ant credit for the moiety of the proceeds of the 728 oz. in a certain event. But there are other facts which are to be taken into consideration. In the first place, there is the fact that Messrs. Montefiore & Co. were afterwards satisfied that the amount should be paid to the defendant: and, in the next place, there is the fact that the plaintiffs never acted upon Montefiore's letter of the 4th of February, 1852, but carried to the account of Messrs. Montefiore & Co. the whole of the net proceeds of the 728 oz., and also a moiety of the net proceeds of the 365 oz. It is obvious why they did this. They wanted to set off the whole against the debt due to them from Messrs. Montefiore & Co., who had become bankrupt. This is blowing hot and cold in a way which is not to be endured.

KEATING, J.-I concur with the rest of the Court in thinking that the defendant is entitled to judgment in this case. Looking at the facts disclosed by the fourth plea, I must say I think it would be a great reproach to the administration of justice if the defendant were held not to be entitled to credit to the amount claimed. *The [*544 728 oz. of gold dust having been consigned to the plaintiffs, they assent to the appropriation of the proceeds in the manner directed by Messrs. Montefiore & Co., and communicate such their assent to the defendant. After having done that, the plaintiffs turn round and say that the authority to so appropriate the proceeds was subsequently revoked by one of the parties interested in the consignment. Without stopping to inquire whether that is the true effect of the letter of Mr. J. B. Montefiore, the question arises, how far Messrs. Montefiore & Co. had power to revoke the direction they had so given. But it seems to me that the plaintiffs cannot rely upon that letter as amounting to a revocation, because their own conduct shows that they did not act upon it as a revocation; for, they credit Messrs. Montefiore with half the proceeds of the defendant's consignment as well as with. the whole of the proceeds of the consignment made to them by Messrs. Montefiore & Co. It seems to me, therefore, that the plaintiffs are precluded from entering into that question, and that the defendant is entitled to be credited with a moiety of the proceeds of both consignments pursuant to the agreement which had been made, and which, as between Messrs. Montefiore & Co. and the defendant, had been carried out to the letter. Judgment for the defendant.

*JOHN CLARKE, Appellant; WILLIAM ROBERT HOG

GINS, Respondent. Jan. 25.

[*545

The mere fact of a man being instructed to deliver papers at the house of a third person is no answer to a complaint against him under the 10 & 11 Viet. c. 89, s. 28, charging him with having "wilfully and wantonly" disturbed the party and his family by violently knocking and ringing at the door at an unreasonable hour of the night.

THIS was an information laid by William Robert Hoggins, one of the police constables for the county of Salop, against the appellant, John Clarke, for an offence against "The Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847," which is incorporated with "The Wellington, Salop, Improvement Act, 1854" (17 & 18 Vict. c. xl.)

:

The following is a copy of the information:"County of The information and complaint of William Robert Salop, to wit. Hoggins, of Wellington, in the county of Salop, police constable, exhibited before me, the undersigned, one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county, and acting in and for the Wellington division of the hundred of Bradford, in the said county, the 25th day of October, 1861, who saith that John Clarke, of Wellington, in the said county, tailor, on the 24th day of October, 1861, at the parish of Wellington, in the said division and county, did, in a certain street there, situate within the limits of the Wellington (Salop) Improvement Act, 1854, to the annoyance of the residents therein, wilfully and wantonly disturb certain inhabitants of the said street by pulling and ringing a certain door-bell and knocking at the door of a certain house in the occupation of one George Marcy, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided."

The case came on for hearing before two of the justices acting in and for the Wellington division of the hundred of Bradford, in the county of Salop, on the 30th of October, 1861, when the following facts were proved :

*546] Mr. George Marcy was formerly in partnership with *Mr. Charles Wall Hiatt, as solicitors at Wellington. The partnership had been recently dissolved; and, on the dissolution, some papers were taken away from Mr. Marcy's office by Mr. Hiatt, and Mr. Marcy on the 22d of October, 1861, served a notice upon Mr. Hiatt, requiring him to deliver up to or leave for him at his offices in Walker Street, in Wellington, on or before the 29th day of October, 1861, certain papers and documents therein mentioned. On the 24th of October, the appellant went to Mr. Marcy's house, which is situate within the limits of the Wellington (Salop) Improvement Act, 1854, in one of the suburbs of the town, and some distance from his office, at 9.20 P. M. Upon being told by the servant that a person was waiting to see him, Mr. Marcy went to the door, when the appellant said, "I have brought you some papers;" to which Mr. Marcy replied, "I have nothing to do with you or your papers." The appellant said, "You refuse to receive them, then;" to which Mr. Marcy made no reply, and shut the door. The appellant then went away, and returned in ten minutes, and rang the door-bell. When the door was opened on this occasion, the appellant was standing at the door, and threw a notice, signed by Mr. Hiatt, into the hall, saying, "Perhaps you will take this notice, Mr. Marcy." At 10 o'clock on the same night, the appellant again came to the house. Mr. Marcy's family and servants had retired to bed, and he and his wife were going up-stairs, when the door-bell (which acts in connection with the knocker) was rung very violently. Mrs. Marcy, without opening the door, called out "Who is there?" To which the appellant replied "Clarke." Mrs. Marcy asked what he wanted. He said, "I want to see Mr. Marcy. She replied, "He is gone to bed, and cannot be seen to-night; and if you want Mr. *547] Marcy, you had better go to the office in the morning." *The appellant replied, "I will see him to-night;" to which Mrs. Marcy replied, "The door will not be opened to any one to-night." The appellant said, "I will stay all night till it is opened:" upon which Mrs. Marcy said, "I will send for a police constable." The

appellant replied, "I don't care if you send for twenty policemen; I will not stir from the door till it is opened." He then commenced to ring the bell and knock at the door very violently. All the inmates in the house were disturbed; and ultimately the servants were despatched for a policeman, and the respondent returned with them in about a quarter of an hour, during the whole of which time the appellant continued pulling the bell and knocking at the door very violently, whereby the wire attached to the bell was damaged. Upon the respondent's arrival, he saw the appellant rapping and ringing at the door. The door was then opened by Mr. Marcy, when the appellant rushed against the hall, and threw in a bundle of papers and a key. Mr. Marcy pushed him out of the house, and desired the respondent to take him (the appellant) into custody. This was not done: and the appellant then left the premises, with the respondent.

It was also proved that the inmates of the adjoining house were disturbed by the knocking at the door and ringing of the bell.

On the part of the appellant, it was contended that the disturbance was not "wilful and wanton," within the meaning of the Act of parliament; and that he went to the house for the purpose of delivering certain papers, and was doing no more than his duty in ringing the bell to call the attention of Mr. Marcy or his servants; and that, when he had delivered the papers, he left the premises.

The respondent contended that the appellant had committed a breach of the law, inasmuch as he was told that Mr. Marcy [*548 had retired to bed, and that the door would not be opened that night, and that if he wanted to see Mr. Marcy, he might do so at his office in the morning; and, after this, he was not justified in ringing the bell and creating the disturbance. The respondent also contended that, the appellant having paid two previous visits to the house, he might have transacted any business he had with Mr. Marcy or left the papers on one of those occasions, and that the last visit was a wanton and wilful disturbance.

The justices were of opinion that the evidence established the charge, and convicted the appellant, and ordered him to be imprisoned for the space of fourteen days.

Notice of appeal having been given, this case was stated for the opinion of this Court, as to whether the conduct of the appellant was a wilful and wanton disturbance, within the meaning of the Act of parliament.

Montague Smith, Q. C., for the appellant. The justices have submitted the question of law to the Court whether the conduct of the appellant was a wilful and wanton disturbance, within the meaning of the statute 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, s. 28: but they have not set out the facts so as to enable the Court to judge whether or not the offence has been committed. They merely say that the charge was proved; but they do not find circumstances from which the Court may judge of the bona fides of the ringing. That section enacts that "every person who in any street, to the obstruction, annoyance, or danger of the residents or passengers, commits any of the following offences, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 40s. for each offence, or in the discretion of the justice before whom he is convicted, may be committed to prison, there to remain for a period not exceeding fourteen

days; and any constable or other officer appointed by virtue

*549] of this or the special Act shall take into custody, without war

In

rant, and forthwith convey before a justice, any person who within his view commits any such offence," that is to say (amongst others), "every person who wilfully and wantonly disturbs any inhabitant, by pulling or ringing any door-bell, or knocking at any door." The conviction must turn upon the word "wantonly," which means "without reasonable cause." [WILLES, J.-The question is, whether there was evidence from which the justices might reasonably draw the conclusion they did.] The Court cannot tell whether the act of ringing the bell was wanton or not,-unless the facts are before them to enable them to judge whether the appellant was bonâ fide doing his duty or wantonly intending to annoy the complainant and his family. Rider, app., Wood, resp., 1 Law Times, N. S. 30, it was held that a workman who leaves his master's employment upon a bonâ fide belief that his employment is regularly terminated, though it has not been so terminated in fact, is not liable to be convicted under the 4 G. 4, c. 34, s. 3: and the bona fides of his conduct is a question to be de termined by the justices. Cockburn, C. J., there says: "If a man absents himself with a knowledge that his employment is not at an end, he is guilty under the statute; but, if he believes that his contract is at an end, and so leaves, he is not guilty. The convicting justices do not appear to have considered the subject in this point of view. The case therefore ought to go back to them under the 6th section of the statute, (a) with our opinion upon this point, and then they will decide whether the appellant left the employment in the bonâ fide belief that he had properly put an end to it; for, if he did, he would not be guilty under this statute."

*550] WILLES, J.(b)--I am of opinion that the question for our decision sufficiently appears upon the face of the case, and should be answered in accordance with the conclusion at which the magistrates arrived. The appellant, it appears, was sent by Mr. Hiatt (who had formerly been in partnership with Mr. Marcy) to that gentleman's house. Mr. Hiatt had received a notice from Mr. Marcy on the 22d of October, 1861, requiring him to deliver up or to leave for him at his offices on or before the 29th, certain papers and documents. On the 24th, the appellant received instructions from Mr. Hiatt to deliver a notice and certain papers to Mr. Marcy. He accordingly proceeded to Mr. Marcy's dwelling, which was situate at some distance from his offices. He arrived there at about 9.20 at night, and knocked at the door and asked for Mr. Marcy. Mr. Marcy went to the door, when the appellant said he had brought him some papers. Mr. Marcy, declining to receive them at that time, shut the door. The appellant went away and returned again in about ten minutes and rung the door-bell, and on the door being opened threw a notice into the hall. At about 10 o'clock on the same night, the appellant called again,the family and servants having all gone to bed, and Mr. Marcy and his wife preparing to retire to rest also,-and rung the door-bell very violently. The adverbs are not unimportant. He was told by Mrs.

*Markby, contrà, was not called upon.

(a) Antè, p. 518.

(b) Erle, C. J., and Williams, J., were sitting in the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Marcy that Mr. Marcy had gone to bed and could not be seen that night, and that, if he wanted him, he had better go to the office in the morning. The appellant insisted upon seeing Mr. Marcy, *and [*551 said he would stay all night, and would not stir from the door till it was opened. He then commenced to ring the bell and knock at the door very violently, disturbing all the inmates in the house, and continued so to do for about a quarter of an hour. At length a policeman was sent for; and he found the appellant still ringing the bell to the extent of injuring the wire, and knocking violently. It was also proved that the inmates of the adjoining house were disturbed by the knocking and ringing. Now, the objection to the conviction is, that the disturbance was not wilful and wanton within the meaning of the statute, inasmuch as the appellant went to the house for a lawful purpose, and was doing no more than his duty in ringing as he did. On the part of the respondent it was answered that the manner of performing the alleged duty was such as to bring the appellant within the statute. The justices were of opinion that the evidence established the charge, and convicted the appellant. What is the charge? It is that the appellant wilfully and wantonly disturbed Mr. Marcy and his family by knocking and ringing at his door. Taking the facts stated together with the contention before the magistrates, it is quite manifest what their decision was, viz., that the manner in which the appellant attempted to deliver the papers, and his whole conduct, were such as to bring him within the Act of Parliament. The question submitted to us virtually is, whether he was absolved by his employment by Mr. Hiatt from the consequences of his acts. The answer to that question obviously must be in the negative. That the appellant acted wilfully is clear. He rang so violently that he broke the bell-wire. The only element remaining is the wantonness. I agree with Mr. Smith that "wantonly" means, not having a reasonable cause. Here we come to the kernel of the case,-whether one having a lawful right to *come to another's house, has a right to stop there at a late

hour at night knocking and ringing violently, though he [*552

knows that the inmates do not choose to admit him or to receive what he brings. That answers itself. Wantonness consists in the doing that which will annoy another and which the party doing it knows will produce no results to himself. I think the magistrates could come to no other conclusion than they have done; and that the question which they have put to us is capable of receiving only one

answer.

KEATING, J.—I am of the same opinion. I agree with Mr. Smith to this extent, that, if the appellant went bonâ fide to deliver the papers at Mr. Marcy's house, and in carrying out that object knocked and rang louder than was reasonable, he might not come within the Act. But here the magistrates thought, and upon sufficient evidence, that the appellant's conduct was not bonâ fide, in the sense of intending to carry out a lawful purpose.

Appeal dismissed, without costs.