منے T said by the court in Plimpton v. Bigelow (supra); concerning a similar statute of New York, in view of the fundamental principle upon which all attachment proceedings rest, that the res must be actually or constructively within the jurisdiction of the court issuing the attachment, in order to any valid or effectual seizure under the process.' (See, also, Taft v. Mills, 5 R. I. 393.) In the case at bar the stock in question was neither actually nor con to hear the application and grant the order asked for. The act changes the age of children who may be committed to the custody of the wife from ten years to sixteen, and the maximum allowance which the court may grant to the wife, to be paid by the husband, is fixed at two pounds in all cases, whether the complaint is on account of desertion or cruelty. Apparently this is a statute which is a vast improve ment on the English practice on this subject, and is one which we might appropriately copy.structively in this State at the time of the atIt certainly has in it two very valuable im-provements which we might utilize. First, in granting the relief to the wife without a divorce; and, secondly, by giving expediency in legal procedure. Both are valuable; the first to women; the second, perhaps especially impor-ceeding; although we do not wish to be undertant, as the beginning of a thorough change in legal matters, more properly making them conform to business methods. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Ireland v. Globe Milling and Reduction Co., held that the stock of a non-resident in a foreign corporation cannot be attached, the stock in question not being actually or constructively in the State, though its business is being carried on and its officers are within the State. The court said in part as follows: tempted attachment thereof, and hence the proceeding was a nullity. And this statement is equally applicable to the attempted proceeding by trustee process or garnishment, set out in the pleadings, as to the said attachment pro stood as intimating that shares of stock in a corporation can be reached in this way. In this connection see Lowell, Stocks, § 9, and cases cited." At a meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, the annual address was delivered by Roger A. Pryor, Esq., of New York city, who was born in Virginia. The subject of his address was the Influence of Virginia in the Formation of the Federal Constitution, which is most interesting as well as instructive. Mr. Pryor spoke in part as follows: again took the lead in the march toward a renovated government. Simultaneously with her cession of territory, she imparted to the Congress the power of impost; thus, in the language of Mr. Bancroft, 'marshalling the United States on their way to a better union.' Still more decisively, Virginia summoned the convention to recast the constitution; and Virginia first commissioned delegates to that auspicious assembly. "We think it is well settled that shares of stock owned by a non-resident defendant in a "As in every crisis of American history, Virforeign corporation. cannot be reached by pro-ginia had advanced to the front, so now she cess of attachment, although the officers of the corporation are within the State, and the business of the corporation is being carried on here. The situs of the stock for the purposes of attachment and execution, is the domicile of the corporation, and that place only. (See Cook, Stocks & S. [3d ed.], $ 485, and cases cited; Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592, 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 632, and cases cited; Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn. 394, 4 Atl. 250.) A corporation can have but one legal residence, and that must be within the State or sovereignty creating it, although, by comity, it may be allowed to do business through its officers and agents in other jurisdictions. (Chafee v. Bank, 71 Me. 514.) Our statute, which au-ginia who gave the first signal of resistance to thorizes the attachment of the shares of the defendant in any corporation,' etc. (Judiciary act, chap. 33, § 20), 'is to be construed,' as "Thus, on a review of the successive stages in the development of the republican system in America, we observe: That it was Virginia who set the example of representative government and colonial autonomy; that it was Vir British aggression; that it was Virginia who initiated union in the common cause; that it was Virginia who first abjured allegiance to the English Crown and instituted a republican polity by the act of her sovereign will; that it was Virginia who first proposed to the sister colonies a declaration of independence; that the sword of one son made good what the pen of another had proclaimed; that for the sake, even, of an imperfect federation, she surrendered a domain of imperial magnitude; that she opened a way for the career of progress and expansion which the republic has since so gloriously pursued; that on the collapse of the Confederacy she rescued the country from chaos by summoning the States to the reconstruction of its fundamental law; in short, that Virginia stimulated the desire and provided the means; and prompted the effort and furnished the ideal for the Federal Constitution of 1787. We are now to see her in the act of making it moulding its form and fashioning its features, by her consummate statesmanship. signer of the Declaration in Congress, with Jefferson and Pendleton framer of the reformed legislation for the State, and member of the Court of Chancery; Madison, also member of the convention of 1776 and of the committee to report a constitution for the State, member of the Legislature and of Congress, active and able and eminent in every station; Mason, author of the first constitution for an independent American State, and of the first bill of rights ever formulated for a free community; ranking, by these achievements, with the most illustrious law-givers of the world such were the characters who, in behalf of Virginia, assumed the task of reconstructing the Federal government. "Of alliances offensive and defensive, of leagues of friendship such as the Articles of Confederation, and of Federal associations with varying degrees of intimacy, examples were not wanting, either in ancient or modern times. But here is a system at once Federal and National; its constitutents, states as well as individuals; acting coercively within the limits of the several sovereignties, yet, so acting without restraint upon local autonomy or abatement of its own efficiency, and without peril of collision Forecasting, on the eve of the convention, the probable influence of Virginia on its action, her commanding attitude in the Confederacy was a significant factor. In deference to her superior wealth, her greater population, her historic primacy among the States, and her foremost part in the achievement of indepen-between the concurrent forces. The expedient dence, the initiative and ascendency were accorded to her without dissent. 'As the convention had met,' says Hildreth, 'on the invitation of Virginia, it seemed to belong to the delegates of that State to start the proceedings.' The approved abilities and ripe experience of the men whom she specially commissioned for the work, gave assurance that it would be done by them and be well done. Washington, in whose unerring wisdom the nation reposed its surest trust'I know,' wrote Knox, 'your personal influence and character is the last stake which America has to play' - Randolph, delegate in the Congress of the Confederation, and successively, attorney-general and governor of the commonwealth; Blair, long a burgess of the colony, member of the convention of 1776 and of the committee which reported the plan of State government, member of the Court of Chancery and Chief Justice of the General Court; Wythe, strenuous champion of independence in the House of Burgesses, by which so felicitous and so marvellous a result was attained consists not, as commonly taught, in a partition of powers between the Federal and State governments-for each retains its faculties in all their plentitude - but in the distinction of objects to which those powers are directed - Federal functions being limited to purposes of national policy, and State functions restricted to the ends of local economy --and in an effectual provision against conflict between the co-ordinate jurisdictions by according precedence and supremacy to the Federal authority. "This contrivance,' says Judge Hare, 'so far as my knowledge extends, has no precedent in political history.' With equal emphasis, Prof. Fiske exclaims that 'thus at length was realized the sublime conception of a nation in which every citizen lives under two complete and well-rounded systems of law the State law and the Federal law each with its legislature, its executive and its judiciary, moving one within the other, noiselessly and without friction. It was one of the longest reaches of constructive statesmanship ever known in the world.' "By whose genius the solution of the hitherto insoluble problem of national unity with local self-government was achieved, authentic history demonstrates to the world. In advance of the convention, Madison sketched in outline a project of Federal union, which, approved by his colleagues, was propounded as the plan of the Virginia delegation. Two competing plans, the one of New Jersey and the other of Hamilton, were submitted; but, these cast aside with slight regard, the convention proceeded to construct a system on the principles of the Virginia programme. After four months of earnest and exhaustive discussion, the Virginia scheme emerged from the stormy debate, altered in de- | tail, but identical in substance; and, so modified, was promulgated by the convention for acceptance by the states. That Madison gave the outline of the plan which the convention adopted,' and that 'the fundamental conception of our partly Federal, partly National government, appears throughout the Virginia plan as well as in the Constitution which grew out of it,' are the explicit concessions of Hare and Fiske, critics from whom Virginia may not expect anything of exaggerated commendation. "Thus did Virginia, acting upon the initiative allowed to her hegemony in the Confederation, introduce to the convention the true theory of Federal government; and thus is the Constitution of 1787 but the articulation of the principles she propounded. Nay more, in the form of its acceptance by the states, that is, by ratification in sovereign convention of the people as proposed by Madison, she gave it a sanction and a stability of which it would have been destitute had a mere legislative approval, as suggested by Hamilton, been the only basis on which it reposed." A quite important decision has been made in the Supreme Court of South Carolina in the case of Groesbeck v. Marshall, 22 S. E. R. 743, in which it is held that a note which on its face recites that it was given for value received may be shown to have been given to prevent a criminal prosecution, although recitals are made in a receipt which was executed simultaneously with the note to the effect that the note was given in settlement of the claims of certain persons against third parties. This is, perhaps, a proper and just exception to the general rule as to the admission of oral evi: dence to disprove a written instrument, but the decision is only in accord with the changing mark of limitation which the courts have placed at various times on kindred subjects. The decision in part is as follows: "We will first consider whether the defendant had the right to interpose against the plaintiff such defenses as could have been set up against Stokes, the payee of the note. This is not an action for damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on account of incorrect statements in the instruments of writing aforesaid, inducing him to become the indorsee of the note, nor is it an action by the plaintiff, seeking to be subrogated to the rights of J. Foster Marshall in the property conveyed to the defendant on the ground that the consideration upon which it was conveyed having failed, he should not longer be allowed to hold the same; but this action is simply upon the note. If the note was given upon the consideration that the prosecution against J. Foster Marshall for embezzlement should be discontinued, such contract would be against public policy, illegal, null and void (Williams v. Walker, 18 S. C., 577, and cases therein cited). The general proposition that an indorsee of a negotiable promissory note after maturity takes it subject to all equities existing between the original parties to the note is not questioned; but it is contended that the defendant is estopped by reason of the fact that J. Foster Marshall, to whom the defendant had delivered the receipt and certificate hereinbefore mentioned, showed them to Groesbeck at the time he became the indorsee of the note, and thereby induced such action on the part of Groesbeck. Let us analyze the statements contained in the receipt and certificate. The only fact set forth in the receipt which does not appear upon the face of the note is that it was in full settlement of all demands of Wise and Strough against J. Foster Marshall. The facts set forth in the certificate which do not appear upon the face of the note are (1) how the proceeds are to be divided among those to whom the several amounts are due; (2) that J. Foster Marshall had conveyed his interest in real estate in Columbia, S. C., to the defendant as security for the sums therein mentioned; (3) that Stokes signed the receipt in full as attorney and so stated that he was attofney for the parties therein mentioned; (4) that the $600 was not to be held until the maturity of the note for $1,187.50, but was to be paid out immediately. The certificate bears no date, and there is nothing upon the face to show whether it was made before or after the maturity of the note, except the words' until the maturity of the note,' which indicates that the certificate was made before the maturity of the note, though the testimony is to the contrary. The certificate does not show the nature of the demands which Wise, Strough and others held against J. Foster Marshall. A note given by a third person as compensation for the civil injury in a case of this kind, is without consideration. In the case of Williams v. Walker, supra, the court says: 'But where a note is given by a person not liable for the damages sustained by the party injured, for the purpose of stopping a prosecution, even for assault and battery, it will be held void, as based upon an illegal consideration, because in such a case the 66 consideration cannot be referred to the com pensation due by the one to the other, for there is nothing due in such a case from the maker to the payee of the note, and the consideration must be referred to the stopping of the prosecution, and is therefore illegal." These views are fully supported by the following cases: Corley v. Williams (1 Bailey, 588); Mathison v. Hanks (2 Hill [S. C.], 625); Banks v. Searles (2 McMul. 353); Gray v. Seigler (2 Strob. 117); also, Hearst v. Sybert (Cheves, 177). The case of Booker v. Wingo (29 S. C. 116, 7 S. E. 49) differs from the case of Williams v. Walker in some important particulars: (1) The deed executed and delivered by the third party was based upon a valuable consideration, apart from the compensation made for the civil injury sus stored, nor had there been any offer to restore it. It does not appear that the plaintiff made any inquiry as to the consideration of the note, although he had ample opportunity to do so. There were facts and circumstances sufficient to put him on inquiry, and his failure to find out the facts in the case must be attributable to his own negligence. He should have inquired why J. Q. Marshall, a third party, living in South Carolina, gave a note to settle demands of certain persons in Missouri against J. Foster Marshall. He cannot insist that he was misled by the statement in the certificate that J. Foster Marshall had conveyed his interest in real estate in Columbia for the purpose of securing the defendant for money advanced, as it is not contended that this statement is untrue. This court is, therefore, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances, of the opinion that the defendant could set up his defense against Groesbeck, the plaintiff. The rights of the riders ôf the silent wheel have again been successfully upheld in a recent case tried before a nisi prius court of Pennsylvania, whose holding is valuable argumentatively rather than otherwise. The action was begun by a wheelman against the owner of a wagon who had driven on his wheel, which had it. The court, in addressing the jury, charged been leaning on the curb outside, and smashed that bicyclists had no more rights on the sidewalks than vehicles; that sidewalks were reserved for persons who were walking, but that on the public thoroughfare bicyclists had the same rights as persons driving wagons or engaged in similar occupations. Upon the streets a wheelman is entitled to his share of the road and no person should needlessly or recklessly run him down, and should they do so they must answer for damages. tained by reason of the criminal act. (2) The THE CANALS AND THEIR IMPROVEMENT. contract was executed, the grantee performed The many lawyers in the Constitutional Convention his part of the contract, and the grantor acqui- last year manifested generally quite a reluctance to esced in his possession for eighteen months. Under these circumstances the court refused to lend its aid, as the parties were in pari delicto, especially as the status quo could not be re commit themselves either for or against the canals. While it was alleged in some quarters that the lawyers of eminence in the State were largely corporation lawyers, and for that reason opposed to the her canals, such was not really the case. Their opposition, if such it may be termed, was due more to a lack of knowledge of the real feeling toward the canals on the part of the people. They dreaded anything that might in any way injure the passage of the constitutional amendment relating to the judiciary and many others, and so at first tried to side-track the canal improvement amendment. So well known a corporation attorney as Edward Lauterbach, however, actually saved the day in the Constitutional Convention, by making a speech on the roll-call for absentees when the amendment. lacked some dozen votes. It received just one more than it required as a result of Mr. Lauterbach's speech. In the final arrangement of the submission of the amendments it was decided to separate the canal improvement section from the others. In this the friends of the canals acquiesced with pleasure, confident of the people. Their confidence was justified, in that the separate canal improvement amendment received a majority of 115,315, which was a larger majority by 32,000 than was given for any other amendment. As a result of this Gov. Morton strongly urged the Legislature to provide for the improvement of the canals, which it did, a bill being passed by a majority of 103 to 35, providing for the bonding of the State for $9,000,000 for the deepening of the Erie and Oswego canals from seven feet, as now, to nine feet, and the Champlain from its present depth of five to seven feet. The committee working up public sentiment in behalf of the bill assert that the improvement will enable the present boats to carry twice the commerce, by the increase in their loads and greater quickness of trips, and so reduce transportation rates from 33 to 50 per cent. It is said that this is the first time in the history of this State that a bill, in its nature wholly a referendum, has thus been submitted to the voters for their approval, and the result is looked for with great interest. The canals have this advantage, that they have always received enormous majorities, when before the people in the form of constitutional amendments, as, for instance, when they were, in 1882, made free of tolls by a majority of 322,868. The three canals which it is proposed to improve have paid into the treasury of the State over $34,000,000 more than they cost up to the time tolls were abolished, and their low rates of transportation which the railroads meet during the season of navigation, have made them very popular with the people. There is little doubt of the bill's adoption. It, probably, is merely a question of how large a majority it will be. Conservative estimates, made by those particularly interested, place the majority at about 100,000. An address delivered before the Incorporated Law Society at Liverpool, Eng. NE of the most humiliating positions in which a man who takes any pride in his profession can possibly be placed is to hear his chosen calling publicly abused, and to have to remain silent because the particular charge is one he cannot refute. And this is a position in which a lawyer must, of necessity, occasionally find himself. At such times his pardonable pride in the law, and in himself as a representative of that law, retires to his boots, and he begins to wonder whether, after all, the object of his worship is a mere idol of wood and store to which the people appeal in vain. Perhaps the most vulnerable spot in the whole system of our laws has been that which has lent itself to the contemptuous reproach that there is "one law for the rich and another for the poor." That such a pernicious charge should have a shadow of foundation is greatly to be regretted, and I often wonder how it is we so frequently permit it to pass unchallenged, and thereby appear to countenance it. Possibly we trust too much to the notorious shortness of public memory to efface the recollection of the circumstances which from time to time give occasion for its illustration. We forget, however, that though, to the average citizen, yesterday and all its incidents is wiped out the moment it expires, and that, like the grasshopper in the fable, we live only in the present, there are yet scattered amongst us divers irrepressible individuals who, note-book in hand, eagerly record these ephemeral incidents to be used with effect at times—such as election times when the public mind is more susceptible to the contagion of nasty things. However much we, as lawyers, may be inclined to ridicule the idea that there is in fact any foundation for the suggestion that the law is a respecter of persons, there can be no doubt that, as an abstract belief, the sentiment is inherent in the breasts of the whole of the lower classes, and that the periodical exhibition of concrete illustrations of it forms a weapon which is most effectively utilized by the agitator in his ceaseless war on capital. It has seemed to me that our supineness regarding the charge is to some extent due to the foundation upon which our legal education is built up. For, observe, upon what different lines proceeds the education of a lawyer and a man of business in this respect. The very first impression that is implanted in the mind of the embryo lawyer-and which forms the elementary truth on which his idea of law is hinged-is that the portals of justice are open to all comers indifferently. This |