this matter as an important one, and to confine their opinions largely to cases reversed, where it is necessary to set out the grounds for granting a new trial. This plan has the additional merit of relieving the appellate tribunals, most of which are overburdened with business, from much additional labor.

Upon the whole, however, the condition of affairs as to the multiplication of reported decisions, although discouraging is very far from desperate.

In the first instance it must be borne in mind that the largely increased facilities for the examination of authorities have well nigh kept pace with their rapid multiplication.

Digests of the law, giving the points of the decided cases, have long taken the place of the abridgements like Bacon and Comyn, and by a combination of devices have made it comparatively easy, considering the mass of decisions to make an exhaustive investigation of any question. The collation and consideration of authorities in text books and elementary works upon all the principal topics of the law go far to relieve the labor of the lawyer, while the full annotations of authorities and elaborate decisions of mooted questions in the legal periodicals are no small aid. Nor is the system of marginal annotations, showing what subsequent decisions have referred to a given case, to be overlooked in considering labor saving devices. By these means the whole range of the common law, as embodied in the reported decisions, is brought much nearer to the practitioner, and he is enabled to examine the authorities on a given question much more readily and conveniently than heretofore.

The most important element, however, tending toward a remedy for the evils and inconveniences arising from the enormous volume of the unwritten law, is the gradual but certain evolution of the law.

This evolution appears in both the unwritten and the statute law, and in its relations to both has a most important bearing upon this question, since the obselete provisions of the law, as found in the reports, are only of historical value and being of very little utility, are seldom referred to, cited or even examined.

It was this element of which Hale said: "The great wisdom of Parliament have taken off or abridged many of the titles about which it was conversant, usage and disusage hath antiquated others, and some that were anciently useful are now less useful."

The effect of modern litigation, discussion and decision has been to resettle and dispose of most of the questions which have been regarded as open, and undetermined, and to again determine and reiterate, as well as to apply the rules and principles gathered from the earlier reports. In other words,

the wealth of judicial decisions has and is to a great extent working a cure of the difficulties it occasions by rendering it unnecessary to refer to the older authorities, and confining citations not only to the more recent reports, but very largely to those decided within the jurisdiction where the particular case is brought.

While Mansfield is still recognized as the highest authority on all questions of commercial law, it is most unusual to find a citation from the reports of his decisions, and Hale and Holt are but names of great judges to conjure by, their opinions having been embodied in and superseded by modern authorities. The same is true of the great equity judges, and Hardwicke and Eldon are seldom referred to, except as the authority which has been relied upon in more recent judicial utterances. Indeed, the references to the first 100 volumes of the reports of the United States Supreme Court are comparatively few and far between, except as they are cited in support of a proposition fully discussed and determined in later volumes, and a like state of affairs exists as to the reports of the appellate tribunals of the several States. A distinguished jurist who has just retired from the appellate bench, in one of our largest States, where he sat as chief or associate for thirty years, recently remarked: "It has become quite infrequent as compared with the custom in my early days on the bench, for counsel to cite an English authority, or even that of a sister State."

The courts of almost every State have, in some form or other, grappled with the leading principles of the law and their application to diverse and peculiar facts, and litigation now arises principally from the new industrial conditions and changed business methods, which are the marked feature of

the times.

The older reports thus became practically obsolete as to the bulk of legal lore spread on their pages, and the common law, as it now exists today, the result of centuries of change, improvement and evolution, as applied to the affairs of the day, is to be found, to a very great extent, in the later volumes of the reports of every jurisdiction. The fittest principles have been either enlarged, restricted or modified, and, as thus improved, survive in the latest utterances of the courts. It has thus come about that the language of a recent writer, used in a somewhat different connection, well expresses the situation when he says, "Adjudged cases are the mile stones which mark the pathway of judicial progress."

More marked, and fully so important, changes have been going on in the statute law, and with equal, if not greater, effect, in ridding the reports of decisions which have become useless and un

necessary. The change in this regard has been mainly in the direction of simplifying the law and procedure. Possibly the most forcible illustration of this statement is to be found in the statutes relative to real estate, more particularly the abolition of uses and simplification of trusts.

The highly artificial system of the mother country, gave rise to numberless decisions, which by reason of statutory enactments beginning about 1830, and continuing up to this time have become of no value except to the student and the antiquarian. Almost equally great is the volume of authority rendered superfluous by the simplication of the legal relation of husband and wife, as regards property. As statute after statute has swept away the common law rights of the busband, volume after volume of reports have fallen into " innocuous desuetude."

The changes in procedure even where most conservative have rendered obsolete, scores of decisions based upon the mere technicalities, which were once the pride of the common law practice, and even in those jurisdictions where it is still retained, the increased liberality based upon statutory enactment, and rules of the court renders valuless, the opinions sustaining the refinement and subtleties of common law pleading.

The effect of statutory changes necessarily raises the question as to the probable operation of codification upon the multiplication of reported deci

sions.

of lawyers and judges, as well as to decrease largely the volume of reported decisions.

It only remains to add, that while the suggestions presented do not remedy the evils complained of, and in nowise tend to lessen the burden of expense arising from the number of reports, they to a considerable extent mitigate a burdensome condition, and alleviate a situation which would otherwise be intolerable.

CONCLUSIONS.

I. The duplication of reports of opinions, can and doubtless will be remedied, by the official reporters and publishers. They will find the bar eager to patronize an official series to the exclusion of all others, whenever it is edited with ability and promptness, and furnished at a reasonable price and in a convenient form.

This is true of a single series of a combination of the different series, in the same jurisdiction, and equally true of a combined series of several jurisdictions, properly edited on behalf of the official reporters of those jurisdictions.

II. The character of the reports as edited by the official reporters, should be more nearly uniform. The syllabus and index should be prepared upon a commonly accepted basis, combining the scientific and practical views, as the result of the experience of the reporters of the country. And the bar should continue to demand, and the bench select, for the work, lawyers not only possessed of legal ability, but of some degree of literary skill, and, moreover, imbued with a progressive spirit, aud an appreciation of improved methods.

It must not be overlooked, however, that code practice, as it is now carried on, has abandoned its simplicity, and is losing its distinctive character, and unless return is made to first principles, will in a very short time be subject to all the criticisms made on its predecessor, with but few of its redeeming features.

Still, much remains to be said in favor of statutory revision by which well settled rules may be reduced to statutory form, as a relief from the examination, if not from the multiplication of reports, and as providing a statement of the law in compact, concise and convenient form. Very many elaborate opinions result from conflicting enactments in various statutes, which have never been revised or corrected, with a view to rendering them either complete or consistent, and the result of a careful and systematic revision must be to lessen the labor

or misleading head notes would be avoided if the practice which is enforced by law in some jurisdictions by which the judges prepare the head notes were adopted, or even if as in others the judges uniformly carefully examined and revised the proof of the syllabus as drafted by the reporter.

III. In the improved working tools, forming part of the Law Library, is to be found much assistance in the almost interminable labor of the search among the authorities, but still more relief is to be had in the gradual evolution by which the important principles with their almost endless modifications survive in the later volumes, relieving much of the necessity for, examination of the older authorities; and, perhaps, most of all, in the more rapid growth of Statute Law, reducing to rules well established principles and reconciling conflicting decisions, so as to assimilate them to the current of recent authority, thus rendering obselete

Of these, two, the District Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and the Supreme Court of Idaho, have no official reporters.

Salary is paid in 40 States, ranging from $200 to $6,000 per year, and 7 of these States allow, in addition to the salary, from $2,400 to $8,000 per annum for assistants, while in 4 others the reporter has, in addition to his salary, the copyright of the volumes he edits.

In 5 States the reporter is compensated solely by his ownership of the copyright of his volumes.

The number of volumes of reports annually issued ranges from one in four years in Idaho, to 17 per year in New York, and is indicated for each court reported, in each State, in an appropriate column.

The varying size of the volumes presents a rather humorous feature, when it is recalled that the contents of each is of a like character with that of its fellows, and that the use to which the volumes are to be put is precisely the same in all jurisdictions.

The length of the volumes are given as follows: 10 inches in 1 state; 9 1-2 inches in 6 States; 9 1-4 inches in 7 States; 9 3-16 inches in 1 State; 9 1-8 inches in 1 State; 9 inches in 15 States, and 8 inches in 1 State.

Widths: 7 1-2 inches in 2 States; 7 inches in 1 State; 6 1-2 inches in 1 State; 6 3-8 inches in 1 State; 6 1-2 inches in 4 States; 6 1-4 inches in 1 State; 6 inches in 20 States; 5 3-4 inches in 2 States, and 5 inches in 1 State.

Thickness: 2 1-2 inches in 2 States; 2 1-4 inches in 3 States; 2 inches in 15 States; 1 7-8 inches in 2 States; 15-8 inches in 1 State; 1 3-4 inches in 4 States, and 1 1-2 inches in 2 States.

The measurements most general, it seems, are a volume 9 inches long (15 States), 6 inches wide (20 States), and 2 inches thick (15 States). But even these measurements are not common to any 15 States.

The number of pages varies from 550 to 1,000. But these figures give no actual or relative idea of the quantity of matter contained in the volumes. An examination of the last volume of the official report of each court shows quite as great a variety in the type in which they are printed, as is shown by the measurements, above given, of the volumes as bound. In many instances the type is quite large, the spacing between the lines very wide, and the margins correspondingly liberal. In others the type is compact and readable, while between these two extremes the assortment of type is as varied as that shown in the catalogue of a modern type foundry. An interesting feature of this diversity is noted in the fact that, generally, the largest type, the widest spacing and margins, and the fewest pages are found in the volumes edited by those reporters whose compensation is derived solely from the copyright.

In constructing the reports, it seems that in six States the judges make the statement of facts; in nineteen instances the reporters state no facts not given in the opinion; while in twenty States the reporter goes to the record or transcript for facts not stated in the opinion, when he deems it necessary to give an accurate understanding of the case.

Tables of cases are given by 30 reporters, while 11 had no such aid to the case-hunter in the volumes they construct.

Sixteen reporters either summarize or print in full the briefs and citations of counsel, while 20 give no attention to this feature.

The answers to the inquiry as to the system of indexing followed are not subject to intelligent generalization, although it may be said that what is known as the Index Digest system seems to predominate.

Table B.

This table contains the results of an inquiry into the structure of the cases reported from all our courts during the year, June 1, 1894, to May 31, 1895, and shows the number of cases reported from each tribunal, and the name and number of the judicial authorities which each court cited in its opinions in the cases, together with the number of times text books were so cited.

The table may be summarized as follows: Total cases examined, 16,416; total number of citations

therein, 58,941; of which the several courts cited their own precedents 28,995 times, and all other courts 29,946 times.

In other words, over 49 4-5 per cent. of all the judicial authority used by the courts of appellate jurisdiction of this country, in making up their final judgments in the cases mentioned, was the authority of their own previous judicial utterances. To express the thought a little differently, it would seem, from this showing, that each tribunal has, within the compass of its own decisions, all the authority requisite for its determination of causes submitted to it, and that, on the average, our courts cite the decisions of other tribunals only in support of their own like conclusions. And what is thus shown to be true of the country at large is, with the exception of the tribunals in the new States, whose litigation has not yet aggregated sufficient decisions to either cover the range of cases submitted to them, or to justify the unsupported citation of their own meagre collection of cases, found to be generally true of each State, and is indicated in parallel columns.

From this date it is impossible to escape the thought that, if in those jurisdictions where it is true that they have, as a general rule, upon the pages of their own reports, decisions covering all the questions which they have to discuss and determine, the courts thereof would confine their opinions to a succinct statement of facts and the rules of law in their judgment applicable thereto, citing only cases from their own reports covering the same the ground, much space would be saved, fewer volumes be required, and yet no diminution of actual judicial authority result.

An interesting feature of this compilation, and one that is not without significance, is the number of times that the common law courts are found to have cited the decisions of other common law tribunals, and the decisions of the code States, and, on the other hand, the number of times the code States cited Code decisions, other than their own, and the decisions of the common-law courts.

By computation, and leaving out the citations which the common-law courts made of their own previous decisions, we find that our so-called common-law tribunals cited common-law cases 9,141 times, and code cases 1,861 times. The code State tribunals cited common-law cases 7,359 times, and the decisions of code States, other than their own, 6,003 times.

We ascertained, with reference to these citations, that, of the common law citations by common law courts, 5,238, or 57 per cent were cited in support of points of procedure, and that of the code State citations by common law courts 1,671, or 34 per cent were cited to support decisions upon points of procedure. Turning to the code State tribunals we

found that, of the citations they made of common law cases, 1,943 or 26 per cent were cited on procedure points, while of the code State citations by the code State tribunals, 4,172, or 69 per cent were upon points of practice and procedure.

How it happens that the common law courts require over 57 per cent of their common law citations, and over 34 per cent of their code State citations; and that the code State courts require a little over 26 per cent of their common law State citations, and over 69 per cent of their code State citations, upon the points of procedure involved in the litigations, can be readily answered by thoughtful lawyers. But the most significant, and the most conspicuous fact disclosed by this computation, is that the methods of procedure followed in this country, and known as the codes, and the common law system, modified as it everywhere is by the practice acts and statutes, are in fact, not so divergent as we have generally supposed, but that they can and should be amalmagated and shaped into a uniform system. This done, and the volume of the labor and output of our courts of appellate jurisdiction reduced one-half by the elimination of disputes in litigation reported to this association last year showed was possible and the adoption by the judges of our courts of last resort, of the suggestion afforded by our present investigations, that they confine their opinions, when practicable, to a summary statement of fact and law, basing the application of the latter to the former upon precedents of their own courts, and. the great problem, to study which this committee was appointed, will be shorn of the features which to-day make it so ominous and disheartening. FRANK C. SMITH,