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1640

Leslie near
Dunse.

Plan of a

SCOTTISH PARTIES.

181

Dunse.1 He, too, had difficulty in obtaining money and provisions for his army, and for some weeks he was obliged to content himself with keeping a small force upon the Borders till supplies came in sufficient quantities to enable him to gather his whole army for the projected invasion. Nor were political diversions wanting to add to his distraction. The huge Committee of Estates was but a cumbrous, dictatorship. substitute for a Government; and, as the prospect of a reconciliation with Charles melted away, the Covenanters can hardly be blamed for looking around for some temporary form of executive which would give unity of control to their actions Naturally the name of Argyle was uppermost in their thoughts, and plans were discussed, in one of which it was proposed to constitute him dictator of the whole country, whilst in another he was to rule with unlimited sway to the north of the Forth and two other noblemen were to receive in charge the southern counties.

Cumber

nauld.

To such a scheme Montrose declared himself bitterly hostile. He was still under the delusion that it was possible to August. establish an orderly constitutional and Presbyterian The Bond of government, with Charles at its head. Whether this notion were wise or foolish, it was shared, at least in theory, by a large majority of his countrymen, and when he entered into a bond with eighteen other noblemen or gentlemen to protest against 'the particular and direct practising of a few,' and to defend the Covenant within the bounds of loyalty to Charles, he only said plainly what few of his countrymen would have cared openly to deny. This Bond of Cumbernauld, as it was called, took but a sentimental view of the position of affairs. Scotland is, however, a land in which sentiment is peculiarly strong, as long as it does not require the positive neglect of the

subsequent title. It is therefore possible to argue that the Lord Wariston of the letter is the result of Oldmixon's ignorance. Yet, after all, Johnston was, to the end, Lord of Warriston, not because he was a judge, but because he was proprietor of the estate. For Savile's acknowledgment of the forgery, see p. 210.

1 Outside the wood is a spot marked as Camp Moor on the Ordnance Map.

hard facts of daily life. Amongst the signers of the Bond were such undoubted Covenanters as the Earl Marischal, who had been joined with Montrose in his attacks upon Aberdeen, the Earl of Mar, to whose keeping Stirling Castle had been entrusted by the national government, and Lord Almond, who was at that time second in command of the army destined for the invasion of England. The Bond itself was kept secret, but the feelings which prompted its signature were well known. In the face of this opposition it was impossible to persist in establishing a new Government, which would have shocked the conscience of the nation. It was arranged that half the Committee of Estates should remain at Edinburgh, whilst the other half should accompany the army to the field. It would be time enough to settle what the future constitution of Scotland was to be when the objects of the invasion had been attained. In the policy of the invasion itself both parties were agreed.1

The small number of the forces on the Borders, combined with the rumours of want of money, deceived the English commanders. Up to August 10 Conyers and ErneThe English commanders ley from Berwick, and Conway from Newcastle, reported constantly that no invasion was to be

do not expect an invasion.

expected, and that at most a mere foraging raid was intended.2 At Court the truth was better understood. The Scottish nobility and clergy who had taken refuge there had friends in Scotland who took care to keep them properly informed of passing events.3 But the knowledge of the danger Vacillation did not make it any the easier to resist it. There was the old vacillation in Charles's mind. One day, orders were given to disband the regiments which had been told off to serve under Hamilton, because it was understood that the men would break out into mutiny rather that set foot on board ship. Another day orders were given to bring them

at Court.

1 Napier, Memoirs of Montrose, i. 262. Memorials of Montrose, i. 183, 254.

2 Conway to Northumberland, July 28. Conyers to Windebank, July 29. Conyers to Conway, Aug. 4. Erneley to Windebank, Aug. 5, S. P. Dom. ccccli. 58, cccclxi. 40, cccclxiii. 31, 39.

3 Vane to Conway, Aug. 3, Clar. S. P. ii. 101.

1640

THE IRISH ARMY.

183

back to their colours. The preparations for coinage of base money were suspended, without being absolutely countermanded. A fresh attempt to obtain a loan from the City companies separately having broken down, the French and Dutch merchants residing in London were asked, with equal want of success, for a small loan of 20,000l.1

Amidst all this matter of confusion, Strafford felt the ground slipping away beneath his feet. To what purpose had he

Strafford deserted.

placed himself in the forefront of the battle, had bullied aldermen, and cried out for the enforcement of ship-money and coat-and-conduct money, if none of the things which he recommended were really done? Except in himself 'thorough' was nowhere to be found. A bewildered king, a commander-in-chief who had no heart for the war, officials who shrank from the responsibility of illegal actionthese were the instruments which he found to his hand at the time when, as he firmly believed, the whole future well-being of his country was at stake. Whatever was to be done he must do it alone in spite of Charles, if it could not be done otherwise. On one part of the world alone could he look 'The Irish with satisfaction. The Irish army was not mutinous army. and disorderly like the English peasants. The infantry was already at Carrickfergus. The cavalry had not yet gathered to its rendezvous, but it was ready to rise on a word from him. In the first week of August he had purposed to cross the Irish Sea.2 Once in Ireland he would be free from the trammels of courtiers and the weakness of a man whom he had seen too closely to respect him as he had respected him from a distance. At least, that master had had no hesitation in giving him full power over his Irish forces. With dangers gathering thickly around him in England, patent giving the old idea of using that trusted soldiery to compel him power to suppress obedience elsewhere than in Scotland took formal England. shape in the patent by which the command was entrusted to Strafford. He was to be 'Captain-General over

Aug. 3.

Strafford's

sedition in

II

1 Northumberland to Conway, Aug. 11, S. P. Dom. cccclxiii. 71. Joachimi to the States-General, Aug. 21, Add. MSS. 17,677 Q, fol. 225. 2 Wandesford to Ormond, Aug. 25, Carte MSS. i. 240.

the army in Ireland, and of such in England as the King by his sign manual shall add thereunto, to resist all invasions and seditious attempts in England, Ireland, and Wales, and to be led into Scotland, there to invade, kill, and slay.' These troops. he might conduct into any of the King's dominions with power to suppress rebellions or commotions within any of the three kingdoms or Wales.''

His fresh demand for a Spanish loan.

The patent was indeed but a copy, with unimportant alterations, of the patent which had been granted to Northumber-land.2 But it can hardly be doubted that if need had arisen Strafford would have been ready to take advantage of its widest terms. Yet, what were soldiers without money? Once more, on the 8th, Strafford pressed the Spanish ambassadors for an instant loan. His demand for 300,000l. had sunk to 100,000l. a fortnight before.. Now he declared that he would be well content with 50,000l. If the Cardinal Infant would lend that, he should have the whole of the Irish Customs as his security, and should be allowed to levy 6,000 Irishmen for the Spanish service, and to hire twenty English ships to reinforce the Spanish fleet in the coming spring. The ambassadors recommended the Cardinal Infant to comply with the request.3 Events were, however, hurrying on rapidly in England, and it might be too late before the answer came.

Into Strafford's inner soul during these distracting months it is impossible to penetrate. Save by fierce expressions of contempt, he never betrayed his chagrin. His hard destiny. had yet to be fulfilled. He had built the edifice of his hopes on the shifting sand. He had misconceived the conditions of political life in the England of his day, and facts were already taking upon him their terrible revenge.

Not yet had the iron entered into his soul as it was to enter in the coming weeks. On August 10 Conway at last convinced

1 An Abstract of Strafford's Patent, Aug. 3, Carte MSS. i. 240.

2 Strafford's Patent, Aug. 3, ibid. i. 397.

› Velada, Malvezzi, and Cardenas to the Cardinal Infant, Aug.

Brussels MSS. Sec. Esp. cclxxxv. fol. 149.

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1640

THE NORTHERN ARMY.

185

himself that an invasion in force was imminent.

Aug. 10. Conway learns that an invasion

is imminent.

Conway was

a brave and tried soldier, but he was not the man to uphold a sinking State. Strafford, in his place, would have seized upon an authority which was not lawfully his, and, by threats and encouragements, would long ago have fortified Newcastle. Conway had remonstrated that the place was in danger, and when he was told that he could have no money for the fortifications, had quietly acquiesced in his helplessness. He now wrote a doleful letter to Northumberland. Newcastle, he said, was utterly indefensible. At the utmost it might be guarded for a day or two. He had written to Astley to send him men from Selby, but men without money would ruin the country worse than the Scots. He had also written to Sir Edward Osborne, Strafford's vice-president of the Council of the North, to put the Yorkshire trained bands in readiness, and to inform him how the country and the gentry stood affected. With his scanty numbers it was impossible for him to do anything against a whole army.1

Aug. 11. State of the forces in the North.

Astley could do little to help. By the 11th, 12,800 men had arrived at Selby, about half the number with which the Scots were preparing to cross the Tweed, and of these 3,000 were entirely unarmed. All depended on the supply of money. The week before there had been a mutiny for want of pay, and a soldier had been hanged t by martial law. Osborne's reply was equally discouraging. The Yorkshire trained bands were completely disorganised. Arms which had been lost in the last campaign had never been replaced. Four colonelcies were vacant, and Yorkshire. it was impossible to find men in the country fit to fill them, who stood rightly affected as to his Majesty's service.' If the men were called out, the gentry would refuse to lead them out of their own country. "I am persuaded," wrote the Vice-President, "if Hannibal were at our gates some had rather open them than keep him out. I think the Scots had better advance a good way into Northumberland without resistance than we send this army to encounter them without

Aug. 14. Feeling in

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1 Conway to Northumberland, Aug. 10, Clar. S. P. ii. 102.

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