Kingdon, for the respondent, asked for the costs of the appeal. He submitted, that, inasmuch as there were at least two cases, viz.. Pitts, app., Smedley, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 907, 7 M. & G. 85 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 168, and Wansey, app., Perkins, resp. (Hill's Case), 8 Scott N. R. 978, 7 M. & G. 151, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 252,expressly in point against him, the appellant ought to pay the penalty of his unsuccessful experiment.

PER CURIAM.-We think, that, under the circumstances, regard being had to the unsatisfactory state of the authorities upon the subject, the appellant was justified in taking the opinion of the Court upon his right to the franchise. Costs refused.

ALEXANDER BENNETT WILSON, Appellant; THOMAS ROBERTS, Respondent. Nov. 15.

The occupation of "offices," without any actual severance from the residue of the premises, does not confer a right to vote for a city or borough, under the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27.

R. occupied "offices" in the city of London, comprising the whole of the first floor of the house (his residence being within the required distance), and was rated and assessed, and had paid all rates and taxes in respect of the premises. The landlord occupied the shop on the ground-floor of the house, and with his family resided on the upper floor thereof. There were two outer doors to the house,-one opening from the street into the shop, the other into a passage communicating with the staircase leading up to the first and upper floors. The door opening from the street into the passage had only one lock, of which R. and the landlord each had a key-Held, that R. was not qualified to vote as tenant of a "house" within the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27, the "subject of occupation" being a "part of a house," which part had not become by actual severance an entire house in any sense of the word.

AT a court held for the revision of the list of voters for the city of London, Thomas Roberts, on the list of voters of the company of makers of playing-cards, duly objected to the name of Alexander Bennett Wilson being retained on the list in respect of offices at No. 32, Dowgate Hill, in the parish of St. Mary Bothaw. The facts of the case were as follows:

Alexander Bennett Wilson (hereafter called the appellant) had for a period of more than twelve calendar months prior to the last day of July, 1861, been in the exclusive occupation, at a rent of 107. a year, and upwards, of "offices" comprising the whole of the first-floor of the house No. 32, Dowgate Hill, aforesaid, and during all that time. had resided at Charlton, being within the distance of seven miles of the city of London, and been rated to the relief of the poor, and been assessed to the assessed taxes, and had paid all rates and assessed taxes payable by him in respect of the said premises. His landlord occupied the shop on the ground-floor of the house, and resided with his family on the upper floor thereof. There were two outer doors to the said house,-one opening from the front street into the shop occupied by the landlord, and the other opening from the front street into a passage communicating with the staircase leading up to the first *and upper floors. The door opening from the street into the *51] passage had only one lock; and both the appellant and the landlord had a key thereof and locked and unlocked this door and passed

through the same when and as they pleased; and the appellant had never been in any way controlled by his landlord in the use of this door. The only mode of access which the appellant had to the first floor in his occupation was through this door into the passage communicating with the common staircase: but there was also an inner door leading from the shop into the passage; and this was used exclu sively by the landlord and his family.

The question was, whether, under the circumstances stated, the occupation and tenancy of the appellant were sufficient in point of law to entitle him to have his name inserted in the list of voters, in respect of the qualification described on such list.

The revising barrister held that they were not sufficient for that purpose, and expunged his name from the list of voters.

If the Court should be of opinion that that decision was erroneous, the name of the appellant was to be reinstated in the list of voters for the parish of St. Mary Bothaw.

Overend, Q. C. (with whom was Fawcett), for the appellant. The question is whether the appellant is entitled to have his name inserted in the list of voters as the occupier of "offices." He does not reside on the premises, so as to make him a lodger. He has the exclusive occupation of all the rooms on the first floor; he has the command of the outer door; and he is rated for the premises he so occupies. The case is not to be distinguished from Wright, app., The Town Clerk of Stockport, resp., 7 Scott N. R. 561, 5 M. & G. 33 (E. C. L. R. vol. 44), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 32. There, a factory containing four *stories or floors was let off to a number of different persons for [*52 the purpose of cotton spinning: to each of these per ons a distinct portion of the building, consisting of one room, was let at a distinct rent, varying from 107. to 30l. per annum for each room, according to its dimensions: in these rooms each tenant had his own machines for spinning, which machines were worked by a power sup plied by a steam-engine belonging to, and worked by and at the expense of the landlord, who also found the main gearing or shafting which communicated such power to the machines; it being part of the contract with each tenant that the landlord should so supply u h power each tenant had the exclusive use of his room, and had the key to the door thereof: the approach was in some instances a common staircase leading from the entrance to the factory, and upon which staircase the different doors to the rooms opened; in others, the rooms were approached by separate staircases from the ground outside the building; and in others by doors on the ground opening into the factory yard: and the Court, after time taken to consider, decided that each of these rooms so held was such a building as under the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27, would confer a right of voting upon the occupier, and that each tenant had an exclusive occupation. Tindal, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court, says: "We are of opinion that each of the rooms held in the manner described in the case was such a building as to confer the right of voting upon its occupier. It is called in the case 'a room;' it is described as a distinct or separate portion of the factory: each tenant is stated to have the exclusive use of his own room, and the key to the door thereof. And we think

such a description and such a mode of occupation brings it as much within the meaning of the word 'building' as is a shop or counting*53] house, which are expressly specified *in the Act." In Toms, app., Luckett, resp., 5 C. B. 23, 34 (E. C. L. R. vol. 57), 2 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 19, Wilde, C. J.. says: "The 27th section of the 2 W. 4, c. 45, enacts that every male person of full age, who shall occupy, as owner or tenant, any house, warehouse, counting-house, shop, or other building,' of the clear yearly value of not less than 107, shall, if duly registered according to the provisions thereinafter contained, be entitled to vote in the election of a member to serve in parliament. What did the legislature intend to be comprised within those words? We all well know that the terms 'warehouse, counting-house, shop,' import parts of houses devoted to particular purposes of business; and the general words that follow, or other building,' must have been intended to embrace other separate occupations of distinct portions of a house. The object of the legislature, in introducing these words, seems to have been, to prevent the discussions that might be expected to arise out of the previous words." [WILLIAMS, J.-Is not a lodger a tenant? (a) He may be distrained on, even in the case of readyfurnished lodgings: Newman v. Anderton, 2 N. R. 224. The cases upon this subject seem to me to have been running in a wrong groove. Is not the question, whether the party is tenant of a house?] Almost anything will satisfy the word "house" see Nunn, app., Denton, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 794, 7 M. & G. 66 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 178; Daniel, app., Coulsting, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 949, 7 M. & G. 122, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 230: and see Whitmore, app., Wenlock (Town Clerk), resp., 7 Scott N. R. 489, 5 M. & G. 9 (E. C. L. R. vol. 44), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 10. [WILLIAMS, J.-The position of a lodger is very fully considered by Lord Mansfield in Lee v. Gansell, Cowp. 1, where it was held that a bailiff in execution of mesne process may *54] break open the door of a lodger's apartment, having first gained peaceable entrance at the outer door of the house.] That could hardly apply in the case of a holding such as this.

Underdown, who appeared for the respondent, stated that he was instructed to leave the case in the hands of the Court.

Cur, adv. vult.

ERLE, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court: (b)In this case the claimant occupied the first floor, being a part of a house, which part had not become by actual severance an entire house in any sense of the word: and we consider that the qualification fails, because the tenement, the subject of occupation, was not sufficient. It is not stated to be a shop, warehouse, or counting-house. It was not a house, because it was only a part of a house. It was not a building of a nature analogous to the others described in the statute, because it was only one part of a building, without any actual severance from the other parts.

We have assigned our reasons, and referred to the authorities on which we rely in support of this judgment, in the case of Cook, app., Humber, resp., antè, p. 33.

(a) Cook, app., Humber, resp., antè, p. 33, had not at this time been decided.

(b) The judges present at the argument were, Erle, C. J., Williams, J., Byles, J., and Keating, J.

This being our opinion upon the nature of the tenement occupied, it is immaterial to consider how the occupation of the claimant was affected by the uncontrolled access to the first floor, and by his absence all night from the premises. Decision affirmed.

*City of WESTMINSTER.

[*55

HENRY SMITH, Appellant; GEORGE HUGGETT, Respondent. Nov. 11.

Notices of objection to a voter for the city of Westminster were sent to the overseers, by post, enclosed in one envelope, addressed "to the overseers of the parish of St. Anne, in the city of Westminster," pursuant to the 101st section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, and were duly received and published by them :-Held, that this was a sufficient service; and that the objector was not bound to show that he had complied with all the requirements as to posting in s. 100.

Quare, whether the provisions of s. 100 as to service of notices by post, apply to notices to overseers?

AT a Court held for the revision of the list of voters for the city of Westminster, Henry Smith objected to the name of John Michael Allen being retained on the list of voters for the parish of St. Anne, Westminster. The name of John Michael Allen appeared on the list of persons claiming to vote, as follows:

Allen, John Michael. 37, Wardour Street.

House.

37, Wardour Street.

The facts of the case were as follows:-On the revising barrister calling upon the objector, in conformity with the 40th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, to prove the service of his notice of objection on the overseers of the parish of St. Anne, it appeared that this notice was enclosed in the same cover with several others intended to be served by the objector in the same parish. The cover was addressed to the overseers of the parish of St. Anne, in the city of Westminster;" and a parcel of notices thus made up was despatched by post: but the regulations prescribed by the 100th section of the abovementioned statute for the posting of notices of objection were not followed; and no duplicate stamped by any postmaster according to the provisions of that section was produced before the revising barrister. The notice of objection reached the overseers of the said parish of St. Anne,(a) and was by them included in the published list of objec

tions.

*It was contended that service of a notice of objection on [*56 overseers by post in the manner described, was sufficient to satisfy the provisions of the statute; and, if it were not sufficient, the effects of the irregularity were removed by the publication of the objection in the overseers' list.

On the first point, the revising barrister was of opinion that, if notices of objection were served on overseers by post at all, the mode

(a) It was assumed on the argument that the notice got to the hands of the overseers before the 25th of August, as the fact was.

of posting prescribed by the 100th section of the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, must be adopted; this mode of posting being by the 101st section made applicable to the service of notices on overseers; and that, consequently, service by post of a notice of objection on overseers could only be proved before the revising barrister by production of a duplicate stamped by a postmaster, in conformity with the regulations provided by the 100th section of the statute.

On the second point, the revising barrister was of opinion that it was not in the power of the overseers, by the publication of the objection, to remove the effects of any irregularity committed by the objector in the performance of any of the acts required from him by the statute.

The conclusion of the revising barrister on the case before him, therefore, was, that there had not been such a service of the notice of objection on the overseers as the Act of parliament demanded. Consequently, he retained the name of John Michael Allen on the list of voters for the city of Westminster: but, in view of the appeal to be brought before this Court, he called upon the said John Michael Allen to prove his qualification, which he failed through non-appearance to do.

The cases of one hundred and eighty-one other persons named in the list depending on the same decision, were consolidated with the principal case.

*If the Court should be of opinion that the decision of the

*57] revising barrister was wrong, the name of John Michael Allen

as well as those of the other persons above referred to were to be expunged from the register of voters for the city of Westminster: if they should hold the decision right, the names were to be retained upon the register.

Macnamara (with whom was the Hon. R. Bourke), for the appellants. -The decision come to by the revising barrister in this case was clearly wrong. The notices in question were well served: and, assuming that they were not, the revising barrister has found that they duly reached the hands of the overseers, and were duly acted upon by them. The revising barrister held the service to be insufficient, because the requirements of s. 100 of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18 had not been followed. The 17th section of the statute enacts "that every person whose name shall have been inserted in any list of voters for any city or borough may object to any other person as not having been entitled on the last day of July next preceding to have his name inserted in any list of voters for the same city or borough; and every person so objecting shall on or before the 25th of August in that year give or cause to be given a notice, according to the form numbered 10 in schedule B., or to the like effect, to the overseers who shall have made out the list in which the name of the person so objected to shall have been inserted," &c.: and s. 18 provides that the overseers shall make and publish a list of the persons so objected to. The person objected to is only interested in the publication of the objection: it is quite immaterial to him by what means the notice has come to the hands of the overseers: it is enough that it has reached them in due time. The 40th section provides, that, where the objector appears to support the objection, and proves that he gave the notice

*58]