Objections to the mode of levying subsidies. sums of money. In 1634 the Lord Deputy had bethought himself of a new way of collecting the supplies voted. He and his council came to the conclusion that each subsidy ought to be worth a certain sum, and this sum was then distributed amongst the counties, each county being left to assess its own share upon its inhabitants. This precedent had been followed by Wandesford. The Commons now drew up a declaration, in which they alleged that each man's property1 should be rated to pay a certain proportion, whether the whole sum came up to the Deputy's expectations or not. The first subsidy voted might be gathered in as Wandesford had proposed, but the others must be collected in a moderate Parliamentary way.' To this demand Wandesford was forced to give his consent, and the Houses were then prorogued till October.2 June 13. Declaration of the Commons. The Irish army. In spite of this rebuff Wandesford was still hopeful. The full value of the first subsidy would now be paid. The army, which was waiting for supplies, would be able to rendezvous at Carrickfergus by the end of July. By that time Strafford would be sufficiently recovered to cross the sea, and with him as its leader the long-expected blow would at last be struck. The pecuniary loss to the Irish Treasury was even greater than the Lord Deputy anticipated. The first subsidy, indeed, collected on Strafford's plan brought in 46,000l. The second and third subsidies together brought in only half that sum. The fourth subsidy was never col Small value of the subsidies. lected at all.3 It was as well that it should be so. Strafford's plan deserved 1 Irish Commons' Journals, i. 146. 2 In a subsequent petition of the Commons (S. P. Ireland, Bundle cclxxxvi.) it is said that estates were valued at the tenth part, and that they then paid 4s. in the pound in lands and 2s. 8d. in goods, and that this was higher than the rates used in England. This helps us to understand how a subsidy of nominally 4s. in the pound was borne. 3 Wandesford to Ormond, June 7, 10, 12, 30, Carte MSS. i. fol. 203, 206, 209, 211. Radcliffe to Conway, July 4, S. P. Ireland, Bundle cclxxxvi. 1640 to fail. EFFORTS TO FIND MONEY. 157 To call upon Ireland, poor as she was, to bear a burden out of all proportion to that which England had ever consented to bear, was to make a demand beyond the bounds of reason. Nor was it fair upon Ireland to place her thus in the forefront of the battle. Victorious or vanquished, she would but bring down upon herself the hatred of her more powerful neighbour. Whilst Ireland was drawing back and Scotland was menacing, the English Government was in desperate straits for money. Proposed Early in June an agent of Cottington's offered the Genoese and most advantageous conditions to the French Go French loans. vernment in return for a loan, and at the same time an effort was made to obtain a similar advance from the financiers of Genoa. Neither attempt was successful. Richelieu had no wish to help Charles out of his difficulties, and the Genoese were hardly likely to be satisfied with any security which the English Government had in its power to give.1 Another plan was to squeeze money out of the unfortunate Catholics. Orders were given to arrest all the priests who were to be found, as well as such of the laity as frequented the chapels of the Catholic ambassadors. The Queen's influence, however, was once more brought to bear upon her husband, and these proceedings were stopped on the understanding that the Catholics would follow the precedent of 1639 by making a voluntary contribution towards the expenses of the war.2 Attempt to get money from the Catholics. Alarming news began to pour into Whitehall from those who were entrusted with the military preparations. There had Condition of always been a strong belief at Court that the opposition to the King was for the most part confined to the upper classes-at all events amongst the rural population. The theory was not entirely without foundation. the army. 1 Memorandum, June, S. P. Dom. cccclviii. 75. Montreuil's despatch, June 4, Bibl. Nat. Fr. 15,995, fol. 93. Giustinian's despatches, June 5, 12, Ven. Transcripts. R. O. 15, 29 2 Rossetti to Barberini, June R. O. Transcripts. Puritanism had no deep root in the minds of the agricultural poor. Country gentlemen and small freeholders might be averse to Laudian innovations in the Church and to unparliamentary exactions in the State, but the labourers and the small handicraftsmen of the country-side cared very little about the matter. They wanted to be let alone that they might be allowed to earn their daily bread in peace. It was the great mistake of the Government to imagine that this passive submission could be easily converted into active loyalty, and that it was possible to pass over the opposition of the intelligent classes, because those classes were of necessity only a minority of the whole population. The moment the carters, the blacksmiths, and the labourers were ordered to put on a uniform and to march far away from their cottages and their families, they would be full of dissatisfaction with the Government which tore them from their homes to expose them to danger, and perhaps to death, for a cause which inspired them with no interest whatever. Something of this feeling is sometimes manifested in modern armies whenever the reserves are called out for actual war. But in modern armies the feeling is always shortlived. Enthusiasm for the cause at stake, military habits created early in life, and, above all, the influence of a body of officers accustomed to command, and of comrades accustomed to obey, combine to create the military habit of discipline and obedience which has been for a time put off amidst the cares and emulation of civil life. To Charles's army all this was lacking. There was no enthusiasm whatever. In the new-levied ranks there were none but raw recruits, and the alienation of the country gentlemen made it impossible to appoint men whose local influence would inspire confidence, and in some way redeem their want of military knowledge. Officers who had served in Holland or Germany were mingled with officers who had never served at all. Scarcely one of either class had any knowledge of the men whom they were designed to lead. Fresh from Court they arrived to take the command of companies in which every soldier was in a state of irritation at having to serve at all, and in which not a single soldier had any reason to hold them in the slightest respect. Even in the preceding 1640 STATE OF THE ARMY. 159 But in year something of this inconvenience had been felt. 1639 the bulk of the army had been drawn from the trained bands of the counties north of the Humber, who were consequently under the orders of the gentlemen of their own shires. In 1640 the trained bands were not called out at all, and the northern counties were excused from a service to which they had contributed so much in the preceding summer. The pressed men of the shires south of the Humber, who formed the army of 1640, were both more indifferent to the chances of a Scottish invasion, which was not likely to reach their own homes, and were themselves drawn from a lower class. Distrust of Nor did the danger end here. The sixteenth century had left behind it as a legacy an indelible, if somewhat unintelligent, hatred of the Roman Catholic Church. With few exceptions, high and low were actuated by a common feeling of abhorrence. Charles, indeed, had himself a firm determination never to acknowledge the Papal claims; but in his dread of Puritan ascendency, he fancied that he could trust the Catholics, and that he could trust very few others. Even before the Short Parliament Rossetti boasted that many Catholics were placed in military commands from which Puritans were strictly excluded.' Charles forgot that such an arrangerment would loosen still more the ties of discipline, already loose enough; and that the commentary which he had thus given upon his employment of an Irish army was likely to increase, if possible, the bitterness which that imprudent measure had caused. Want of pay. It is possible that if pay had been constant, such seeds of mischief might, not without much difficulty, have been eradicated. But the financial troubles of the Government made themselves felt everywhere. When at last, early in June, the men started on the march for the rendezvous at Selby, it was often with a feeling of doubt whether the money due for their services would ever really be paid. Tales of disorder at once began to pour in from every side. In Wiltshire a company roved about stealing poultry and Want of discipline. June 17. Lieutenant assaulting honest countrymen who refused to satisfy the demands of the soldiery. Another body of men in the same county were filled with the universal fear of Popish intrigue. They asked their captain whether he would receive the Communion with them. On his refusal, they told him 'that if he would not pray with them, they would not fight with him,' 1 and declined to follow him farther. In Suffolk the deputylieutenants announced that the mutinous soldiers had threatened 'to murder them.' In the City of London, in Kent, Surrey, Essex, Herts, Buckinghamshire, and Bedfordshir resistance to the levy was almost universal. On the 16th Northumberland complained that desertions were so numerous that Murder of scarcely half the numbers raised would appear at Mohun. Selby.2 Before long the Government and the country were startled by the news that an officer had been actually murdered by the Dorsetshire men at Faringdon. Lieutenant Mohun had given an order to the drummer. The boy refused to obey, and insolently raised his drumstick to strike him. Mohun drew his sword, and slashed at the drummer's wrist, almost slicing away his hand. The news quickly spread. Mohun was chased to his lodgings by the angry soldiers. His brains were dashed out with their clubs, and his body, after it had been dragged through the mire, was suspended to the pillory. The authors of the outrage dispersed in every direction. Many of them were subsequently captured and committed for trial, but the organisation of the force was hopelessly broken up.3 Other regiments were in nearly as bad a condition. LunsJune 22. ford complained that the Somersetshire men in his Desertion in charge refused to obey his orders. "Divers of these," he wrote from Warwick, "in troops returned home, all in a forwardness to disband, and the counties rather inclined Warwick shire. 1 J. Nicholas to Nicholas, June 1. Rossingham's News-Letter, June 8, S. P. Dom. cccclvi. 44. 2 Deputy-Lieutenants of Suffolk to the Council, June 8, fol. 2. Northumberland to Conway, June 13, 16, ibid. cccclvi. 45, 77; cccclvii. 5, 34. 3 The Sheriff of Berks to the Council, June 20. Rossingham's NewsLetter, June 23, S. P. Dom. cccclvii. 104. |