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"had not his Majesty been in person, I do not conceive it had been possible to have induced this county to have risen by any other means, so great was the distemper when his Majesty arrived here; and by this you see that the person of a king is always worth 20,000 men at a pinch." Encouraged by the example of Yorkshire, Charles ordered that the nine counties. lying nearest to the southern border of that county should be summoned to send their trained bands to the common defence. In the meanwhile, the Council was not idle in London. So great did the danger appear that they appointed Cottington Constable of the Tower, to prepare that fortress to stand a siege. Arundel was appointed Captain-General of all his Majesty's forces to the south of the Trent, and was directed to put into execution the Commission of Array, calling out all able-bodied men for the defence of the country.2

Time wanting to the King.

It was all too late. Time would in any case have been needed to weld these heterogeneous elements into a disciplined army, and time was not even allowed to unite the forces which Charles already had at his disposal. The Scots were hastening their march, in spite of the heavy rains which had soaked the roads and impeded their progress. Over the King's army there was no commander present except himself. Strafford had been delayed by necessary preparations in London, and had been overtaken at Huntingdon by an attack of his old disease. In spite of failing health he pushed on to the scene of duty. On the Strafford's 27th he was at the King's side at York, adjuring the Yorkshire gentry to give up their demand of a fortnight's pay. They were bound by their allegiance, he said, to follow his Majesty to resist invasion at their own cost; 'bound,' he repeated, 'by the common law of England, by the law of nature, and by the law of reason.' They were no better than beasts if they now hung back.3

Aug. 27.

appeal to Yorkshire.

1 Yorkshire Petition, Aug. 24, Rushworth, iii. 1231. Vane to Windebank, Aug. 25, S. P. Dom. cccclxiv. 95.

2 Windebank's Notes, Aug. 25, 26, S. P. Dom. cccclxiv. 94. Order for the Commission of Array, Aug. 26, Rushworth, iii. 1233.

3 Strafford's speech, Aug. 27, Rushworth, ii. 1235.

Worn out by fatigue and disease, Strafford had made his last effort for a time. He would gladly have hurried to the front, but his bodily weakness chained him to York. Racked with pain, he sent off an impatient letter to Conway, bidding him to defend the passage of the

Urges Conway to defend the Tyne.

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Aug. 27.

When Strafford's letter reached Conway it found him in no mood to attempt anything heroic. Having been on the spot for some months, he had taken a truer measure of Conway the military position than could be taken by anyone despairs. in London. Astley had hurried up to Newcastle, where for some days the inhabitants had been labouring hard at the necessary fortifications. Yet there was no chance that the work would be completed before the Scots arrived, and Conway was totally unprepared to meet the enemy in the field. It is true that by this time the two armies were about equal in numbers; but even if the quality of the two forces had been equal, the Royal army was too scattered to make resistance. Twelve thousand foot and five hundred horse were with the King at York. Ten thousand foot and two thousand horse were with Conway and Astley at Newcastle. If the Scots succeeded in crossing the Tyne, not only would the English army be cut in two, but as Gateshead was still

1 Strafford to Conway, Aug. 27, Clar. S. P. ii. 107.

1640

THE ROUT OF NEWBURN.

193

unfortified, Conway's troops at Newcastle would be entirely at the mercy of the enemy.1

Strafford's advice.

Strafford's advice was the best possible under circumstances which admitted of none that was good. He recommended Conway to lead out the bulk of his forces to stop the 2 passage of the Tyne. The suggestion reached Conway too late; like most weak men, that officer was attempting to gain two incompatible objects at the same time. He divided his army into two parts. About two-thirds he left to garrison Newcastle, though he was perfectly aware that the town was open to the south. With the other third, about 3,000 foot and 1,500 horse,3 he marched out on the evening of the 27th, to hold the ford at Newburn, some four miles above Newcastle.

Conway's

dispositions.

Aug. 28.

Newburn.

The Tyne at Newcastle is a tidal river, only passable at low water. Low tide on the 28th was between three and four in the afternoon, and, as the Scots had not reached the The ford at spot on the preceding evening, Conway had some time to make his preparations. Not much that was effectual could be done. The river winds among flat meadows which lie between steep banks, rising up at a distance of about half a mile from one another. Any force placed to defend the ford would, therefore, be commanded by the northern height, which at this place slopes down to the water's edge. Yet simply, as it would seem, to avoid the charge of cowardice, Conway prepared to defend, with inadequate means, an indefensible position.* He threw up two small works, one close to the river, the other a little in the rear. In each of these he

1 Conway to Vane, Aug. 26, S. P. Dom. cccclxv. 3.

2 Strafford to Conway, Aug. 27, ibid. cccclxv. 10. In the Clar. S. P. ii. 108, the force of the advice is lost by the number of the foot which Strafford wished Conway to take with him, being misprinted as 800 instead of 8,000.

3 The numbers are variously given.

4 I do not think it presumptuous in one without military knowledge to speak strongly on this point. In the summer of 1880 I visited the spot, and the impossibility of resistance appeared to me to be evident even to the most unpractised eye.

VOL. IX.

placed 400 men and four guns, whilst he drew up his horse at a small distance to the eastward, to be ready to charge the Scots as they reached the shore in confusion. His headquarters were at Stella, on the top of the southern height, where the remainder of his men were kept in reserve.

The Scots

ford.

When the Scots arrived they occupied themselves with planting cannon in a commanding position. The English were the first to fire, but they could do but little damage cross the from the low ground. For three hours their guns were unanswered. Then, when the tide was running low, the Scottish ordnance began to play upon them. The English bulwarks gave Conway's soldiers but little defence against the plunging shot. The raw troops, never having before seen a gun fired in anger, began to murmur against their officers. Why, they asked, had they been kept there night and day? Why had not men come from Newcastle to relieve them? At last a shot struck to the ground some of the defenders of the nearest work. The rest threw down their arms and fled.1 The men in the other work soon followed their example.

Their

By this time the Scots had begun to cross the river. horse charged the English cavalry, and drove it off the level Defeat of the ground. Astley did his best to rally his men at the English. top of the hill; the Scots followed them there, and charged once more, with Leslie in person at their head. The English horse broke and fled, leaving some of their officers as prisoners in the hands of the enemy. The fugitives did not draw rein till they reached Durham. The infantry fell back on Newcastle.2

To remain at Newcastle was to be caught in a trap. Early

1 Dr. Burton (Hist. of Scotl. vii. 109) quoted Conway as saying, in his Narrative, that the soldiers were unacquainted with the cannon,' and interprets this as meaning that 'they were not aware of their existence till they opened fire.' Conway's words, as given in the Clar. S. P., are, 'the soldiers were new, unacquainted with the cannon,' meaning that they had never been under fire before. Conway's character for discretion in posting his men in such a trap cannot be defended on the plea that he did not know that the Scots had cannon. The reports of the spies in the State Papers prove the contrary.

2 Rushworth, iii. 1236. Balfour, ii. 384. Baillie, i. 256. Conway's

1640

Aug. 29. Newcastle abandoned.

PROGRESS OF THE SCOTS.

195

in the morning of the 29th, therefore, Conway and Astley marched out with all their force, leaving the town to its fate. Before many hours had passed, Sir William Douglas presented himself at the gate with the usual. promises of good treatment. His countrymen, he said, had come to petition for their religion, their laws, and their liberties, but had brought with them a sword to defend themselves against all who might attempt to hinder them from reaching the King. They were ready to pay for all that they consumed. The next morning Newcastle was occupied in force by the Scots. They seized the King's custom-house, and took for their own use the stores which had been abandoned by the retreating army.1

Aug. 30. Newcastle occupied by the Scots.

On the night of the 30th, Conway, having rejoined his fugitive horse, arrived with his whole force at Darlington. Conway at Strafford, who was there to receive them, wrote Darlington. cheerfully to the King. To his bosom friend, Sir George Radcliffe, he poured forth a wail of despair. "Pity me," he wrote from Northallerton, to which place he had gone, to put himself at the head of Conway's men, "for never came any man to so lost a business. The army altogether necessitous and unprovided of all necessaries. That part which I bring now with me from Durham, the worst I ever saw. Our horse all cowardly; the country from Berwick to York in the power of the Scots; an universal affright in all; a general disaffection to the King's service, none sensible of his dishonour. In one word, here alone to fight with all these evils, without anyone to help. God of his goodness deliver me out of this the greatest evil of my life." 3

Strafford spoke truly. Not the scaffold and the raging

Narrative, Clar. S. P. ii. 108.

to Windebank, Sept. 10, S. P.

Vane to Windebank, Aug. 29. Dymock
Dom. cccclxv. 38, cccclxvii. 6.

Narrative of the Scots' entry (S. P. Dom. cccclxv. 59 i.) compared

with Dymock's letter to Vane, quoted in the last note.

The dates are

difficult to make out, unless the Narrative, which is said to have been

written on Aug. 29, was in reality written on the 30th.

2 Strafford to the King, Aug. 30, S. P. Dom. cccclxv. 49.

3 Strafford to Radcliffe, Sept. 1, Whitaker's Life of Radcliffe, 203.

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