judgment against either of the judgment debtors Olson v. Feazie, 855. 22. JUDGMENTS OF SISTER STATES-ACTIONS UPON-INTEREST.—In an action upon a judgment rendered in another state interest may be recovered thereon, although the judgment sued on does not of itself purport to bear interest, and there is no proof of a statute of such state authoriz ing the collection of interest on judgments rendered therein. Olson T. Veazie, 855. 23. JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER STATE-HOW PROVED.-The judgment of a court of another state, if authenticated as provided by the act of Congress, must be received in evidence; but it is admissible here if authenticated according to the statute of this state, though such authentication may not be as full as that required by the act of Congress. In re Ellis' Er tate, 514. EFFECT OF DELAY IN ENFORCING.-One who does not attempt to enforce a judgment until more than three years have elapsed after its entry ought not to complain if, in the mean time, he has lost any rights by reason of his inaction. Rogers v. Cady, 101. Bee EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 9-11; JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; MARBIAGE AND DIVORCE, 3-6; PARTNERSHIP, 9; PROCESS. JUDICIAL NOTICE JUDICIAL SALES. 1. Validity of AGREEMENT TO MAKE JOINT BID.-An agreement to make a joint bid at a judicial sale, although it may indirectly have the effect of keeping others from bidding, is not illegal unless it is intended to avoid competition. Hence, in the absence of any fraudu lent or illegal intent or purpose, an agreement whereby one of several persons is authorized to bid for their common benefit on property about to be sold at sheriff's sale is not invalid. Gulick v. Webb, 720. 2. COMBINATION TO MAKE JOINT BID. A combination between several persons holding liens against real property sold at sheriff's sale, no one of whom is able financially to bid individually at such sale, whereby one of such persons, by attorney, bids in the property for himself and the other lienholders, is not forbidden or contrary to law, and does not vitiate the sale. Gulick v. Webb, 720. 2. SALE TO COMBINED Bidders will be Upheld, WHEN.—A judicial sale to an association of persons formed for an honest purpose and with an honest intent, not with a view of stifling competition as to bids, but to enable them to compete where, without combining, they could not do so, will be upheld and completed. Gulick v. Webb, 720. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 4. JURISDICTION. 1. PRACTICE.-A COURT WILL RECOGNIZE WANT OF JURISDICTION even if no objection is made, for, if the court is without jurisdiction, it is pow. erless to act in the case. State v. Van Beek, 397. 2. JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR COURTS-CONCLUSIVENESS OF RECORD-EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH.-The record of a court of inferior or limited jurisdiction is given the same verity as that accorded the record of a court of general jurisdiction, only after it is shown that the inferior court had jurisdiction of the subject matters and the parties tried before it. If jurisdiction is denied, no step can be taken until jurisdiction is shown. If the recitals in the record show jurisdiction and their correctness is admitted, that is sufficient; otherwise proof outside the record must be adduced to establish jurisdiction. Smith v. Clausmeier, 311. See ADMIRALTY; Insolvency; Judgments, 14, 17; JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. JURORS. See NEW TRials, 1, 2. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. 1. Judgment.-The statute requiring a justice of the peace to "forthwith render judgment," simply means that it shall be rendered within a reasonable time after the verdict is received, in view of the circum. stances surrounding the particular case. Sorenson v. Swensen, 472. 2. JUDGMENT-REASONABLE TIME. -A judgment rendered by a justice of the peace on Monday, upon a verdict returned on the preceding Satur day, is within a reasonable time after verdict if he was then busy with other cases. Sorenson v. Swensen, 472. & JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR COURTS IN CRIMINAL CASES.-To give a justice of the peace jurisdiction over the person of one charged with a violation of criminal law the first step necessary is the filing of an affidavit naming the offense and the person charged with its commission, and without such affidavit there is no jurisdiction, and all the proceedings are void. An affidavit filed afterward comes too late, and cannot be made to relate back so as to confer jurisdiction at the time of the trial. Smith v. Clausmeier, 311. See HABEAS CORPUS. LACHES. See CONTRACTS, 4; JUDGMENTS, 24; LIS PENDENS, 9. LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. IMPROVEMENTS.-A tenant cannot recover for improvements erected by him on the leased premises, without the consent and against the protest of the landlord. Jones v. Hoard, 17. 2 COVENANTS-RIGHTS OF TENANT-EVICTION.-Under a sublease of a cigar and news room in a hotel, with the appurtenances thereto, and the right of entrance to and from the hotel rooms, together with the entire cigar privilege of the hotel, the tenant is entitled to have the hotel kept open without reference to an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment. The abandonment of the lower floor of the hotel and the use of a portion only of the upper floors for sleeping-rooms in connection with a hotel across the street constitutes an eviction of such tenant. Coulter v. Norton, 458. & ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE-EVICTION-LIABILITY OF ASSIGNEE.-An assig. nee of a lease, to whom a subtenant attorns, is liable for the eviction of such tenant, accomplished by such assignee's acts. Coulter v. Norton, 458. 4EVICTION.-MEASURE OF DAMAGES for the eviction of a tenant is the actual value of the unexpired term, less the rent reserved. Coulter v. Norton, 458. See SURETYSHIP, 6, 7. LEASE See ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS; CONTRACTS, 5; CORPORATIONS, 12; Lan LORD AND TENANT. LEWDNESS. See INDECENCY. LEGISLATURE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GIFTS, PROHIBITION OF — - PREVENTS LEGISLATUER FROM CREATING LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE. - Under a constitu tional provision forbidding the legislature from making any gift of public money, it has no power to create a liability against the state for any past act of negligence on the part of its officers. Chapman v. State, 158. LIENS. See ADMIRALTY; MECHANIC'S LIEN; PARTNERSHIP, 8; SURETYSHIP, ▲ LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. 1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A PURCHASER PENDENTE LITE. He will not be regarded as holding adversely to the parties to a suit during the litigation. Norris v. Ile, 233. 2 NOT UNTIL THe Purchaser at a FORECLOSURE SALE 18 Entitled TO A DEED can the mortgagor or his grantee assert an adverse possession. Norris v. Ile, 233. & DOWER.-The statute of limitations does not begin to run against the inchoate dower interest of the wife in lands until the death of her husband. Thompson v. McCorkle, 334, 4. CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MISTAKE IN AN ABSTRACT WHEN ARISESIf a searcher of records employed to make a correct abstract of publie records affecting the title to real property, through his negligence or mistake omits an instrument from such abstract, a cause of action against him is at once created, and the statute of limitations commences to run in his favor, and cannot be made to commence at a later day by proving that the mistake was not discovered until such later day. That the party for whom it was made, subsequently acting in reliance on its correctness, paid out money which he would not have paid had it been correct does not constitute any new cause of action. Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 381. 5. TORT, ACTION FOR, WHAT IS NOT.-The fact that a person negligently performed a duty which he imposed upon himself by contract cannot entitle another contracting party to sustain an action of tort for such negligence, and therefore any action commenced to recover damages for the failure to perform such duty is an action upon a contract, and the statute of limitations applicable thereto is not that designating the time within which actions may be brought for torts, but is that declar ing the time within which actions may be prosecuted upon contracta. Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 381. 6. DISABILITY-REMOVAL OF.-The statute of limitations begins to run as to persons under legal disability, when the action accrues, but, if it has fully run before the disability expires, an action may be brought within the time limited by statute after the disability is removed. The phrase "legal disability" includes infancy. King v. Carmichael, 303. 7. NEW PROMISE.-A letter from an alleged debtor stating that if he does not hear from the creditor soon he will tender the amount due, and that whatever is due is ready whenever he can safely pay either to the person to whom the letter is directed, or to another person named therein, does not constitute a new promise sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations, because it shows that there was a dispute as to what was due and to whom it was payable, and that the alleged debtor was not willing to pay until these two questions were settled. Braithwaite v. Harvey, 625. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 2, 3; COTENANCY, 1, 2; MORTGAGES, 4. LIQUORS. See INTOXICAting Liquors. LIS PENDENS. 1. TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID LIS PENDENS three things are necessary: 1. The property must be of such a character as to be subject to the rule; 2. The court must have jurisdiction both of the person and of the res; 3. The res or property involved must be sufficiently described in the pleadings. Norris v. Ile, 233. 2. LIS PENDENS BEGINS FROM THE SERVICE OF THE SUBPOENA after the filing of the bill. A purchaser from the defendant while the suit is pending acquires his interest subject to such decree as may be rendered on the hearing. Norris v. lle, 233, 8. LIS PENDENS IS NO MORE THAN THE ADOPTION OF THE RULE IN REAL ACTIONS at common law, where, if the defendant aliens after the pen. dency of the writ, the judgment in the real action overreaches such alienation. Norris v. Ile, 233. 4. A purchaser of lands pendente lite takes his title therein subject to the final decree in the pending suit. Norris v. Ile, 233. 5. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY IN THE PLEADINGS is sufficient if any one reading them must be able to learn thereby what property is intended to be made the subject of the litigation. The legal maxim that that is certain which can be made certain applies to the ques tion whether property is sufficiently described to create lis pendens. Norris v. Ile, 233. 6. A PURCHASER PENDENTE LITE NEED NOT BE MADE A PARTY to the suit nor otherwise noticed by the litigating parties. Norris v. Ile, 233. 7. AMENDMENTS.—If a bill originally so defective in its description of property, or, in the language of the prayer, as not to create lis pendens, is afterward cured by amendment in these particulars the lis pendens will commence at the time of filing the amendment, if the defendant has been served with process. Norris v. Ile, 233. 8. THE FILING OF AN AMENDMENT does not prevent lis pendens operating as under the original bill if such amendment does not set up any new equity, nor bring forward a new claim or distinct ground of relief. Norris v. Ile, 233. 9. DELAY OR LAPSE OF TIME IN THE PROSECUTION OF A SUIT will not create any estoppel against the right to enforce the rules of lis pendens, unless the complainant has been so negligent in its prosecution as to induce the belief that such prosecution had been abandoned. Norris v. Пle, 233. See LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, 1. LIVESTOCK. See CARRIERS, 2; Railroads, 6, 7. MACHINERY. See MASTER And Servant, 4-6 MALICE. See SLANDER, 6. MANDAMUS. MANDAMUS AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.-Mandamus does not lie to compel a municipal corporation to enter into a contract with one who shows himself to have been the lowest bidder in response to calls for bids to do city work. Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 865. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. 1. DIVORCE ON AMENDED COMPLAINT.-Review OF DECREE.-If a plaintiff in an action for divorce, who has not acquired the statutory residence within the state before bringing suit, acquires such residence before filing an amended complaint setting up a distinct and separate cause for divorce, the amended complaint is equivalent to bringing a new action, and a decree of divorce rendered therein is regular so far as the question of residence is concerned, and cannot be set aside as erroneous on a bill of review. Wood v. Wood, 42. 2 DIVORCE-PLACE OF TRIAL in Action for-JurISDICTION.-The trial of an action for divorce in a county other than that declared by statute to be the proper county for its trial does not go to the question of jurisdiction; and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the law of a sister state in which the divorce was granted will be presumed to be the same as our own on this point. In re Ellis' Estate, 514. & DIVORCE IN ANOTHER STATE-COLLATERAL ATTACK.—If the judgment of a court of a sister state, granting a divorce on the complaint of a wife, is collaterally attacked in this state, its validity cannot be affected by the fact that she was induced to bring the action by persuasion, illtreatment, and threats by the husband that unless she did bring it he would continue his ill-treatment. In re Ellis' Estate, 514. DIVORCE IN ANOTHER STATE-VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE-COLLATERAL ATTACK JURISDICTION-JUDGMENT.-If both parties voluntarily ap pear in an action for divorce in the court of another state, and submit to its jurisdiction, they are bound by the judgment, and cannot avoid it in a collateral proceeding in this state by proof that, when the action was brought and judgment rendered, neither of them was a resident of that state, but that both were residents of this state. In re Ellis' Estate, 514. 6. DIVORCE IN ANOTHER STATE-COLLUSION-JURISDICTION—JUDGMENT— COLLATERAL ATTACK.—If residents of this state go to another state for a divorce, collusion between them as to the judgment to be rendered in the action does not affect the jurisdiction of the court of that state, or render its judgment void when collaterally attacked in this state. In re Ellis' Estate, 514. 6 JUDGMENT FOR DIVORCE, VACATING.-THE SUBSEQUENT marriage of the plaintiff does not impose any obstacle to the vacation of the decres of |