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See OFFICERS, &
Soe Banks, 3-6; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 3, 4,
DECEIT—JOINT PORCHASE OF LAND.-If one party induces another to join
with him in the purchase of land, each to pay one-half of the purchase
price, which the former falsely represents to be greater than it really
is, and the latter gires the former one-half of such excessive price to be
used in paying for his share, and the former pays for the land with a
smaller amount, keeping the remainder himself, the deceit is action-
able and the latter may recover the amount paid in excess of his share
of the actual price, though the land is worth the price represented
Bergeron v. Miles, 911.
Boo FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES; JUDGMENTS, 11-13, 18; NEGOTIABLE 15.
STRUMENTS; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 12.
4. Evidence-CoNcEALMENT OF BUSINESS CARRIED ON IN Son's NAME-
In an action to subject land purchased in the name of the wife of
an insolvent debtor, and paid for ont of the proceeds of a business
carried on by him in the name of his son, evidence that the wife had
no separate estate, that the son had made no other contribution to
the business than the use of his name, that he had paid no atten.
tion to the purchase of the real estate, which was made by his
father, and not showing that the son had ever received any of the
proceeds of the business, or that they have ever had an accounting
with reference thereto, sustains findings that the debtor was the real
owner of the business, and carried it on in the son's name for the
purpose of fraudulently concealing it and its profits from his credite
ors, that the real estate was purchased with such profits, and conveyed
to the wife, and accepted by her with like fraudulent intent, and that
it should be conveyed by her to her husband's assignee for the benefit
of creditors. Ansorye v. Barth, 928.
2. FRAUD AGAINST CREDITORS-CONCEALMENT OF PROPERTY UNDER COFER
OF AGENCY.-An insolvent debtor cannot accumulate property under
cover of another's name, acting ostensibly as the latter's agent. If
such a claim is made, it is always a question of fact whether the basie
ness actually belongs to such other person or to the ostensible agent
and debtor, and whether the alleged agency is a mere scheme and de-
vice to conceal and keep the property used in, or gained by, it from his
creditors. Ansorge v. Barth, 928.
& CHATTEL MORTGAGE, authorizing the mortgagee to take possession forth.
with, and, in addition to the usual power sale upon default, author
izing the mortgagee to sell at private sale or in the usual course of
trade, does not vest any actual title in the mortgagee, and is not
inconsistent with the rights of the mortgagors or their creditors wbo
may acquire liens to redeem at any time. Hence such mortgage is
not void as a general assignment with preferences. Cluett v, Rosenthal,
INSOLVENT DEBTOR-DISPOSITION OF EXEMPT PROPERTY.- As against
creditors, an insolvent debtor has a right to give his exempt property
to his son as well as his time in carrying on and managing his son's
business. Ansorge v. Barth, 928.
& SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING TO Show. An allegation in a bill in equity
that the payment by the husband of à mortgage note given for the
purchase money of property conveyed to the wife was for the con.
venience of the husband, and for the purpose of defrauding, hindering,
and delaying his just creditors, of which fact complainant was igno-
rant until recently before the filing of the bill, is an allegation of fraud
in fact, and, coupled with a showing that the complainant, at the time
of such settlement, sustained the relation of creditor to the husband,
is sufficient of itself, if true, to maintain the bill and to subject the
property in the hands of the wife to his debt, to the extent of the
amount thus paid by the husband. Reel v. Livingston, 202.
& PURCHASE BY HUSBAND FOR WIFE-Riour or HUSBAND'S CREDITORS
TO ATTACK.—The fact that property is purchased by the wife and
partly paid for by the husband, and the deed taken in the namo of
the wite, coupled with an existing indebtedness of the husband, makes
a prima facie case of fraud, and the creditor of the husband can sub.
ject the property in the hands of the wife or her legal representativos
to his debt to the extent of the amount paid by the husband, unless
the presumption of fraud is negatived by the financial condition of
the husband, and the circumstances at the time, or other rebutting ori.
deno Reel v. Livingston, 202.
See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR; PARTNERSHIP, 7.
See HOMESTEAD, 7.
See ASSIGNMENT, 7.
8oo ASSIGNMENT, 3; ATTACHMENT.
800 BOUNDARIES; PUBLIO LANDS, L
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
See HOMESTEAD, 4.
1 IRREGULARITIES_REVIEW OF JUDGMENT.—After the court has acquired
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person the subsequent
proceedings, however erroneous, constitute no ground for tho discharge
of such person on a writ of habeas corpus. This writ cannot be used to
review a judgment. Smith v. Clausmeier, 311.
AX. ST. REP., VOL. XLIII. - 62
& JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR COURT—EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH.-In a hobeas
corpus proceeding for release from custody under a commitment made
by a justice of the peace evidence is admissible to show that the
record of the court is untrue, and that the justice never obtained ja.
risdiction of the person of the petitioner. Smith v. Clausmeier, 311.
See STATES, 3, 4
1. A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION PROTECTS THE LAND, and not any par.
ticular claim of title to it. Perry v. Ross, 66.
2 POSSESSION.-One having possession of land is owner as to all the world
except the holder of the legal title, and is entitled to the benefit of the
Homestead Act. Perry v. Ross, 66.
& ORDER SETTING APART HOMESTEAD TO Widow-ACTION TO ANNUL-
CONCLUSIVENESS OF_FRAUD.-If the complaint in an action to annal
an order setting apart a homestead to the widow of a deceased husband,
out of his estate, merely sets forth the falsity of the widow's statement.
made in her petition for the order, and again repeated in ber testimony
upon the hearing thereof, concerning the nature of the title to the land
set apart, it does not state a cause of action, as the question of title
was necessarily involved in the homestead proceeding, and was con-
cluded thereby, the plaintiff having had notice of that proceeding, and
not being prevented by fraud from appearing therein and contesting it
Fealey v. Fealey, 111.
LJUDGMENT SETTING APART HOMESTEAD TO WIDOW-CONCLUSIVENESS
Of, as to INCOMPETENT HEIR AND GENERAL GUARDIAN. — It is the
duty of a guardian to protect the rights of his ward. Hence, if a
person dies leaving a widow and his mother as his only heirs at law,
and the widow obtains an order setting apart a homestead to her out
of the property of the decedent, the mother, previous to such order,
having been adjudged an incompetent person for whom a general
guardian was appointed, and the guardian having bad knowledge of
the homestead proceeding, the judgment in that proceeding is con-
clusive as to the mother in an action by her to annul the order. Pealey
v. Fealey, 111.
6. Res JUDICATA-HOMESTEAD-COMMUNITY PROPERTY.-In a proceeding
to set apart a homestead to the widow of a decedent, the question as to
whether the land set apart to her is or is not community property is
necessarily put in issue, and is concluded by the judgment. Pealey v.
& JUDGMENT CONCLUSIVENESS AND EFFECT OF ORDER SETTING APART
HOMESTEAD TO WIDOW OF DECEDENT. - An order setting apart •
homestead to the widow of a decedent, no homestead having been
declared during the lifetime of the deceased, operates to vest in her •
title to the land set apart out of the community property. It is in the
nature of a judgment in rem, is conclusive upon all persons interested
in the estate, if the court has jurisdiction to pronounce it, and can be
raccessfully attacked in equity only upon the same grounds that •
judgment in personam may be annulled. Pealey v. Fealey, 111.
7. Win is ENTITLED TO CLAIM a homestead for herself and children ont
of tho property of her husband after he has become a fugitive from
justice, if she and her children continue to remain on and occupy the
land. Hollis v.
h HOMESTEAD CLAIMANT DOES NOT TRANSFEB HIS RIGHT BY ASSIGNING
HIS CONTRACT OF PURCHASE. - If a husband io possession of land, after
filing a declaration of homestead thereon, enters into a contract for its
purchase from the owner, his assignment of the contract to secure bor..
rowed purchase money does not create a lien upon the land, or convey
to the lender either the contract right or the equitable title, although
the declaration is filed before the purchase is made. Perry v. Ross, 66.
A LIABILITY FOR COSTS. -Homesteads are not subject to sale under exo.
cution to satisfy a judgment for a fine or costs in a criminal proseca.
tion. Hollis v. State, 28.
See MORTGAGES, 6.
1. INDIOTMENT FOR MURDER need not state the dimensions of the incisod
wound which caused the death. Walker v. Slute, 186.
2 INDICTMENT FOR MURDER need not state apon what partiular part of
the human body the inortal wound was inflicted. Walker v. Slate, 186.
& INDICTMENT FOR MURDER charging that a mortal wound was inflicted
apon the “body” of the deceased is sufficient in law without stating
apon what particular part of the body the wound was inflicted, and the
word “body," as thus used, means the trunk of a human being as dis.
tinguished from the head and limbs; that part between the upper part
of the thighs or hips, and the neck, excluding the arms.
EVIDENCE-RES GESTÆ.—An occurrence happening so short a time before
a homicido as to be practically a part of the difficulty which ended with
the killing is part of the res gesta and admissible in evidence as such.
Walker v. State, 186.
6. ARREST FOR MISDEMEANOR-HOMICIDE TO Prevent ESCAPE.—A peaco.
officer may arrest one committing a misdemeanor in his presence with.
out a warrant, and, if necessary, orally summon as many persons as he
deems necessary to aid him in making arrest. In making the
arrest, or in preventing an escape after the arrest, the officer or person
assisting him in obedience to a summons, when resisted by the offender,
is not bound to retreat, but may use such physicial force as is appa.
rently necessary, on the one hand to effect the arrest by overcoming the
resistence he encounters, or, on the other hand, to subdue the efforts
of the prisoner to escape, but he cannot in either case take the life of
the accused, or even inflict upon him a great bodily harm, except to
save his own life, or to prevent a like harm to himself. Smith v. State,
& To CONSTITUTE Self-Defense it need not to be made to appear that the
killing was actually necessary; but to justify the killing, however, the
accused, in acting upon the facts as they appear to him, must honestly
believe, without fault or carelessness on his part, that the danger is so
argent and pressing that it is necessary to kill his assailant in order to
save his own life, or to prevent his receiving a great bodily injury. If
there is no danger, and his belief of the existence thereof is imputable
to negligence, he is not excused, however honest his belief may ba
Smith v. State, 20.
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
1 MARRIED Woman's Note — RIGHTS OF HUSBAND'S CREDITORS.-A stat-
ate authorizing married women to acquire property by purchase fres
from their husbands' debts and to give notes therefor, but only when
their husbands join in their execution, cannot be construed, as matter
of law, as clothing the husband with the title to property purchased
solely on the credit of the wife, so as to render it liable for his sole debts,
when the purchase price of the property is secured by a note signed by
the wife, her husband and her sureties and paid by the wife and her
mureties alone. Bollinger v. Gallagher, 791.
1 HUSBAND MAY ACT AS AGENT FOR HIS WIFE. - It is entirely competent
for a husband to act as his wife's agent in the transaction of his wife's
separate business, and his doing so will not be allowed to prejudice
the wife's rights. Wood v. Armour, 918.
& HUSBAND'S RIGHT IN WIFE's ESTATE-ASSIGNABILITY-DESCENT-ADYır.
ISTRATION.—The husband, as an heir of his wife, has an interest in her
estate, which he may sell or assign, subject to the claims of adminis-
tration thereon, or dispose of by will. If not so disposed of it passes
to his heirs subject to administration. In re estate of Dobbel, 123.
ADVERSE POSSESSION Under Tax TITLE ACQUIRED BY MARRIED WOMAN,
After a married woman has acquired a tax title to land in the posses.
sion of her husband, and put it on record, her possession of the land
through tenants is none the less adverse to the original owner by res.
son of the fact that her husband acts as her agent in the management
of the property.
Wood v. Armour, 918.
MARRIED WOMEN-POWER TO CONTRACT-ATTORNEY'S SERVICES IN DI.
KORCE Suit.- A married woman may, by contract, make herself charge.
able with the value of services rendered by an attorney upon her
employment to secure a divorce from her husband, and the husband is
not liable for such services unless made so by order of court Wolcott
v. Patterson, 456.
& TENANCY BY ENTIKETIES ContinuES TO Exist in New York when a
conveyance has been made to a husband and wife, notwithstanding the
separate property acts relating to the rights of married women.
*. Fisher, 762.
2 TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES.—THE GREAT CHARACTERISTIC which distin.
guishes a tenancy by entireties from a joint tenancy is its inseverability,
whereby neither the husband nor the wife, without the consent of the
other, can dispose of any part of the estate, so as to affect the right of
survivorship of the other. Hiles v. Fisher, 762.
& TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES – POWER AND CONTROL OF HUSBAND. - At the
common law a husband was held to be entitled to the full control, and
to take all rents and profits of the land during the joint lives to the
exclusion of the wife, and he had power to sell, mortgage, or lease for
the same period, and this life interest was, according to the weight of
Bubberity, subject to the claims of his creditors. Hiles v. Fisher, 762
TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES-CONTROL OF HUSBAND.-UNDER THE STATUTS
RESPECTING THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF MARRIED Women by which
a husband is deprived of his control over the property of his wife, and
of his right to exclude her from its enjoyment, he has no greater inter-