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with other small losses, comes to £94 11s. I pay the full rate of wages to every skilled and competent man. [The names of several men were put to the witness, and he said in each case that they were not competent plasterers.] He continued: I paid the men the rates they asked. Some men left the union to remain in my employ. I had nothing to do with the Fibrous Plasterers' Association.

This was the case for the plaintiffs.

Mr. Robson, Q. C., in opening the case for the defendant, said he quite admitted the right of the master to make any contract he liked. These men said: "We disapprove of certain employers." Any man had a right to say: "I won't work for that master, and I won't have anything to do with any other man who aids that master." If any section of men took up an unreasonable position society would inevitably protect itself against such conduct. A man had a right over his own labor, and a right over the labor of others where he was not guilty of malice. A single man could not possibly compete with capital. Where a man sought to injure another for the sake of injuring him it was malicious; but where a man sought to control his own labor and to persuade another to control his in the same way as the man himself did it was not malicious. Where a man pursued his own interests, and in doing so incidentally injured another there was no malice. Throughout this case there was absolutely no evidence of malice. Mr. Hennessey was never told: "I have a contract which you are seeking to make me break."

Mr. Hennessey, the defendant, was then examined by Mr. Robson, Q. C., and said: "I am organizing secretary of the National Association of Operative Plasterers. My duties are to increase the membership, and if I find a breach of the rules, to try and get it rectified. If a dispute arises between masters and men I go and see what it really is. I put it before the committee, and they advise me whether it is necessary to take action or whether they will let it go on as it is. I never had any communication with Messrs. Maxwell. On September 8, I went to Mr. Watkins, with Mr. Verdon, and told him that his notice that he would only pay up to Thursday night was causing friction. Wright's name was never mentioned. Watkins said he should do as he liked. After that there was a strike. Watkins then changed his mind. I did not know then that Wright was employed there. The objection we had to Mr. Wright was that he was continually employing men and not paying them what we considered the trade union rate of wages.

Cross-examined by Mr. Lawson Walton, Q. C.I regarded Wright as an unfair employer. My business was to control the dispute. To get rid of Wright would be the speediest way of settling the

dispute. From my point of view it would be the happiest thing that Wright should go and our men should stop. I object to Wright employing laborers to do plasterers' work. Mr. Watkins voluntarily offered to employ our men instead of Wright's men.

Mr. Botright, examined by Mr. Robson, Q. C., said - I am a plasterer. I have worked for Wright. The usual rate is 94d.; he paid 9d. I worked overtime and got nothing for it.

Cross-examined by Mr. Walton, Q. C.—I am a bona fide plasterer. Wright said I was not a plasterer.

This was the case for the defense.

Counsel on both sides having addressed the jury, Mr. Baron Pollock, in summing up, said that the form of action was of modern origin and had not No man hitherto come very much into the courts. had a right to do that which injured another man unless by acts he had a legal right to do. In this country every one had a right to express his opinion clearly with reference to the questions of the day. But if an individual, in order to enforce his particular views, did an act knowingly and intending to inflict an injury upon another, the law did not allow that to be done. Nor could a man say “If you don't employ a certain class of people we shall do certain things which will injure you in your business." The question was, did the defendant say to himself, "I will go to these people and will write such letters as will prevent them from employing Mr. Wright, and then he will be obliged to come to our terms and not to exercise any free will of his own." His lordship left the following questions to the jury: (1) Do you think that the course of conduct pursued by the defendant with regard to the employment of the plaintiff Wright was improper in the sense of being malicious-i. e., with the intention of injuring him? (2) Do you think that the letters which were written were written with an improper motive to injure plaintiff or were written bona fide and with the houest intention of discharging a duty?

The jury found that there was malice on the part of the defendant in the sense in which his lordship had used the word "malicious," and they returned a verdict of £500 damages for the libels and £300 for inducing the breaches of contract.

His lordship gave judgment accordingly, and granted an injunction restraining the defendant from inducing, or endeavoring to induce, Messrs. Colls & Sons from breaking their contract with the plaintiffs in respect of work at the Pavilion Theatre, Whitechapel, and from inducing or endeavoring to induce any person or persons to break contracts made, or hereafter to be made, with the plaintiffs.

His lordship also granted an injunction restrain_ ing the defendant from continuing to write or pub

lish the libels complained of. A stay of execution was granted upon the terms of the defendant paying £500 into court within a week.

EDITORIAL OF THE TIMES (LONDON) ON WRIGHT

& Co. v. HENNESSEY.

Questions as to labor have of late for some reason been more heard of in our courts than used to be the case, and the trial which we reported on Saturday in the action " 'Wright & Co. v. Hennessey is an example of a class of disputes with which judges and juries have had frequently to deal. Many years ago parliament modified the labor laws. It removed the legal disabilities of which trade unions complained. The property of such associations was protected by law. They were no longer deemed unlawful associations merely because they contemplated the supporting of strikes. But both here and in America, and in the latter much more than with us, the recent action of trades unions has brought them into collision with the courts; and it has been necessary sharply to remind too energetic secretaries of unions that the removal of disabilities has not conferred upon these bodies privileges and immunity from all legal control. Sometimes it is the case of a body of workmen or their representative going to an employer and saying that, unless he discharges A, who has broken a trade union code, they will throw up their work. Sometimes it is an attempt to induce people not to sell goods or materials to a builder who has incurred the displeasure of the local branch of the union. The substance of such cases as Templeton v. Russell,' "Flood v. Jackson," and "Wright v. Hennessey' is a threat by some one "unless you conduct your "business as we direct, employ those whom we approve, we shall make it unpleasant for you and "do our best to ruin you." In the action tried before Mr. Baron Pollock the defendant was the organizing secretary of the National Association of Operative Plasterers. A master plasterer named Peek having had a difference with Hennessey, the secretary, Peek's workmen were ordered to withdraw from his service, which they did. Wright came to his rescue and lent him workmen. This, it was alleged, brought upon Wright the wrath of the National Association. His name was inserted in a "black list," and other means were taken to coerce him. The organizing secretary wrote to Messrs. Patman and Fotheringham, under whom Wright had taken a sub-contract, that "unless Mr. Wright is removed they will be reluctantly compelled to take steps to prevent the men from finishing the work." A deputation was sent to another firm which had given Wright a contract for fibrous plaster work at South Kensington, and the result

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apparently was that he lost the contract. other case the firm which had given the contract for fibrous ceiling to Wright was informed by the organizing secretary that the removal of Wright's men was necessary; as we have several members engaged upon the above works the presence of these men is causing friction." Messrs. Colls, who had employed Wright as sub-contractor in connection with works carried on at the Pavilion Theatre, were told, in a formal communication addressed to them, that "this man's opposition to the organized plasterers of London have caused a revulsion of feeling throughout London, and no man worthy of the name will work for or on any works where he is employed.* * Should Mr. Wright and his men be allowed to remain on the works, we cannot be responsible for what may occur. ?? Messrs. Colls not. at first yielding to this threat, a strike took place, and in the end Wright seems to have been thrown over. There were insinuations wholly baseless, as it turned out that the work which he carried out was of an inferior quality, and that his rate of pay was lower than the trade allowed. But the only real defence was that stated by Hennessey in cross-examination: "I regarded Wright as an unfair employer. My business was to control the dispute. * * * I object to Wright employing laborers to do plasterers' work."

*

The way in which English law deals with this class of dispute is open to criticism. It has not attempted to define with nicety the point at which the right of every one to insist upon a particular form of contract of service and to induce others to do likewise becomes intolerable tyranny. Our courts have got out of this difficulty, as out of so many others, by the use of the magical word 'malicious "-that word which means so much or s little, and the learning about which is half the stock-in-trade of an English lawyer. They have said that it is permissible to do all or most of the things which Hennessey actually did, provided such conduct be not malicious in the sense of being done to injure. They have not made it very clear under what circumstances such conduct could have any other object. They have been content to lay it down that if the intention is to injure some one the courts will interfere. The jury is thus left master of the situation; it may absolve or condemn according as it thinks the boycotting is spiteful or In the action tried on Saturday the jury took a serious view of the matter, for it returned against the secretary a verdict of £500 damages in respect of the libels contained in the letters as to the style of Mr. Wright's work, and £300 for bringing about the breaches of contract from which he was a sufferer. It may be doubted whether the law as it stands is in all respects perfect; and whether it will

not.

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not be practicable to distinguish with more pre-
cision between the legitimate advocacy of a par-
ticular policy and attempts to enforce it by ruining
men in their business. But there is no question
that many of the things brought to light in
"Wright v. Hennessey" could not safely be tol-
erated. Suppose that every group of persons
with supposed interests in common wrote letters
and generally behaved towards all who seemed to
be in their way as the National Association of

Operative Plasterers did through Mr. Hennes-
sey; suppose that every tradesman sought to
obtain custom by taking organized means to ruin
his neighbors who dealt elsewhere; that merchants
trusted less to supply and demand than to threats
of retaliation, and every trade circular wound up
with a notice that, unless the particular wine, coals,
silk, cotton, were ordered of the sender within
twenty-four hours he would do his best to ruin the
man whose custom was solicited. Suppose that
each of these groups acted in this spirit, and that
in consequence contracts were freely broken and
men in large numbers were dismissed. Could so-
ciety subsist with this bellum omnium contra omnes?
The evidence in Wright's case was that the plain-
tiff's business had fallen off 50 per cent. in conse-
quence of the action of Hennessey. There would
be such a loss all round if everybody acted in his
spirit and sent out wholesale messages of war to the
Mr. Hennessey writes as if the operative
plasterers were an ancient caste and he and his
friends full-blown Brahmins who will not brook Mr.
Wright's pariahs touching things meant for sacred
hands.

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RESTRAINING BOND

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ISSUE. Where a bill in equity to restrain a pro-
posed issue and sale of municipal bonds shows no

other valid reason why such issue and sale should
be estopped, except that the proceeds of the sale of
such bonds will go into, and be expended by, im-
proper hands, it is error to enjoin the issue and sale
of such bonds, or to go further with an injunction,
in such a case, than to restrain the delivery of such
bonds when issued, to unauthorized hands, and to
prohibit the proceeds thereof from going into the
hands of, and being expended by, unauthorized
South. Rep. 581.)
persons. (City of Tampa v. Salomonson [Fla.], 17

WILLS.-ESTATE DEVISED.-Under a devise "to
my adopted daughter, H, to have and to hold for
And after
and during the term of her natural life.
the death of H I give and devise the reversion or
remainder to her lawful issue, to have and to hold
the same in common to them, their heirs and assigns,
forever. And, in case the said H should die with-
out leaving lawful issue, then the aforesaid real
estate shall revert to my estate, aud I give and
devise the same to my heirs under the interstate
laws."-H takes a fee: the words lawful issue"
meaning lineal descendants, and having prima facie,
the force of words of limitation, and the words “in
not being such superadded words of
limitation or distributive modification as will make
words of purchase.
the words "lawful issue"
(Grimes v. Shirk, Penn., 32 Alt. Rep. 113.)

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It is astonishing how old abuses reappear under new names. For some centuries trade corporations all over Europe exercised various forms of monopoly. Strangers were not allowed to ply their trades within a city until they had become "free" of it. A long period of apprenticeship was an essential WILL.-VESTED REMAINDERS.-Testator devised condition to the practising of most professions and his estate to trustees, a portion of the income being industries. Each town, and indeed each industry, payable to his wife, who was authorized, during the were ruled by by-laws framed with absolute disretrust, to dispose of one-third of the personal propgard of the interests of the whole community, and erty by will, and the remainder of the income to be with the exclusive object of benefiting the little paid in equal proportions to a daughter and three combinations in possession of the field. sons; and provided that if the daughter or either this sort of slavery," to use Adam Smith's phrase, of two sons should die, leaving issue, the issue which the great economist sought to destroy. should take the parent's share; but power of disWherever these irksome restrictions have existed position was not given to any child. The trust they have been hurtful to trade, and their removal was to end on a fixed date, and the property was in England proved the beginning of an era of pros- then to be paid to testator's legal representatives: perity. Let Mr. Hennessey and other energetic Held, that the remainders did not vest on testator's organizing secretaries have their way, and we death, so that, on the death of the daughter before should soon see a system of industrial castes and the termination of the trust, her surviving husband corporate tyranny as oppressive as that exposed in became entitled to the income previously payable to the Wealth of Nations. It is satisfactory to know her, or to any part of the principal of the estate. that for the present, at all events, the mandate of | (Eager v Whitney, Mass., 40 N. E. Rep. 1046.)

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Correspondence.

NEW YORK, 8 July, 1895. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

"But this rule must be modified in this country, where estates are small, and the policy of our laws is to distribute them with each generation, where dower is one of the positive institutions of the es

DEAR SIR.- The Executive Council of the Asso- tate, founded in policy, and the provision for the

ciation for the Reform and Codification of the Law

is glad to announce that it has arranged for the next conference to be held at Brussels, in the Palais des Académies, from the 1st to the 4th of October, when the president of the Association, Sir Richard E. Webster, K. L. M. G. Q. C. M. P. is expected to preside, and the Bourgmestre and Eschevins of the city of Brussels will kindly entertain the Association.

The council will welcome to membership in the Association any of the American judges and leading jurists of the United States.

FRED. JAS. TOMKINS, M. A., D. C. L., Member of the Council, Secretary of the Reception Committee, at the Guildhall, London.

P. S.- Application for membership can be made to Mr. Alexander, 33 Chancery lane, London; or to Mr. Scott, at the time of the conference in Brussels. F. J. T.

RIGHT OF LIFE TENANT TO OPEN MINES. NEW YORK, August 12, 1895. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In the Students' Helper for July there appeared an article by Darius H. Pingrey, an article in which there occurred a statement to the effect that unopened mines could be developed by a life tenant. This was so extraordinary a proposition that I wrote to the editor of the Helper for Mr. Pingrey's authorities, there being no references to authorities in the article. In reply I was referred to section 370 of Pingrey on Real Property. That section I find to be as follows (with citations as given):

"The widow is dowable in mines which had been opened at the death of the husband, and it is generally held that she cannot open new mines even upon the lands set apart to her as dower; that is to say, a widow is not dowable of mineral deposits where there is no opened mine.'

'Lenfers v. Henke, 73 Ill. 405; Hendricks v. McBeth, 61 Mich. 473; Kreer v. Stotenhur, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 641; Gaines v. Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 603; Crouch v. Puryear, 1 Rand. (Va.) 258; Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17; 9 S. W. 198; Findlay v. Smith, 6 Munf. (Va.) 134; Sayers v. Harkinson, 110 l'enn. St. 473; 11 id. 308; Irwin v. Covode, 24 Penn. St. 162; Neel v. Neel, 19 Penn. St. 323; Moore v. Rollins, 45 Me. 493; Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq. 248; Billings v. Taylor, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 460; Bishop on Married Women, § 264; 1 Scribner on Dower (2d ed.), 200-6.

widow is a part of the law of distribution, and the aim of the statute is not subsistence alone, but provision commensurate with the estate. Thus, a husband died in the possession of land which was not improved and was wholly valueless for agricultural purposes or lumbering. Its principal value, and practically its sole value, was in deposits of iron ore

contained in it. And it was held that the widow was entitled to dower rights in the royalties realized from the lease by the guardian of minor heirs of the mineral lands which were undeveloped at the time of her husband's death, and solely valuable for the minerals afterwards discovered therein. This is the correct doctrine in this country.2

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The English authorities should not be followed. They define dower as a provision which

the law makes for a widow out of the lands or tenements of husband and for her support and the nurture of her children.3

"The rules applicable in England, where landed estates are large and diversified, where the laws of inheritance are exclusive, where the theory of dower is substance merely, and where there is a strong disposition to free estates from even that charge, should not obtain in the United States.

"So a widow should not be excluded from her dower interest in mineral lands which, at the death of her husband, are unimproved and unproductive, and are chiefly and solely valuable for the minerals contained in them. This doctrine is in accordance with the interpretation of the statutes of the States providing for dower, though it is opposed to the English rule. But the mere possessory right given by the United States Statutes to the location of a mining claim is not such an estate that dower can be predicated thereon by State legislation as against the United States and its grantees.*

"On examination of the late Michigan case cited (In re Seager's Estate, 92 Mich. 186) I find that the whole body of Mr. Pingrey's text is adopted almost without a change of language from the judge's opinion, and he even cites all the authorities that are cited by the judge in support of the general doctrine, except Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. 450; Washb. on Real Prop. 166; Bishop on Married Women, § 246; and Scribner on Dower (2d ed.), 200-6; and he even copies the mistake of the judge in citing Clift v. Clift, 87 Tenn. 17, twice.

In re St. Leger's Estate, 92 Mich. 186.

3 Co. Litt. 30 h., 2 Bl. Com. 130.

Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 859.

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The case of Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 52 Fed.
Rep. 859, is authority only on the point contained
in the sentence last given.

A close examination of the Michigan case, it is
thought, does not warrant the position taken that a
life tenant may develope unopened mines. This
was a case where the guardian of infant heirs had
opened mines on lands valuable only for the miner-
als contained therein, and the court held that the
widow was entitled to dower in the proceeds of the
mines thus opened. The court say on page 197 of
the report:

"In the present case the grant is by operation of the statute giving the use of all the lands of which the husband was seized. The grant must he held to include the use of the lands, irrespective of whether mines were opened upon them before or after the husband's death. The question here is not the impairment of one mode of enjoyment or source of profit to reach another. There is but one mode of enjoyment of the land in question, but one source of revenue or profit. The land is susceptible of but one use. The widow is therefor entitled to onethird of the amount in the hands of the petitioner." This is thought to be unnecessary to the decision of the case in hand and for that reason purely dictum.

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I find that the same point is discussed by another work on real property just out, and a contrary conclusion arrived at. I refer to Kerr on Real Property, recently announced by Banks & Bro. In section 583, Mr. Kerr says: 'Where mines, quarries, claypits, gravel-pits, and the like, have been opened on the premises and worked by a former owner of the fec, the tenant for life may continue to work them 5 without restriction" or limitation,' for the reason that such mines have been made part of the profits of the land. If a mine or quarry has been.worked for commercial profit, that must order

5 Billings v. Taylor, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 460; s. c. 20 Am. Dec. 533; Executors of Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq. (1 C. E. Gr.) 248; Rockwell v. Morgan, 13 N. J. L. (2 Beas.) 384, 389; Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460, 474; Lynn's App., 31 Penn. St. 44; Neel v. Neel, 19 Penn. St. 323, 324.

6 Under a statute providing that the tenant for life shall have "reasonable and necessary use and enjoyment" of the land, the right to work mines, quarries, etc., will not be limited or restrained. Westmorland Coal Cos. Appeal, 85 Penn. St. 344; Kier v. Pattersen, 41 Penn. St. 357; Irwiu v. Covode, 24 Penn. St. 162.

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In section 584, Mr. Kerr says: "The life tenant, where he has a right to mine, in order to more advantageously pursue such work, may open new pits and sink new shafts.10 But the opening of mines and the opening of new pits and shafts must be conducted and done on the tract of land already worked, and not upon a different tract of land and in a place where the mine or vein has never been opened or worked," because a tenant for life has no right to open new mines, the opening of new mines forfeiting the estate where such tenant is liable for waste. 12 The American cases, however, have greatly modified the law of waste, so as to adopt it to the conveniences and requirements of a new and growing country, in order to encourage tenants for life to make a reasonable use of wild and undeveloped lands. 13

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What I would like to know is whether the American cases have modified the doctrine of waste to adapt it to the conveniences and requirements of a new and growing country" to such an extent as to justify the position taken by Mr. Pingrey in his work on Real Property? It does not seem to the writer that they have. After a diligent search I have not been able to find a case that supports the Michigan court in the dictum quoted, and upon which Mr. Pingrey is content to announce the novel doctrine. I trust that some one well-read in real estate case law will furnish the wanting authority, for I have a great deal depending upon being able to find an authority that can be safely relied upon to support Mr. Pingrey's position, which the Michigan case certainly does not do.

HARRY M. HANSON.

'Elias v. Snowden Slate Quarries Co., L. R. 4 App. Cas. 454, 465.

10 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 32 N. J. Eq. (5 Stew.) 86; Crouch v. Puryear 1 Rand. (Va.) 258; s. c. 10 Am. Dec. 528.

11 Westmorland Coal Cos. Appeal, 85 Penn. St. 344.

12 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. (6 Stew.) 603; Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 460, 474; Viner v. Vaughan, 2 Beav. 466; Whitfield v. Bewit, 2 Pr. Wms. 242.

13 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 33 N. J. Eq. (6 Stew.) 603; Ballantine v. Poyner, 2 Crouch v. Puryear, 1 Rand. (Va.) 258; s. c., 10 Hayw. (N. C.) 110; Irwin v. Covode, 24 Penn. St. 162; Neel v. Neel, 19 Penn. St. 323; Hastings v.

Am. Dec. 528.

Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co., 32 Crunkleton, 3 Yeats (Pa.) 261; Findley v. Smith, 6
N. J. Eq. (5 Stew.) 86.
Munf. (Va.) 134; s. c., 8 Am. Dec. 733.

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