Vict. c. 96, for the discharge of the insolvent (the defendant), and for the protection of his person from process. which strictly complies with all the requisitions of that statute. It has been solemnly de*608] cided by the Court of Exchequer in Platel v. Bevill, 2 *Exch. 508. that a plea like this is a good plea in bar: and that decision is in my judgment entirely consistent with the statute. The 10th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116 expressly enacts, that, if any suit or action is brought against any petitioner for or in respect of any debt contracted before the date of filing his petition, it shall be a sufficient plea in bar of the said suit or action that such petition was duly presented, and a final order for protection and distribution made by a commissioner duly authorized, whereof the production of the order signed by the commissioner, with proof of the handwriting, shall be sufficient evidence." The subsequent statute, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, s. 22, says that the final order shall be an order for the protection of the person of the petitioner from all process in respect of the several debts. and sums of money due or claimed to be due at the time of filing the petition: and the Court of Exchequer decided it to be a bar to any action in respect of any debt as to which the petitioner was discharged by the Act. The second is an amending statute, and is declared by s. 74 not to alter the provisions of the former Act except so far as is therein expressly provided, or its provisions inconsistent with those of the former Act. Then, is a final order for protection, with a direction that the petitioner's proposal for the payment of his debts be carried into effect in a given manner, equally a bar with a final order for protection and distribution? The main argument which has been urged by Mr. Hughes, is, that the former ought not to be a bar, because there might be after-acquired property which might be made available for the liquidation of the debts of the petitioner,-the party, for instance, might obtain his discharge upon a proposal to pay 80l. a year towards the liquidation of his debts, and he might the next day come into property worth 8000l. a year. I do not affect to *609] interfere with the exercise of discretion by the County Court Judge: but, as I read the 9th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, there is express power to deal with after-acquired property for the benefit of the creditors, if the County Court Judge or the Commissioner shall think fit to make an order. It enacts in general terms "that the assignees shall be entitled to claim and demand from the petitioner at any time after the final order any estate and effects acquired by him after such final order shall have been made, and all such estate and effects shall be vested in such assignees, &c., and they shall hold the same in like manner as they held the estate and effects of the petitioner transferred by force of the final order: provided that no assignee, &c., shall be authorized to take possession of any such afteracquired estate and effects, &c., except under an order of a Commissioner, or of the Court of review in bankruptcy," &c. It seems to me that that is a totally distinct provision from s. 12, which enacts “that it shall be lawful for any creditor or official assignee or other assignee, at any time after the final order shall have been made, to give one month's notice to the petitioner, either by personal service, or, if he cannot be found, by service at the place of his residence mentioned in his notice of petition, that such creditor intends to apply by motion to the said Commissioner, or, in case of his death, resignation, or removal, to the Commissioner appointed to succeed him, that the final order be rescinded as far as relates to the protection of the petitioner's person from process, and as far as relates to the effect of such order in bar of suits and actions; and the said Commissioner shall, upon hearing the matter of such motion, and any evidence in support of it, and what the petitioner has to allege against it, and any evidence against it, and, upon examining the petitioner, if he shall desire to be examined, or if the *Commissioner shall think fit, proceed to [*610 make such rescinding order as is herein before mentioned, if he sees reason to believe that the petitioner had not before the making of the order sought to be rescinded made a full disclosure of his estate, effects, and debts, or had since the making of such order not given notice to the assignees of any property after acquired by him.” That enables the Commissioner or Judge to vary the final order, where there has been any concealment on the part of the petitioner: and it is entirely distinct from the power given by s. 9 as to after-acquired property, which does not authorize the Commissioner or Judge to vary the final order, but enables him to make a subsequent order to enable the assignees to possess themselves of the after-acquired property. It seems to me that there is no hardship in this: and I think the decision of the Court of Exchequer in Platel v. Bevill fully applies to the case before us. WILLIAMS, J.—I am of the same opinion. As to the first point, I agree that we are bound by the decision of the Court of Exchequer in Platel . Bevill, that a good plea in bar is given by the 10th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116. The second point is this, that, assuming that there is sufficient foundation for a plea in bar if the case is within that section, the defendant cannot bring himself within it because this is not a final order for protection and distribution, but for protection only. This point was argued on two assumptions, viz., that, where there is an order for carrying into effect a proposal of the insolvent, the consequence of adding that is, that there is no present cession, and no power to seize after-acquired property. I think that neither of these assumptions is warranted by the language of the Act. It must be observed that the form of the final order given in the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96 *does not say anything about distribution. There [*611 is nothing in the Act to warrant the notion that that part of the order which relates to the proposal of the petitioner is to paralyze the other provision. The 4th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116 enacts that the order "shall be called a final order, and shall be for the vesting of his estate and effects in the assignees, or for the carrying into effect such proposal as the petitioner shall have set forth in his petition." With respect to future property, no doubt, if a special proposal has been made by the petitioner, and has been fairly carried out, that will very much guide the Commissioner in the exercise of his discretion under s. 9. For these reasons, it seems to me that the order in question is a final order within the 10th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, and a bar to this action. WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. It is quite unnecessary to compare the language of the two statutes, after the very elaborate judgment of Baron Rolfe in Platel v. Bevill. It is clear, that, under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, the final order constitutes an absolute bar to the actions in respect of which it is a protection. Having decided to follow that case, which I do as much from opinion as because it is the decision of a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction,-it is unnecessary to say more. The 10th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116 enacts, that, "if any suit or action is brought against any petitioner for or in respect of any debt contracted before the date of filing his petition, it shall be a sufficient plea in bar of the said suit or action, that such petition was duly presented, and a final order for protection and distribution made by a Commissioner duly authorized." That is now changed, the 22d section of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96 enacting that “the *612] final order to be made under the provisions of the *5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, as amended by this Act, shall protect the person of the petitioner. from being taken or detained under any process whatever" in the cases thereinafter mentioned; "and such final order shall be in the forin specified in Schedule A. No. 3." The form there given is "to protect the person of the petitioner from being taken or detained under any process whatever in respect of the several debts and sums of money due or claimed to be due at the time of filing his petition from the said petitioner to the several persons named in his schedule as creditors or as claiming to be creditors for the same respectively," &c., and then it proceeds," And it is hereby directed that the proposal of the said petitioner set forth in his petition, for the payment of his debts, be carried into effect in the following manner, that is to say," &c. It is only necessary to refer to s. 4 of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, to see what order the Commissioner is authorized to make: it is thus described," which order shall be called a final order, and shall be for the protection of the person of the petitioner from all process, and for the vesting of his estate and effects in the assignees, or for the carrying into effect such proposal as the petitioner shall have set forth in his petition." When such an order had been made, I should have thought that sufficient. It has been strongly urged upon us, that there is a great hardship on the creditors that the insolvent should be discharged when he gives up nothing which can be made available for distribution amongst his creditors. But the same sort of hardship was as strongly insisted upon in a case of Laurie v. Bendall, 12 Q. B. 634 (E. C. L. R. vol. 64), not very long after the statute was passed. But Patteson, J., said: "There is nothing in the language of the Act to make it requisite in every instance that the insolvent should have property. An *613] assignment of property is no necessary part of the *proceedings, because, under this Act, the estate, if there be any, vests in the assignee on the passing of the final order." It is clear that the assignment of property is no necessary part of the proceedings. The 7th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116 vests in the assignees, from the passing of the final order, the whole estate of the petitioner, present and future, as well real as personal, without any deed or conveyance. For what purpose does it vest in them? Necessarily as trustees either for the insolvent or his creditors. It is hardly necessary to say for which. The legislature provides for the case of there being present property of the petitioner, and also (by s. 9) for future property. That section enacts "that the said assignees shall be entitled to claim and demand from the said petitioner, at any time after the said final order, any estate and effects acquired by him at any time after such order shall have been made; and all such estate and effects, of what kind soever and wheresoever situate, shall be absolutely vested in such assignees upon their filing a copy of their claim, served upon the petitioner personally, or by leaving it at the place of residence mentioned in his notice of petition, and they shall hold the same in like manner as they held the estate and effects of the petitioner transferred by force of the final order as hereinbefore provided." The legislature has provided for the case of there being property presently to pass, and also for the acquirement of future property by the assignees under s. 9. I apprehend the best way of ascertaining the meaning of the 9th section, is, to see what were the corresponding provisions of the former insolvent Acts. Turning to the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, we find a series of sections for dealing with future property. Thus, by s. 87, the insolvent was required before adjudication to execute a warrant of attorney to confess judgment for the amount of the debts [*614 stated in the schedule, upon which the Court was to be at liberty to permit execution to be taken out when it should be made to appear to its satisfaction that he was of ability to pay such debts, or any part thereof, or that he was dead leaving assets for that purpose. And by s. 88, it was provided, that, where the insolvent should after his discharge become entitled to property which could not be taken in execution, the assignees might apply to the Court for relief, and the Court might order the prisoner to be remanded to custody until he transferred such property. So, by s. 89, as to stock in the public funds, &c. It seems to me that it was clearly intended in s. 9 to provide shortly for what was provided for by these and other enactments. It is said that s. 9 does not apply to an ecclesiastical benefice, which can only be got at by sequestration. That may be: there is no provision in either the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116 or the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96 equivalent to the 55th section of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, antè, p. 607. All that that comes to, is, that there is a class of cases to which the 9th section does not apply. Parry v. Jones, 1 C. B. N. S. 339 (E. C. L. R. vol. 87), seems to be an authority for that. If a creditor obtains a judgment which is valid at the time of the final order, and upon which a writ of sequestrari facias has been issued, such writ, it seems, cannot be set aside. All that can be said however, is, that this is a casus omissus in s. 9. KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. If Mr. Hughes could have sustained the position which he assumed, viz., that after-acquired property could not be got at under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116 and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, he would have introduced a very formidable difficulty. He founds his argument on this, that the 12th *section is con[*615 fined only to two cases, viz., where the petitioner has failed at the time of his petition to make a full disclosure of his estate and effects, or where he has omitted to give notice to the assignees of any property after acquired by him; and that the Commissioner has no power to deal with after-acquired property in any other cases. But it seems to me that the 12th section applies to the state of things existing at the time the final order is obtained, and that the 9th section applies, not to the varying of the order which has been already made, but gives the Commissioner jurisdiction to deal with after-acquired pro perty by means of a subsequent order. Under these circumstances, I feel no difficulty whatever in holding that the final order under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, is not the less pleadable in bar because it contains, besides the order for the protection of the person of the petitioner from process, the adoption of the proposal made by him on filing his petition. There must therefore be judgment for the defendant. Judgment for the defendant. *616] *GARRARD and Another v. GUIBILEI. Jan. 11. In an action against baron for goods sold to the feme,-it is not competent to the Judge to amend the record at the trial by adding the feme as a defendant, and an allegation that the goods were sold to her dum sola. The 222d section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, was not intended to apply to the joinder of parties, already provided for by ss. 35-39. THIS was an action brought by the plaintiffs, silversmiths and jewellers in London, to recover the sum of 337. 13s. 6d. for goods supplied by the plaintiffs to the defendant's wife, Lady Sophia Guibilei, before her marriage with the defendant. The declaration was in the ordinary indebitatus form, for goods sold to the defendant. The particulars of demand endorsed on the writ were as follows: "1855. "June 22. Repairing gold hunting-watch; new second hand 66 1856. New shaft to marble vase 28. A set of carbuncle and diamond studs "July 16. A set of lapis studs A gold signet ring, with blood-stone Aug. 6. Tongue to sapphire brooch "Dec. 8. New gold setting to emerald, single stone and resetting "July 20. Set of enamel studs with opals and diamonds The defendant served a notice to admit in the action, requiring the plaintiffs to admit his certificate of marriage with Lady Sophia Guibelei, dated May 22d, 1861. *At the trial before Keating, J., at the sittings in Middlesex *617] after last Trinity Term, the plaintiffs proved the sale of jewellery to Lady Sophia Guibilei before her marriage, to the value of 331. 13s. 6d., and her subsequent marriage to the defendant. The defendant's counsel objected to the non-joinder of the wife as a co-defendant, and the variance between the declaration and the evidence, and submitted that the Judge had no power to cure the defects by amendment. The learned Judge allowed an amendment by joining the wife as a |