feelings he was not likely to plan an Irish invasion of England. But it does not follow that he did not contemplate it as a distant possibility. Pushed hard in the discussion in the committee to justify his confidence, he might fall back upon the forces in Ireland as a convincing proof that alarm was needless, just as he would have the clause relating to England inserted in his patent in order to provide for all eventualities, without expecting those eventualities to occur.

Strafford's

Even Vane's paper of notes conveys the impression that the thought of employing this Irish army for the repression of resistance in England did not enter largely into Strafford's plans. His words point to no knot worthy of such a solution. He had been arguing that the Scots would be overpowered in a single campaign, and that the quiet of England would hold out long. It was only as the refusal of the Commons presented itself to his thoughts that he flashed out into threats of this last resource. Nor is it likely that he at all understood what his countrymen would think of such a threat. To him the thought of an Irish army conveyed no impression which was view of an not satisfactory. The small force which was already Irish army. in existence was distinguished for its discipline and good behaviour. He had every reason to believe that the larger force which he now contemplated would be distinguished by the same qualities. He did not realise the feeling of horror which the very notion of an Irish army conveyed to the mass The popular of Englishmen. Pride of race and pride of religion view. combined in regarding the mere suggestion of the introduction of such a force as a deadly insult. The English people resented it as the Americans resented the employment of Indians against them in 1776, and as the Germans resented the employment of Turcos against them in 1870. To bring over Irishmen to crush their liberties was in their eyes to let loose a horde of pitiless Popish savages upon the sober Protestant, God-fearing population of England. To have planned such an atrocity was sufficient to exclude the contriver from the courtesies of civilised existence.

That the suggestion of bringing over the Irish army, when once it came to be known, added bitter intensity to the feeling

.1640

Position taken by Strafford.

STRAFFORD'S MISTAKE.

127

of hatred with which Strafford was now beginning to be regarded, is beyond dispute. That hatred dates from the day of the dissolution of the Short Parliament. From thenceforth the name of Strafford, of black Tom Tyrant, as he was sometimes called, was coupled with that of Laud in the popular imagination, as the bulwark of arbitrary and despotic government.

The popular imagination was in the main right. No doubt Strafford would have rejected the charge. It was the Commons, he thought, who had failed to do their duty. The case was one in which, as he afterwards expressed it, the King might use as the common parent of the country what power God Almighty hath given him for preserving himself and his people, for whom he is accountable to Almighty God.' This power, he then added, could not be taken from him by others; neither, under favour, is he able to take it from himself." Somewhere

or another in every constitution a power must be lodged of providing for extreme necessities, irrespective of the bonds of positive law, and this power had, at least for some generations, been lodged in the Crown. What Strafford failed to see was that the King had brought that power into contempt by constantly using it to provide for necessities which were not extreme. Men were slow to believe that a special emergency existed when that emergency had been appealed to to justify an unparliamentary government of eleven years. Strafford was undoubtedly in earnest in desiring to put an end to this evil system. If he had no wish to anticipate the constitution of the eighteenth century, he at least wished to bring back the constitution of the sixteenth. It was precisely this which he was powerless to do. If his master had returned victorious from the Northern war at the head of a devoted army, no result but the establishment of a military despotism would have been possible for him. Against this the great national party, with Pym at its head, now numbering the vast majority of educated Englishmen, raised its voice. They were no reformers, no followers of new ideas, by which the lives of men might be

1 Rushworth, Strafford's Trial, 559.

made brighter and happier than of old. They wished to worship as their fathers had worshipped, to believe as their fathers had believed, and to live as their fathers had lived. They did not wish to be harassed by constant changes, of which they did not understand the import, and of which they mistrusted the tendency. To them Parliaments were not an instrument of improvement, but an instrument to avert unpopular alterations. Parliamentary supremacy would give full expression to the inertia which appeared to Strafford to be the most dangerous quality of human society. To him, the activeminded reformer, impatient of restraint, the very thought of Parliamentary supremacy was abominable. He did not, could not, rise up into the knowledge that acceptance of the limitations imposed by the national temper was the only condition under which permanent reforms could ever be accomplished. He did not even acknowledge to himself that the national temper was truly reflected in the Parliament which had been so recently dissolved.

The King endangered by the suspicion of an Irish invasion.

That temper could not but have a wider scope than Strafford's personal weal or woe. With each year the estrangement between Charles and the nation had been growing wider. The suspicion that he and his advisers were tampering with the Catholic emissaries had rooted itself deeply in the minds of his subjects. The dissolution of the Short Parliament had proved that it was hopeless to expect him to return to constitutional ways; while Strafford's appeal to the Irish Catholics in the Parliament at Dublin seemed to place beyond doubt-especially as it was followed by preparations for gathering an Irish army-that Charles meant to rely on the Catholics for aid; and it did not need the rumour which bruited abroad the language used by Strafford in the Council-chamber, to convince men that if Scotland were subdued by the help of Irish Catholics, England's turn would come next.

The Scots not hated.

Charles had found it impossible to rouse the House of Com- . mons against the Scots, and he would find it equally impossible to rouse the English nation against them. The memory of the old national wars had died away,

1640

TWO SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT.

129

and the personal union of the kingdoms had prevented the two nations from coming into angry collision with one another. What was known of the Scots was in English eyes to their advantage. They were certainly enemies of Laud and of the Pope, whilst thousands in England who were not Puritans, were violent enemies of Laud, and still more violent enemies of the Pope. Once more, and more fatally than ever before, Charles had misunderstood the currents of opinion with the help of which he would have to direct his course.

May 5. Strafford and Pym.

On May 5 two systems of government entered upon the final struggle for supremacy in England. Each of these systems had its own representative leader. The voice of Pym was silenced for a time. It was for Strafford to do what in him lay to encourage his fainting allies, to stand forward as the saviour of monarchical government in its hour of trial.

Measures of

At once a Declaration was issued in the King's name for general circulation. Subjects were reminded that of old time The King's it had been held to be the duty of Parliaments to Declaration. support their kings in time of war-not to abuse their power of control over supplies to extort the surrender of 1 the rightful prerogatives of sovereigns. Orders were the Govern also issued to the lords-lieutenants to postpone the departure of the new levies till June 10, so as to gain a little time for financial preparation.2 The studies of Lords Saye and Brooke, of Pym, Hampden, and Erle, were searched, doubtless in the belief that evidence would be secured of criminal intelligence with the Scots. No compromising matter was discovered, and no further proceeding was taken. Three

ment.

May 8.

Parliament

other members did not escape so easily. Crew, the Members of Chairman of the Committee on Religion, was sent in prison. to the Tower for refusing to deliver up the petitions entrusted to his charge. Sir John Hotham and Henry Bellasys were questioned about their speeches on the military charges. Both declared that they neither 'could nor would remember ' words which they had spoken in Parliament. Both were 2 Ibid. iii. 1170.

1 Rushworth, iii. 1160. VOL. IX.

K

committed to prison on the ground that they had given undutiful answers to the Council; and in this way, at least the appearance of an attack on the privileges of Parliament was avoided.

Ship-money and coatand-conduct

The Council then turned its attention to the financial difficulties of the Crown. Sheriffs, who had been remiss in the collection of ship-money, were subjected to stern questioning by the Attorney-General, and orders: were sent to the deputy-lieutenants to see that coatand-conduct money was duly paid.1

money enforced.

May 7.

and alder

to lend.

May 10. Strafford's threats.

On the 7th the Lord Mayor and aldermen were summoned before the Council. The King told them that he expected from them a loan of 200,000l. If they did not proLord Mayor vide the money, 'he would have 300,000l. of the men required City.' They were to return on the 10th with a list of such persons in their several wards as they believed to be capable of bearing their part of the loan, rated according to their means. On the appointed day they came without the list. Strafford lost his temper. "Sir," he said to the King, "you will never do good to these citizens of London till you have made examples of some of the aldermen. Unless you hang up some of them, you will do no good with them."2 The King ordered the Lord Mayor, Garway, to resign his sword and collar of office; and though, at the intercession of the bystanders, he relented and restored them, he committed to prison four of the aldermen-Soames, Rainton, Geere, and Adkins-who had been specially firm in their refusal. One of them, Alderman Soames, gave ment of four particular offence. "I was held an honest man whilst I was a commoner," he told the King to his face, "and I would continue to be so now I am an alderman.” The other aldermen professed their readiness to give in the names of the richer citizens, though they objected to rate them according to their means.3

Imprison

aldermen.

8

1 Rushworth, iii. 1, 167. Rossingham's News-Letter, May 12, S. P. Dom. ccccliii. 24. Rossetti to Barberini, May R. O. Transcripts. 2 Rushworth, Strafford's Trial, 586.

5

18'

Salvetti's News-Letter, May Council Register, May 10. Rossing