to be for the defendants. The defendants avow the taking of the goods as a distress for rent; and the question is whether they had any right to distrain. It appears from the title which is set out in the case that the fee simple of the estate has been traced down to the defendants. There is a devise of the fee, and a settlement of the estate with a power of leasing for lives. Pending the duration of the life estate a lease was executed to the plaintiff for three lives, under which lease he entered; and the remainder in tail gives the defendants the rights of landlords in respect of the term thereby created. So stands the title as to the fee simple. With respect to the term of 1000 years created under the will of John Philipps Langharne in 1813, for raising portions for daughters, one moiety appears to have become merged in one of *the defendants, the other being outstanding *229] in an unknown party. As to that, there is a conveyance to Dr. Connell, to secure a sum of money advanced upon it by way of mortgage. We have nothing to do in a Court of law with Dr. Connell's rights under the conveyance to him, whatever those rights may be in a Court of equity. But we are to say whether, under these circumstances, the defendants can sustain their avowry of a right to distrain for the rent reserved by the lease in respect of which the plaintiffs may be said to have come in under them. Now, it is conceded that, if the defendants have the legal title to the reversion, though they in fact distrained for the whole rent, yet, if they are entitled to any part of it, they are entitled to judgment and a return, the rent being apportionable. Upon the statement in the case it is clear that as to a moiety the defendants had the legal estate and consequently a right to distrain. The case for the plaintiff was rested. entirely upon a letter of the 23d of February, 1858, addressed by Messrs. Ridgway & Drake, acting as attorneys for one of the defendants, to the then tenant of the premises, Arnold, the effect of which letter was to represent that the legal estate was vested in Dr. Connell, in respect of the mortgage to him of the term of 1000 years before mentioned, and to direct that all future rent should be paid to him. As to so much of the rent as the plaintiff has paid or has made himself liable to pay to Connell in consequence of that representation, I agree with Mr. Smith and Mr. Tomlinson that the doctrine of estoppel, as it is commonly called, and which is supposed to have been first laid down in the case of Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. 469 (E. C. L. R. vol. 33), 2 N. & P. 488 (though I think traces of it will be found in our law-books two or three centuries earlier), clearly applies. That doctrine is this, that where one by his words or conduct wilfully *230] causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. So far I agree that that doctrine (qualified by the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654†) should have effect here, but no further. The party who made the representation, or on whose behalf it was made, should never be allowed to say, "Although I represented to you that which was false or mistaken, and by that representation induced you to pay or to become liable to pay rent to onnell, I now call upon you to pay it over again." The plaintiff

has suffered judgment to go against him at the suit of Connell for a part of the rent; and to that extent the distress cannot be sustained. But beyond that I for one am not inclined to give any effect to the letter of the defendants' attorneys. I was certainly much impressed with the observation of Mr. Tomlinson that the doctrine of Pickard v. Sears can have no application to a conveyance of land, or, in other words, cannot affect the title to land; and also with his remark that the letter in question was that of persons professing to be acting in the capacity of attorneys for married women, who properly speaking could not appoint an attorney. Upon the whole, however, I think we are safe in holding that the plaintiff is protected so far as he has acted upon the faith of that communication, but that, as to the balance, he is without protection. Something has been said about the hardship of distraining for the rent after that letter, without further notice. All I can say is, that the case is silent upon the point, though I am much inclined to think that there must have been a good deal of discussion between the parties which has not been *brought before the Court. But I must confess I feel no scruple upon [*231 subject. If the plaintiff had, as is suggested, acted upon the faith of that letter, it would have been satisfactory to my mind to find that he had paid the rent to Connell. He has not, however, paid any one. am not therefore deterred by any consideration of hardship from giving my judgment in favour of the defendants.

the

I

WILLIAMS, J.-I am of the same opinion. I must confess I do not feel at all pressed by the argument of Mr. Tomlinson as to the effect of there being an estate tail, which could not be put an end to without the observance of certain prescribed formalities, because the case which has been put forward by the plaintiff is one which does not dispute the existence of such estate tail, nor that the lease granted by the tenant for life in pursuance of the power would operate as an estoppel as between the landlord and the tenant so long as the latter retained possession under the former. The proposition submitted to us by Mr. Smith is free from all objections of that nature, if well founded. What the plaintiff says is in effect this,-I do not dispute your title as you allege it: but you by your attorneys gave me to understand that prior to your estate tail there was a term of 1000 years outstanding, to which your estate tail was subject, and which term had become vested in Dr. Connell in the character of mortgagee, and that term was subsisting at the time of the making of my lease, and therefore that Dr. Connell, according to the case of Doe d. Higgin botham v. Barton, 11 Ad. & E. 307 (E. C. L. R. vol. 39), 3 P. & D. 194, had power to turn out the tenant, by determining the estate of his landlord, in respect of his being a mere tenant at will to the mortgagee, unless he chose to attorn to him. The question is whether Mr. Smith has succeeded in making out that proposition. I am [*232 of opinion that he has not. Not to mention the difficulty of applying the rule in Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad. & E. 469 (E. C. L. R. vol. 33), 2 N. & P. 488, to the case of a representation made by a person assuming to act as attorney for a married woman, even where such representation has been acted upon, I think there is nothing to prevent the party who made the representation from afterwards saying,— I was mistaken in the representation I made to you, and, so far as you

have not yet acted upon the faith of it, I retract it, and require you to act as if the representation had never been made. Taking, therefore, the letter of Ridgway & Blake to be within the rule in Pickard v. Sears, as qualified by Freeman v. Cooke, and to be binding upon the defendants so far as it had been acted upon by the plaintiff, I think it is quite clear that that rule cannot apply to the claim for rent in respect of which the representation had not been acted upon. Inasmuch, however, as the defendants are entitled to judgment in this action if any amount of rent was due at the time of the distress, it is unnecessary to decide whether or not the doctrine of Pickard v. Sears applies even partially to the present case.

BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. To gather the questions to be decided in this case from the immense mass of paper which is (perhaps not unnecessarily) laid before us would have been a task of extreme difficulty; and I cannot forbear to express the obligation I feel to the learned counsel on both sides for the very clear and succinct manner in which they have stated it in the course of their able arguments. Divested of its accessories, and simply stated, the case is in substance this,--The avowauts are tenants in tail. They happen to be married women,-a circumstance which is not altogether iminaterial. They are tenants in tail *under a settlement which *233] contains a power for the tenant for life to lease for lives. A lease was duly made in exercise of that power; and the plaintiff in this replevin is the party who represents the lessee under that lease for lives. Now, the first difficulty which presents itself in this case arises from a prior term of 1000 years created under the powers of the settlement, which term precedes any possessory interest that could be acquired under the lease for lives. The history of that term is now quite clear, and, as it seems to me, it is entirely removed out of the case. The term became vested in two trustees, one of whom happened to be the tenant for life: and I take it that the effect of that was to merge one moiety of the term in him, leaving the other moiety in the representatives of the other trustee, if discovered. Now, what were his rights? He had no right to turn the tenant for life out of possession, for he had as good a right to be in as himself. Then, what would have been his position had he chosen to distrain? It has long been settled, in the case of a rent-charge, if it be divided by the act of the parties, the law will apportion it, and each of the grantees might distrain for his portion. A difficulty arose in the case of a rent-service; but that was got rid of by the statute 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 9, which dispensed with attornment: and in Rivis v. Watson, 5 M. & W. 255, it was held by the Court of Exchequer that in such a case the assignee of the owner of a portion of the rent-service was equally entitled to distrain for his undivided moiety as the owner of a moiety of a rent-charge would be. That being so, the defendants in this case had a right to distrain for one moiety of the rent, and the representatives of the other trustee of the term would have a right to distrain for the other moiety. It is quite unnecessary here to consider whether *234] there be any person, whether by estoppel or otherwise, who could represent that other trustee, because, as there may be a distress for the one undivided moiety, and as the amount of the rent on the one hand and the value of the goods on the other has not been

found, so as to bring the case within the statute of Charles the Second, that is sufficient to entitle the defendants to a return, which is all the judgment they ask for. The term of 1000 years may therefore be dismissed from consideration, which puts the case in a much more simple aspect. It is the case of a tenant in tail, or a tenant in fee simple, making a lease for lives, and having a clear right to distrain, and whose attorney or agent,--I assume that there is no disability arising from the fact of the parties being married women,-goes to the tenant and says "A. B. is entitled to receive the rent; pay you him;" and the tenant accordingly pays the rent to A. B., or, what Mr. Tomlinson very properly admits to amount to the same thing, suffers a judgment in an action for the rent at the suit of A. B. That payment, or that which is equivalent to payment, enures as a satisfaction pro tanto; for, the rule in Pickard v. Sears is fairly applicable so far. But to say that the doctrine of Pickard v. Sears would displace the estate tail, or destroy it by estoppel or by any relation of the parties under the tenancy for life, would be giving that doctrine a most dangerous and fatal consequence, and one for which no authority has been or could be cited. As far, therefore, as regards the rent which had been paid to Dr. Connell, or for which Dr. Connell had recovered judgment, the title of the avowants is gone; but I am of opinion that nothing which has occurred has the effect of preventing them from distraining for the moiety of the rent accruing subsequently, as to which the representation made by Messrs. Ridgway & Blake has not been acted upon. In addition to which, Mr. [*235 Tomlinson has presented to our consideration what did not occur to me, viz. that the lease was made under a power contained in the settlement, and therefore if the doctrine of Pickard v. Sears were to be applied to the extent contended for by the plaintiff, the rights of the settlor would be affected by a representation made by a person who was not his agent: and there is the further difficulty of the defendants here being married women, and therefore unable to appoint an attorney so as to be bound by his representations. That being so, I entertain no doubt whatever that the avowants are entitled to the judgment of the Court upon one ground if not upon several.

KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. It is only necessary, in order to dispose of this case, to decide the question raised by Mr. Smith, and upon which he entirely rested his argument, viz., whether, assuming the title of the avowants to be unimpeachable, they had not estopped themselves, by reason of the doctrine of Pickard v. Sears, from recovering this rent. I entirely agree with the rest of the Court, although the very able and ingenious argument of Mr. Smith at one time raised considerable doubt in my mind, that there is nothing in that point; because, assuming that the representation made by Messrs. Ridgway & Blake could bind the defendants in this case in any way so as to bring them within the rule in Pickard v. Sears, they being married women, still that representation could by no possible construction be held to extend beyond the state of things existing at the time at which the representation was made. The rule laid down in Pickard v. Sears is, that, where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things,

and induces him to *act on that belief, so as to alter his own *236] previous position, the former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. I do not, however, wish to be understood as in any way intimating an opinion that that doctrine ought to be allowed to prevail against the avowants under the circumstances of this case. The question how far an estoppel of this sort could bind a married woman came under the consideration of the Court of Exchequer in a case of Cannam v. Farmer, 3 Exch. 698.† That was an action upon a promissory note; to which there was a plea of coverture: and the question was whether the defendant had precluded herself from alleging that defence by the fact of her having upon the face of the note described herself as a "widow." The Court, however, held that the defendant's incapacity to contract, by reason of her coverture, was not removed by her representation. That consideration becomes of the less importance here, because Mr. Tomlinson does not dispute that the estoppel, as it is called, ought to prevail to the extent of the rent which the tenant has paid or for which he has become liable upon the judgment. I would remark, in conclusion, that the County Court Judge has introduced into the statement of the case a fact which might have spared us a very long discussion, and which would seem to me to have precluded the plaintiff from raising this objection at all, viz., that the warrant of distress was signed by Dr. Connell. However, taking the points as they have been argued, and assuming the warrant not to have been signed by Dr. Connell, I agree with the rest of the Court in thinking that the avowants are entitled to judgment for a return, with costs. Judgment accordingly.

For the American cases, see the note to Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's L. C. pp. 642, 667.

*237]

*GEORGE WILTSHIRE, Appellant; WILLIAM BAKER, Respondent. Nov. 18.

The 25th section of the "Llandaff and Canton District Markets Act, 1858," 21 & 22 Vict. c. cv., enacts that "every person who shall sell or expose for sale at any place within the limits of this Act (other than in any existing market-place, or the market-house and market-places to be established under this Act, or in his own dwelling-house, or in any shop attached to and being part of any dwelling-house) any article in respect of which tolls are by this Act authorized to be taken, other than eggs, butter, and fruit, shall forfeit 40s. :”—

Held, that a vessel moored to a wharf on the old canal within the limits was not a "shop" within the exemption.

THIS was a case stated pursuant to the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, for the opinion of the Court, by two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the borough of Cardiff, in the county of Glamorgan.

At a petty sessions held in and for the said borough on the 12th of July, 1861, the respondent appeared before the justices in obedience to a summons charging him with having on the 5th July then instant unlawfully exposed potatoes for sale at a certain place within the limits of "The Llandaff and Canton District Markets Act, 1858," 21