Ohio providing that every person convicted a third time of felony shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. The enforcement of such law has been held constitutional by the Supreme Court of Ohio, where the first of the two previous convictions of the defendant occurred before the passage of the act. (Blackburn v. State, 36 N. E. R. 18.) We strongly approve of the policy of this statute. It gives more than a fair chance for reform. But, when a person has committed three felonies, it may properly be said that his criminal disposition is permanently fixed, and it is simple folly to go on turning him loose to prey anew on the community, and to waste public money in fresh trials and convictions. Somewhat the same result as that contemplated by the Ohio statute may be accomplished in our State under section 688 of the Penal Code, providing for sentences for increased terms upon convictions for second offenses. Under this section, Judge Fitzgerald wisely exercised his discretion last week to impose practically a life sentence on the fire-bug Shoenholse. We do not see why the law of New York should not be retained practically as it is to cover cases of second offenses, and the Ohio statute also borrowed in order to make a life sentence inevitably follow a third conviction of felony, no matter what the grade of the different offenses. The criminal classes are apt to be quite prolific reproducers of their kind, and observation and stutistics show that the criminal disposition is almost invariably transmitted to offspring. Of course environment has much to do with hardening the inherited nature, but the specific criminal heredity is often so potent that educational influences and moral surroundings during childhood are incapable of neutralizing it. The perpetual imprisonment of habitual criminals, besides protecting the present generation from their practically certain depredations, would quite materially diminish the quota of heredity criminals of the next generation. It is altogether possible that the indefatigable efforts of modern Charity Organization, by making it more difficult to pick up a living by mendacity and begging, will drive considerable numbers of shiftless persons into positive crime. But we cannot say that the policy of Charity Organization is to be deprecated because of this incidental result. If the status of habitual criminal, with its penalties as above outlined, certainly await a convict, an additional deterrent from crime and an additional incentive to honest work will be offered. And, in the long run, society can probably deal with the hopelessly vicious as habitual criminals to better advantage than if they were permitted to go on unmolested in their impositions upon the benevolent. -N. Y. Law Journal. ad mo Abstracts of Recent Decisions. ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS PREFERENCES.Where an assignee was the cashier of a creditor bank, the insolvent's preference of an usurious claim to the bank will invalidate the deed of assignment. (Hiller v. Ellis [Miss.], 18 South. Rep. 95.) ATTACHMENT DAMAGES.-In an action for the wrongful attachment of property which the owner had sold, the value of the property, in estimating the measure of damages, is the price contracted for, though it is in excess of its market value. (Curry v. Catlin [Wash.], 41 Pac. Rep. 55.) CONFLICT OF LAWS -INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS PREFERENCES.-The fact that the laws of New York forbid preferences by insolvent corporations does not render void authority conferred in that State, by the board of directors of an insolvent corporation, organized under the laws of New York, but holding its entire property in Pennsylvania, on the corporation's president, to execute in Pennsylvania, a judgment note in favor of a creditor of the corporation. (Appeal of Chautauqua County Nat. Bank [Penn.], 32 Atl. Rep. 539.) COUNTY WARRANTS LIMITATION MISSOURI STATUTE. Rev. St. Mo. 1889, § 3195, providing that county warrants not presented for payment within five years of their date, or, being presented within that time, and protested for want of funds, and not presented again within five years after funds are set apart for payment thereof, shall be barred, prescribes a special limitation for actions on such warrants, within section 6791, providing that the limitation of ten years prescribed by section 6774 for action on any writing for the payment of money shall not extend to any action which shall be otherwise limited by any statute. (Knox County v. Morton [U. S. C. C. of App.], 68 Fed. Rep. 787.) DEED--TITLE TO VEST AFTER GRANTOR'S DEATH. An instrument from a father to his children, which is in form an absolute deed, and executed as such, but not attested as a will is required to be, which contains the clause "provided always, and it is expressly understood and agreed, that this conveyance is not to take effect till after my death, and that, at my death the title to the foregoing lands are to vest immediately in my said children," will be construed as a deed reserving a life estate to the grantor, where it was delivered when executed, and the grantor lived on the land with the grantees till his death, without attempting to make any other disposition of the land. (Abney v. Moore [Ala.], 18 South. Rep. 60.) Correspondence. SPECIAL VERDICTS IN INDIANA UNDER A NEW To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The General Assembly of the State of Indiana, at the session of 1895, made a radical change of the law as to special verdicts. This law has come before the courts for the first time at the Fall sittings. It is as follows: of the verdict is in the usual form that if, upon the above findings, the law is with the plaintiff, then we find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at dollars; and if the law is for the defendant, we find for the defendant. So vital a change in the form of special verdicts cannot but attract the attention of the profession at large, and if it should prove satisfactory, other States may be inclined to profit by the example. JOHN A. FINCH. INDIANAPOLIS, Oct. 2, 1895. New Books and New Editions. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE END OF THE FIRST CENTURY. By George S. Boutwell. "That in all cases tried by the jury, the court shall, at the request of either party, in writing, made before the introduction of any evidence, direct such jury to return a special verdict upon any or all of the issues of such case. Such special verdict shall be prepared by the counsel on either side of such cause and submitted to the court, and be subject to change and modifications by the court. The same shall be in the form of interrogatories so framed that the jury will be required to find one single fact in answering each of such interrogatories; the jury, on retiring, shall take all the plead-legal profession, and may be considered not only a ings in the case, including the instructions of the court, if in writing, and the interrogatories as approved by the court, and shall answer each of the interrogatories submitted to them." Under our former practice the courts were required to order the jury to render a special or a general verdict at the request of either party. If a special verdict was required, the courts were required to order the jury to answer special interrogatories on the request of either party. If the general verdict was not in harmony with the answers to the interrogatories, judgment might be rendered upon the answers to the interrogatories and against the party in whose favor the general verdict was rendered. This law repeals the law allowing special interrogatories to be propounded, and the only form we now have is the general verdict, or special verdict prepared according to the above statute. Each of the Superior Courts and the Circuit Court of this county has had special verdicts rendered under this statute, and the change from the old practice is thought to be very satisfactory, especially in cases where a jury might be more affected by sympathy than by the facts proved. The practice under this new statute is, after proper request by either party, for counsel on each side to prepare a special verdict in the form of interrogatories. The court takes these forms as prepared and has a new draft made embodying anything pertinent in either form submitted, and adding any other interrogatory that seems to be necessary for a finding upon all of the facts. This is submitted to the jury as coming from the court, and they have no intimation as to which side prepared any particular interrogatory. The conclusion A long experience as legislator and as a legal practitioner has given the author of this work a familiarity with the Constitution of the United States which renders him unusually well fitted to prepare such a work as this. The book is prepared in a way which is almost novel to members of the treatise but also a text-book on this most important that which a text-book ordinarily possesses. Its subject. Its value, however, extends largely beyond preparation shows careful and conscientious work, aided by great experience and unusual ability. The work is divided into sixty-four chapters, which at first seem to be too many in a work of only 400 pages, but the convenience of the subdivisions is apparent after a careful examination. The work begins with the Declaration of Independence, and subsequently the Constitution of the United States haps, the most valuable part of this work to be the is published with annotations. We consider, peranalytical index of the Constitution of the United States, which occupies sixty pages of the volume. Few persons who have not carefully studied the Constitution appreciate the immense amount of material which is contained within the few pages, and the index to which we refer strengthens the opinion which we have had of the immensity of the ConstiWe consider that this index alone will give lawyers a more easy means of referring to the Constitution than anything we have ever seen before. The decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions are cited under the sections to which the decisions relate, and the leading decisions appear with a careful examination of their scope and meaning, while the lines between State sovereignty and the national government are distinctly marked. The development of the Constitution from the colonial charters is ably demonstrated; in short, the whole work is a most complete and comprehensive book on the subject. The arrangement of the work is most appropriate, and we are especially pleased with the way in which each section of the Constitution has a chapter devoted to its explanation, origin and development. It is bound in cloth and in a convenient form for use. tution. Published by B. C. Heath & Co., Boston, Mass. 1 The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, NOVEMBER 9, 1895. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW Journal. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] AT United States courts. American Bar Association in 1890 at Saratoga, and that is the necessity of having some legislation governing and regulating commercial paper, so as to get somewhat of a uniformity. We all know that under the decisions of Alabama a person who takes negotiable paper as collateral security for pre-existing debt, with no new consideration, is not a bona fide purchaser for value; that is also the law in New York. In 1880, I think it was, a railroad company made a note, and all its directors endorsed it, and turned it over to an agent to negotiate that note for the purpose of raising money for the benefit of the railroad company; the agent took that note and carried it to his bank, and as he owed that bank an overdraft he deposited it with that bank as a collateral security for his overdraft. Subsequently the bill matured, it was not paid, the bank instituted suits in the courts for the money against the endorsers on that paper, the case went to the Court of Ap this bank was not a bona fide purchaser for value, that, therefore, there could be no recov At that time the laws of the United States T the recent meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, H. C. Tompkins, Esq., offered several interesting suggestions in regard to changes which might be made in the statute law of the State in order to make it conform more properly to the laws of the United States and of the different States. Mr. Tompkins showed that at present the law in Alabama was that a person who took negotiable paper as collateral security for a pre-existing debt without any new consideration is not a bona fide purchaser for value. The same principle is recog-peals of New York, and that court held that as nized in New York State, and Mr. Tompkins showed how the law was practically over-ruled on account of the different holdings in the ery. A few remarks can demonstrate the necessity of uniformity of laws in the States and the United States, and there, was an evident feeling at the meeting that some action should be taken in this direction. Just before the close of the session of the Association this desire was put in a practical form by the introduction of a resolution to promote uniformity in the existing laws on the subjects of marriage and divorce, the form of notarial certificates, the descent and distribution of estates of decedents, acknowledgments of deeds, execution and other subjects relating to the domestic relation, and the transaction of business. It was also determined that commissioners should be appointed to promote such uniformity and to act in conjunction with like commissioners who have been or may be appointed by other States. It is with great pleasure that we regard this increasing desire on the part of active members of the bar to further the ends of this most important reform. Mr. Tompkins said in part: There is another matter that I would like to call to the attention of the Committee on Legislation, it is a matter that I have thought a great deal about, and read an article before the VOL. 52 No. 19. allowed a bank to bring a suit in the courts of the United States regardless of the residence of the parties. The bank brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York; they got a judgment for the amount, and that case went to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court held that a party taking paper of that sort was a bona fide purchaser for value, and that the railroad company was liable. They had not sued the railroad company in the first suit. Now, a man can make a note in Alabama, an accommodation paper, it can be deposited by a mere depositor who has endorsed it as collateral security for his pre-existing debt, bring a suit in the courts of Alabama, the bank or party taking it cannot recover, but if he happens to live in Georgia and he can make it convenient to stop in Columbus and live months enough to be considered a resident, and bring suit in the courts of the United States he can recover. Again, we have what we call irregular endorsements. I make my note to you promising to pay you so much money by a certain date; I procure my friend Col. Hargrove to endorse that note what we call an irregular endorsement under the laws of Alabama that note is subject to all the rules governing any other commecial paper or bills of exchange there must be a protest or notice of non-payment, he cannot be charged unless there is protest or notice, but if the party who holds the note was to move out of the State of Alabama, and bring suit in the United States Court, the result would be that Col. Hargrove would be charged as a maker, not as an endorser, and no protest necessary. These various views of the law are held by the different courts. There are very few courts that hold with the Alabama court. New York and some few other states are the only states that hold with Alabama if they are deposited as collateral for pre-existing debt. I move as an amendment that the Committee on Legislation take into consideration and report on the feasibility of legislation to procure uniformity of commercial law, and the law governing commercial paper. At the same meeting of the Alabama State Bar Association, the annual address was delivered by Samuel M. Meek, Esq., who made some excellent suggestions in regard to the reform which might be instituted by the bar. The subject of the address was the Power and Influence of the Bar. There were many thoughtful lines in this address and part of it runs as follows: "Every enlightened and candid lawyer must concede that the character of the bar is not what it ought to be. It is a fact, that a large number of people in every community, and many of them people of great intelligence, regard a lawyer not only as a trickster, but as a fellow who in the practice of their vocation will speak without any regard to the truth, and will do anything short of a violation of a positive criminal law. Of course the people make exceptions of some members of the bar. But such is certainly the opinion of a great many citizens of every community in regard to many, perhaps a majority of the members of the bar. Now, the question is, is there any just foundation for this opinion? Do any considerable number of lawyers, by their habitual practice and conduct, afford just ground for this opinion, and thus, so far as their examples go, fix upon the bar generally this stigma? I am afraid that every candid lawyer would have to admit that the imputation finds much to warrant it in the conduct and practice of many members of the bar. Is it not a fact that many members of the bar do not, in the pursuit of their profession, consider themselves at all subject to be controlled by the ordinary rules of morality? And do they not habitually in their dealings and practice as professional men set at naught the plain rules of right and duty? Do they not frequently practice falsehood and deceit to ensnare the unwary and to compass their ends? "And to what are we to ascribe this departure by many members of the bar from the path of rectitude? Must we not ascribe it, in many cases, to the defective methods of legal education? The great point with many young men is to get to the bar to procure license to practice law,-which very many do without the necessary preliminary study and preparation; and entering the profession without any just conception of its true nature and proper functions, and regarding it as merely a position to enable them to get money, by any available means and methods, they wholly disregard that high moral standard which is the basis of all professional character and excellence. "Surely every candid lawyer must say that the bar needs reform-that the unworthy members ought to be cast out, and that only those possessing the proper qualifications and character and learning should be allowed to enter or remain in its ranks. "Nor, in this matter of reform, ought the bench to be overlooked-that needs reform too. A seat on the bench ought to be the crowning final of an honorable career at the bar-the fitting reward of ripe professional experience and untarnished integrity and unsullied honor. Indeed, in proportion as the bench is elevated, the character of the bar will be raised, and unworthy persons will not easily find places in its ranks. "The law is practically what the bench and bar make it. If the bench be learned and upright and dignified, and if the standard of the bar be elevated and lofty-if its members esteem it as their first and highest duty to advance truth and justice, then the law will be what it ought to be-will be in practice what it is in theory-a great system of rules and principles for the vindication of right and the the Sir Matthew Hale, who, under the forms of law, executed devout and spiritually minded women, upon the charge of witchcraft. "You know that even religion itself is practically, in a great measure, only what its priests and ministers make it. If these, instead of being enlightened in mind and upright in character, and pure and holy in life, be ignorant and vicious, then religion will degenerate into a miserable superstition, and instead of elevating and purifying its votaries, will only degrade and debase them." be true. Our profession, from the earliest times, has been subjected to the severest criticisms that ingenuity and malice could invent. The great Bard of Avon reveals the prevailing sentiment of his times, when he makes one of his characters in Henry VI exclaim: "The first thing to do, let us kill all the lawyers." The great, good and stainless John Marshall, while chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was charged, while in a fit of passion, from which none of us are exempt, by no less a personage than the immortal Thomas Jefferson, with having prostituted his high office and stained the judicial ermine for sordid purposes, and he pronounced him unfit to occupy the high office which for so great a time he adorned. With all these brilliant examples before us, and knowing as we all do, the gross injustice to which our profession, as a profession, has been subjected, we can only move onward in the thorny path before us with a firm tread, undismayed and unchecked by the howlings of prejudice and the shafts of passion. To the unthinking, ignorant and howling multitude, if their ravings are noticed at all, we proudly point to the names that decorate the sky of our profession and crowd its ranks in the daily pursuit of their high vocation, and to the illustrious men who wear the judicial ermine of the various States and of the Supreme Court of the United States which for more than a century "has blazed the way through the unexplored forest of a Republican form of government"-have preserved the judicial ermine from soil or corruption, and commanded the respect and admiration of mankind. We must look above, and beyond these base reflections. These views, so well expressed by this able lawyer and distinguished jurist, the reflecting mind I think will admit, to a great extent, to That there are bad and unprincipled men members of our noble profession-some of them, too, deeply learned in its scientific principles, and men of high intellectual attainments, for none of us are faultless-all of us will admit. When admitted, they, perhaps, had the necessary attainments, both in learning and morals, but belonging to a fallen and falling race, the temptations of the flesh overcame them and they fell! Peter and Judas, when they first attained the companionship of the Savior of mankind, were thought to be worthy, but the weaknesses of poor human nature they were unable to shake off; there moral structure being weak, in an evil moment the one denied Him and the other betrayed Him. I do not mention these instances as a justification, but simply to show that the paths trodden by poor fallen humanity are "devious and winding," and that it requires the utmost caution and the most constant watchfulness to keep all things straight. Hence, while we are forced to admit that there are bad and reckless and unprincipled men in our profession, yet I most emphatically deny that in its ranks immorality more frequently exists than in the other various avocations of life. The science of the law is a physical science, and has its foundations in reasons and justice. Its ethical standard today is as elevated and pure as in any previous period of the world's history. The law has often been made an engine of oppression, and the great and learned Coke and the justly abused and notorious Jeffrey are shining exThis Alabama of yours, in which as one of amples of the methods pursued in their days. her sons I feel so much pride, in all the eleThe most illustrious example of judicial blind-ments which constitute a great and noble, State ness and cruelty is to be found in the career of -in fertility of soil, in salubrity of climate, "For 'tis a base, ignoble mind, That mounts no higher than a bird can soar." The times in which we live are crowded with great and ever-varying events, and it demands all the bold energies of fearless manhood to meet and control them. |