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2. JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR COURT-EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH.-In a habeas corpus proceeding for release from custody under a commitment made by a justice of the peace evidence is admissible to show that the record of the court is untrue, and that the justice never obtained ju. risdiction of the person of the petitioner. Smith v. Clausmeier, 311. See CONTEMPT.

HARBOR COMMISSIONERS.

See STATES, 3, 4.

1. A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION ticular claim of title to it.

HOMESTEAD.

PROTECTS THE LAND, and not any par
Perry v. Ross, 66.

2. POSSESSION.-One having possession of land is owner as to all the world except the holder of the legal title, and is entitled to the benefit of the Homestead Act. Perry v. Ross, 66.

& ORDER SETTING APART HOMESTEAD TO WIDOW-ACTION TO ANNULCONCLUSIVENESS OF FRAUD.-If the complaint in an action to annul an order setting apart a homestead to the widow of a deceased husband, out of his estate, merely sets forth the falsity of the widow's statement. made in her petition for the order, and again repeated in her testimony upon the hearing thereof, concerning the nature of the title to the land set apart, it does not state a cause of action, as the question of title was necessarily involved in the homestead proceeding, and was concluded thereby, the plaintiff having had notice of that proceeding, and not being prevented by fraud from appearing therein and contesting it. Fealey v. Fealey, 111.

4. JUDGMENT SETTING APART HOMESTEAD TO WIDOW-CONCLUSIVENESS OF, AS TO INCOMPETENT HEIR AND GENERAL GUARDIAN. It is the duty of a guardian to protect the rights of his ward. Hence, if a person dies leaving a widow and his mother as his only heirs at law, and the widow obtains an order setting apart a homestead to her out of the property of the decedent, the mother, previous to such order, having been adjudged an incompetent person for whom a general guardian was appointed, and the guardian having had knowledge of the homestead proceeding, the judgment in that proceeding is conclusive as to the mother in an action by her to annul the order. Fealey Fealey, 111.

V.

5. RES JUDICATA-HOMESTEAD-COMMUNITY PROPERTY.-In a proceeding to set apart a homestead to the widow of a decedent, the question as to whether the land set apart to her is or is not community property is necessarily put in issue, and is concluded by the judgment. Fealey v. Fealey, 111.

6. JUDGMENT CONCLUSIVENESS AND EFFECT OF ORDER SETTING APART HOMESTEAD TO WIDOW OF DECEDENT. - An order setting apart a homestead to the widow of a decedent, no homestead having been declared during the lifetime of the deceased, operates to vest in her a title to the land set apart out of the community property. It is in the nature of a judgment in rem, is conclusive upon all persons interested in the estate, if the court has jurisdiction to pronounce it, and can be successfully attacked in equity only upon the same grounds that a judgment in personam may be annulled. Fealey v. Fealey, 111.

7. WIFE IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM a homestead for herself and children out of the property of her husband after he has become a fugitive from justice, if she and her children continue to remain on and occupy the land. Hollis v. State, 28.

8. HOMESTEAD CLAIMANT DOES NOT TRANSFER HIS RIGHT BY ASSIGNING HIS CONTRACT OF PURCHASE. —If a husband in possession of land, after filing a declaration of homestead thereon, enters into a contract for its purchase from the owner, his assignment of the contract to secure bor. rowed purchase money does not create a lien upon the land, or convey to the lender either the contract right or the equitable title, although the declaration is filed before the purchase is made. Perry v. Ross, 66. 8. LIABILITY FOR COSTS.-Homesteads are not subject to sale under exe. cution to satisfy a judgment for a fine or costs in a criminal prosecu tion. Hollis v. State, 28.

See MORTGAGES, 6.

HOMICIDE.

1. INDICTMENT FOR Murder need not state the dimensions of the incised wound which caused the death. Walker v. State, 186.

2. INDICTMENT FOR MURDER need not state upon what partiular part of the human body the mortal wound was inflicted. Walker v. State, 186. & INDICTMENT FOR MURDER charging that a mortal wound was inflicted upon the "body" of the deceased is sufficient in law without stating upon what particular part of the body the wound was inflicted, and the word "body," as thus used, means the trunk of a human being as dis tinguished from the head and limbs; that part between the upper part. of the thighs or hips, and the neck, excluding the arms. Walker ▼ State, 186.

EVIDENCE-RES GESTE-An occurrence happening so short a time before a homicide as to be practically a part of the difficulty which ended with the killing is part of the res gesta and admissible in evidence as such. Walker v. State, 186.

5. ARREST FOR MISDEMEANOR-HOMICIDE TO PREVENT ESCAPE.-A peace. officer may arrest one committing a misdemeanor in his presence without a warrant, and, if necessary, orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him in making the arrest. In making the arrest, or in preventing an escape after the arrest, the officer or person assisting him in obedience to a summons, when resisted by the offender, is not bound to retreat, but may use such physicial force as is apparently necessary, on the one hand to effect the arrest by overcoming the resistence he encounters, or, on the other hand, to subdue the efforts of the prisoner to escape, but he cannot in either case take the life of the accused, or even inflict upon him a great bodily harm, except to save his own life, or to prevent a like harm to himself. Smith v. State, 20. 6. TO CONSTITUTE SELF-DEFENSE it need not to be made to appear that the killing was actually necessary; but to justify the killing, however, the accused, in acting upon the facts as they appear to him, must honestly believe, without fault or carelessness on his part, that the danger is so argent and pressing that it is necessary to kill his assailant in order to save his own life, or to prevent his receiving a great bodily injury. If there is no danger, and his belief of the existence thereof is imputable

to negligence, he is not excused, however honest his belief may be. Smith v. State, 20.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

1 MARRIED WOMAN'S NOTE - RIGHTS OF HUSBAND'S CREDITORS.—A statate authorizing married women to acquire property by purchase free from their husbands' debts and to give notes therefor, but only when their husbands join in their execution, cannot be construed, as matter of law, as clothing the husband with the title to property purchased solely on the credit of the wife, so as to render it liable for his sole debts, when the purchase price of the property is secured by a note signed by the wife, her husband and her sureties and paid by the wife and her Bureties alone. Bollinger v. Gallagher, 791.

HUSBAND MAY ACT AS AGENT FOR HIS WIFE.-It is entirely competent for a husband to act as his wife's agent in the transaction of his wife's separate business, and his doing so will not be allowed to prejudice the wife's rights. Wood v. Armour, 918.

a HUSBAND'S Right in Wife's ESTATE-ASSIGNAbility—DescenT—ÅDMIN. ISTRATION.-The husband, as an heir of his wife, has an interest in her estate, which he may sell or assign, subject to the claims of administration thereon, or dispose of by will. If not so disposed of it passes to his heirs subject to administration. In re estate of Dobbel, 123. ADVERSE POSSESSION UNDER TAX TITLE ACQUIRED BY MARRIED WOMAN, After a married woman has acquired a tax title to land in the possession of her husband, and put it on record, her possession of the land through tenants is none the less adverse to the original owner by rea son of the fact that her husband acts as her agent in the management of the property. Wood v. Armour, 918.

MARRIED WOMEN-POWER TO CONTRACT-ATTORNEY'S SERVICES IN DIVORCE SUIT.—A married woman may, by contract, make herself chargeable with the value of services rendered by an attorney upon her employment to secure a divorce from her husband, and the husband is not liable for such services unless made so by order of court. Wolcott v. Patterson, 456.

TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES CONTINUES TO EXIST IN NEW YORK when a conveyance has been made to a husband and wife, notwithstanding the separate property acts relating to the rights of married women. Hiles ▼. Fisher, 762.

7. TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES.-THE GREAT CHARACTERISTIC which distinguishes a tenancy by entireties from a joint tenancy is its inseverability, whereby neither the husband nor the wife, without the consent of the other, can dispose of any part of the estate, so as to affect the right of survivorship of the other. Hiles v. Fisher, 762. TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES-POWER AND CONTROL OF HUSBAND. — At the common law a husband was held to be entitled to the full control, and to take all rents and profits of the land during the joint lives to the exclusion of the wife, and he had power to sell, mortgage, or lease for the same period, and this life interest was, according to the weight of authority, subject to the claims of his creditors. Hiles v. Fisher, 762 TENANCY BY Entireties-CONTROL OF HUSBAND.—UNDER THE STATUTES RESPECTING THE SEPARATE PROPERTY of Married WOMEN by which a husband is deprived of his control over the property of his wife, and of his right to exclude her from its enjoyment, he has no greater inter

est in, or control over, the property held by him and his wife as temants by the entire ties than she has, and therefore a mortgage made by him and a sale thereunder do not confer upon the purchaser any right to exclude the wife from the property, or from the rents or profita thereof. Such purchaser becomes in effect a tenant in common with the wife, subject to her paramount rights of survivorship. Hiles «. Fisher, 762.

See DESCENT; DURESS; ESTOPPEL, 2; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 1, 5, 6 HOMESTEAD, 7, 8; INSURANCE, 2-4; MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; WI NESSES, 2, 3.

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.

See WITNESSES, 9.

IMPEACHMENT.

See JUDGMENTS, 12-14.

IMPROVEMENTS.

Bee LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 9, 10.

INCEST.

INCEST AND RAPE.-One accused of incest cannot escape conviction on the ground that the female upon whom the crime was committed did not consent thereto, or was of such an age that she was not at the time capable of giving her consent. That the act so committed also constitutes the crime of rape does not prevent it from constituting the crime of incest. State v. Chambers, 349.

INDECENCY.

1. GROSS LEWDNESS, ACT OF, IS "OPEN," WHEN.-Under a statute providing for the punishment of “open and gross lewdness," an act of gross lewdness is "open" though committed in a private place, and in the presence of but one person. Hence, such an act is "open" if committed in the presence of a child of tender years. State v. Juneau, 877. 2 CRIMINAL LAW-"OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS"—EVIDENCE.-A person may be convicted of the offense of "open and gross lewdness," upon the testimony of a child five years and five months old, who was less than five years old when the offense was committed, if there is some corroboration of its testimony. State v. Juneau, 877.

INDEMNITY.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 1.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.
See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1-3,

INDICTMENT.

See HOMICIDE, 1-3.

INDORSEMENT.

See BANKS, 3-6; CHECKS, 2-5.

INJUNCTIONS.

AN INJUNCTION WILL ISSUE TO RESTRAIN THE PIRACY OF PLAINTIFF'S TRADEMARK, the distinguishing feature of which is used, in combination with others, to constitute a trademark or brand so similar in appearance as probably to deceive customers or patrons of plaintiff's trade or busi ness, although it is not shown that any one has in fact been deceived, or that there has been intentional fraud. Listman Mill Co. v. William Listman Milling Co., 907.

See MUNICIPAL Corporations, 24.

INNUENDO.

See SLANDER, 8-10.

INSANE PERSONS.

COMMITMENT OF INSANE "DUE PROCESS OF LAW.”—A valid proceeding to commit one as insane requires notice, and an opportunity to be heard before judgment. There must be a trial before a determination as to his sanity, and an opportunity to produce witnesses and evidence. Hence, a statute authorizing such a commitment, but not so framed as to compel a hearing before judgment, and which does not guarantee to the person charged an opportunity to be heard in defense, is invalid, because it conflicts with those provisions of the state and federal constitutions which forbid that any person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law. State v. Billings, 525.

INSOLVENCY.

JURISDICTION.-A COUNTY COURT IN ILLINOIS, acting in insolvency proceedings, has jurisdiction to determine that a judgment rendered against the insolvent is not a lien upon his property or the proceeds thereof in the hands of his assignee, and to declare that such judgment, or some part of it, shall not be paid out of such proceeds. Atlas Nat. Bank v. More, 274.

See CORPORATIONS, 14-17; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES,

INSTRUCTIONS.

See APPEAL, 5; NEW TRIAL; TRIAL, 3.

INSURANCE.

1. PAYMENT OF PREMIUM BY PROMISSORY NOTES-CONSIDERATION.— Though one of the conditions of an insurance policy is that it "shall not be valid or binding until the first premium is paid," if it is silent as to the mode of payment, promissory notes received by the company, even in the absence of any express agreement, must be deemed to have been accepted in payment of the premium. The policy is bind. ing, and is a valid consideration for the notes. Union etc. Ins. Co. v. Taggart, 474.

POLICY PAYABLE TO WIFE-SEPARATE PROPERTY-GIFT.-A husband may lawfully give to his wife a policy of insurance upon his life, and, when made payable to her by name, it is her separate property, although the application is made by the husband and the premiums are paid with money of the community. In re Estate of Dobbel, 123.

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