But how this desirable state could be best maintained consistently with the honour and dignity of an independent nation, was a matter of difficulty. Some supposed it would be best, at all hazards, to repel hostile aggressions by force in their early stages, and to retaliate them by retort. Others were for a kind of commercial warfare, by withholding our commerce from the aggressing power: and some few of these proposed going so far as a sequestration of such property of the aggressing power as could be found within our reach. Others again seemed to suppose that we had given plausible if not just cause for the aggressions and threats we had experienced, and that we ought to acknowledge our errors, and shew our desire of amendment by taking part in hostilities against France. Of this last class, however, though the number was not inconsiderable, there were but few, if any, who were intitled to a voice in our councils by birth and by services rendered in effecting the Revolution. To carry any of these propositions into effect required the interposition of the legislature; and each of them were opposed by too many obstacles to be hastily adopted. The President thought it best to try the gentler mode of negociation and treaty, to which his constitutional powers were adequate without the intervention of the legislature; he therefore dispatched a minister plenipotentiary for this purpose, to the court of Great Britain.

In the meantime the tide of success had somewhat changed its course in Europe. The French, by extraordinary exertions, had become more formidable to their enemies, and clouded the prospect of their being subdued. The disposition of the British court respecting America was changed, and the American minister found little difficulty in coming to an explanation with them on the subject of his mission. A treaty was formed for settling and removing the subjects of discontent which had arisen between them and us. If this treaty had extended no farther than was necessary for this object, it is probable it would have received the general approbation of the citizens of the United States; but it contained also a

plan of amity and commerce, by which it was proposed to connect the friendship and interests of the two countries by an enlargement of their commercial intercourse. In this plan were interwoven stipulations which were deemed by many citizens, both within and without the doors of Congress, injurious to if not incompatible with our prior national engagements, and perhaps not perfectly consistent in other respects, with the dignity of an independent nation. One article in this treaty was deemed by the Senate so totally inadmissible that, although the majority were disposed to advise the ratification of the rest, they accompanied their advice with an explicit rejection of that article. It was also evident, from many circumstances, that difficulties occurred to the mind of the President concerning the ratification, without further corrections than the expunging of this article; but after deliberating some time on the various consequences of his determination either way, and probably considering that on the whole the consequences of rejection might be attended with greater evils than would be produced by adoption, and that in the latter case he was armed with the constitutional advice of the Senate for his support, whereas in case of rejection he should be singly and alone responsible, he decided in favour of the qualified ratification advised by the Senate.

LETTER IV

I do not mean by what I have said respecting the British treaty and the circumstances respecting it, to call into question either the wisdom or the patriotism of the President in the business; nor would the subject have obtained more than a bare mention on this occasion, if so much, were it not that I conceive it has been highly influential in marking the differences of the parties, and in exciting that spirit of animosity in opposing each other, which has given occasion to this communication. The parties have designated each other by various epithets and remarks, disgraceful to the character of Americans, on different occasions; and amongst other terms of

reproach "English Party" and "French Party" have been applied with Billingsgate freedom. These appellations, though they did not derive their origin entirely from this treaty, derived more currency and importance from it than they had obtained before; for previously to this æra the Americans, friendly to the revolution, were but little divided by the distinctions which these appellations indicate, however they might be divided in other respects.

It cannot be necessary to enumerate the various reproachful epithets which each of the parties in their warmth have bestowed on the other; they are numerous, and most of them intended to irritate and provoke; in this respect they have seldom failed of success and are perhaps nearly equally balanced. The distinction of the parties however, may be as clearly understood by a single appellation appropriated to each as by the variety they have used respecting each other. I shall therefore, when I have occasion to speak of them, distinguish them by calling one of them Federalists, and the other Republicans; not because I think either of them entitled to the exclusive appropriation, but because these are the appellations which they seem to have respectively chosen for themselves. For federalists, to be fairly intitled to the name, must be republicans; and republicans, according to the national constitution, must also be federalists. Both parties profess an attachment to and a reverence for, the Constitution as their guide, but from the principles and causes I have heretofore suggested, they frequently differ in opinion as to the modes and measures manifesting their attachment and veneration, and reciprocally charge each other with designs to warp, subvert and destroy the Constitution itself.

The government seems to be designated by the constitution as a government of laws, rather than of men; and in the framing and executing of the laws, as well as in the choice of men to perform the service, it is naturally to be expected in a community of freemen that diversity of opinion should frequently arise. It may indeed be said to be necessary that measures proposed by some should be

opposed or questioned by others, so far at least as to promote discussion; for the best of men are liable occasionally to err, and by collision of opinions the truth may be brought to light. One would imagine that in a community of enlightened and patriotic citizens these discussions would be conducted with decency, moderation and fair argument; and that constitutional decisions by a majority of suffrages, would be fairly obtained and peaceably acquiesced in, without breaches of moderation and decorum.

That the affairs of the United States have not on all occasions been conducted with a due degree of moderation and magnanimity -that debates and discussions have run into intemperate disputes and altercations, and exhibited unwarrantable demonstrations of envy, hatred and malicious animosity, is much to be lamented. These things cannot have been occasioned merely by differences of opinion concerning the construction and meaning of the constitution, or the measures necessary to support and carry it into fair operation. We must look to other circumstances for the causes of the extension, if not of the origin of these evils.

It is inherent in the nature of power, especially of executive power, to excite in its possessors a desire to increase the proportion constitutionally vested in them. It has been often said, and not uncommonly acquiesced in, that despotic power in an individual, or government by a single will, would be the best mode for the happiness of the people, provided security could be obtained that the person vested with such power, and his successors, would always possess superior wisdom and patriotism, with a constant desire to promote such happiness. But it is not necessary, in order to support this axiom, to suppose that every man in power aims at becoming a despot; nor to impute to him motives unfriendly to the people, by desiring to increase his own power. An honest man vested with limited power may suppose that if his power were enlarged he could use it more beneficially for the people, and he may

be honestly disposed to do so, and therefore may wish to remove some of the restraints which he finds impede the exercise of that disposition. But the experience of the world has shewn that the extension of power, even to the best of men, may become a precedent [of] which a successor, however unfit to be trusted with it, might and most probably would avail himself. And hence the inconveniences of the restraints which limit and controul the exercise of power in the hands of the executive are submitted to for the sake of safety; as the evils they produce are of less magnitude, and less to be dreaded, than those which might be expected from the relaxation of those restraints and the enlargement of such limits farther than is absolutely necessary for the due execution of the laws.

These observations will be considered as a qualification of and if necessary an apology for, what has been or shall be said concerning the executive of the United States.

The principles heretofore suggested as dividing the people of all countries enjoying any degree of freedom into what is commonly understood by Court and Country parties, I take to be the principal root or leading cause of division of the parties in this country called Federalists and Republicans. This, though probably the primary cause, does not in the United States, however, operate alone. To do justice to the subject it will be necessary to take into view several auxiliary causes which tend to irritate and inflame the parties, and to strengthen and confirm their prejudices against each other. These may be described under different heads, for which I must refer you to my next letter.

LETTER V

It was suggested in my last letter that some notice should be taken in this of the auxiliary causes which strengthen and confirm the prejudices of the parties, in aid of what was considered as the primary or leading cause of division; and these were to be arranged under several heads.