its illegal sale, and if other laws become necessary to accomplish that end, we have that faith in the Legislature to believe they will pass them as they should do. On the other hand, we have territory in Texas where the sale of intoxicating liquors is legalized by licensing dealers therein, and under this license they are authorized and permitted to make sales thereof to the general public under such regulations as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law. So long as the laws of Texas recognize, legalize and legitimize the sale of intoxicating liquors and license dealers therein, just so long the Legislature of Texas will be powerless to pass a law which will prevent the citizens of the State from going into this licensed place and purchase such liquors in quantities and under the terms which the licensed dealer has been authorized to sell, and when the citizen purchases it at such licensed place, it becomes his property; is not subject to confiscation, nor can he be prevented from carrying it to his home for his own use; nor can he be prevented from making use of the common carriers of the country in having it conveyed to his home for his own use, unless the Legislature should arrive at the conclusion that it was proper to prohibit one living in prohibition territory from owning, keeping in his possession, and using intoxicating liquors altogether in order to prevent illegal sales thereof. This this bill does not seek to do, and the citizen, by its terms, is authorized to transport and import it into prohibition territory for his own use. Intoxicating liquor is not an article of commerce (where commerce therein is legalized by law) that its mere carriage by an express company, or baggage company, or other common carriers is dangerous to the public welfare in any sense of the word. And when the law legalizes its sale and purchase by the citizen, to undertake to say how the citizen shall carry it, or that he can not have it carried by another, is not a regulation of the intoxicating liquor, but becomes a regulation of the citizen in the management of his property acquired under the law, and seeks to control him in a matter in which the public can have no interest, and can in no sense be hurtful to the safety of the public, nor its health, nor morals, nor the general welfare of the public. But in holding that the Legislature is without authority and power to regulate the citizen as to the means to be adopted in the transportation or carriage of intoxicants purchased for his own use, at places where the State authorizes its acquisition-to his home-we do not wish to be understood as holding that if the liquor is purchased or intended for resale in the prohibition territory, or intended to be used in prohibition territory for any unlawful purpose, that the Legislature is without authority to prohibit its shipment, transportation, carriage and delivery to any person (even the owner), for such illegal purposes. We think the Legislature has authority and power to do so, and it is its duty to do so, and that it has done so by the provisions of the Allison Law, and that a proper construction of this law shows that this is all the Legislature intended to do. It is a well known rule of construction that if a bill, by all of its terms, is subject to two constructions, and by one construction it would be rendered void, yet by another construction,

of which it is equally susceptible, its terms would be within the authority of the Legislature to enact under the police power, and violative of no provision of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to give to the Act that construction which would render it valid. What was the evil the Legislature had in mind? Not to prevent one from obtaining liquor for his own use, for the act authorizes him to get it and keep it for his use, but recognizing that liquor was being shipped into, transported into, carried into and delivered to others in prohibition territory for illegal purposes, that is, to make illegal sales thereof in prohibition territory, it was at this evil the terms of the Act were directed and which it intended to prevent in future, and which should be, and by the terms of this Act is, prohibited.

Sutherland on Statutory Construction states the "universal principle applied in considering constitutional questions is, that an Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although such construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. The courts may resort to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it."

Black on Interpretation of Laws says: "The presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a statute; every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute, not against it, and the courts will not adjudge it invalid unless its violation of the Constitution is clear, complete and unmistakable. Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the Constitution, but will rather put such interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the Constitution and give it full force and effect, if this can be done without extravagance. If the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary for this purpose to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language employed."

In the case of W. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 121 S. W. Rep., 194, Chief Justice Key of the Court of Civil Appeals cites a number of authorities,, and reaffirms the rule "that if a statute is capable of two constructions, one of which will render it valid and the other render it invalid, the former will be adopted."

In the case of Bassett v. Mills, 89 Texas, 162, our Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Gaines, said: "Where a statute is. capable of two constructions, one of which would comply with a positive: requirement of the Constitution, and the other leaves the duty unper-. formed, the former will prevail." And in the case of Galveston Ry. Co. v. Gross, 47 Texas, 428, that court held: "When a law is susceptible of two constructions, that which is constitutional will be adopted."

In our court it was held in Ex parte Mabry, 5 Texas Crim. App., 93: "When a legislative Act can be so construed as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, and give it the force and effect of law, such construction will be adopted by the courts." Again, in Ex parte Murphy, 27

Texas Crim. App., 492, it was held: "In construing a legislative Act, courts must so interpret it as to harmonize its provisions with the Constitution, if possible." This rule of construction has always prevailed in the courts of this State, and we think properly so, and the rule is upheld by all text-book writers of any note. Courts should never hold an Act of the Legislature void, unless compelled by the clear and specific language of the Act to hold that its terms are in contravention of the inhibition of the State Constitution, and if the language used in the Act as a whole is reasonably subject to a construction that will render it valid, and reach the evil intended to be suppressed, such construction should be adopted by the court and its validity upheld.

We have felt impelled to discuss these questions at length and cite these authorities by reason of the differences in opinion existing between members of this court. Our senior justice, Judge Davidson, is of the opinion that the language of the Act is subject to the construction that it prohibits the shipment, transportation and delivery of one's own liquor to him in prohibition territory, and if so, that the Act would in that event be clearly violative of the provisions of the Constitution and void; and further, that section 20 of article 16 of the Constitution should be construed as a limitation on the power of the Legislature to pass any law under the police power to affect in anywise intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory other than merely to punish for an illegal sale, as evidenced by his dissenting opinions in the Snearly, Sneed and other cases hereinbefore cited. On the other hand, Presiding Judge Prendergast is of the opinion that the proper construction to give the law is, that it prohibits the transportation, shipment, carriage and delivery of intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, except for medicinal, scientific and sacramental purposes, and that the Legislature has the authority and power to regulate and prohibit the transportation, shipment and delivery of liquors for one's own use in prohibition territory and that this law does do so, even though the law in section 9 authorizes one to purchase it for his own use and carry it to his home in prohibition territory, as evidenced by his dissenting opinion in Ex parte Peede. To neither of these, to my mind extreme views, have I been able to give my assent, for I do not believe such to be the law, which fact has been known to my associates on the bench since the rendition of the opinion in Ex parte Muse, 168 S. W. Rep., 520. In the writer's opinion, the police power is one of the greatest and most essential powers possessed by the government, and that it is necessarily inherent in sovereignty-the power to protect the health of the citizenship of a State, the morals of the citizenship, and to insure the safety of the citizenship, and when exercised within these bounds, the judiciary, nor any other authority has the right to annul laws passed in regard to such matters when necessary for the public welfare, but when the Legislature goes beyond the proper bounds and seeks to control the individual citizen in the mode of transportation or carriage of his property to his home (whether in prohibition territory, and whether it be whisky or other property) that he has

legally acquired at points where the State has licensed and authorized. its sale, when the property is not of the nature that the mere mode and method of its shipment, transportation and carriage can be injurious to the public health, public morals, public safety, nor the general public good, it has gone beyond the limits heretofore recognized as inherent in the State under the police powers. Entertaining these views, as I do, and knowing that the views I entertain in this case are not concurred in by either of my brethren, I have written perhaps at more length than was necessary, and yet I deemed it necessary and proper to do so to show why I think the Allison Law violative of no provision of the Constitution, and yet that it did not prohibit a citizen of the State from carrying or having conveyed to his home, by the usual and customary methods of conveying property, his own property that the law by express terms authorized him to acquire and to carry to his home and there use it himself, or administer to his family when he deemed it advisable or necessary.

To the rule of law hereinbefore stated, that when an Act is subject to two constructions, that the courts should give it that construction which would render it a valid law, another equally well recognized rule of construction may also be added: That we should take into consideration the evil intended to be remedied. From contemporaneous history we are made aware that wherever local option has been adopted it had, to some extent at least, become customary to ship intoxicating liquors into such territory, establishing depots therefor denominated as "cold storages" and under other nomenclatures, which said liquors were not intended for the personal use of the person receiving same, but were intended when shipped into such territory to be surreptitiously sold and otherwise used in violation of the laws of this State, and by such means render ineffectual the prohibition law. It was such evils as this that the Legislature intended to remedy, and yet it was careful in the same Act to reserve to the individual citizen his right to procure and use intoxicating liquors if he elected so to do as evidenced by section 9. And while many of us may differ as to the advisability of a citizen using intoxicating liquors, and doubtless do differ, yet with the general public policy of a State the courts can have no concern. This, the Legislature has the right to determine and must declare, and it has in every law that it has ever passed since the right to adopt local option by a vote was adopted as a part of the organic law, declared that it was not the policy of this State to interfere with the right of the individual citizen to use intoxicating liquor if he so desired, provided he did not drink it in certain public places, and did not become drunk in public places. As said by an eminent law writer, an Act can not be declared void because in the opinion of the court it violates the best public policy, nor can its terms be so construed as to make effective a public policy the court deems most advisable and for the best interests of a State, which would be in antagonism to the settled policy of the State as expressed in this and former legislative Acts. The wisdom of the policy

adopted by the State as expressed in its laws and the desirability of another and different policy are matters addressed to the legislative branch of the government, and must rest upon the intelligence, patriotism and wisdom of that body and not upon the judgment of the court. When the Legislature has declared the policy of the State, and given to the citizens, and each citizen thereof, the right to acquire intoxicating liquors and convey it to his home, the courts have no authority to seek to nullify that right by erecting and placing insuperable barriers to the exercise of the right. If it is deemed desirable to prohibit the individual citizen from obtaining and having in his possession for his own use intoxicating liquors, the remedy is with the people and not with the courts, and should not be sought to be exercised by them. Mr. Sutherland in his work on Statutory Construction says:

"In general the same rules of construction apply to Constitutions as to statutes. A statute should be so construed as to give a sensible and intelligent meaning to every part, to avoid absurd and unjust consequences and, if possible, so as to make it valid and effective. 'It is familiar rule that if the words employed are susceptible of two meanings, that will be adopted which comports with the general public policy of the State, as manifested by its legislation rather than that which runs counter to such policy. When a general intention is expressed in a statute and also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception and both are to have effect in their respective spheres." As sustaining this text he cites the following authorities: Martin v. Election Commissioners, 126 Cal., 404, 58 Pac. Rep., 932; Davis v. Dougherty County, 116 Ga., 491, 42 S. E. Rep., 764; Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill., 102, 48 N. E. Rep., 137, 39 L. R. A., 197; People v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill., 486, 50 N. E. Rep., 599; Dodge v. Chicago, 201 Ill., 68, 66 N. E. Rep., 367; Boyd v. Brazil Block Coal Co., 25 Ind. App., 157, 57 N. E. Rep., 732; Arnold v. Council Bluffs, 85 Iowa, 441, 52 N. W. Rep., 347; Poor v. Watson, 92 Mo. App., 89; State v. District Court, 14 Mont., 452, 37 Pac. Rep., 9; Home B. & L. Assn. v. Nolan, 21 Mont., 205, 53 Pac. Rep., 738; Cate v. Martin, 70 N. H., 135, 46 Atl. Rep., 54, 48 L. R. A., 613; McGinn v. State, 46 Neb., 427, 65 N. W. Rep., 46, 50 Am. St. Rep., 617, 30 L. R. A., 450; State v. Cornell, 53 Neb., 556, 74 N. W. Rep., 59, 68 Am. St. Rep., 629; Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y., 132, 29 N. E. Rep., 85; Wormser v. Brown, 149 N. Y., 163, 43 N. E. Rep., 524; Portland v. Gaston, 38 Ore., 533, 63 Pac. Rep., 1051; McAskie's Appeal, 154 Pa. St., 24, 26 Atl. Rep., 60; Kolb v. Reformed Episcopal Church, 18 Pa. Sup. Ct., 477; Hayes v. Arrington, 108 Tenn., 494, 68 S. W. Rep., 44; Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 76 Texas, 630, 13 S. W. Rep., 665; People v. Utah Commissioners, 7 Utah, 279, 26 Pac. Rep., 577; Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va., 207, 12 S. E. Rep., 484; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S., 468, 12 S. C. Rep., 55, 35 L. Ed., 821. See Ex parte Ah Hoy, 23 Ore., 89, 31 Pac. Rep., 220.