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preciate such danger, so as to regulate his conduct and avoid it. Knowledge of the danger, and consent to continue in the service notwithstanding, is in such case imputed to the servant; so that if he subsequently suffers injury in consequence thereof he has no right of recovery against the master. This view is in accordance with what was held in Jones v. Florence M. Co., 66 Wis. 268, 277; 57 Am. Rep. 269. The same rule applies to the case of an employee who is a minor, where the defect or danger is open and obvious, in so far as he is of such age, intelligence, discretion, and judg. ment as to enable him to comprehend the situation and appreciate the danger incident to the work or employment.
Subject to this qualification, knowledge of the defect or danger is to be imputed to him in like manner as to an adult. It is, however, a question for the jury to determine upon the evidence whether a minor servant was of sufficient age, intelligence, discretion, and judginent to bring him within the operation of the rule applicable to adult servants: Chopin v. Badger Paper Co., 83 Wis. 192. In the absence of proof it is fair to presume that he possessed these characteristics in the degree usual to persons of his age. Because the question was one for the jury, the defendant's motion for a nonsuit and the request that the jury be directed to find for the defendant were properly denied.
The instruction asked by the defendant, and refused, should, we think, have been given. The consequence of its refusal was that the defendant was denied the benefit of the rule as to imputed negligence and assumed risk, to the extent it was properly applicable to the case, and the case was made to turn, so far as open and obvious defects and danger were properly an element in the case, not upon what the plaintiff's intestate ought to bave known and understood, in view of his age, intelligence, discretion, and judgment, but upon what he in fact knew or comprehended as to the danger to which he was exposing himself. He was bound to exercise the degree of intelligence, knowledge and judgment he actually possessed, as much so as an adult, and must be held to have assumed the risk if he exposed himself to a danger which was open and obvious, and which he was capable of perceiving and fully appreciating, whether he actually appreciated and comprehended it or not. The general charge does not contain any instruction equivalent to the one asked, and entirely excluded from the consideration of the jury the
material question whether the plaintiff, in view of his age, intelligence, discretion, and judgment, ought reasonably to have known 450 and understood the dangers to which he was exposed in his employment. The effect of this error is indicated by the answers of the jury to questions submitted to them, as above stated.
Other errors were assigned, but as the questions thus presented may not arise on a new trial, it is not necessary to consider them. For the reasons stated the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed.
By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
MASTER AND Servant — Minor EMPLOYER. - A minor employee who knows and appreciates the danger and peril of the work in which he is engaged assumes the risk of his employment. If he is ignorant, however, of such danger and peril by reason of youth and inexperience, and has not been properly instructed by his employer, the latter is answerable for an injury sustained by reason of a want of such knowledge. Most especially should this duty of instruction be performed, when the dangers and the means of avoiding them are not apparent or fully within the comprehension of the servant. . Whether a servant was such a person as was entitled to have special instructions concerning risks to which he was exposed, and the means of avoiding thein, and whether the duty of instructing him was discharged by his employer, are matters for the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case. The burden is on the servant to prove the existence and breach of such duty, and, in determining whether a minor employee was, when injured by dangerous machinery, exercising ordinary care, the jury may take into consideration his age, intelligence, and discre. tion, and his knowledge of, or inexperience with, machinery. The same degree of care is not required of a mere boy of inexperience and immature judgınent as of a person of mature years: Chicago etc. Brick Co. v. Rein. neijer, 140 Ill. 334; 33 Ain. St. Rep. 249. Proof that a minor servant hade done the work, in the doing of which he was injured, for some time prior to the accident, and of the number of times he had done it, may be properly considered by the jury in determining whether the master was negligent in requiring him to continue it. Ordinary care for minors is that degree of care which children of the same age are accustomed to exercise under simi. lar circumstances. minor servant, properly instructed concerning the danger of his employment, thereafter, stands on the same plane with other servants with respect to the risks of the emyloyment: Note to Greenway v. Conroy, 40 Am. St. Rep. 718.
WOOD V. ARMOCR.
(88 WISCONSIN, 488.) Tax TITLE MAY BE ACQUIRED BY MARRIED WOMAN.-A tax title to land
may be acquired by a married woman acting in good faith, by a purchase ont of her separate estate, although her husband is in possession
of such land, and under a legal obligation to pay the taxes. ADVERSE POSSESSION UNDER TAX TITLE ACQUIRED BY MARRIED WOMAN,
After a married woman has acquired a tax title to land in the possession of her husband, and put it on record, her possession of the land through tenants is none the less adverse to the original owner by rea. son of the fact that her husband acts as her agent in the managemen'
of the property. HUSBAND MAY ACT AS AGENT FOR HIS WIFE.-It is entirely competent
for a husband to act as his wife's agent in the transaction of his wife's separate business, and his doing so will not be allowed to prejudice the wife's rights. EJECTMENT by the widow and heirs at law of one John P. Wood. The subject of controversy was part of a quarter section of land to which one Curtis Mann had held the title in fee prior to 1850. Mann, in February, 1850, deeded to Wood, who was then living in New York, and who died in 1864, still holding the paper title to the land. In 1856 Mann moved to Wisconsin with his family, and went into possession of the land, and remained in possession until August, 1887. He paid all taxes until November, 1877, when he became in. solvent and paid no further taxes. The land was sold for the unpaid taxes of 1883 and 1884, and tax deeds, fair on their face, were made to Warham Parks, the holder of the tax certificate in 1887. This tax title was bought of the tax title holder, in August, 1887, by Nancy M. Mann, the wife of Cur. tis Mann, with money arising from her separate property, and she received a deed therefor. The land was then in the possession of tenants, and she, after getting her deed, received the rents, made repairs, paid expenses, redeemed unpaid taxes, and paid the current taxes. Her husband acted as her agent in these matters. In September, 1892, the land in controversy was conveyed by Nancy Mann to one Morse, who afterwards conveyed the same to the defendant. The circuit court found that the land had been adversely possessed by Curtis Mann for more than twenty years, that the tax title acquired by Nancy Mann was valid, and had been followed by adverse possession for more than three years. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.
Quarles, Spence & Quarles, for the appellants.
490 WINSLOW, J. The record is quite voluminous. The foregoing statement does not state all of the facts which appear in evidence, but it is believed that it states all the facts which are material to the decision of the case. The question was much discussed, both in the briefs and in the argument, whether Curtis Mann's entry and subsequent possession were adverse. In the view we have taken of the case we find it unnecessary to decide this question. When the tax deed was executed the title to the property was either in the plaintiffs or in Curtis Mann, and in either event it was entirely competent for Nancy Mann, out of her separate estate, to purchase that tax title. The tax deeds were fair on their face. No irregularity is shown or claimed in the levy of the tax upon which they were based. Hence, they conveyed a title in fee simple, unless there was some legal reason why Nancy Mann could not purchase that title.
It is suggested that Curtis Mann could not acquire the tax title, because he was in possession of the land and it 491 was assessed to him, so that he was under legal obligation to pay the taxes. However much force this argument might have against a title acquired by Curtis Mann, or by a third person collusively for Mann's benefit, it has no force against Mrs Mann, who was not in possession and was under no obliga. tion to protect the title. No duty rested on her to pay the taxes on these lands, whether they belonged to her husband or to the plaintiffs. She had a separate estate, and, if she chose to use a part of it in purchasing a tax title on these lands in good faith and for her own benefit, we know of no rule, in the present state of the law as to the property rights of married women, which would prevent her from doing so. The evidence showed, and the court rightly found, that, after such purchase, she went into possession of the lands in ques. tion, and held such possession until she conveyed the same to the defendant's grantor. The actual manual possession during this time was in tenants, but we think the possession of these tenants, under the facts, must be held to be the possession of Mrs. Mann. She received the rents and profits, built fences, repaired buildings, paid the taxes, and managed the property as her own. It is true that her husband acted as her agent in many of these matters, but it is entirely com
petent for the husband to so act in the transaction of his wife's separate business, and we do not see how this is to prejudice the wife's rights. Certainly no one has had possession adverse to her since she acquired title. The plaintiffs have not, and her husband has not, nor have the tenants. She put her title on record at once, thus announcing to all the world, including the plaintiffs, that she claimed title to the premises. This constituted not only a "challenge of the right of the original owner and all opposing claimants, but it was notice to them of its existence and presumed validity": Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245.
492 In any view which we have been able to take of the case we have been unable to see why the tax title acquired by Nancy Mann did not vest in her a perfect title to the property, which is now vested in the defendant, her grantee.
By the Court. Judgment affirmed.
Who MAY PURCHASE AT Tax SALE.-One who is under no legal or moral obligation to pay taxes on a piece of land is not precluded from purchasing at a tax sale thereof, although in possession at the time of assessment or sale: See note to Laton v. Balcom, 10 Am. St. Rep. 383, and monographie note to Blake v. Howe, 15 Am. Dec. 684-690, on who may purchase at a tas Bale.
A HUSBAND MAY ACT As Agent For His Wife in transactions relating to ber separate estate: Notes to Hoffman v. McFadden, 35 Am. St. Rep. 105; Wells v. Batts, 34 Am. St. Rep. 512. The fact that he assists her in the management of her separate estate does not impair her title to its pro-lucts, and the value of the husband's labor and skill in such a case cannot be reached by creditors: Note to Trapnell v. Conklyn, 38 Am. St. Rep. 47. Whether he has been constituted her agent is a question of fact for the jury: Note to Wells v. Balls, 34 Am. St. Rep. 512.
STATE V. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT Co.
(88 WISCONSIN, 512.) CORPORATIONS—What Have NO VALIDITY.-A corporation whose primary
object is without statutory authority can have no lawful existence, although some of its declared purposes may be lawful. Hence, if ite primary object is to obtain money from its members, it is unauthorized, although its declared purposes are " to encourage frugality and economy in its members; to create, husband, and distribute funds from monthly installments, dues, or investments from its members; to purchase, take, hold, sell, convey, lease, rent, and mortgage real estate and personal property: to loan surplus accommodations; and to carry on and conduct a general investmeut business."