and that, therefore, the stay of the trial was still in cert being established, then the act of either one force and the trial could not be had. I have a reasonable doubt of the validity of this precipitate proceeding in the Supreme Court. If it is to be allowed in this defendant's case, then it can be repeated in any one's case. It is quite as important that justice appear to be done as that it be done. It is important that crime should be punished, but far more important that the rights of the individual should be held inviolable, for that alone is all that stands between him and tyranny, whether executive or judicial. was the act of the other; and in that way the defendant could be convicted. Evidence had been produced from which the jury could have found that the illegal relation existed. Next, it was proved that Burns stopped the work of pulling down a building which Seagrist was engaged in, and told him he could not go on with it till he saw the captain, namely, the defendant. This was the coercion used to extort the money. Seagrist says he went to the station to see the captain, but he was not in. The next thing to prove was that the money was paid. Seagrist swore positively that he paid fifty dollars to either the defendant or Burns, but that he could not remember which. His dubiety was upon this point only. He then testified that he made a true memorandum of the occurrence at the time of payment, and produced it. Being requested to look at the memorandum to refresh his memory, he did so, and then said: "I have no distinct recollection by looking at the book to whom I paid it, because it was a double entry." The memorandum was then offered and received in evidence against the objection of defendant's counsel. It is as follows: "November 21, 1891. Material. Paid to McLaughlin for protection per Seargent Burns, Ordinance officer, $50." Seagrist said, as we have If the order of the Supreme Court was void, then the stay was in force when the Court of Oyer and Terminer tried the cause. I do not see how a court may force a party to bring on a trial or application of any kind within less time than he has legally noticed it for, unless by express statutory authority to shorten the time, which did not exist in the prssent instance. It might as well try to make a party bring on a trial or application that he had not given notice of at all. The notice was shortened in this case by the aforesaid order of the Special Term | of the Supreme Court upon the ground that the public interest required that there be no delay of the trial of defendant. If there be a valid ground, then a notice of trial or of motion in any case involving public interests may be shortened or disre-seen, that he could not tell from this memorandum garded by a court. It seems to me the learned dis- to which one he paid the money, because it was a trict attorney mistook his course, and that the court "double entry;" not referring to double entry bookacted without jurisdiction. The way for the district keeping (for no such thing was before him), but attorney to prevent delay of the trial was plain. meaning that the entry was double in meaning, or The law had not left it in the power of the defend- equivocal. And so the memorandum seems to be; ant to delay the trial at will. He had to get a stay for who can say from it, any more than Seagrist pending his motion in order to delay the trial at could, whether it conveys the statement that the all; and the district attorney had the right to apply money was paid to McLaughlin per or through to the judge who had granted the stay to vacate it, Burns for protection, or paid directly to McLaughunless the defendant would stipulate as an alterna- lin for protection to be given per or through Burns. tive to argue the motion in a shortened time. The It follows that this delphic memorandum was like is often done in civil causes in respect of both not competent to prove to which one the money notices of trial and of motion. But that a court was actually given by Seagrist. That was the only has inherent jurisdiction to shorten at will notices point upon which his memory failed; and the essential to give it jurisdiction, I cannot believe. memorandum could not be competent to prove anyThere was no due process of law by which the thing except something which the witness could Special Term of the Supreme Court was able to do not recollect. (Ulster Co. Bank v. Madden, 114 N. what it assumed to do in this case. Y. 280; Rice on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 100.) He remembered positively that he paid the $50 to one or the other, so that the memorandum could not be received to prove that. But in another aspect it seems that the memorandum could not be legal evidence. The rule allowing an original written memorandum of a fact to be used as evidence of such fact in the absence of recollection of the fact by the person who made the memorandum, relates only to memoranda of facts, and not to memorandum of inferences or conclusions. The memorandum in question is of a conclusion. It con Another assigned error raises a grave question. The indictment was for the extortion of fifty dollars from one Seagrist. To make out the crime it became necessary for the prosecution to prove a continuing illegal concert between the defendant and his ward man Burns, to extort money; for the acts necessary to constitute the particular crime for which defendant was being tried were not at all committed by defendant personally, but, on the contrary, some, or, as the prosecution finally claimed, all of them, were done by Burns. This illegal con tains a conclusion that an illegal concert existed between McLaughlin and Burns; that payment to Burns was payment to McLaughlin for his protection or else that payment to McLaughlin was for his protection through Burns. Indeed, it contains a statement of a conclusion that the very crime for which the defendant was being tried was committed. It was competent for Seagrist to testify that he paid the money to Burns, but not competent for him thereupon to state the conclusion that such payment amounted to payment to McLaughlin. Yet that is what this memorandum was interpreted to state by the prosecution. If one could make a written memorandum of his conclusions, and in that way afterwards have them received in evidence, no one would be safe in liberty or property. There would be no end of fabricated memoranda. Even an original memorandum of a simple fact is received in evidence with hesitation, and only from necessity, and such caution is necessary, as our highest court has said, "until the moral infirmity of human nature becomes exceptionally less than it yet has." (114 N. Y. 285.) The motion is granted. PRIVATE INTERNATIONÁL LAW.(α) The effect of the recent decision of the judicial committee of the Privy Council in the case of Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. H. H. The Raja of Faridkot being to judicially affirm the sovereignty of the independent native State within its own territorial limits, it becomes easy to understand that private international law has for the Indian student a practical no less than a theoretical interest. It would indeed be difficult to conceive an author alleging a better raison d'être for his work than Sir W. Rattigan has done. India, like classical Hellas, now consists of a number of separate independent States, but the enormous number of those States (no less than 629) shows how far India transcends the classical parallel. Though Sir W. Rattigan explicitly announces that this manual is written primarily for the Indian or English student of law, no one who looks into this work can doubt that it possesses interest for a much wider class of readers. On the psychological principle of variatio delectat, there must be something to attract the mind in the extraordinary variety of legal systems that obtain throughout (a) By Sir William Henry Rattigan, LL. D., of Lincon's-inn, Barrister-at-Law, Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Punjab. Author of "The Science of Jurisprudence, Roman Law of Persons," etc. London Stevens & Sons Limited, 119 and 120 Chancery lanc. the globe however much the demand for harmony the elegantia juris of the Romans-might desire the removal of all antinomies. But, as the author in a passage of great power at the close of his work points out, the rights of the foreigner are gradually assuming recognition in our courts, in spite of that positivism which gives our English school of jurisprudence so marked a contrast to the jurisprudence of the continent. One of the most salient features of modern legal history is the same as that which the student of the Antonine jurisprudence encounters, the increased facility for acquiring citizenship. The means employed are not the same, but in this respect, as in others, the aphorism of Sir H. S. Maine holds good that it is not possible to overstate the value of Roman jurisprudence as a key to international law. That which Sir H. S. Maine wrote the Cambridge essays of 1856 would one day be true of our municipal law, is, in the sphere of private international law, un fait accompli, Sir W. Rattigan points out that it is one of the instances of the final tri umph of the Roman principles of jurisprudence that this (the principle of jus sanguinis in fixing nationality) is the theory which is now more and more largely recognized in Europe." But no one can peruse the pages of this work without having to make the admission that the want of a Gemeines Recht in the sphere of international intercourse is only too palpable. Private international law is, in fact, the appropriate sphere of le conflit des lois. It has been well pointed out by a recent writer on international law that the antinomies of different legislation are but ineffectually met by treaties. What is wanted is uniformity of legislation. Thus the Berne convention of 1885, adopted in England under the sanction of the international copyright act, while doubtless an act of international betterment in itself, brings into full relief the fact that the copyright of an author in his works is protected longer in some countries than in others. A signal illustration of le conflit des lois exists in the law of nationality respectively obtaining in France and England. Though the under secretary for foreign affairs (Sir James Fergusson) stated in the House of Commons in 1889, that the British government had no ground of protest, yet grandchildren, born in France of natural born British subjects, who have British nationality confered upon them by various statutes of Anne, George II., and George III,, become, by virtue of the French naturalization act of 1889, French subjects, and are now liable as such to military service. This illustration may serve to show that, though the Roman law is a key to international law, it is still far from being the Gemeines Recht of the nations. The private international law of copyright, being a purely modern creation, bears no trace of derivation from the Roman law. The fundamental notion of public international law is the territoriality of sovereignty. In private international law, the student's attention is frequently directed to exception to this principle-to the extra-territorial application of certain laws. This conception of personal laws extending their empire and authority so as to attach to the person everywhere was first asserted by the Italian jurists of the thirteenth century. As Sir W. Rattigan formulates the problem, Private International Law "solves the difficult questions arising from the inquiry, as to what extent the native law is bound to respect the foreign law, and the conditions under which the latter must always yield to the former." Sir W. Rattigan, in his chapter on the Law of Things, says that "the jurisprudence of Continental Europe, following that of the old Civil Law, knows no other classification of things except mobilia and immobilia." It is significant to observe that this division into mobilia and immobilia does not occur in the eighth title of the First Book of the Digest -de divisione Rerum et qualitate. The French Code Civil, adopted in Italy after 1866, certainly does say (art. 516): "Tous les biens sont meubles ou immeubles." But this is invariably translated : "All property is either personal or real." In excellent French dictionaries like Gasc's, the substantive immeuble has the meaning of real estate, landed estate, or property, but not immovable thing. The criticism so frequently directed against the English division of property, that it designates leasebolds for a term of years as chattles real, and therefore a personal property, is adopted by Sir W. Rattigan, who quotes Lord Selborne's dictum in Freke v. Lord Carbery, that land, whether held for a chattel interest or a freehold interest, is, as a matter of fact, immovable and not movable. But it may be observed that the Code Civil goes nearly the same length in unduly extending the meaning of the term real property, as the English law does in restricting it to freehold interest in land. Thus, by Code Civil, under certain circumstances, cattle, pigeons, warren rabbits, and farming implements may be designated real property (cf. art. 524). One of the most interesting chapters in this work is the chapter on Immaterial Rights of Copyright, Tradesmarks and Patents. These rights have been slow to receive international recognition. It is much to be regretted that Russia and the United States did not join in the Berne convention. The decision in Routledge v. Low leaves it uncertain whether the presence of a foreign author within British territory at the time of publication is necessary or not in order to enable him to claim the benefit of 5 and 6 Vict. c. 45. Fourteen years previously to this decision such presence was explicitly | declared to be necessary in the case of Jeffreys v. Boosey. It only remains to say that the elaborations and wealth of reference of this little manual will render it no less useful to the practitioner than its lucidity of exposition will render it attractive to the student.-Law Times. Abstracts of Recent Decisions. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-VAL· IDITY. - Where an assignment purports to convey all the debtor's property to be equally distributed among all his creditors, and the same is accepted by the assignee, and by a majority in number, if not in amount, of all the creditors, it cannot be held fraudulent on its face, although it contains provisions which might be objectionable if the assignment were one granting preferences; nor can such assignment be PRACTICE PRODUCTION OF set aside because of the fraudulent intent of the assignor, not shown to have been participated in by the assignee and the accepting creditors. (Porter v. James [U. S. C. C. of App.], 67 Fed. Rep. 21.) FEDERAL COURTS BOOKS AND PAPERS.-The right given by Rev. St. § 724, to compel the production of books and papers in action at law, is not limited to requiring their production at the trial, but the court may, in its discretion, grant an order for inspection, with permission to copy, prior to the date of the trial. (Lucker v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of London [U. S. C. C., S. Car.], 67 Fed. Rep. 18.) FEDERAL COURTS--SUPREME COURT-DENIAL OF RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.-When the ground of jurisdiction is the alleged denial of a title, right, privilege or immunity, secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, it must appear that such title, right, privilege or immunity was specially set up or claimed at the proper time and in the proper way; and cannot be recognized as properly made, when set up for the first time in a petition for rehearing after judgment. (Sayward v. Denny [U. S. S. C.], 15 s. c. Rep. 777.) MECHANIC'S LIEN-COMMUNITY PROPERTY.-The husband may contract for the erection of buildings mechanic's liens therefor. (Douthitt v. McCulsky on the community real estate, so as to subject it to [Wash.], 40 Pac. Rep. 186.) agents, on plaintiff's land, and the cutting and con- HORNBOOK SERIES - GLENN'S INTERNATIONAL LAW. ' version of timber growing thereon, in a single count, the entire cause of action is local, and only a federal court within the State in which the land lies has jurisdiction. (Ellen wood v. Marietta Chair Co. [U. S. S. C.], 15 S. C. Rep. 771.) New Books and New Editions. MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. Mr. Thomas Alfred Walker, fellow and lecturer of Peterhouse, Cambridge, Eng., has produced & most valuable and interesting addition to the subject of International Law. The book is designed as a comprehensive general introduction to detailed study of the subject, and such a work the author has certainly produced showing moreover a thorough and clear knowledge of the subject in hand. The style is extremely clear and the treatment careful. It should prove a work of great interest not only to the legal profession or any student, but also to the general public. Published by C. J. Clay & Sons, London, Eng.; McMillan & Co., N. Y. MUNICIPAL HOME RULE. Prof. Goodnow, the present occupant of the chair of administrative law in Columbia College, has added to his already high reputation as an authority on administrative law by his latest work, "Municipal Home Rule." The book is a study in the administration of cities which cannot fail of a wide and favorable reception, coming as it does in the midst of the present agitation of the subject. Published by MacMillan & Co., N. Y. Price, $1.50. HALL'S INFRINGEMENT OUTLINE. Glenn's International Law is the ninth and latest, hand-book of the now widely known Hornbook Series, from the press of the West Publishing Co., of which series we had occasion to write at some length two weeks ago. The general merit of the series cannot but be enhanced by the present work, which is a most broad and admirable treatise of international law, stating the controlling principles of the law in a readily accessible style, and giving copious references to the many ramifications of these principles met with in actual practice. The author, who is a member of a profession from which additions to the number of our text-book authorities would scarcely be dreamed of, Captain Edwin F. Glenn, acting judge advocate of U. S. army, deliberately and in praiseworthy contrast to so many authors, disclaims any original work in this ancient field of the law, and emphatically states that he has "freely copied from authorities of recognized standing," claiming for his work the greater merit in a treatise of this kind of careful compilation and clear and accurate statement. Published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. AMERICAN ELECTRICAL CASES, VOLS. II & III. The second and third volumes of this valuable compilation of cases of a branch of the law the importance of which is only of late beginning to be felt, have just been issued by Matthew Bender, Albany, N. Y., being edited by William H. Morrill, the well-known writer on legal subjects. unusual merit, embracing as they do, the decisions The wide scope of these volumes makes them of of the Federal Courts and of almost every State in the Union from 1886-1892. The cases in these volumes are arranged most advantageously for reference, not being, as usual in such works, placed in chronological order, but grouped together according to the subjects of the decisions. In his preface to Volume III, the author comments on the rapid increase of adjudications in This is an extremely brief and succinct outline of the law of the infringement of patents for inventions (not designs) from the pen of Thomas B. Hall, Esq., of the Cleveland bar, the author of the well-electrical law, especially in the newer field of known works, "Hall's Patent Infringement" and "Hall's Patent Estate." Mr. Hall has based his "Outline" solely on the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the volume is of corresponding value to any patent practitioner of this country, or any one desiring in brief form a short treatise on this branch of the Patent Law. For a volume of its size, 36 pages, it contains an unusually large number of references to well-established cases. Published by Banks & Bros., New York and Albany. applied electricity by reason of the many new questions arising from the interference of the powerful currents of power and light companies with the weaker currents and more delicate apparatus of telephone companies. The question as to the rights of abutting owners as affected by the maintenance in highways of apparatus required by users of electricity, occupy an important place in Volume III. These reports are of the greatest value to every lawyer of the present age of electricity. Published and sold by Matthew Bender, Albany, N. Y. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, AUGUST 10, 1895. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] THE HE question is being raised in a somewhat peremptory way as to the right of a corporation owing its charter to another State to do business according to methods condemned by the laws of a State in which it has established itself. There is a popular impression that a corporation organized, say, under the laws of New Jersey, has a constitutional right to do business in the State of New York. But what may be called the interchangeability of American citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States does not extend to those artificial persons known as corporations. These, being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where they were created. In the language of the United States Supreme Court: A corporation "must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty. The recognition of its existence, even by other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States a comity which is never extended where the existence of the corporation or the exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interest or repugnant to their policy." This latter statement is not so obviously true as when it was written in deciding the case of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle, because it was not then common to combine corporations "to limit production, stifle competition and monopolize the necessaries of life." As Mr. Justice Brown remarked in his recent address at Yale, the extent to which this has already been carried is alarming, the extent to which it may hereafter be carried is revolutionary. But there is no reason why a combination in unlawful restraint of trade, which could not be legally formed under the laws of Massachusetts, VOL. 52 No. 6. should be tolerated here merely because it was organized in another State. If it were a lottery company it would be promptly suppressed, however clear might be its right to do business in the State of its origin. A State that desires to check the spread of monopolistic combinations has the remedy in its own hands. It need not allow its people to be imposed on for a day longer than they are willing to be. The law on the subject is very fully set forth in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court delivered by Justice Field in the "leading case of Paul v. Commonwealth of Virginia. It is there laid down that as a corporation has no absolute right of recognition in any other State save that of its origin, but depends for such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts upon the assent of other States, it follows that such assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to impose. They may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to particular localities, or they may exact such security for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public in terest. The whole matter rests in their discretion. It is clearly an anomaly that corporations should be allowed to do business undis turbed in States where their charters would be annulled were they of domestic origin. If the laws of any State have been deliberately framed to favor the formation of trusts and monopolies, or if they are so administered as to protect the existence of such combinations, there is no reason whatever why other States should allow their laws to be similarly per verted. One of the first cases decided in England in some years as to the dispossession of the real property of one party by another was in Marshall v. Taylor which was determined by the Lord English Court of Appeals recently. Halsbury in writing the opinion of the court says: "So far as the facts found by the Vice-Chancellor are concerned, I am not disposed to interfere with anything he has found. But I cannot concur with him in the inference he has drawn from those facts. With reference to the origin of this strip of land, 4 feet wide and |