or copy." In short, it means two originals; which cannot be unless both are signed by the same person. Consider the position of the revising barrister when this question comes before him. The statute says that 86 the production by the party who posted such notice of such stamped duplicate shall be evidence of the notice having been given to the person at the place mentioned in such duplicate on the day on which such notice would in the ordinary course of post have been delivered at such place." That refers to the notice required by the 7th section, which is to be "signed by the party so objecting." I think the revising barrister rightly decided that what was done here was sufficient to show that the notice of objection had duly reached the hands of the person objected to; and that, if it were otherwise, the very beneficial effect of this provision would be in a great degree

neutralized.

KEATING, J.-I also am of opinion that the revising barrister had abundant evidence before him that the *objector had duly sent *32] to the person objected to a notice of objection signed by him. It is material to observe the provision of the statute. The party who wishes to avail himself of the mode of service of the notice of objection given by the 100th section, is to take two papers to the postmaster, one of which is to be transmitted to the person to whom it is addressed, and the other to be returned (stamped) to the person bringing them. It is for the postmaster, and not for the objector, to determine which of the two shall be sent and which returned. That being so, it follows that the document which is returned to the person bringing it, and produced before the revising barrister, must be signed by the objector, and must be satisfactory evidence before the revising barrister that the notice sent to the person objected to was also signed by the objector. The fact of the signature of both being the personal signature of the objector necessarily forms one of the elements of their character of duplicates. The case of Toms, app., Cuming, resp., could hardly have been decided upon any other ground. If the two were not duplicates in the sense of being both signed by the same person, I am inclined to think that proof that the one sent was signed by the objector would have been enough to satisfy the revising barrister. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the decision was right, and ought to be affirmed. Decision affirmed.

*33]

*Borough of BRIDGEWATER.

JAMES COOK the Younger, Appellant; JOHN HUMBER, Respondent. Nov. 15.

The occupation of "part of a house," without any actual severance from the residue, does not confer a right to vote for a city or borough, under the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27,-non obstante the dictum in Toms, app., Luckett, resp., 5 C. B. 23, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 19.

C. occupied part of a house, consisting of two rooms on the ground-floor and other rooms above on one side of the house, the landlord (who resided on the premises) also occupying two rooms on the ground-floor and the rooms above on the other side of the house,-the rooms on the ground-floor rented by C. having doors into the house-passage or hall, which was shut off from the street by an outer door kept closed night and day; and the rooms on the upper floor

rented by him being approached by a staircase used exclusively by him, and there being no communication between such rooms and the rooms on the other side of the passage. C. had a lock and key to each of his rooms, and both he and his landlord had keys of the street door; and they were rated jointly :-Held, that C. was not qualified to vote as tenant of a "house" within the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27, the "subject of occupation" not being a house, but only a part of a house, without any actual severance from the residue.

AT a Court held for the revision of the list of voters for the borough of Bridgewater, John Humber objected to the name of James Cook, the younger, being retained on such list. On such list the name of the appellant appeared thus:

The following facts were proved before the revising barrister:-During the first portion of the twelvemonth next previous to the last day of July, 1861, the appellant occupied as tenant a house at Hamp, in the borough of Bridgewater, of sufficient value; and, during the remainder of the twelvemonth he resided in a house in Chandos Street, in the said borough, one side of which last-mentioned house he rented at a rent exceeding 101. a year. The rooms on the ground-floor of this house which were rented by the appellant, have doors into the house-passage or hall, which is shut off from the street by an outer door kept closed during night and day. The rooms on the upper floor rented by him are approached by a staircase used exclusively by him, and there is no communication between such rooms and the rooms on the other side of the *passage. The rest of the house is occupied by the [*34 appellant's landlord, who is the owner in fee of the whole house, and who resides on the premises together with his family. The appellant has a lock and key to each of his rooms, and both he and his landlord have keys of the street door; and they are rated jointly. There was no demise in writing to the appellant, the letting being verbal.

The revising barrister expunged the name of the appellant from the list, and held that the facts proved did not show that he occupied as tenant, so as to give him a right of voting under the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27.

If the Court should think otherwise, the name of the appellant was to be reinstated on the list of voters.

Kinglake, Serjt., for the appellant.-The decision of the revising barrister in this case was wrong. It may be conceded that where rooms in a house are hired, the landlord residing on the premises, and having control over the rooms and the access to them, the party hiring is a mere lodger, and acquires no right to vote in respect of his occupation. But, where there is a complete and entire severance of the premises, and the occupier of part has complete control over the access to that part, he is a "tenant" within the 27th section of the 2 W. 4, c. 45, notwithstanding his landlord may occupy and reside on the other part. In the present case, there is a complete severance of the

rooms occupied by the appellant from those occupied by his landlord; and the appellant has a key of the outer door. In Score, app., Huggett, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 919, 7 M. & G. 95 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 198, it was held that a "house" under the statute is not the less a house because it is split up into different demises, where each tenant has a key of the outer door, and the qualification is in *35] other respects sufficient. In that case the landlord *did not reside upon the premises: but the decision is not put upon that ground. Tindal, C. J., says: "In this case, the claimant had the key of the outer door. The case, I think, cannot be distinguished from one where two families occupy one house, the one family occupying rooms on one side of the staircase, and the other family on the other side." In Pitts, app., Smedley, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 907, 7 M. & G. 85 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 168, the claimant had no key of the outer door, and therefore was held to have a mere permissive occupation as lodger. The next case was Wansey, app., Perkins, resp., (Hill's Case), 8 Scott N. R. 978, 7 M. & G. 151, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 252, the residence of the landlord on the premises was held to disentitle the claimant to be registered. In Toms, app., Luckett, resp., 5 C. B. 23 (E. C. L. R. vol. 57), 2 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 19, it was held that one who has the exclusive occupation of apartments. in a house, at a rent, having a key of the outer door, and free and uncontrolled access thereto at all times,-the landlord occupying part of the premises, but not residing therein,-is entitled to be registered as tenant of a "building." Maule, J., there says: "The case seems to me to raise, and to have been intended to raise, the question as to the nature, not of the thing occupied, but of the occupation. It is well settled that the exclusive occupation of a floor as tenant will confer a right to vote. But the question here is, whether the occupation of Toms in this case was an occupation as tenant within the meaning of the 27th section of the 2 W. 4, c. 45, or whether his occupation was merely that of a lodger. I think the spirit of the decisions is this,-Where the owner of a house takes in a person to reside in a part of it, though such person has the exclusive possession of the rooms appropriated to him, and the uncontrolled right of ingress and egress, yet if the owner retains his character of master of the house, the individual so *36] *occupying a part of it, occupies it as a lodger only, and not as a tenant within the meaning of the 27th section. The fact of the party having or not having a key of the outer door is not decisive of the question. If he has a key, I cannot conceive that the circumstance of other persons enjoying the same privilege, can make any difference, he having only a right of way, which would be in no degree affected by his having it in common with others. But the question depends upon whether or not the owner of the house resides upon the premises, retaining his quality of master, and reserving to himself the general control and dominion over the whole. If he docs, the inmate is a mere lodger. It does not, however, follow that the owner of the house retains his character of master, merely because he is landlord. He may, indeed, expressly reserve to himself the general superintendence and control, though he do not reside on the premises; but it will not be inferred merely from the fact of his being the landlord." Applying that doctrine to the present case, can any

thing be more distinct than the part occupied by the appellant from the rest of this house? The passage and staircase divide them; and the landlord has no control whatever over the occupation of his tenant. [ERLE, C. J.-What control has the landlord over any lodger? He has no right to enter his lodger's rooms.(a)] In Monks v. Dykes, 4 M. & W. 567,† Lord Abinger says, "a room within a house may be a dwelling-house or it may not." In Downing, app., Luckett, resp., 5 C. B. 40, 2 Lutw. Reg. Čas. 33, A. occupied as a counting-house a room in a house, the landlord of which also had a counting-house there, but did not reside there: there was an outer door, which was *locked at night; A. had no key of this door, nor was there any key-hole on the outside: a person employed and paid by the land. [*37 lord lived in the house, for the purpose of protecting the premises, and letting in the several tenants when the outer door was closed: and it was held that A. was "tenant" of a counting-house, within the 2 W. 4, c. 27. In opposition to the right of the party to vote, reliance was placed upon the fact of the landlord himself occupying a part of the house, and by his servant retaining such a degree of superintendence over the whole as to prevent any one of the tenants from acquiring that exclusive possession which is essential to confer the right to vote. But Wilde, C. J., said: "The question is, whether the circumstance of the landlord having a person living on the premises 'for the protection of the premises and accommodation of those who occupied counting-houses there,' in any degree operates to limit the interest granted to the tenant. I am unable to distinguish the case from that of chambers in the Albany, or shops in Burlington Arcade, where there is a common entrance, and a porter in attendance to open the gate, and for the general protection and accommodation of the several occupiers. There is nothing to indicate any intention on the part of the landlord to retain to himself any dominion over the premises, in derogation or in restriction of the rights of the tenant." Applying the principle of these decisions and these dicta, the facts disclosed upon this case clearly show an occupation as "tenant," so as to entitle Mr. Cook to have his name retained on the voters' list.

23

Kingdon, contrà.-If the cases of Pitts, app., Smedley, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 907, 7 M. & G. 85 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 168, and Wansey, app., Perkins, resp. (Hill's Case), 8 Scott N. R. 978, 7 M. & G. 151, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. *252, explained as they are by the [*38 judgment of the Court in Toms, app., Luckett, resp., 5 C. B. (E. C. L. R. vol. 57), 2 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 19, are to be adhered to, the revising barrister was right in holding that the appellant in this case had not the qualification in respect of which he claimed to be retained on the list of voters. An attempt has been made to distinguish this. case on the ground that there was a complete severance of the rooms occupied by the appellant from the rest of the premises occupied by the landlord. But the severance was not more complete here than in Pitts, app., Smedley, resp., and Wansey, app., Perkins, resp., nor the possession of the occupier more exclusive. [WILLIAMS, J.-I observe, that, in the annual return made to parliament respecting these appeals, Tindal, C. J., puts the decision in Pitts, app., Sinedley, resp., on the

(a) See Hawk. P. C. Book 1, c 17, ss. 28, 29: and see Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, 7th edit. 186.

control over the outer door. BYLES, J.-You do not, of course, deny that the appellant had such a possession of the rooms occupied by him as would entitle him to maintain trespass against one breaking and entering them?] Certainly not. The true principle is laid down by Wilde, C. J., in Toms, app., Luckett, resp., 5 C. B. 35 (E. C. L. R. vol. 57): "A man may have a right to the exclusive possession of apartments in a house, and yet another may have such a degree of dominion over the whole as to denude such possession of the character of a tenancy under the Reform Act. The Court has on various occasions had to consider whether or not the occupier of apartments had, under certain circumstances, such an exclusive occupation as tenant within the meaning of the act as to entitle him to be registered. Where the landlord has been found residing in part of the house, and retaining the key of the outer door, the Court has inferred that he thereby reserved to himself the dominion over the whole of the premises, so as to prevent an occupier of apartments therein from being *39] *deemed a tenant within the Act: Pitts, app., Smedley, resp. So, where the occupier of the apartments likewise had a key of the outer door: Wansey, app., Perkins, resp. (Hill's Case). But, where the landlord did not reside in or occupy any part of the house, and the lodger had a key of the outer door, the latter was held to occupy as tenant within the statute: Score, app., Huggett, resp." Thus the Court put it entirely on the fact of residence or non-residence of the landlord. [WILLIAMS, J.-Pitts, app., Smedley, resp., differs from this case in the circumstance of the landlord there retaining the key of the outer door. Wansey, app., Perkins, resp. (Hill's Case), is exactly like this, only it is not stated there that the claimant had the keys of the rooms occupied by him. BYLES, J.-The case, however, states that he had the "exclusive occupation" of them. WILLIAMS, J.-In Victoria Street, the houses are divided into "flats," like the old houses in Edinburgh and elsewhere in the north. Suppose the owner of one of those houses himself occupied a flat in it, would that disfranchise all the tenants?] That would probably be held to be a case of distinct buildings. An attempt at a definition of a "lodger" is made by Lord Hardwicke in Fludier v. Lombe, Cas. temp. Hardw. 307, where the question was as to the right of certain persons to vote as householders in corporate elections for the city of London, under the 11 G. 1, c. 18. "No man," says his Lordship, "can be occupier of a house, but either by living in one of his own or one that he hires: a lodger was never considered by any one as the occupier of a house: no part of it can be said to be in his tenure or occupation; and, though he pay rates, yet will he not have the power to vote, not being deemed to be a householder or occupier. A lodger cannot be said to be an inhabitant, but an inmate under *the tenant." It is submitted that the decision here was correct, and that the appellant has no Cur, adv. vult.

*40]

vote.

Kinglake, Serjt., was heard in reply.

ERLE, C. J., on a subsequent day delivered the judgment of the Court:

In this case the appellant contended that he was qualified by reason of his occupying the part of the landlord's house stated in the case, that is, two rooms on the ground-floor and other rooms above on one