A. But it need not do so. It is not expressing what regards merely the individual corpse, but all the members of Christ. There is held out to all the sure and certain hope of a joyful resurrection, there is no expression of judgment as to whether any one in particular will have such a rising. The Israelites had a sure and certain hope of Canaan, but all did not enter into the land of Canaan individually, though they did so collectively. So we commit the body to the earth in certain hope of a joyful resurrection of the worthy members of the Church, but we do not express a judgment on the person before us. S. Here is the beautiful verse from Rev. xiv. 13.

A. Formerly used in the daily Mass for the dead, and, as Dr. Evans points out, describing their state in Paradise. It is, indeed, a most comfortable text.

S. The Kyrie and the Lord's Prayer follow.

A. The next prayer is from the office in the Sarum Missal. How often we feel the truth of the words, 'the burden of the flesh,' after watching great suffering. And I think it is worthy of note that it is here especially when we have our hearts turned from this world, and prepared to yearn towards that where all tears are dried away, that the Church ventures to put into our mouths the petition in the highest sense of Thy kingdom come.'

S. That He would accomplish the number of His elect and hasten His kingdom. Yes, we may be nearer to the spirit of St. John's Even so come, Lord Jesus' (Rev. xxii. 20).

A. The last Collect is the special Communion Service Collect; but omitting the sentence, Both we, and this our brother departed, receiving again our bodies, and rising again in Thy most gracious favour, may with all Thine elect receive eternal joy.'

S. Left out, I suppose, for fear it should be a prayer for the dead. A. Yes; to gratify that strange and harsh recoil from what had been used for corrupt purposes. The overthrow of so much that may add to the peace and bliss of souls in their waiting state, has been most unfortunate, and there is almost as much ignorant superstition in the opposition to anything of the kind, as there is in the system of observances in the Roman Church.

S. However, private commendation is quite lawful.

A. That it was authorised, among others, by two such Bishops as Andrews and Heber, shows that it cannot be contrary to the mind of the Church.

S. The apostolic blessing ends.

A. It was added by Bishop Cosin. I suppose the words, 'Come ye blessed,' etc., of the Collect, were thought previously to be a sufficient blessing and dismissal.

SHORT ESSAYS.

BY ELIZABETH M. SEWELL.

ESSAY V.

IMAGINATION.

I HAVE been asked to write a paper upon Imagination, or rather upon the indulgence of it. The subject is difficult, and I feel disinclined to enter upon it. A definition is, as in most cases, the first thing required, and definitions are always more or less perplexing. They need so much guarding and correcting. Let any one try to give the true meaning of half-a-dozen nouns chosen at random, and he will soon be convinced of this.

Looking into Webster's Dictionary, which is the only one I happen to have near me, I find Imagination described in various ways by various authorities. The first definition seems the simplest. 'Imagination is the power or faculty of the mind by which it conceives and forms ideas of things communicated to it by the organs of sense.' Imagination, therefore, according to this meaning, can neither be right nor wrong. It is only a power of the human mind.

Bacon says, Imagination, I understand to be the representation of an individual thought.'

A representation implies a picture. Imagination therefore is a mental picture. We all understand what this means, for we constantly make use of the expression, To picture to ourselves.'

Dugald Stewart says, 'The business of conception is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have also a power of modifying our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I apprehend this to be the proper sense of the word (Imagination), if Imagination be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter.'

...

This definition implies more than the creation of a mental picture. It involves a new arrangement and combination of such pictures. Webster himself says, 'We would define Imagination to be the will working on the materials of memory. Not satisfied with following the order prescribed by nature, or suggested by accident, it selects the parts of different conceptions, or objects of memory, to form a whole, more pleasing, more terrible, or more awful, than has ever been presented in the ordinary course of nature. The two latter definitions give the true sense of the word, as now understood.'

It would seem from these definitions that the terms right and wrong, when applied to the indulgence of the Imagination, can only refer to the power of the will exercised in arranging, reconstructing, or turning away from the mental pictures derived from the organs of sense. If a person wills to picture to himself the scenery and surroundings. of some great crime, he may be exercising with perfect innocence the faculty which enables the poet or the painter to bring before his fellow-creatures a vivid representation of some real or some fictitious

event.

But if, in addition to this, he pictures himself to himself as the originator of, or sharer in the crime, he is manifestly wrong, because by this imagination he rouses in himself the excited feelings which, if the opportunity offered, would possibly lead him actually to commit the offence.

It is here that the danger of Imagination meets us; but many of us are very slow to recognise it. We look upon Imagination as a valuable gift, and no doubt it is. Without it this would be a very dull, prosaic world, and the things of time and sense would occupy our thoughts to the exclusion of all higher objects. But none the less is it a danger. That which is most precious in its right exercise is most destructive when it is wrongly used, and to the unlawful indulgence of the Imagination may be traced many of the greatest crimes and the most degrading vices of mankind.

Yet further-some persons, especially the young, will say, and say truly, that images present themselves to the mind uncalled; but they will also say that such images cannot be dismissed at will, and this is unquestionably false. We have only to recall some very common expressions to assure ourselves that when it suits our purpose we can dismiss, and constantly do dismiss, images which are unpleasant What, for instance, is the meaning of the words, 'I made up my mind not to think about it;' or, The subject was so disagreeable, I did not let my mind dwell upon it'? Thoughts, abstract ideas, are surely derived from images of sense. Beauty is the abstract idea of beautiful things. If we had never seen any beautiful thing, we could, it seems, have no idea of beauty; and though we may have no specially disagreeable object before our eyes when we turn away from an unpleasant thought, there can be little doubt that if we had not originally imagined or pictured to ourselves some of the circumstances and surroundings connected with the thought, it would have had no existence in our minds. I speak a little doubtfully upon this point, because it is connected with some deep metaphysical and controverted questions; yet in the ordinary way of looking at the government of the thoughts, I think we shall all allow that if we want to turn the mind away from a painful subject of thought we can do so, though we may not be equally willing to admit that we can, in like manner, get rid of some painful picture impressed on the Imagination. But let it be granted that mental pictures, images, imaginations, are

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PART 83.

less under control than abstract thoughts, then is it not incumbent upon us all the more, if we wish to control the latter, to begin by keeping a watch upon the former? The duty seems clear. It may be well to inquire into it a little more carefully.

Vanity is said to be a woman's special fault; what fosters it?When I was a little girl, in a very old-fashioned strict school, no looking-glass was allowed us in our bedrooms, with the exception of one which could not by any possibility be used, for it was placed upon the top of a very high wardrobe. I am not aware that any of us were so lovely as to make the sight of our own countenances an incentive to vanity; and I am not at all sure that the fear of being badly dressed, or untidy, did not tend quite as much to concentrate our thoughts upon ourselves, as a glance in a looking-glass, which might have shown us that our fears 'were unfounded, would have done; but anyhow, it was deemed better for our young minds that we should not see what we were like; so the supposed temptation was kept out of our way. But St. James, when writing to the early Christians, seems to have had no fear of such temptations. He says expressly that a man, (and I suppose the word is to be taken as describing a human being of either sex) "beholding his natural face in a glass . . . beholdeth himself, and goeth his way, and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was.' Looking in a mirror does not then in itself conduce to vanity; the impression left is too vague, and the power of imagination is only momentary. And yet when we speak of a silly girl who is constantly looking at herself in the glass, we certainly do mean that such looking is to be condemned. What makes the difference? Surely the exercise of will. A girl looks at herself accidentally, or with a view to neatness and order in her dress, and the will is exerted unconsciously. She looks at herself continuously or repeatedly, thinking of the admiration she will excite, and the will is exerted consciously. The one action is simple, the other is not. The one is right, or at least innocent; the other is wrong and dangerous.

This brings me to the conclusion which I wished to reach. The discipline of Imagination is as much a duty as the discipline of action, because it is in our power to check or to indulge it. We may turn away from the mirror if we choose to do so. The first look may be necessary, the effect of the image upon our mind will be natural; but whether we repeat our glance or turn aside is to be decided by will and judgment. The action may be right, it may be wrong, it may be a matter of indifference, but anyhow it needs an exertion of the will; and whatever is the outcome of the look, we have no right to say we are not answerable for it because the working of the Imagination is involuntary. I have no wish absurdly to exaggerate the importance of the illustration I have chosen. It is not, of course, a sin for a girl to look at her face in the glass, and if it is a pretty face it must give pleasure, and the fact of possessing it must

be a gratification, just as it is pleasant to possess any other pretty thing. I only say that if a girl wishes to be simple and untouched by the love of admiration which leads so many to ruin, she will be watchful not to impress the image upon her mind by, repeated glances, but will recognise that the visible image arouses the mental Imagination, and that the Imagination affects the will, and the will leads to acts.

This is just the natural sequence. It may not follow in every case, but it is likely that it will; and if we want to keep ourselves from personal vanity, we must begin by guarding the Imagination.

But yet further; I would say that the Imagination is a danger even when we are unconscious of its action. The pictures of external objects come before us at every turn, whether we will or not, and they leave some impression upon us; they must do so. But is this impression equally strong, whether we will or not? Many may be inclined to answer Yes. But here again we deceive ourselves. The will is continually at work. What do we mean by giving our attention, noticing, remarking? When the mind works in this way, it is in obedience to the will. What is it which arouses the will? Some hidden influence of inclination or dislike, which we have fostered at other times, and which now urges forward the will, and compels it to notice or attend. The will is in fact dependent on former impressions. They may be good; they may be bad; but in any case the will of to-day is influenced by the will of yesterday. When that will has been corrupted and debased by evil imaginations awakened by sights and sounds and words that are past, we shall be quick in giving our attention to the similar sights, or sounds, or words, which are present. We shall find ourselves springing forward, as it were, to meet them. The link of association will be between us and them. If, on the contrary, we were careful to fill our minds yesterday with thoughts of devotion, purity, kindness, derived from sights, sounds, and words of goodness, the kindred images of to-day will catch our attention and be welcomed, and reawaken in us the thoughts and the will which lead us to good actions. Not indeed that the imaginations of purity and goodness are reproduced as easily as those which are the reverse; the impulses of a fallen nature, and the imperfect action of a weak will prevent this; but the law of nature holds good, though it may and does act more strongly in the one case than in the other.

It is therefore a matter of the highest moment to keep our first imaginings pure, and to remember that the action of the will alone can render them impure, and this leads to a point which will touch young persons very nearly. Logicians tell us that there are various degrees of human knowledge, ranging from clear, as opposed to obscure; to intuitive, as opposed to symbolical. It is of the latter that I wish to speak. 'Intuitive' (I am quoting from Elementary Lessons in Logic,' by the late Mr. Stanley Jevons) would denote that

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