episode, which has thrown the country into a fever of excitement, makes it the emphatic duty of lawyers as a class to counsel thoughtful and deliberate action and to spread a dispassionate realization of the legal bearing of the controversy. "The American Law Review for NovemberDecember, 1895, contains an article by Mr. Mark B. Dunnell, of Minneapolis, on 'The Monroe Doctrine,' which briefly, but adequately, sketches the history of the events leading to its promulgation, and presents, in very cogent form, the author's conception of the true status of such doctrine to-day. Mr. Dunnell's article was published before the recent diplomatic correspondence between England and America was given out; but he substantially concurs with Lord Salisbury as to the causes and immediate occasion of President Monroe's utterance, and it would see.n that, to a material extent, he anticipated the English prime minister's position as to the necessary modification of the doctrine by change of conditions. Mr. Dunnell says: "On the other hand, we should not fall into the corresponding error of maintaining that the declaration of Mr. Monroe is binding upon us to-day. His declaration was made to meet a particular exigency and ceased to be operative long ago. Its life was limited to the continu ance of the circumstances that provoked it. What we now call the Monroe Doctrine, and cherish as a fundamental rule of our foreign policy, is the principle which underlay Monroe's declaration, and not the declaration itself. The declaration of 1823 was simply a particular application of a general principle, and is valuable merely as a precedent. It is like a judicial decision-not the law itself, but an application of the law; and, as the lawyer studies cases to get at the principle they embody, so we may study Monroe's declaration to get at its principle or doctrine."" "The author then contends that the principle of the doctrine is merely a rule of self-defense, to wit: The United States will oppose any interference on the part of a European power in the affairs of this hemisphere which it may deem, under all the circumstances of the particular case, dangerous to its life or interests.' He further says: and to be re on the condi must be decided on its merits. The mere fact that it is an interference does not close the question of our duty. It must be such an interference that, from all the circumstances of the case, it would be dangerous to our peace and safety.' It is owing to a failure to keep in mind this necessary limitation of the doctrine, that much confusion of thought has arisen, and that wholly unwarrantable extensions of the doctrine have been made. Mr. Monroe's ideas of what is dangerous to our peace and safety' are dead. Mr. Monroe's ideas that we should resist dangerous interference is a living force in Our national life to-day. It matters not whether Mr. Monroe's language is susceptible of the construction that all interference is dangerous sisted. His ideas were founded tion of things existing in 1823. An interfer ence that might well have been thought dangerous then might safely be disregarded by us to-day. It is palpably absurd to impose the ideas of danger entertained by a government of seven millions, on a government of seventy millions. The American who regards European interference in distant South America a danger to this country has a ridiculously inadequate conception of his country's great ness. We have long since outgrown the infantile weakness of seventy years ago. The arear of danger has shrunk with our increasing strength. It is inconceivable that any sensible American would willingly shed his blood to keep England out of Chili, for example. On the other hand, it is quiet conceivable that he would be willing to do so to keep her out of Cuba. defense; the other, sheer quixotism. The one act would be largely a matter of selfSo far as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned we have encroachments by England in Venezuela, than no more cause to check the alleged territorial to enter a caveat against her expansion in India; and for the sufficient reason that the enlargement of her power in one place is no more dangerous to us than in the other.' "We venture to say that many members of the American Bar agree in the main with Mr. Dunnell's contention, and that many more, if they would give the merits and gravity of the situa tion due consideration, would exert all their "It follows that each case of interference influence towards proceeding deliberately, and . at least give the present popular ebullition time to subside. Granting, of course, that an Rostensible movement to settle a just boundary line may conceal a design for territorial encroachment, and admitting, for the sake of argument, that such is England's intent in Venezuela, it still must be conceded that any proposed apprehension of actual danger from an encroachment in that quarter is not bona fide. With our whole Canadian frontier exposed and accessible, alarm at the possibility of Great Britain making war on us from Venezuela is absurd. The only object in resorting to force to determine the Venezuela boundary line, according to our interpretation of the rights of the primarily interested parties, would be to settle an abstract principle. And such principle is not one recognized by international law. The British government is the only European power that has ever given even a qualified assent to the Monroe Doctrine, and the substantial purport of Lord Salisbury's remarks on the subject seems to be that, according to English interpretion, such recognition as was given by England extended only to the application of the doctrine to the peculiar circumstances existing when it was promulgated. In insisting on a general right of supervision in the United States, co-extensive with the hemisphere, our government would, therefore, not we have the moral sanction of settled international law. We would have to be prepared to maintain our position perpetually by force, and certainly such a burdensome extension of our foreign policy should not be adopted without a fair presumption of practical utility, and, in any event, not without sober second thought. of the character and acts of Napoleon Bonaparte in magazines and newspapers. And we fear that, incidental to legitimate utterances of loyalty and love for the American flag as the symbol of our national unity and life, there has been a large amount of uncalled for bellicose declamation. It would seem that the essential need of the hour is a spirit of calm reasonableness. We believe that the policy suggested by the President's message involves a very material extension of what thoughtful students of American history have understood as the Monroe Doctrine." Whether the nation is to be finally committed to such extension certainly should not be determined without bringing to the minds of the people, after some measure of sobriety shall have returned, the historical bear ings and theoretical merits of the question, the possible benefit to accrue from our success and its probable cost. The difference of views of lawyers and laymen is well exemplied by an article in the Nation, which said: in this world is well exemplified in an article in "The difficulty of getting things exactly right the last number of the Forum, by Mr. Cassatt of the Cincinnati bar, on the Monroe Doctrine. He shows easily enough that it was a doctrine produced for purposes of defence under circumstances which have totally changed, and that no contemporary expositor thought of giving it the offensive, aggressive character which some of our present preachers claim for it, and that the Congress to which Monroe presented it, as a suggestion of his own, never acted on it, nor took any notice of it; so that, in fact, it "Undoubtedly, the great avidity with which has no legal status and is no part of American the proposition for interference in Venezuelan polity. In tracing the history of it, however, affairs has been caught up is due to the intoxi- he says that the general principles of the cating effect upon the popular imagination Holy Alliance were in harmony with the monwhich the possibility of war always has. With-archical institutions and ideas of Great Britain, out in the least deprecating patriotic enthusiasm, or a legitimate sentiment of national pride, we believe there has been of late far too much stimulation of mere national braggadocio. We may always look for such element as a political expedient, but there are special causes which have contributed to ingrain the warlike spirit into the popular mind. For instance, there has been during the past year or two a great deal of undiscriminating and intemperate laudation but the possession of Central America by Spain would have been injurious to the commercial interests of Great Britain,' and therefore she joined us in the protest known as the 'Monroe Doctrine.' It would be difficult to give a more misleading account of the whole transaction. England refused to admit that the Alliance after the Congress of Vienna meant anything more than the maintenance of the territorial divisions then made. She denied by formal circular the right of interference in the internal affairs of the States then carved out. She refused to enter into the Holy Alliance, and when, in pursuance of the policy of interference the Alliance traced out, the French entered Spain to put down the revolution there, Canning declared he would call the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old' by acknowledging the independence of the Spanish colonies then in revolt. But this famous saying was anticipated by Lord Castlereagh in his instructions to the Duke of Wellington when, going as a delegate to the Congress, he said, 'it was evident from the course which events have taken that their recognition of the revolted colonies as independent states was merely a question of time.' But Canning's action in this hemisphere was really taken in furtherance of a European policy, and was intended as a counterstroke against the Holy Allies. The view that it was due to a desire to get the Spanish-American commerce away from Spain is original with Mr. Cassatt, as is also the view that 'the general principles of the Holy Alliance were in harmony with the monarchical institutions and ideas of Great Britain.' It was because the contrary was true that Great Britain refused to enter into the Alliance, although Castlereagh and Wellington would probably have liked to do so. no right to set itself up as a protecting power over all the States of North, Central and South America. "Furthermore, the interpretation that the Washington government now gives the Monroe doctrine does not at all agree with the text of the address of President Monroe, on December 2, 1823, where he expressly states that the er isting colonies or dependencies of any Europea Power shall not be interfered with. "Besides, the Monroe doctrine is not a dogma of international law, but only a political programme. The United States has interpreted it as it pleased sometimes more and sometimes less vigorously. I have merely to recall the treaty regarding the Panama Canal; also its attitude in the Mexican question of 1863. Only in 1865 did the United States government at last find strength and occasion to remember about the Monroe doctrine. "The doctrine might become even preju dicial to the United States, for only the little South and Central American States would deIt was indeed these States rive benefit from it. which, in 1826, following the lead of Peru, showed forthwith an intention of rendering ef fective the presidential declaration of December 2, 1823. Calvos, in his international law, writes that the republics of South America at once understood the advantages of associating themselves with the cause of the United States and of com Professor Lammasch is to day the greatest authority on International Law in Austria and bining in this respect in one exterior policy for in discussing the Monroe Doctrine he said: "In the first place, a word about that curious motto. · America for Americans,' from which Americans now deduce the conclusion that no European State can intervene in American affairs in general. This theory does not appear to me to be sustainable from any point of view. "It recalls a similar motto - - that of the Eastern Empire, in which all Europeans were called collectively Franks, because France was then, in the twelfth century, the principal power of the west. It goes without saying that that circumstance would not give France the slightest right to assert a protectorate over all the Franks of the Levant. the entire New World. "But the power that did not participate in the congress convoked by the government of Peru at Panama was the United States; and Mr. Adams who, in 1825, became President, made personal efforts to weaken as much as possible the Monroe doctrine over the creation of which, in his capacity as Secretary of State, he had exercised as essential influence. He declared that it was not the duty of the United States to see that the territory of other Ameri can states remained in an unaltered condition. "The agreement among all the parties repre sented at the meeting to the effect that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders may be found desirable. "I resume, then. The Monroe doctrine contradicts the principles of non-intervention if it looks upon every intervention in every American affair as an act against the United States. President Monroe has even declared that the United States ought not to mix itself up in the affairs of existing European colonies. "It derives no advantage from doing so, but on the contrary incures serious prejudice, for on this very basis it might be rendered responsible by the European Powers, if any American states failed to fulfil their obligations." A curious case has been recently decided by the Court of Appeals, and is that of Philip Schuyler against Ernest Curtis and the mem:bers of the Women's Fund Association. It is Ca highly interesting as shedding light on the right of privacy," and is as follows: Schuyler brought this action to prevent the defendants from making a statue or bust of his aunt, the late Mrs. Mary M. Hamilton Schuyler, in any form, and from causing it to be made or exhibited at the World's Fair. The lower court granted the injunction and found that Schuyler is the only son of George L. Schuyler and of Eliza Hamilton Schuyler, who was a daughter of the late James A. Hamilton and grand-daughter of Major-General Alexander Hamilton. Mrs. Schuyler died in 1863, and the plaintiff's father, for his second wife, married Mary Morris Hamilton, a younger sister of his first wife. The second Mrs. Schuyler died in May, 1877, and her husband died in July, 1890, and her only brother died in December, 1889. The only immediate relatives now living of the second Mrs. Schuyler are certain nephews and nieces, an uncle and aunt, all of whom approved of the commencement and maintenance of the action. The defendant's avowed object was the completion of two sculptures to honor Woman as the Philanthropist" and "Woman as the Reformer," to be placed on exhibition at the Columbian Exposition in 1893. They announced in May, 1891, that “ as the typical philanthropist " Mary M. Hamilton, who died Mrs. G. L. Schuyler, had been chosen as the subject, and that they intended to place the statue on exhibition at the same time and place as a statue of Miss Susan B. Anthony, whom they had chosen as the subject of the statue of the "Representative Reformer." Schuyler requested the defendants to abandon the making of the statue, but they denied his right to prevent them. The lower court found that the acts of defendants constituted an unlawful interference with the right of privacy, and that the relatives of the deceased were specially injured by the acts. Upon the trial the defendants showed that Mrs. Schuyler was a very charitable woman, was a member of many private charitable associations; that in 1852 she was one of the founders of the School of Design for Women in New York, and one of its managers until it was adopted by the Cooper Institute; that some of the female defendants were members of the School of Design for Women and had frequently met Mrs. Schuyler and were on terms of intimacy with her; that the "Ladies' Art Association" was founded about 1867, partly at the suggestion of Mrs. Schuyler made to some of the defendants, who were members of the School of Design for Women; that the "Woman's Memorial Fund Association" was composed largely of members of the "Ladies' Art Association," and that Mrs. Schuyler was prominently identified with the United States Sanitary Commission during the late war; and also that she was one of the vice regents for the State of New York of the Mount Vernon Association, which was organized for the purpose of securing the preservation of the home of Washington. In deciding this case the Court of Appeals says in part: "This action is of a nature somewhat unusual. Briefly described, it is founded upon an alleged violation of what is termed the right of privacy. "It may, perhaps, be somewhat difficult for the ordinary mind to perceive any reason for the plaintiff's distress, arising out of this contemplated action by women of respectability who are desirous of honoring the memory of a woman whom they regarded in life as a friend and benefactor of their sex. For the purpose we have in view it is unnecessary to wholly deny the existence of the right of privacy, to which the plaintiff appeals as the foundation of his cause of action. "In the present case the grounds of the plaintiff's objection are not very many, and have been stated in the complaint and by the plaintiff on the witness stand. these: "1. The persons concerned in getting up the proposed statue were not friends of the plaintiff's deceased aunt, and, as plaintiff alleged, did not know her. They are would have, in our judgment, the least ground of complaint that an action, confessedly meant to do honor to the memory of a noble woman, was proposed by those who in her lifetime had not the honor of her personal acquaintance or friendship, but whose proposed action was ner ertheless the outgrowth of admiration of he character as a friend and benefactor of the sex of which she was herself so great an ornament. 2. They were proceeding with their plan without consulting with the plaintiff or other immediate members of the Schuyler-Hamilton family, and without their consent to the making of any statute. 3. The circulars issued by or in behalf of the defendants contained a statement that Mrs. Schuyler was the founder of or the first woman in the enterprise for securing the home of Washington, and that this statement was inaccurate, because a prominent woman in South Carolina was in fact such founder and justly entitled to the honor arising therefrom. This mistake, it was asserted, has caused adverse comment in the newspapers as to the attitude of the family of plaintiff in permitting such a claim to be made when they must have known it was without foundation. 4. It was disagreeable to the plaintiff, because the making of such a statute would have been disagreeable and obnoxious to his aunt were she living. She had, as plaintiff said, a great dislike to have her name brought into public notoriety of any kind, as she was a singularly sensitive woman and of a very retiring nature, anxious to keep her name from the public prints or newspapers. 5. That plaintiff's aunt had not been personally acquainted with Susan B. Anthony, and he was quite sure she had not sympathized with or approved the position taken by Miss Anthony upon the question of the proper sphere of woman and her treatment by the law, and it was disagreeable and annoying to have the memory of Mrs. Schuyler joined with principles of which she did not approve. "After taking all the objections into careful consideration, we cannot say that we are in the least degree impressed with their force. The first ground of objection, even if well founded in fact, is not of the slightest importance. Whether the defendants were friends or not of Mrs. Schuyler in her lifetime does not seem to us to have any legitimate effect upon the question. No surviving relative, male or female, "The second ground of objection, we think, is equally untenable. The fourth ground may properly be considered as a part of it. It is true that these defendants have assumed to take the preliminary steps leading to the mak ing of the proposed statue without having con sulted with or obtained the consent of the plaintiff. The whole of the plaintiff's claim of the right of privacy in this case rests upon the lack of this consent. "It is stated that Mrs. Schuyler was not in any sense a public character during her life, and consequently had not surrendered to any extent whatever her own right of privacy. "It is not a question of what right of privacy Mrs. Schuyler had in her lifetime. The plaintiff does not represent that right. Whatever right or privacy Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights in the legal sense of that term, and when Mrs. Schuyler died her own individual right to privacy, whatever it may have been, expired at the same time. "A woman like Mrs. Schuyler may very well in her lifetime have been most strongly adverse to any public notice, even if it were of a most flattering nature, regarding her own works or position. She may have been (and the evidence tends most strongly to show that she was) of so modest and retiring a nature that any publicity, during her life, would have been to her most extremely disagreeable and obnoxious. All these feelings died with her. "It is therefore impossible to credit the exist ence of any real mental injury or distress to a surviving relative grounded upon the idea that the action proposed in honor of his ancestor would have been disagreeable to that ancestor during his life. "We cannot assent to the proposition that one situated as the plaintif in this case can properly enjoin such action as the defendants |