existence at the time, was only a latent motive, that, of itself alone, could not have stimulated him to assume a station which presented in perspective a very remote and doubtful triumph on one hand, an ignominious death on the other. He was