2 SALE OR BALLMENT.—A dealer who receives goods ander an agreement to

hold them in trust for another as the property of the latter, with liberty
to sell on his account, and to hand the proceeds to him to apply on the
purchase price, and for the payment of any other indebtedness due
from the dealer, takes no property in the goods, and they are not liable

for his other debts. Brown v. Billington, 780.
3. NEGLIGENCE—EVIDENCE OF.-IN AN ACTION AGAINST A BAILER for loss

and damage to property by accident, proof of the accident may afford

prima facie proof of negligence. Wintringham v. Hayes, 725.
4. BAILOR AND BAILEE—BURDEN OP PROOF AS TO CARE.—If a bailor proper

the condition in which he delivered his property to the bailee, the na-
ture of subsequent injuries suffered by it, and that they were not the
result of ordinary wear and tear, he makes out a prima facie case, and
the burden of proof shifts to the bailee if he had the property within his
exclusive control, and he must be held answerable for such injuries,
unless he can show that they were not the result of his want of proper
care. Wintringham v. Hayes, 725.

See RAILROADS, 7.

BANKS.
1. COLLECTIONS—TRUSTS. -A transaction by which a draft is sent to a bank

for collection and remittance, collected and the proceeds placed in its
vaults by the bank, it merely forwarding a draft in payment, establishes,
as between the correspondent and the bank, the relation of debtor and
creditor, and not that of cestui que trust and trustee. Bowman v, Pirst

Nat. Bank, 870.
2 TRUST FUNDg.–Funds in the hands of a bank not impressed with a trast

at the time the bank ceases to do bnsiness are not impressed with a
trust in the hands of the receiver of such bank. Bowman v. First Nasta

Bank, 870.
8. A BANK INDORSING AND COLLECTING A CHECK WARRANTS THE GENUINS

NESS OF ALL THE PRE-EXISTING INDORSEMENTS thereon, including the
indorsement of the respective payees named in such check, and is
answerable for moneys received by it if any of such indorsements are

forgeries. First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 247.
4. BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND CHECKS.—THE ACCEPTANCE OF A CHECK DORS

NOT PROVE OR ADMIT THE GENUINEN ESS OF ANY SIGNATURE THEREON
other than that of the drawer, and will not exonerate from liability a
bank subsequently collecting such check or bill by virtue of a forged
indorsement, though such indorsement was not made by it or with its
knowledge or procurement. First Nal. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank,

247.
8. FORGED INDORSEMENTS.—The drawee of a check is bound to know the

signature of his own customers, but is not bound to know any other
signature thereon, and by accepting or paying a bill or check does not
admit the genuineness of any indorsement of it. First Nat. Bank v.

Northwestern Nat. Bank, 247.
K. A BANK PAYING A CHECK ON A FORGED INDORSEMENT IS ENTITLED to

recover the money so paid from the person receiving it, on making
demand within a reasonable time after the discovery of the forgery.
First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 247.

See CHECKS; EVIDENCE, 5.

1

BENEFICIARIES.
See INSURANCE, 11, 12, 14

BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS.

See INSURANCE, 6–14.

BILLS AND NOTES.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
800 BANKS, 4; CHECK3, 1; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTI.

BILLS OF REVIEW,
1. REVIEW OF DECREE. —A bill to review a decree of divorce, on the ground

of alleged errors of law apparent on the face of the record, may be filed
without first obtaining leave of-court; but an erroneous order of court
to strike the bill from its files should not be reversed, unless prejudicial

to the appellant. Wood v. Wood, 42.
& In an attack upon a decree by a bill of review for errors of law, the court

cannot examine the evidence to see whether the decree is based upon a
correct finding of facts. In such case it is the sole duty of the court
to inquire whether the record, exclusive of the evidence, contains any
substantial error of law pointed out by the bill. Wood v. Wood, 42

BONDS.
1. COUPONS—NEGOTIABILITY.-Interest-bearing coupons attached to bonds

payable to bearer are, in legal effect, promissory notes, and possess all

the attributes of negotiable paper. Trustees v. Lewis, 209.
2 COUPONS – NEQOTIABILITY - INTEREST.- Interest-bearing coupons ato

tached to bonds and payable to bearer may be detached and negotiated
separately by simple delivery, and sued on separately from the bond
after the latter has been paid, as well as before. Such coupons once
detached and negotiated cease to be mere incidents of the bond, and
become independent claims, carrying interest after inaturity. Trustees

V. Lewis, 209.
2. PAYMENT OF BEFORE MATURITY – FAILURE TO TAKE UP COUPONS.

The payment or cancellation of bonds before maturity to the holder
thereof does not affect the interest-bearing coupons payable to bearer,
and detached from the bonds, and transferred before maturity to, and
in the hands of, another bona fide holder. Trustees v. Lewis, 209.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS--PAYMENT_FAILURE TO TAKE UP-COUPONS
A negotiable instrument paid before maturity should be surrendered to
the payer to prevent further negotiation, for, if payment is made to the
original payee and the instrument is not surrendered, but has been, or
is thereafter, transferred before maturity to a bona fide holder, with.
oat notice, such holder can recover thereon against the maker notwith.
standing such payment. This rule is here applied to interest coupons
detached from bonds and payable to bearer. Trustees v. Lewis, 209.

Soe ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 1; OFFICERS, 7-6

BOOKS OF ACCOUNT.

See EVIDENCE, 3, 12

BOUNDARIES.
1. A GRANT OF LAND BORDERING UPON A RIVER carries the exclusivo

right and title in the river to the center thereof, subject to the right
of passage in the public, unless the terms of the grant specially is
dicate an intention on the part of the grantor to confine the grantee

to the edge or margin. Chicago v. Van Ingen, 285.
2 In Town LOTS ARE SOLD AND CONVEYED BY A MAP REPRESENTING

THEM AS FRONTING UPON A STREAM of water or designating such stream
As one of their boundaries, the purchaser becomes the owner of the
fee to the ceuter of the stream, with the right to maintain docks or
wharves out to the line of navigability. Of this right he cannot be di.
vested without compensation first being made. Chicago v. Van Inget,
286.

See WATERS, 5.

BROKERS.
WHEN ENTITLED TO COMMISSION – FAILURE OF TITLE-If an agent to

sell land agrees to pay a coinmission to a broker for procuring a par
chaser, and one is obtained, he is liable for the commission, though it
is then discovered that the land does not belong to the principal.
Such a mistake is not, in law, a mutual mistake which will avoid the
contract to pay a commission on the sale. Barlhell v. Peler, 906.

BUILDING CONTRACTS.
ARCHITECT, DecisiON OF, WHEN FINAL.-If the parties to a building con-

tract agree that the architect shall pass upon the work and certify apos
the payments to be made his decision is binding, and can be attacked
only for fraud or evident mistake. If, in such a contract, provision is
made for payment of the price upon presentation of the architect's cer.
tificate, the obtaining of such certificate is a condition precedent to the
right to require payment, and to maintain an action therefor in case
payment is refused on the architect's certificate as to delay in perform.
ing work, and as to the damages recoverable therefor. If a building
contract specifies that the decision of the architect shall be binding in
case of any disagreement between the parties relating to the perform-
ance of any covenant therein, and that damages shall be allowed for
the nonperformance of the contract at the sum of fifty dollars for each
and every day the work remains undone after a date named therein,
which sum should be deducted from the contract price, the architect
is empowered to determine the extent to which delay was due to the
fault of the contractor, and to deduct from the amount of his certifi.
cate the fifty dollars for each day's delay for which bo finds the case
tractor chargeable. Hennessy v. Metzger, 267.

See DAMAGES, 7.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

See BAILMENT, 4

BY-LAWS.
Soe CORPORATIONS, 3-6

CARRIERS.
1. THE LIABILITY OF A CARRIER AS SUCH IS NOT PRETENTED FROM Ar

TACHING by the fact that it is not ready to perform its duty and
retains the property in its possession because not then able to provide
the means of transportation. London etc. Ins. Co. v. Rome etc. R. R.

Co., 752.
2. CARRIERS OF LIVESTOCK-NEGLIGENCE-SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING AND

Proor.-In an action by a shipper of livestock against a railroad com.
pany to recover the value of an animal lost a declaration which alleges
bóth delay in the transportation and failure to furnish an opportunity
for feeding and watering the stock justifies a recovery upon proof of
omission on the part of the company to furnish an opportunity to the
shipper to feed and water the stock, although the company is not liable
for the delay. Smith v. Asichigan Cent. R. R. Co., 440.

See ELEVATORS; RAILROADS, 5-&

CERTIORARI.
CERTIORARI AS WRIT OF REVIEW.-The writ of certiorari cannot be used

to serve the purpose of a writ of error or appeal with bill of exceptions.
The granting of the writ is not a matter of right, but in the legal dis-
cretion of the court; and, in order to review and quash the proceedings
of an inferior tribunal upon such writ, the court must have proceeded
in the case without jurisdiction, or its procedure must bave been clearly
illegal, or unknown to the law, or essentially irregular.—llunt v. Jack-
sonville, 214.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
1. A DESCRIPTION IN A CHATTEL MORTGAGE IS SUFFICIENT if it will enable

third persons, aided by the inquiries which the instrument indicaten

and directs, to identify the property.--Andregg v. Brunskill, 388.
2 THE DESCRIPTION IN A CHATTEL MORTGAGE referring to the ownership

or location of the property mortgaged is of great importance, and the
omission of these data may leave imperfect and void a description,
which, were they present, might properly be sustained. Andregg v.

Brunskill, 388.
3. A DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY MORTGAGED as “fourteen steers one year

old, crop off left ear, and slit in the same ear; four heifers one year old,
marked on ear as above steers," without any reference or statement
respecting the location or ownership of the property, is insufficient and
void. Andregg v. Brunskill, 388.

See EVIDENCE, 12; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, &

CHECKS.
1. BANKING.-A CHECK PAYABLE TO ORDER is a bill of exchange payable to

order on demand. First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 247.
2. DILIGENCE AS TO PRESENTMENT. — The rule of diligence as between

indorsee and indorser is the same as between payee and drawer. Hence
the indorser of a check is not liable thereon if it is not presented for
payment within a reasonable time after its indorsement and delivery.

Gifford v. Hardell, 925.
& COMMENCEMENT OF REASONABLE TIME FOR PRESENTATION.-As between

the indorses and indorser of a check the period of reasonable time for

presentation begins when the check is dolivered to the indorser af
to his agent. Gifford v. Hardell, 925.
DILIGENCE AS TO PRESENTMENT IN DISTANT PLAUI. –The general ralo
of diligence as to the presentation of a check received in « pleco
distant from that of the bank upon which it is drawn is, that the check
must be forwarded to the latter place on the next secular day after ita
receipt, and be presented for payment on the day after it has reached
such place by due course of mail. Gifford v. Hardell, 925.
PERIODS FOR PRESENTATION.- Each indorsee of a check is allowed
the same period of time for presentation for payment, w betweea
himself and his immediate indorser, that the payee had u betwoce
himself and the drawer. Gifford v. Hardell, 925.

See BANKS, 4-6; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,

CHOSES IN ACTION.
Soo EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, Lo

CLOUD ON TITLE.
AOTIONS-PARTIES_DoWER.–A widow claiming a dower interest in lande

conveyed by her husband in his lifetime by deed in which she did not
join, and subsequently sold for taxes, is a necessary party to an action
to quiet title to the land. Thompson v. McCorkle, 334.

COLLATERAL ATTACK.
Boo EIBOUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3, B; JUDGMENTS, 4, 11; Mar

RIAGE AND DIVORCE, 3–5; MORTGAGE, 13; PATENTI, 6-73 PURI
LANDS, 1.

COLLATERAL SECURITY.

See DORESS, 2

COLLUSION.
800 JUDGMENTS, 9, 11-13; MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, &

COMMISSIONERS.

See STATES, 3, 4

COMMISSIONS
See BROKERA

COMMON CARRIERS

See CARRIERS.

COMMON LAW.

Soe RELEASE

COMPENSATION.

See OSTICERS, 6

COMPOUNDING FELONY.
DENI.-Tho makor of a promissory cote cannot arold payment thereal

on the ground that it was given to compound a felony. Outy Nash Band
V. Kurworm, 880.