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suggested for future guidance. We therefore add that the question is the same as that which would arise in equity if the trustees brought ejectment against the minister without any legal cause for removal, and the minister applied for an injunction to stay the action. Lord Eldon, for his guidance upon that point, in The Attorney-General v. Pearson, above cited, directed the master to inquire as to the usage in respect of the duration of the office, and particularly whether any agreement or understanding was entered into between the minister and the persons for the time being members of the congregation attending the meeting-house and subscribing to its support, touching the ministry of the minister.

According to the result of such an inquiry upon the duration of the appointment would be the decision of the revising barrister for or against the qualification. Decision affirmed.

*County of KENT.-Western Division.

[*23

CHARLES EDWARD LEWIS, Appellant; THOMAS NICHOLS ROBERTS, Respondent. Nov. 11.

In order to prove the transmission by the post of a notice of objection "signed by the objector," under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 100, it is sufficient to produce before the revising barrister the stamped duplicate returned by the postmaster to the person producing it, so signed.

AT a Court duly held on the 14th of October, 1861, for the revision of the lists of voters for the parishes in the polling district of Blackheath, in the western division of the county of Kent, John Innous (on the register of voters for the parish of Bromley, in the said division), objected to the name of Thomas Lovitt Howard being retained on the list of voters for the parish of Plumstead.

A paper writing in the following form,

'To Mr. Thomas Lovitt Howard,

of Eve Cottage, Powis Street, Woolwich.

"Take notice that I object to your name being retained in the Plumstead list of voters for the western division of the county of Kent. "Dated this 20th day of August, 1861.

"JOHN INNOUS,

"On the register of voters for the parish of Bromley."

purporting to be a duplicate of the notice of objection, stamped at a proper post-office on the 24th of August last, was produced before the revising barrister; and it was proved, that, in due course of post, the original notice would have reached the voter on or before the 25th of August last. The signature to the said paper writing or duplicate was proved to be in the handwriting of the said John Innous; and the identity of the person signing the said duplicate notice with the person of that name on the Bromley list of voters was proved; but no proof was given before the revising barrister that the original notice of objection, of which such paper writing purported to be a duplicate, had been signed by the said John Innous, other than

[*24

the production of such stamped duplicate so signed by him as aforesaid.

The notice of objection to the overseers in the same case was duly proved.

It was contended on behalf of the said Thomas Lovitt Howard that the production of such stamped duplicate notice of objection was no evidence that the original notice of objection retained by the postmaster to be sent to the said Thomas Lovitt Howard, was signed by the party objecting, as required by the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 7. The original notice was not produced.

The said Thomas Lovitt Howard did not prove his qualification: and the revising barrister held that the notice of objection to him was valid, and expunged his name from the list. The name of James Jacobs was expunged from the same list of voters under the same cir

cumstances.

If the Court should be of opinion that such notice of objection was invalid, the names of the said Thomas Lovitt Howard and James Jacobs were respectively to be restored to the list of voters for the said parish of Plumstead, and the register of voters was to be amended. accordingly. If the court should be of opinion that such notice of objection was valid, the said register was to stand without amend

ment.

Macnamara, for the appellant.-The question is whether, in order to prove the transmission of a notice of objection by the post "signed by the objector," under the 100th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, it is sufficient to produce before the revising barrister the stamped duplicate returned by the postmaster to the person posting it, without also showing that the original notice so transmitted was actually *25] signed by the objector. It is submitted that it is not. The 7th section provides that the notice of objection shall be "signed by the party objecting" and in Toms, app., Cuming, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 910, 7 M. & G. 88 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 200, it was held that this notice, as well as the duplicate, where the notice is sent by post, must be personally signed by the objector himself. In that case, Tindal, C. J., referring to the language of s. 17 (which is similar to that of s. 7), and to the form given in the schedule, says: "The natural meaning of these words is, that there shall be a personal signature. And there is great reason and good sense in such an enactment. If the objector were unknown, and was at liberty to get some one else to sign the notice, there might be great difficulty in obtaining costs from him. Some shuffling person might be put forward in his stead; and great inconvenience and vexation might be the result." By s. 40, the objector is bound to prove that he gave the notice required by the

act.

And by s. 100 it is declared to be sufficient if the notice is sent by post (post-free), directed to the person objected to, at his place of abode as described in the list; and the section goes on to provide, that, "whenever any person shall be desirous of sending any such notice of objection by the post, he shall deliver the same duly directed, open and in duplicate, to the postmaster of any post-office where money orders are received or paid," &c.; and "the postmaster shall compare the said notice and the duplicate, and, on being satisfied that they are alike in their address and in their contents, shall forward one

of them to its address by the post, and shall return the other to the party bringing the same, duly stamped with the stamp of the said post-office; and the production by the party who posted such notice of such stamped duplicate shall be evidence of the notice [*26 having been given to the person at the place mentioned in such duplicate on the day on which such notice would in the ordinary course of post have been delivered at such place." In the present case, the objector contented himself with producing the stamped duplicate, signed by him: but there was no evidence that the original notice transmitted by the postmaster was signed by the objector himself. The stamp on the duplicate produced was no authentication by the postmaster of the genuineness of the signature either to the original or to the duplicate. That was no part of his duty; nor had he any power to inquire into the fact. Indeed, so little importance ist attached to the performance of this duty, that it was held in Allen, app., Waterhouse, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 68, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 92, that it need not be the personal act of the postmaster himself, but may be performed by a clerk or servant in his office.

Tindal Atkinson, for the respondent.—The two documents delivered to the postmaster must in all respects correspond. In Birch, app., Edwards, resp., 5 C. B. 45 (E. C. L. R. vol. 57), 2 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 37, the absence of an external address upon one of them was held to be a fatal objection. In fact they are both originals, and must both be signed. [WILLIAMS, J.-It is, you say, the duty of the postmaster to satisfy himself that the signature to each is the same?] Undoubtedly. Toms, app., Cuming, resp., shows that both must be personally signed by the objector: and the postmaster, after comparing them, is at liberty to send which he pleases. In Bishop, app., Helps, resp., 2 C. B. 45, 52 (E. C. L. R. vol. 52), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 353, Maule, J., suggests that "the legislature, as to the evidence, only meant to substitute the stamped duplicate for the original, which it might be difficult to procure." And when, in the course of the argument *in Toms, [*27 app., Cuming, resp., it was urged by counsel that "it is only necessary to prove the personal signature of the objector to the origi nal notice which is sent to the party objected to," Erle, J., asks "Is not the production of the stamped copy [duplicate] sufficient for that purpose?" One can hardly exaggerate the inconvenience which would result from holding the objector bound to do more than produce the stamped duplicate. The legislature manifestly intended that the stamped duplicate should in all respects stand in the position of an original document. In Toms, app., Cuming, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 917, Maule, J., says: "The true definition of the term 'duplicate,' is, a document which is the same in all respects as some other instrument, from which it is indistinguishable in its essence and in its operation. It is a very different thing from an examined copy; although an examined copy may be a duplicate under' certain circumstances." [BYLES, J.-Suppose through some default of the post-office the notice fails to reach the person to whom it is addressed in due time or at all, the objection would still be good.] In Bishop, app., Helps, resp., the notice did not reach its destination until after the 25th of August, and yet it was held valid. [WILLIAMS, J.-The postmaster is to be satisfied that the two documents are alike "in their address and in

their contents," not that the handwriting is the same.] They would not be alike in their contents, if one was a valid notice, and the other not.

Macnamara, in reply.-It could not be denied that the documents might be duplicates though one was as to the body of it in a different handwriting from the other. The Courts have always scrutinized these notices with great strictness.

*28] ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that the decision of the *revising barrister in this case was right. The evidence was, that the notice of objection, in duplicate, was taken to the post-office, and all the requirements of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 100, complied with, and that one of such duplicates was returned by the postmaster, duly stamped, to the person who brought them, and that the copy so returned was produced at the court of revision, signed by the objector. The question is whether that is evidence that a notice of objection, signed by the objector, was duly served upon the person objected to. The words of the 100th section are, that "the production by the party who posted such notice of such stamped duplicate shall be evidence of the notice having been given to the person at the place mentioned in such duplicate on the day on which such notice would in the ordinary course of post have been delivered at such place." I am of opinion that this provision of the statute was introduced for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of a specific witness going to the place of residence of the voter and there doing all that is usual to effect personal service, and that the objector has complied abundantly with all the legislature has required by doing what was done here. The statute says that the duplicate so dealt with shall be evidence,-not conclusive proof,-that the corresponding duplicate was given to the party; and I give effect to that enactment by saying that there was evidence in this case that the notice duly reached the hands of the person objected to. Then, it is said that it was intended that the objector should be identified by his personal signature to the notice. It was decided in Toms, app., Cuming, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 910, 7 M. & G. 88 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 200, that both the notice and the duplicate must be personally signed by the objector. In that case, one of the documents (that transmitted to the person objected to) was signed by the objector, the other by a clerk by his direction and in his *presence: and this was held to be no compliance with the *29] statute. The Court there say that the true meaning of the term "duplicate" is, a document which is the same in all respects as some other document, from which it is indistinguishable in its essence and in its operation. One of the essentials is, that there shall be the signature of the objector. The document returned to the person who goes to the post-office is not a duplicate unless it is signed, like that transmitted to the person to whom it is addressed, by the objector himself. This construction insures there being a real objector, and prevents the intrusion of a man of straw, because, the objector's own handwriting appearing on both the document which is forwarded and that which is returned to him, he is estopped from denying that he sent a duplicate of that which is produced. The statute has provided that the postmaster shall compare the said notice and the duplicate, and, on being satisfied that they are alike in their address and in their

contents, shall forward one of them to its address by the post, and shall return the other to the party bringing the same, duly stamped. Part of the contents of the documents undoubtedly is, that both purport to be signed by the same person. Besides, the stamped duplicate, when produced before the revising barrister, is only evidence if produced by the person who posted the one document and kept the other. He must know, and he is the only person who can give strict proof of the fact, that the notice has been duly posted. I am therefore of opinion that the statute has been complied with in this case, and that the decision of the revising barrister is in entire accordance with the case of Toms, app., Cuming, resp. The document cannot be a duplicate unless it is the same in all essentials with that of which it professes to be a duplicate. We should be entirely defeating the statute, which meant to give a *short and easy and safe mode of proving the [*30 giving of the notice, if we held that what was done here was not sufficient proof of the notice, without being able to say what the objector must do in order to prove the fact. I am clearly of opinion that the 100th section dispenses with any further proof than the production of the stamped duplicate signed by the objector.

WILLIAMS, J.-I must say it is not without some doubt and difficulty that I concur in what has fallen from my Lord, and which I understand to be the opinion entertained by my two learned Brothers: and I do so, not only out of sincere deference to them, but also because I am desirous of giving full effect to this useful provision of the statute. The grounds upon which I feel some doubt are these:-The 100th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, after providing, that, "whenever any person shall be desirous of sending any such notice of objection by the post, he shall deliver the same, duly directed, open and in duplicate, to the postmaster," &c., goes on to define what the postmaster shall do. He "shall compare the said notice and the duplicate, and, on being satisfied that they are alike in their address and in their contents, shall forward one of them to its address by the post, and shall return the other to the party bringing the same, duly stamped with the stamp of the said post-office." If the words had been, "on being satisfied that they are duplicates," I should have thought there was strong ground for the argument that both must be signed by the same person. But the statute does not say that: it only says that the postmaster is to be satisfied, on comparing the documents, "that they are alike in their address and in their contents;" and that they may well be although they are signed by different persons. Then the section goes on to enact what shall be the effect of the *stamped duplicate: "And the production by the party who posted such [*31 notice of such stamped duplicate shall be evidence of the notice” (not of the duplicate) "having been given to the person at the place mentioned in such duplicate on the day on which such notice would in the ordinary course of post have been delivered at such place." That means that it shall be evidence that the notice which is transmitted to its destination by the postmaster, whatever that may be, has come to the hands of the person to whom it is addressed.

BYLES, J.-I agree with my Lord that the production of the stamped duplicate is evidence of the due service of the notice of objection. The statute uses the word "duplicate" as contradistinguished from "draft"

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